The Biden administration has been uncommonly vigorous in shaping American policy to maintain American hegemony or Globalisation 2.0
National security seems to have become the motif of Globalisation 2.0, like free trade was that of its predecessor. It was not surprising when, in April, the United States (US) Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen made it clear that national security would always trump economic considerations in relations with China. Though the remarks were aimed at reassuring China about the recent policy moves restricting technology to Beijing, they underscored Washington’s new way of looking at things.
Even earlier, the Chinese had made it clear that national security was the key element in its global paradigm. A paper by Merics noted that while “comprehensive national security” was officially introduced in 2014, it now comprised 16 security areas considered essential for China’s development and future.
Xi has upgraded legal and institutional support systems and a National Security Commission (NSC) was set up in 2014 to coordinate security work across party and state organs.According to the paper, Xi has made “national security into a core component of party ideology.” Originally, it comprised areas like political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, technological, and cybersecurity; now it includes information security, resource security, biosecurity, and space security. Further, Xi has upgraded legal and institutional support systems and a National Security Commission (NSC) was set up in 2014 to coordinate security work across party and state organs. Besides a central NSC, there are NSCs down to the provincial and local levels. At the end of last month, the first meeting of the National Security Commission after the 20th Party Congress took place. The meeting emphasised that “the complexity and difficulty of the national security issues we currently face have significantly increased.” It called on the need to adhere to “bottom line thinking and worst-case scenario thinking”. It also said that “it is necessary to guarantee the new development pattern with the new security paradigm, take the initiative to shape the favourable external security environment.” The readout said that the meeting reviewed and approved documents on accelerating the construction of a national security risk monitoring and early warning system and on strengthening national security education. National security has long shaped the US worldview. The events of the past several years have brought a different nuance to it and the target—China—has become clearer. In the past, geopolitics and geoeconomics had their distinct spheres. But beginning with the Trump tariff wars against Beijing, a shift has taken place. The Biden administration has retained the tariffs but made reshoring and friendshoring issues of national security. It has initiated a new industrial policy that has accompanied tightened restrictions on exports to China, all in the name of national security. And its October 2022 National Security Strategy is clear that China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it.”
The Biden administration has retained the tariffs but made reshoring and friendshoring issues of national security.In statements and declarations, US policymakers have sought to play down the significance of these steps. But no matter from which angle it is viewed, this looks like what Globalisation 2.0 will be. Yellen in her remarks cited above noted that, “We seek a constructive and fair economic relationship with China.” She acknowledged that there would be an economic impact from the US policies, but “they are motivated solely by our concerns about our security and values.” Speaking at the end of April, Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor, laid out the elements of what Globalisation 2.0 would look like. It would involve a new industrial and innovation strategy within the US and its partners around. It would promote “diversified and resilient global supply chains” and would create a “fairer and more durable economic order.” As for China, the US was taking some “tailored measures” that were “premised on straightforward national security concerns.” More importantly, the US was not thinking of “decoupling” but, “de-risking and diversifying” its supply chains. The US controls would, as in the past, be “narrowly focused on technology that could tilt the military balance.” The whole idea was to manage competition responsibly. The “unlimited” partnership between Russia and China has also triggered concerns that the latter could use the Ukraine events as a template for its approach to Taiwan. This has served to consolidate the Western alliance and Japan and encourage them to adopt the new US national security discourse. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed out in a recent interview, the war “demonstrates that security is no longer regional, security is global.”
While the Trump administration sidelined South Korea and Japan, Biden reached out to them and enhanced the interaction with them at the alliance level.In practical terms, the Biden administration’s national security approach has manifested itself in the western Pacific. He has, in the words of Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s top man on Asia, not only aligned the US allies with its approach, networked them closely, but also involved them in drills and joint exercises to signal the US determination to check Chinese power. Not only did the Biden administration double down on consolidating the Quad, but it also created a new military alliance, AUKUS—a trilateral military alliance involving the UK, Australia, and the US. While the Trump administration sidelined South Korea and Japan, Biden reached out to them and enhanced the interaction with them at the alliance level. A major development was the decision by Japan to significantly shift its national security policy towards meeting its “greatest strategic challenge”—China. Another significant development has been the decision of the new government of the Philippines to give the US access to four more military bases in the country. Three of the four are situated in the northern part of the island nation opposite the Bashi channel from Taiwan. The fourth is on Palawan Island, adjacent to the disputed South China Sea. In mid-April, the Philippines and the US staged their largest-ever joint military exercise involving 17,500 troops. Despite all this, the military balance in the western Pacific is beginning to tilt towards China. As an article in Atlantic magazine pointed out, the issue is not just war, but the fact that American military dominance “has underpinned the American economic and security system in East Asia”. In other words, Globalisation 1.0. The Biden administration has been uncommonly vigorous in shaping American policy to maintain American hegemony or Globalisation 2.0 from its point of view. But there is still work to be done in integrating the various strands of its alliance system into effective operational plans.
The Biden administration has been uncommonly vigorous in shaping American policy to maintain American hegemony or Globalisation 2.0 from its point of view.Equally important is to give shape to the new economic framework that will be the foundation of the new globalisation 2.0. There is little chance of reviving the old Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Biden administration has unrolled the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). But, as of now, it is only a concept whose promise will have to be proved on the ground. But the US paradigm could take a somersault if Donald Trump is elected President in the upcoming 2024 presidential elections. His views on national security are well- known, and they are not too encouraging for American allies, whether in Europe or Asia. More damaging could be the whimsical policymaking he is known for. The geopolitical situation today is much more fraught as compared to when he came to power in 2016.
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Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...
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