Myanmar stands at a critical crossroads, grappling with the populace’s yearning for democratic governance and the entrenched grip of the military Junta on its political landscape. Observations suggest that determined resistant forces strive to overthrow the Junta and usher in a new era. Recent statistics indicate their growing strength, evident in escalating conflicts at major international border crossings like Muse, Myawaddy, and Tamu.
In 20 months, from 1 February 2021 to 30 September 2022 since the Junta took over, a report revealed that the Myanmar military, police, and associated militia were accountable for more than 3,000 documented civilian fatalities. In that same period, anti-coup resistance factions caused the deaths of more than 2,000 civilians, and at least 1,000 civilians lost their lives at the hands of unidentified perpetrators. These staggering figures are likely an underestimation, as many such incidents remain unreported, a silent testament to Myanmar’s turmoil.
The challenges surrounding the potential success of the resistant forces in toppling the Junta emphasise the complexity and uncertainty of the situation.
On 15 October, several ethnic rebel groups boycotted an event hosted by the military regime to mark the eighth anniversary of the endorsement of a multilateral ceasefire accord, thus underscoring their discontent with the current administration. The challenges surrounding the potential success of the resistant forces in toppling the Junta emphasise the complexity and uncertainty of the situation. The task of envisioning the nature of a post-Junta government is equally challenging, given the country’s protracted absence of democratic institutions.
Constitutional dilemma
The entrenched power of the Junta, bolstered by six decades of authoritarian rule, poses significant challenges to its removal. Scholars who study political system transitions often stress that democracy entails more than just the mere process of holding regular, fair, and well-executed elections. It also demands inclusivity. In particular, newly-elected leaders must have substantial and meaningful authority to effectively govern, a quality notably absent in the previous democratic regime, as showcased in several instances, especially in making amendments to the Constitution.
The 2008 Constitution, primarily designed by the military administration to favour their interests and create a “disciplined democracy,” imposes substantial limitations. It reserves 25 percent of parliamentary seats for unelected military officers and confers significant emergency powers upon the Commander-in-Chief over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the state. Amending this Constitution is intricate, requiring over 75-percent member approval, making it constitutionally and legally unfeasible to reduce military influence effectively, thus, preserving their dominant role. The Junta’s willingness to employ brutal suppression further complicates efforts to unseat it.
Can NUG bridge the gap?
The National Unity Government (NUG), publicly poised to take the leadership if they win the ongoing internal war, comprises ethnic parties, minority communities, and stateless communities such as the Rohingyas. They aim to abolish the 2008 Constitution and establish a federal structure where the federal government’s responsibilities will be streamlined, focusing primarily on essential domains such as defence, monetary policy, and foreign relations. Concurrently, a significant portion of authority will be devolved to subnational levels. This constitutional framework presents a viable path for numerous statelets in Myanmar that have effectively operated with a degree of independence, including entities like the Wa State, Kokang, and the increasingly autonomous southwestern Rakhine State.
The National Unity Government (NUG), publicly poised to take the leadership if they win the ongoing internal war, comprises ethnic parties, minority communities, and stateless communities such as the Rohingyas.
The NUG cabinet showcases remarkable diversity, with a significant presence of non-Burman members. The acting President and the Natural Resources minister are from the Kachin community, while the acting Prime Minister comes from the Pwo Karen group. Likewise, the Federal Union minister and the International Cooperation minister are of Chin ethnicity; the Labour minister hails from the Mon community; the Women’s Affairs minister is from the S’gaw Karen group, which comes from the Kachin community. The Human Rights minister is from the Rohingya community.
However, it’s important to note that the NUG cannot unite all armed groups against the Myanmar military. Different groups have different interests. Reports suggest that some sections are waiting for a reshuffle of this supposed cabinet that is essentially non-Burman. The NUG portrays itself as Myanmar’s lawful government but faces challenges in providing public services and safeguarding its citizens. Many of its ministers are situated overseas, and even those within the nation often need help with their mobility. Their movement is frequently confined to the domains controlled by influential ethnic armed factions, such as the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army in Laiza. These ethnic armed groups have well-established governance structures that function autonomously from the NUG.
Matter of recognition
Representation and acknowledgement pose international and regional challenges for the NUG. The United Nations (UN) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adhere to the principle of recognising states rather than entities in governance. While Myanmar’s standing as a member state remains undisputed, determining the legitimacy of a representative acting on behalf of the state is a complex task in the post-2021 coup environment.
The NUG portrays itself as Myanmar’s lawful government but faces challenges in providing public services and safeguarding its citizens.
Up to this point, NUG representatives are present in several nations; it’s essential to note that these NUG representatives need to possess diplomatic accreditation. While some countries engage in discussions with the NUG, they have yet to extend formal recognition. In line with this, several NUG ministers have met with Canadian and Spanish lawmakers and high-level government officials from the United States (US), Germany, and Sweden. While the NUG might be the favoured option for the international community, the road to its official recognition remains elusive.
Regional pressure
The military Junta’s reluctance to adhere to the Five-Point Consensus advocated by the ASEAN regional bloc has created significant obstacles, particularly in engaging with all stakeholders, holding constructive dialogues, ending violence, and ensuring the equitable distribution of humanitarian aid.
During the 43rd ASEAN Summit in Indonesia, held from 5-7 September 2023, ASEAN issued a statement highlighting the necessity of adherence to these points. The member countries also evaluated the need for a specific timeline containing practical and measurable indicators to support the peace plan.
During the latest series of meetings, ASEAN leaders made two crucial decisions concerning the ASEAN chairmanship. First, they turned down Myanmar’s bid for the rotating presidency in 2026, with the Philippines taking over that year of the presidency. Additionally, they established a “troika” framework to address the Myanmar issue—where a trio of states, including the upcoming chair, Laos, will collaborate with the previous chair, Indonesia, and the succeeding chair, Malaysia, to oversee the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus in Myanmar.
During the latest series of meetings, ASEAN leaders made two crucial decisions concerning the ASEAN chairmanship.
This troika system is viewed as a positive development because it relieves Laos from making unilateral decisions and shields it from external pressures. Simultaneously, it opens up the opportunity to exert more pressure on Myanmar’s military leadership, as both Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a firm stance against the military rule in Myanmar. This scenario indicates a growing regional concern and involvement. However, whether this will yield significant results remains to be seen.
Myanmar’s future remains a global concern in this intricate and uncertain landscape. It will require concerted efforts from internal and external actors to pave the way for a democratic, inclusive, and stable Myanmar. The journey towards democratic governance and lasting peace in Myanmar demands ongoing attention and diplomatic engagement from the international community, recognising the importance of representation, dialogue, and cooperation in resolving the country’s longstanding challenges.
Sreeparna Banerjee is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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