Introduction
On 24 February 2022,
Russia invaded Ukraine following months of military build-up along the borders of the two states. In the eyes of the Russian leadership, this decisive action was a result of a series of events dating back to the
reunification of Germany in 1990. The crux of the issue was NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, which Russia opposed. Western leaders had assured the erstwhile Soviet leadership that NATO would not expand eastwards after the German reunification. However, by 2004, NATO had arrived at Russia’s border. The perceived threats to Russia, given the possibility of NATO deploying troops and weaponry across their borders, were decisive in dictating Russia’s aggressive policy towards Georgia and Ukraine. Though not identical in terms of preceding events, the 2008 Russia-Georgia War provides a framework of analysis when considering the 2022 Ukrainian conflict, making the latter appear to be an outcome that was predictable and therefore possibly avoidable.
The Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
The Warsaw Pact was a Soviet Union-led military bloc created in 1955 to oppose NATO and came about immediately after West Germany formally joined the alliance. Many decades later, in 1989, the Berlin Wall was toppled, following which West and East Germany were unified in October 1990. Because the latter was incorporated into West Germany, which was a NATO member, East Germany exited the Warsaw Pact, sparking the treaty’s eventual dissolution. Soviet approval of this unification was made possible only after President Mikhail Gorbachev was assured by Western leaders that
NATO would not expand eastwards. At the time, Gorbachev faced a plethora of domestic issues, coupled with the understanding that internationally the two blocs were moving away from confrontation, which led to the Kremlin accepting the verbal assurance without insisting on a written document. Still, the Soviet position was clear—they would not accept NATO presence any closer to their borders.
The perceived threats to Russia, given the possibility of NATO deploying troops and weaponry across their borders, were decisive in dictating Russia’s aggressive policy towards Georgia and Ukraine.
The West turned the lack of a written assurance to its advantage and began expanding NATO within the same decade. In 1999, three former Warsaw Pact nations—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—joined the alliance. In 2004, following the Istanbul Summit, seven countries were assimilated into the alliance—Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The latter three are the only former Soviet republics to have joined the alliance. Four years later, the alliance’s
Bucharest Summit appeared to have opened the path to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine.
The Russo-Georgian War of 2008: NATO’s advance towards Russian borders
Georgia, like other former Soviet republics, had declared its independence in 1991, and it was at this time that issues regarding the assimilation of what it considered two of its northernmost provinces began. However, South Ossetia and Abkhazia held that they were culturally distinct from both Georgia and Russia, and
demanded independence. These tensions plunged Georgia into a civil war, which was ended by a ceasefire agreement in 1994. In March of 2008, when NATO recognised Kosovo, these separatist sentiments saw a resurgence in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with both regions submitting requests for recognition to the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Georgia, emboldened by the apparent prospect of impending NATO membership, moved troops toward the capital of South Ossetia.
Russia sent its forces to defend the provinces, which it would eventually recognise as independent following the end of the war. Within five days, the Russian army quashed the Georgian effort and forced them to retreat. The Russian military began advancing towards the capital of Georgia—Tbilisi. Then Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili quickly agreed to negotiate
a ceasefire with Russia, bringing an early end to the advancement towards his seat of government. This agreement was mediated by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Crucially, established military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia created a buffer zone between Georgia and itself. Russia also successfully snuffed out Georgia’s NATO ambitions, with little development taking place in the 11 years following the Russo-Georgian War. states that Wary of the consequences of war with Russia, NATO chose to avoid granting membership to Georgia, because if Georgia was a member, NATO would have had to step in as dictated by Article 5.
When NATO recognised Kosovo, these separatist sentiments saw a resurgence in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with both regions submitting requests for recognition to the Kremlin.
From the Euromaidan to Crimea: The origins of the Ukraine War
In November of 2013, the Ukrainian government had agreed, in principle, to become a party to the European Union’s Free Trade and Association Agreements. This would lead to free trade with Europe, as well as significant funding from the EU for economic development programmes and eventually membership in the European Union. Ukraine signed the agreement would also
make it a party to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. In the context of strained Russia-NATO relations, this was once again seen by Moscow as a threat to Russian security. Significantly, the cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the EU would severely restrict economic and trade relations between Russia and Ukraine. Apart from shared diasporas and close trade relations, Ukraine was a source of military equipment, primarily turbines for ships, and the leased military base at Sevastopol. Countering the EU's moves, the Russian government threatened trade restrictions and sanctions and offered
a loan of US$3 billion, which was accepted by Kyiv.
