Growing scrutiny on Indian intelligence activity highlights the need for intelligence oversight, but the implementation might prove to be difficult
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The amplification of allegations surrounding Indian intelligence activity and covert action overseas by news media and foreign governments has, over the past year, brought India’s intelligence services under unprecedented domestic and global scrutiny. As the dust settles, two questions emerge. First, to what extent are the mechanisms of internal course correction and oversight—or lack thereof—guiding India’s intelligence apparatus commensurate with its democratic credentials? Second, how have the political parties, armed with their manifestos before general elections, dealt with this issue?
The INC manifesto in 2014 simply assured that “intelligence has been strengthened” and that if it is elected to power, the government will engage in creating a “…robust framework of intelligence sharing…”.
The manifesto of the Indian National Congress (INC) for the 2024 Lok Sabha Elections promised to ensure that “…intelligence agencies will function strictly by law. They will be brought under the oversight of Parliament”. It also promised to carry out investigations of “...repeated intelligence failures at the highest levels”. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) manifesto, on the other hand, aimed at eliminating the threat of drugs on our society through a series of “..technical, legal and intelligence programmes”. Unlike the INC, the BJP manifesto made no mention of intelligence oversight and accountability. In 2019, the INC manifesto promised to pass a law that would provide safeguards against “unlawful or excessive surveillance and monitoring and provide for both independent and Parliamentary oversight”. It may be convenient for political parties to make such promises when they’re not in power, as bringing in oversight mechanisms for intelligence agencies is a task easier said than done. Take, for example, the BJP’s 2014 manifesto, which had a detailed call to overhaul, strengthen and modernise the intelligence apparatus as well as to “insulate intelligence agencies from political intervention and interference”. The INC manifesto in 2014 simply assured that “intelligence has been strengthened” and that if it is elected to power, the government will engage in creating a “…robust framework of intelligence sharing…”.
For the Lok Sabha Elections in 2009, when the horrors of the 26/11 terrorist attack were still fresh in public memory, the BJP manifesto explicitly stated that “intelligence agencies will be held responsible for lapses,” also declaring that it would “completely revamp the internal and external intelligence agencies” within 100 days of coming to power. In contrast, the INC manifesto in 2009 kept mum on strengthening the intelligence apparatus or making the intelligence apparatus accountable, similar to the silence on such issues in the manifesto of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 2004. The INC manifesto in 2004, on the other hand, had promised “a discussion in Parliament on the Subrahmanyam Committee report on Kargil and move resolutely to implement its recommendations to strengthen our intelligence networks.”
The INC manifesto in 2009 kept mum on strengthening the intelligence apparatus or making the intelligence apparatus accountable, similar to the silence on such issues in the manifesto of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 2004.
Realising that no formal structures, processes, and institutional mechanisms for accountability exist in India, Western powers may push for more on that front. The lack of such institutional mechanisms that can absorb the knock-on effects boils down to the domestic political ramifications that any political party in power may face. While global examples of oversight provide precedents to emulate and mould to the specific conditions in which Indian intelligence services operate, oversight alone does not provide a silver bullet to increase strategic efficiency. What it does, however, is ensure greater public and governmental accountability—a view that has, over the past decade and a half, been echoed by parties and individuals across India’s political spectrum.
Intelligence policy in recent years has come to be inextricably linked to electoral issues, explaining why it finds greater mention in party manifestos in India. Strategic challenges linked to disinformation and foreign electoral interference have been amplified by the growing ubiquity and oversaturation of social media, augmenting public concern about the threats presented by hostile foreign intelligence services and the readiness and power held by our intelligence service. This makes its way into party manifestos. Yet, this very character also makes the question of intelligence oversight especially susceptible to politicisation and partisan biases in the domestic sphere.
It should be noted that a manifesto is an important document which portrays the vision and philosophy of a political party. It serves as a vital medium for political communication that allows the electorates to make well-informed decisions. Intelligence reform, however, has not gained enough traction in public opinion and receives a perfunctory interest from political parties amid other high-stake electoral issues. The very mention of reform and oversight in the manifesto could be significant for critical engagement on matters that are deliberately shunned from public scrutiny. While a sensitive subject like national security and the role of intelligence would largely remain under the confines of the elite, raising the question of accountability and oversight in a manifesto can shape public attitudes. That said, can citizens measure reforms done on the intelligence front by the incumbent party or parties previously in power? If yes, to what extent? What will be the more important aspect—performance or accountability— for the citizens to make a judgement?
The very mention of reform and oversight in the manifesto could be significant for critical engagement on matters that are deliberately shunned from public scrutiny.
In this Catch-22 situation, it is most likely that an incumbent government may shift the blame onto intelligence agencies to escape the political blowback. This can become a concern for strategic interests, as the intelligence community may resist such blame. Moreover, if intelligence agencies are made the scapegoat, they will be left with little credibility in the future. This also leaves the ball in the succeeding government’s court, where there can be uncertainty over the extremity of its face-saving decisions. It must be noted that when reforms are initiated as knee-jerk reactions, they lack proper analysis and understanding of long-term implications and effectiveness and leave out the question of whether such reforms are initiated after an independent and unbiased post-mortem.
Intelligence oversight is no panacea for the complex issues encountered in the functioning of intelligence agencies, but it is indeed a step in the right direction. Party manifestos showcase the intention of respective political parties regarding intelligence oversight. To expect intelligence agencies to succeed in areas where foreign policy and diplomacy have failed is also something worth a second thought. The politicisation of intelligence affairs is not necessarily bad. It may be a very good tool to shape the narrative in the national interest, but oversight mechanisms ensure that the interests served remain national and not personal.
Dhruv Gadhavi is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat.
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Dhruv Gadhavi is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Security Studies, School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat. ...
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