Annus Horribilis
Even by Pakistani standards, 2022 was a tumultuous year. Perhaps, after 1971, this was the most eventful year in Pakistan's history. There was an unprecedented constitutional regime change, where, for the first time ever, a prime minister lost a confidence vote; there were equally unprecedented and unseemly manoeuvres to grab or cling on to the post of the Army chief; the all-powerful Pakistan Army came under unprecedented fire, not just from the political pulpit of former Prime Minister Imran Khan but also his troll army on social media; the economy faced an unprecedented crisis and remained on the verge of a meltdown; an already on-the-ropes economy was further battered by the unprecedented floods caused by unusually heavy rainfall that inundated almost a third of the country; chronic political instability became a new normal, and was exacerbated by good old fashioned judicial jugglery with the law and constitution; institutional discord, disarray and decay became the order of the day; jihadist terrorism not only made a comeback but also aligned itself with secular militancy of Baloch separatists. But if 2022 was bad, 2023 promises to be worse. The perfect storm that has been building up throughout 2022 is likely to sweep through Pakistan in 2023. The danger is that it could not only rip apart the rickety democratic structure of Pakistan, but also wreak havoc in what is already a dysfunctional state.
The second season of the Pakistani GoT came later in the year and the plot revolved around who would be appointed the real ruler of Pakistan or the next Army chief.
Regime Changes
Last year saw two regime changes: The first was the political regime change in April when Shahbaz Sharif replaced Imran Khan after a
no trust vote, which played out like a veritable reality TV show and a Pakistani version of
Game of Thrones (GoT), with all the twists and turns, plots and subplots, sinister conspiracies and back room deals. The second season of the Pakistani
GoT came later in the year and the plot revolved around who would be appointed the real ruler of Pakistan or the next Army chief. In many ways, season one was only a precursor for season two, which was even more exciting and more critical, but also more disruptive. In the end, however, season two ended in something of an
anti-climax when Gen Asim Munir succeeded Gen Qamar Bajwa. But the backdrop in which the
Game of Thrones was playing out—a collapsing economy, resurgent terrorism, massive flooding, political and institutional chaos, administrative paralysis, diplomatic indifference, even dissonance—shook up Pakistan like never before.
More than three years of feckless governance and economic mismanagement by the Imran government had already made Pakistan a basket case economy, which survived on loans from multilateral institutions and friendly countries. By the time Imran was ousted, the economy was on the edge of the precipice—a whisker away from default. Imran had laid ‘landmines’ for his successors when it became clear he wouldn’t be able to win the confidence of the National Assembly. The Shahbaz government tried to restore some semblance of order in the economy. But the high hopes attached to the new government didn’t take long in getting dashed.To get back into the IMF programme, the government was forced to raise prices of
fuel and
electricity and also allow the Rupee to fall. The result was a massive
inflation – it has remained above 20 percent for most of the year. Rising economic distress levels lost the ruling coalition all political goodwill and raised Imran’s political stock.
Imran had laid ‘landmines’ for his successors when it became clear he wouldn’t be able to win the confidence of the National Assembly.
Imran’s Resurrection
Belying all predictions of pundits who had written him off, Imran launched a political blitzkrieg by holding rallies across the country and drawing ever larger crowds of people. In July, just a couple of months after his ouster, his party swept the
by-elections in the most important province of Punjab. Later, in October, Imran
won seven out of the eight seats he contested. This was a clear indication of the direction in which the political winds were blowing. . Imran also used his rallies to fire an unprecedented verbal fusillade at the generals, even going to the extent of alluding to Gen Bajwa as
Mir Jafar and Mir Sadiq – traitors in the eyes of most South Asian Muslims. For the first time, there were voices in Punjab raised against the Army. And these were not the marginalised people of the province but the rich, powerful, privileged and entitled lot—families of soldiers, judges, lawyers, professionals, businessmen, and of course many from the ex-servicemen community—that was taking aim at the Army leadership. Imran warned the generals that even though they might be opposed to him, their
families would march with him.
Divisions in Army
What Imran seemed to have done was divide the Army from within. Many people looked askance over the apparent paralysis of the Army in dealing with this withering fire on it. There was a lot of speculation on the reason for the Army’s reluctance to move against Imran. There were whispers that the Army is deeply divided with a large chunk of rank and file supporting Imran. Rumours abounded on how, even in the top brass, some generals continued to back Imran. There was talk of defiance—even an insurrection—by the Imran cult within the Army if any action was taken to bottle up the Frankenstein’s monster created by the Army itself. There were
reports of Gen Bajwa being taken aback by the pro-Imran sentiment in the Army. While some analysts saw this shift in sentiment towards the Army as a pro-democracy and pro-civilian shift in the power politics of Pakistan, others saw it as a part of a continuum—the army creates its puppets like Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan and then loses control over them.
Imran also used his rallies to fire an unprecedented verbal fusillade at the generals, even going to the extent of alluding to Gen Bajwa as – traitors in the eyes of most South Asian Muslims.
