Munir’s Controversial Rise and Pakistan’s Drift to a ‘Hard State'

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Despite suffering significant military setbacks during the four-day conflict with India, Pakistan Army Chief General Syed Asim Munir achieved a notable personal victory. Within two weeks of the conflict, Munir was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal “in recognition of the strategic brilliance and courageous leadership that ensured national security and decisively defeated the enemy.” This move appeared to be a desperate yet strategic attempt to safeguard the military’s reputation amid a massive setback, rebuild public trust in the armed forces, and maintain the fragile and compromised coalition government. While Munir has undeniably consolidated power following his recent promotion and questionable claims of ‘victory’, the country has arguably faced another institutional defeat—this time at the hands of its own military. Pakistan now stands on the brink of formal military rule.      

Once the war hysteria and military celebrations in Pakistan subside, citizens will likely recognise that daily livelihood concerns—such as food insecurity, water and energy shortages, political disenfranchisement, and human rights violations—remain unaddressed

Once the war hysteria and military celebrations in Pakistan subside, citizens will likely recognise that daily livelihood concerns—such as food insecurity, water and energy shortages, political disenfranchisement, and human rights violations—remain unaddressed and may deteriorate further in the coming months. For the Pakistani military, any armed confrontation with India or internal anti-terror operations tends to result in increased defence allocations and expanded control over governance. These dynamics will directly impact the allocation of financial resources intended for public welfare. According to an estimate, Pakistan’s defence expenditures are projected to reach USD 11 billion in 2025, a considerable financial burden on an already struggling economy. Global rating agency Moody’s warned that ongoing military tensions with India would likely impede Pakistan’s efforts to achieve macroeconomic stability and fiscal consolidation.

Amid concerns over Islamabad’s capacity to meet loan conditions, the IMF has imposed 11 new conditions on Pakistan to release the next tranche of its USD 7 billion bailout package and warned that geopolitical tensions with India may jeopardise the scheme’s fiscal, external, and structural reform targets.   

Furthermore, Pakistan’s economy remains heavily reliant on foreign loans and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) assistance programme. Recent projections indicate a growth rate of 2.68 percent for fiscal year 2025—a downward revision from the earlier estimates of 3.6 percent. This deceleration suggests a slower-than-expected economic recovery, hampered by persistent challenges in agriculture, industrial output, and external financing, which dampen economic momentum. Escalating military tensions with India could also undermine Pakistan’s ability to service its external debt obligations, further straining its already insufficient foreign exchange reserves. Amid concerns over Islamabad’s capacity to meet loan conditions, the IMF has imposed 11 new conditions on Pakistan to release the next tranche of its USD 7 billion bailout package and warned that geopolitical tensions with India may jeopardise the scheme’s fiscal, external, and structural reform targets.     

Conversely, India has initiated the next phase of ‘Operation Sindoor’ to address cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan through diplomatic channels. Reports suggest that New Delhi intends to submit a dossier to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ahead of its June plenary meeting, urging Pakistan’s re-inclusion on the ‘grey list’ of countries subject to enhanced monitoring. The Indian government also plans to oppose further World Bank funding for Pakistan. Notably, Pakistan had previously been on the FATF’s grey list from 2018 to 2022 due to its failure to curb terror financing. A 2021 study by Tabadlab, an Islamabad-based private advisory services firm and think tank, claimed that the prolonged grey listing of Pakistan between 2008 and 2019 may have resulted in cumulative real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses of approximately USD 38 billion. A renewed listing would likely exacerbate Pakistan’s economic fragility and heighten the risk of a default.     

Moreover, rising military tensions with India are expected to complicate Munir’s flagship economic initiative—the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC)—to attract foreign investment and boost domestic investor confidence. The SIFC already faces criticism over the controversial Green Pakistan Initiative (GPI), which proposes constructing six new canals on the Indus River in Punjab province to irrigate ‘barren’ Cholistan land for corporate farming. This has provoked widespread violent protests in Sindh province, where stakeholders accuse Punjab of appropriating their share of the Indus water. With dwindling water levels across Pakistan, inter-provincial tensions over water and resource sharing have become increasingly acute. As the upper riparian, Punjab is accused of retaining water beyond its legal entitlement under the Indus River System. Simultaneously, the Shehbaz Sharif-led federal government and Munir’s military leadership have faced allegations of inequitable resource allocation, with claims of preferential treatment for Punjab over other provinces.

