North Korea’s nuclear drama continues

Tensions have ratcheted up in the Korean Peninsula after both the North and South conducted missile tests in the of a few days. The tests, which follow closely on the heels of weeks of steadily escalating provocations from the North, underscore just how strained the security situation has become in the region. To begin with, North Korea has been busy. In the last few weeks, North Korea has restarted a previously dormant nuclear facility, tested a new cruise missile and launched ballistic missiles that landed in the Sea of Japan. This flurry of provocations, simply the latest in the long saga of the Hermit Kingdom’s nuclear drama, are aimed at an audience of one: Joe Biden. In late August, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that it had detected suspicious activity from North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Plant. Long a mainstay of the reclusive nation’s nuclear programme, Yongbyon had been temporarily shuttered in 2018 in the heyday of Kim Jong Un’s bonhomie with then-President Trump as a token of the dictator’s commitment to reaching a settlement on his nuclear arsenal with the United States. While no longer as crucial to North Korea’s nuclear plans as it once was, Yongbyon remains the nation’s only source of plutonium and tritium, both key elements for manufacturing the cutting-edge thermonuclear weapons North Korea hopes to build, adding to the dread of the rest of the region.

North Korea has restarted a previously dormant nuclear facility, tested a new cruise missile and launched ballistic missiles that landed in the Sea of Japan.

Only a short while after, North Korean state media reported that the nation’s defence establishment had successfully tested a new cruise missile. The missile, state media crowed, was a “strategic weapon”, Pyongyang-speak for a potentially nuclear capable device. With this addition to its already substantial and growing armoury, the belligerent state has further complicated defence and strategic calculations for the United States, Japan, and South Korea. This was followed swiftly by a ballistic missile launch that ended up in the Sea of Japan and sent alarm bells ringing in regional capitals. This launch, conducted with the aid of a railway-based missile launcher, has had both analysts and government officials sit up and take notice. By diversifying its missile launch and delivery systems, North Korea hopes to improve the survivability of its substantial arsenal. American and South Korean military detection and intelligence assets will now have to map out North Korean rail infrastructure in an attempt to locate and, in the event of an emergency, target these delivery systems. Given the numerous North Korean military assets that Seoul and Washington already monitor, this new development places additional strain on the ability of the two allies to detect and respond to provocations from their troublesome northern enemy. Table: North Korean Tests and Weapons Displays North Korea’s missile inventory. 

Date	Tests
October 2020	Military parade that displays new and improved Hwasong ballistic missile and new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
March 25, 2021	North Korea carried out test-launch of two upgraded KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles carrying a 2.5 live warhead each that correctly hit the simulated targets
11th and 12th September 2021	New long-range cruise missile tested which flew for 1,500 kilometres and were termed “strategic” weapons (euphemism for nuclear capable)
15 September 2021	Ballistic missile fired through new railway borne system and lands in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone

  Source: Forbes

All this begs a simple question: Why?

Ever since the failure of North Korea’s charm offensive with President Trump in 2018-19, Pyongyang has made its military modernisation plans clear. To begin with, Kim Jong-Un lifted a moratorium on missile testing in 2019. October 2020 saw a night-time military parade wherein the rogue state displayed significantly larger Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) than it was earlier thought to possess. Further, North Korea also displayed its version of a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile, which was also recently acquired by Seoul to great fanfare in the international media. Worryingly, Chairman Kim has made clear that his country will continue to walk the path of arms production and modernisation. At the 8th Party Congress earlier this year, Pyongyang’s leadership detailed plans to acquire tactical nuclear weapons, naval nuclear propulsion and enhanced satellite capabilities.

North Korea also displayed its version of a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile, which was also recently acquired by Seoul to great fanfare in the international media.

Obvious objectives

North Korea’s carefully calibrated provocations are an indication that Kim Jong Un is once again ready to talk to the US. Kim has followed a long established North Korean playbook: Create an artificial crisis, force opposing parties to the negotiating table, extract concessions, and repeat. By restarting Yongbyon and flexing his country’s nuclear muscle, Kim hopes to create enough pressure on President Biden to restart the US-North Korea talks that fell apart in Stockholm in 2019. Longtime observers believe that Chairman Kim is out to relieve some of the economic pressure that his country has faced since the imposition of crippling United Nations sanctions on the country after it conducted similar missile tests in 2016 and 2017. The isolated nation’s long-suffering economy has depended heavily on Chinese largesse since. However, the onset of COVID-19 forced Chairman Kim to close his nation’s borders, which led to a sharp contraction in trade with China and caused North Korea’s worst economic contraction in over 20 years. By holding talks with Biden, Chairman Kim hopes to barter some of his sizeable nuclear arsenal for sanctions relief in a desperate play to keep the country running on an even keel. President Biden now finds himself in a bind. Should Biden ignore North Korea’s signaling for talks, Kim Jong Un will have every incentive to continue to develop and test more sophisticated weapons. This would be unacceptable to the Americans given that North Korea already possesses the ability to strike the continental United States. Indeed, during the October 2020 parade, Pyongyang displayed a new and improved version of the 2017 Hwasong missile that could deliver devastating payloads to the American homeland. However, despite Biden’s willingness to engage with the regime, Pyongyang has refused to meet Biden’s Special Representative for North Korean Affairs. Speculation is rife that, having been feted at the highest level by former President Trump, Kim Jong Un and his top advisers will settle for nothing less than a direct dialogue between Biden and Kim. Given Biden’s stated reluctance to eschew the more personalised Trump formula for a more traditional diplomatic approach, a gulf already exists between both sides. Should these matters of protocol be resolved, even thornier issues remain. While the United States has long held that it will only be satisfied with a complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, it has become increasingly evident that Pyongyang has no intention of parting with its hard-won weapons. North Korea’s nuclear weapons not only provide an effective deterrent against potential US military action on the Korean peninsula but also allow a struggling and destitute state to deal on equal terms with the world’s most powerful nation.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons not only provide an effective deterrent against potential US military action on the Korean peninsula but also allow a struggling and destitute state to deal on equal terms with the world’s most powerful nation.

Nevertheless, Biden does have room for creative statecraft. While the US can continue to call for complete denuclearisation in principle, Biden’s team may consider negotiating a phased arms control agreement. Such an agreement would set clear and specific timelines for North Korean actions like the dismantling of Yongbyon and a moratorium on new weapons development and testing. Once the US and allied partners like South Korea verify compliance, sanctions relief and economic investment could be provided to the regime in Pyongyang. To be sure, such a deal would not be perfect by any stretch. It would require a thorough inspection regime which Pyongyang has been reluctant to allow in the past. Further, it would undoubtedly raise the hackles of Biden’s conservative opponents at home. However, such a deal would allow Biden to succeed where Trump failed by recognising a simple truth: While the United States can no longer roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear status, it can creatively shape the regime’s capabilities in a way that diminishes the threat to America and its allies. Given what is at stake for global security, one can only hope that the Biden team steps up to the mark.

• International Affairs
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• Cruise Missile
• Hwasong missile
• IAEA
• Joe Biden
• Kim Jong-un
• launched ballistic missiles
• North Korea
• Pyongyang-speak
• SLBM
• South Korean
• strategic weapon
• trump
• United States

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