Multiple Indian experts and commentators have averred that India needs to distance itself from Moscow following President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. The argument put forth is that New Delhi needs to condemn and reassess its ties with Russia because the foundation of global order have been fundamentally
challenged by Russian imperialistic conduct. A further claim that is being made is that India’s stance on the current Russian invasion of Ukraine is a choice between strategic autonomy and core interests. For New Delhi, the exercise of strategic autonomy and pursuit of interests have remained synonymous, historically and contemporaneously. However, there are eminently good reasons for maintaining comity in New Delhi’s relationship with Moscow. Emotion ultimately is no substitute for either strategy or policy. The first justification for not condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine is that India, officially, has not condemned several countries in the past for identical transgressions, although Russia and its predecessor the erstwhile Soviet Union were chief beneficiaries of India’s quiescence in most cases. Second, India’s core interests vis-à-vis Russia lie in the area of defence trade, disruption to which will have consequences for India’s capacity to defend against its primary foes—China and Pakistan.
The first justification for not condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine is that India, officially, has not condemned several countries in the past for identical transgressions, although Russia and its predecessor the erstwhile Soviet Union were chief beneficiaries of India’s quiescence in most cases.
As explored below, in each prominent case that involved military action by a major power, India did have interests at stake. It was not simply a case for India choosing between “
strategic autonomy and core interests”. Nehru never condemned the Soviet Union’ brutal crackdown against Hungarian dissidents in 1956 and even went to the extent of calling it “
obscure”, publicly but not privately. In public, he had good strategic reasons not to condemn the USSR, which included India’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union; the latter’s support for India on Kashmir and Goa,
especially from 1955 onwards; and Nehru’s effort to cultivate a defence partnership with the Soviets. All these factors meant that New Delhi’s official stance was muted on the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. The following decade New Delhi did not condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 for some of the same reasons such as Moscow’s support for India on Kashmir, and more significantly, a burgeoning defence relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1962, India fought a war with China, and by the late 1960s, Sino-Soviet relations also became more antagonistic giving India more reason to avoid rupturing ties with the Soviets. Again, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, New Delhi did not publicly condemn the Soviets, notwithstanding India conveying its deep opposition and outrage in private. India’s dependence on Soviet strategic patronage compelled India’s silence. Like its predecessor, Russia is a veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) making it crucial source of political support on issues that are germane to India’s interests such as Kashmir. This begs the question, why should India alienate Russia when there are no assurances from western members for support on Kashmir if the matter, regardless of it being a remote possibility today, were to come to a vote in the UNSC. Indeed, Russia’s current rapprochement with Pakistan also explains India’s abstention over the UNSC resolution condemning Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
Why should India alienate Russia when there are no assurances from western members for support on Kashmir if the matter, regardless of it being a remote possibility today, were to come to a vote in the UNSC.
But beyond Russia or its predecessor—the Soviet Union, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was not condemned by India. Despite a substantial Indian expatriate population living in Kuwait at the time of the Iraqi attack, because Saddam Hussein’s Iraq supported India on Kashmir—an exception amongst Muslim countries. Reciprocally, India trained Iraqi military officers and bureaucracy. In addition, the US and its allies have also been beneficiaries of India’s official ambivalence and refusal to condemn unjustified military action, for instance, against the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2011, India abstained from voting in favour of
a resolution at the UNSC authorising the unjustified use of force against Libya by the US and its allies, because it would produce an unviable or failed state like Somalia. In both cases, the Indian governments whether under Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 or Manmohan Singh in 2011, muted their criticism. If anything, in the case of the of the former, India came close to deploying an entire
infantry division of the Indian Army (IA) at the request of the Americans to support the US-British occupation, for what was a disastrous military adventure. Eventually, the Vajpayee government under intense public pressure and lack of consensus demurred from sending Indian troops to Iraq. This was all possible largely because of the positive state of bilateral relations between India and the US and the quest by both to deepen their strategic partnership, which began under the Clinton administration and intensified under President George W. Bush culminating in the US-India nuclear deal towards the end of the latter’s administration. While officially India under Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh never condemned American and, more generally, the western conduct in Iraq and Libya, it did permit a vote in Parliament which led to condemnatory resolutions being passed. The Modi government could do the same, albeit India’s chief opposition party—the Indian National Congress (INC)
supported the Modi government’s decision to abstain from voting at the UNSC. In fact, there appears to be a consensus against condemning Russia cutting across party lines even if there is deep displeasure and consternation with Moscow’s conduct. Except within the media and segments of the Indian foreign policy establishment, there is little traction for a vocally anti-Russian stand. Indeed, if a resolution condemning Russia were put to a parliamentary vote, it is hard to see how much support it might garner. Nevertheless, the government could still convene a special parliamentary session for a conscience vote on a resolution condemning the Russians.
Except within the media and segments of the Indian foreign policy establishment, there is little traction for a vocally anti-Russian stand.
However, push comes to shove, the foregoing only demonstrates that India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and its interests are not in two distinct silos but mutually inclusive. New Delhi, in all the cases surveyed above, exercised its strategic autonomy even as it has pursued its core interests. The Modi government, apart from ensuring the safe evacuation of all Indian citizens trapped in Ukraine, must, consider the collateral damage India is likely to incur as a result of the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia in the wake of the invasion. The government will have to figure out a way of working around the adverse effects the sanctions are likely to have on India and work towards reducing India’s excessive dependence on Russian arms. After all, since New Delhi values strategic autonomy and its pursuit is a function of its core interests, it must have a more robust domestic defence industry.
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