The Ukrainian regime’s suspension of negotiations with the EU provoked nearly one million people to demonstrate across Ukraine, in opposition to this policy U-turn. Following months of protests, an agreement, mediated by some EU foreign ministers,
was signed by then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and the joint Ukrainian opposition in February of 2014, calling for early Presidential elections and dissolution of the government. However, an outbreak of violence, known as the Euromaidan uprising, between demonstrators and security forces, rendered the agreement infructuous and Yanukovych fled Kyiv.
Throughout Ukraine’s history, there have existed fringe far-right political groups in the country. During the Euromaidan uprising, these groups played a role disproportionate to their size, sometimes provoking violence against police and other demonstrators. The protests eventually descended into rioting, and Russia used this to associate the Euromaidan and the new regime with the neo-Nazi fringe groups, who they alleged made up a majority of the protestors. This thus became
Moscow’s narrative—Russia has a responsibility to protect ethnic Russians from the fascist, Nazi-aligned Ukrainian state.
Apart from shared diasporas and close trade relations, Ukraine was a source of military equipment, primarily turbines for ships, and the leased military base at Sevastopol.
In the same month, Russia occupied Crimea and incorporated the territory into the Russian Federation through a constitutional amendment. Meanwhile, rebellions against the government in Kyiv broke out in two eastern regions of Ukraine. The rebels, with covert support from Russia, were successful in establishing strongholds in the two regions—Donetsk and Luhansk. Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk are the regions which have the highest proportion of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. As a result, they are important sites for Russia’s narrative of protecting ethnic Russians. Ukraine’s goals of joining NATO were dealt a similar hand to those of Georgia, following the occupation of Crimea.
In 2019, when President Zelenskyy came to power, he was positioned as a candidate who would
lead peace talks with Russia. However, Ukrainian far-right parties stalled this process, disrupting parliamentary debates and preventing the swearing-in of new members of parliament. Following the stagnation of the Russia-Ukraine negotiation, talks with NATO were reignited. The Ukrainian Constitution was amended in 2019,
with NATO membership becoming enshrined as the state’s primary geopolitical ambition. Once again, Russia was faced with the very real threat of western weapons and militaries deployed directly across its frontiers.
The end of the decade saw the resurgence of NATO’s desire to incorporate Ukraine, seemingly undeterred by the loss of Crimea. In November of 2021, the United States and Ukraine issued a
joint statement on strategic partnership, sending a clear message to Russia, which Moscow viewed as Washington’s intention to further change the European security landscape to its advantage. With the experience of the previous decade, NATO had a fairly accurate yardstick to judge how Russia would react. In this context, predicting a military campaign in Ukraine would have been logical. Particularly given the military build-ups at the Russo-Ukrainian border. Despite these clear indications of Moscow’s hostility to NATO being on its borders, the US persisted and eschewed any serious engagement with Russia on the security issues bedevilling Europe.
The rebels, with covert support from Russia, were successful in establishing strongholds in the two regions—Donetsk and Luhansk. Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk are the regions which have the highest proportion of ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
Conclusion
Given NATO’s unwavering expansion in Eastern Europe, it is difficult to fathom the argument that the alliance did not expect such a reaction. The red line had been spelt out by Russian leaders—NATO presence on their borders will be resisted. As a result of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, millions have been displaced, and tens of thousands have lost their lives in Ukraine, with large parts of the country’s infrastructure in a state of ruin. Russia has made further gains, now occupying most of Donetsk as well as all of the Luhansk region.
Thus, using Georgia, as a model, it is impossible to argue that the West was not aware of the consequences of their actions. The Russo-Ukrainian War could have been potentially avoided if meaningful negotiations were undertaken and some of Russia’s security concerns were addressed. The horrors of this war could be mitigated even today if the West engages in meaningful discussions with Moscow.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