Facing mounting internal pressure over inequitable resource distribution, human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities, the resurgence of Islamist organisations, a struggling economy, political instability, and strained regional relations—particularly with Afghanistan—Munir allegedly sought to divert public attention by instigating a limited military conflict with India. Despite encountering considerable setbacks, including the loss of key airbases, he was unexpectedly promoted to Field Marshal. With soaring public opinion in favour of the military, which had previously been at a historic low before the conflict with India, Munir’s next step is to further consolidate his power by transforming Pakistan into a ‘hard state’.     

During a special meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security in March 2025, Munir highlighted the necessity for improved governance and transforming Pakistan into a ‘hard state,’ rhetorically questioning how long the nation would continue to make sacrifices under the guise of being a ‘soft state.’ He also cautioned the committee members—including Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif—that the ongoing armed insurgencies constitute an existential battle for Pakistan’s future generations, urging stakeholders to set aside parochial differences. While acknowledging the military’s responsibility for national security, Munir attributed recent lapses to ineffective political leadership, implicitly justifying an expanded military role in governance across all provinces. In contrast, the civilian government in Pakistan has failed to hold the military accountable for the failure of Operation Azm-i-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), launched in June 2024, to quell a massive surge in violence across the country.     

Following the Jaffar Express hijacking, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director-General Chief Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry declared that the ‘rules of engagement’ had shifted and pledged that the military “will take them [terrorists], their facilitators, and abettors on, whether inside Pakistan or outside.” Similarly, Munir vowed to combat terrorism with ‘full might’ and stated that the “designs of their facilitators would be foiled through unity.” Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have borne the brunt of this hardline approach, witnessing an uptick in daily cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of peace activists, journalists, students, and local government representatives. Meanwhile, instability continues to rise in Sindh over the unresolved Indus water dispute, with fears that the military may resort to violence against protestors, as was done against former PM Imran Khan’s supporters in Islamabad in November 2024.     

In the aftermath of the India-Pakistan conflict, Islamabad is aggressively and actively trying to implicate India with false allegations of sponsoring local insurgency in Balochistan. This established but unsubstantiated tactic is being reinforced under current circumstances to portray Pakistan as a ‘victim’ of terrorism while it continues to host United Nations (UN)-designated terrorist outfits such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Pakistan is desperately trying to internationalise this false narrative against India regarding terrorism through propaganda dossiers and unfounded allegations of Indian complicity in supporting militancy in Pakistan. However, it is yet another excuse used by the Pakistan army to justify violence against unarmed civilians and to launch new military operations.        

Amid rising nationalism, pro-army sentiments, and limited political and judicial oversight, Munir appears poised to implement his hardline policies with greater assertiveness and aggression.

Amid rising nationalism, pro-army sentiments, and limited political and judicial oversight, Munir appears poised to implement his hardline policies with greater assertiveness and aggression. While such tactics may succeed in temporarily diverting attention from real issues—such as soaring food and energy prices, slow growth rates, water and power crises, inter-provincial tensions, and corruption allegations within the armed forces—their long-term sustainability remains questionable. Moreover, how long can Munir leverage external warmongering and military threats—particularly from India—to advocate for increased defence funding, consolidate power, and deny people basic rights and resources?

Perhaps the clearest indicator of this agenda lies in his decision to provoke military escalation with India following the brutal Pahalgam terror attack, claimed by a shadow group—The Resistance Front (TRF)—linked to the Pakistan army’s trusted Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). This reflects Munir’s ‘hard state’ policies—militarisation over reform, and coercion over consensus. He may consider himself victorious after being promoted to Field Marshal and ‘defeating’ India without evidence. However, once the euphoria of ‘victory’ fades in Pakistan and reality sets in, people will likely take to the streets, demanding their rights from the ‘savior’ Field Marshal, who may be eyeing another promotion in a ‘hard(er)’ Pakistan, or his ‘hybrid regime’ leaders. 

Sarral Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has previously served in the National Security Council Secretariat.

• International Affairs
• Neighbourhood
• Great Power Dynamics
• Defence and Security
• Terrorism
• Neighbourhood
• asim munir
• asim munir field marshal
• india pakistan conflict
• india pakistan conflict 2025
• india pakistan military crisis
• operation sindoor
• pahalgam terror attack
• pakistan chief of army staff
• pakistan economic crisis

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