Army’s new collaborators
After the regime change in the Army, Imran’s political balloon started getting deflated. Imran even tried to make
overtures to the new chief, but received a cold shoulder. While Gen Munir seems to have papered over the cracks in the Army, the image and, even more importantly, the dread of the Army has suffered a serious setback. At the same time, however, there has been a complete role reversal as far as politicians’ relations with the Army is concerned. From a time when Imran survived on the crutches of the military establishment and the opposition demanded that the military stop propping him up, to now when the new ruling combine is dependent on the military establishment for bailing it out and keeping it in power while Imran is on the streets—politics has come a full circle. Interestingly, the more Imran raves and rants against the Army and tries to destabilise the system, the more the sentiment against him hardens in the Army.
“It’s the Economy, stupid”
The real problem for the Shahbaz government and the Army that is propping it is not so much Imran as it is the economy. The current government has only made matters worse. Just when things seemed to be stabilising and the IMF programme was restored, political panic bells started ringing. Imran was on the rampage and the government was losing political capital rapidly because of the tough measures it was forced to take. But Ishaq Dar made a right royal mess with his abrasiveness. He thought he could negotiate hard with the IMF and get it to agree to Pakistan's terms. He also used
strong arm administrative measures to revalue the Rupee from around 240 to a dollar to around 220. In the process, the economy went into a tailspin. The IMF refused to budge from its demands. The artificial propping up of the Rupee backfired with there being
three rates in the market: One interbank at around 224, the second was the open market rate at around 235-240, and the third was the black market rate at 250-260. As a result, remittances started falling. Industry came to a standstill because foreign exchange wasn’t being released. Meanwhile, the reserves started falling because of debt servicing and by the end of the year were reduced to just under US
$5 billion (around 4 weeks of imports).
Pakistan tried to milk these floods to extract concessions from the IMF and get massive infusions of aid from the international community.
With no foreign money coming in—even the
Saudis and Chinese have been tight-fisted—Pakistan has no option except to go crawling back to the IMF. The problem is that if the government implements the IMF demands then taxes will spike, fuel and power tariffs will also rise, the Rupee will fall to around 250—all of which will lead to another massive inflationary spiral. This will, in turn, extract a heavy political cost, and that too in an election year. The economic crisis was further exacerbated by the floods that hit Pakistan in July. Pakistan tried to milk these floods to extract concessions from the IMF and get massive infusions of aid from the international community. But neither has happened. The international aid is a fraction of what Pakistan was seeking, and much of it is in kind and not in cash. Not only is there donor fatigue and serious financial problems in many of the donor countries, there is also a total lack of trust in Pakistan using the money for the rehabilitation of flood victims and reconstruction in flood areas.
Terrorism Redux
To top it all off, Pakistan also saw a massive rise in terrorism. The
ceasefire that was negotiated with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) finally broke down in November. But even while the ceasefire was in place, it was being violated by both sides. The Pakistani authorities were launching
attacks against the TTP leadership inside Afghanistan and managed to kill some top commanders, including Omar Khalid Khorasani. For their part, the TTP was steadily expanding its presence inside Pakistan with target killings, ambushes and bombings. The extortion networks were back in business and even provincial government ministers and police officers were reported to be paying protection money to TTP. From around mid-2022, there were reports of
authorities planning to tackle the TTP resurgence. The Army too
claimed to be getting ready for a tougher line with the Islamist insurgents. Meanwhile, massive
protests broke out in the Tribal Districts and Malakand Agency of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against the growing presence and menace of the Taliban. But, by the end of the year, it became clear that the TTP had regrouped and was all set to restart its campaign against the Pakistani state. The TTP demonstrated its reach when a
suicide bomber entered Islamabad and blew himself up. The attack in
Bannu cantonment and the spate of attacks in the settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (especially in South KP) stand testimony to the potency of TTP.
The extortion networks were back in business and even provincial government ministers and police officers were reported to be paying protection money to TTP.
The terrorism problem was compounded by the fact that the Taliban offered their offices to facilitate dialogue with TTP, but nothing more than that. In any case, there were other problems between Pakistan and Afghanistan that also came to the fore, especially the drone strike that eliminated
Al Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri. Not only have the Taliban not moved against the TTP, they have also not taken any action against the Baloch separatists. There have also been open clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan Army. The Taliban have routinely been uprooting the
fencing along the contentious Durand Line, something that riles up the Pakistanis. The treatment meted out to Afghans in Pakistan, and Pakistani efforts to get a handle over smuggling (including of dollars) have caused a lot of heartburn in Afghanistan. More worryingly for Pakistan, there are now reports of the Pakistani
Taliban and Baloch making common cause against the Pakistani state, something that expands the geography of insurgency and stretches the Pakistan Army and Pakistan's dwindling resources to the maximum.
To read the second part of the series, click here.
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