Modi's visit to Moscow highlighted the evolving dynamics of Russia's foreign policy, emphasizing India's growing importance as a strategic partner
The 22nd India-Russian Annual Summit held on 8-9 July after a gap of two years gained much attention. So, how was it received in Russia and what does it tell us about the conduct of Russian foreign policy, with reference to India and its broader ambitions?
The visit to Russia being Prime Minister’s Narendra Modi’s first bilateral trip abroad after re-election imbued it with much importance in the Russian discourse but what was even more prominently reported was the reaction of the Western press about the visit. These included reports from Bloomberg and The Washington Post that saw the visit as strengthening the Russian position. The narrative of confrontation with the West formed an important part of the backdrop of the summit for Russia. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov labelled the West as being ‘jealous’ of the visit. The US statement that it had raised its concerns with New Delhi about relations with Moscow also fit directly into this narrative.
The visit to Russia being Prime Minister’s Narendra Modi’s first bilateral trip abroad after re-election imbued it with much importance in the Russian discourse but what was even more prominently reported was the reaction of the Western press about the visit.
This underpinned two key messages from Russia: The West seeks to limit the foreign policy independence of other states, and India has resisted this pressure successfully. This feeds into two broader themes of Russian foreign policy: The failure of Western efforts to isolate Russia amidst resistance of what Russia calls the ‘global majority’ and the impact of this on the development of a multipolar world. In this interpretation, the ongoing war becomes a part of the shift of the world towards multipolarity, which is then used to position Russia as a consequential player in this sequence of events.
Another related piece is the focus on the rise of the East, which interacts with the Russian official view that organisations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will form the building blocks of a new order; wherein its relations with both India and China come into focus. Russia’s calls for a Eurasian security architecture also echo this line, demanding a more focused approach towards key Eastern states.
Such a framing of the Modi visit meant that the absence of concrete deals at the end was not necessarily seen as an immediate negative, amidst a sense that the present meeting gives stability to the bilateral partnership. Presidential aide Maxim Oreshkin announced that the main economic result of Modi-Putin interaction was the statement on development of strategic areas of Russia-India economic cooperation till 2030, which sets the framework of a future plan. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov focused on the fact that a good foundation had been laid and all the main directions of cooperation had been outlined and discussions about their implementation will take place.
Such a framing of the Modi visit meant that the absence of concrete deals at the end was not necessarily seen as an immediate negative, amidst a sense that the present meeting gives stability to the bilateral partnership.
It is evident that Russia has interpreted this as a positive sign, despite the challenges involved. The rise of India as a key trade partner on the back of record oil imports, discussions around possible new nuclear power plants, connectivity, Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC) and Russian Far East, besides the discussions on future economic cooperation have been seen as encouraging. As the process of moving towards the East is expected to take some time, with one report noting that it could take at least 10-15 years, it is possible that Russia sees the outline for India-Russia relations that the Modi visit produced as a step in this process, wherein the absence of specific deals during the summit is not viewed entirely negatively.
In addition, the benefits accrued to Russia through engagement with India in multilateral formats is seen as another advantage. Infact, Lavrov highlighted the value Moscow attaches to India’s role in avoiding ‘Ukrainisation’ of G20 agenda and the overlap of their positions at the UN in his discussion of outcomes of the summit.
Here, the importance of relations with India should also be seen as part of efforts to build a more balanced external engagement, especially in the backdrop of the breakdown of relations with the West and rising dependence on China. In the 2021 revised National Security Strategy, for the first time, building relations with India and China were mentioned together (instead of India following China in the pecking order) as part of achieving the objectives of its foreign policy. The 2023 foreign policy concept also put China and India together in a separate heading, with the aim of building relations with “friendly powers” in Eurasia.
Here, the importance of relations with India should also be seen as part of efforts to build a more balanced external engagement, especially in the backdrop of the breakdown of relations with the West and rising dependence on China.
While China has emerged as Russia’s key strategic partner, it has simultaneously led to a need to diversify relations with the rest of the non-western world; making the strategic partnership with India particularly important. But a serious challenge here relates to the rising tensions in the Sino-Indian relationship, wherein even the more optimistic assessments of Indo-Russian ties underline worries about growing Sino-Russian engagement. Expert discussions have regularly expressed concern about New Delhi and Moscow moving into opposing blocs and the necessity of building new foundations amidst uncertainty about their future cooperation, despite high trade volumes.
While this situation has not necessarily improved, it has been argued that such contradictions among non-Western states call for a specific Russian policy towards each case. Therefore, the focus is on the value India and Russia find in each other for achievement of their specific goals, without compromising on relations with other powers based on national interests. Such manoeuvring is expected to continue in an unstable international system by both sides. This reasoning further adds to the Russian narrative that the ‘world majority’ follows an independent course of foreign policy (unlike the United States and its allies); which is reflected in India and Russia cooperating on areas of mutual interest.
Thus, we can see how Modi’s visit to Moscow encapsulates itself in the ongoing restructuring of Russian foreign policy, both in practical and ideational terms. Even though sometimes one of these aspects outstrips the other, Russia sees continued value in both terms while engaging with India. While hardly a full-fledged recipe for success, it does give a sense of how Russia sees its own positioning in an ‘emerging multipolar and multilateral world order’ and the role of India therein, even as its policy towards the ‘world majority’ and Eurasia remains a work in progress. To what extent does New Delhi see its own vision align with that of Moscow remains to be seen.
Nivedita Kapoor is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia.
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Nivedita Kapoor is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs ...
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