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A year after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau raised allegations against Indian intelligence for killing Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar, the issue has reignited public attention with Ottawa reportedly sharing evidence with India. Additionally, the United States (US) naming an Indian official, Vikash Yadav, as part of its investigation against the attempted killing of Khalistani leader, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, has considerably alarmed observers. All of this has brought the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) under criticism for poor tradecraft and manpower management, lack of accountability, and some even calling these developments the biggest debacle in the agency’s history. This article argues that such commentaries are shortsighted and instead recommends that the Indian intelligentsia and its global network should be converting tactical and operational failures into strategic successes using the informational space.
The United States (US) naming an Indian official, Vikash Yadav, as part of its investigation against the attempted killing of Khalistani leader, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, has considerably alarmed observers.
Intelligence operational failures are inevitable
The common criticism levelled against the R&AW is that its police dominance makes it an ineffective intelligence agency wherein essential qualities required for covert operations are lost on the police officers. If one were to conduct comprehensive research on the utilities and challenges of police personnel in intelligence, it could certainly result in interesting findings worthy of policy consideration. However, merely extrapolating this factor as the reason for the botched operation in the US fails to be convincing. For instance, if police dominance explains the failure in the US, what explains the numerous successful targeted killings in Pakistan by the same agency (assuming these killings are the R&AW’s handiwork)? Therefore, it might be prudent to ask if the failure in the US was purely operational rather than organisational. The fact of the matter is that North America is new territory for the agency, and history shows that all intelligence agencies have a learning curve and new operational theatres always present initial setbacks before the right lessons are learnt.
For example, in 1998, Israeli intelligence tried to eliminate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal by poisoning him. The operation failed spectacularly, with the Israeli agents being caught by the Jordanian authorities, leading to a massive diplomatic row between the two countries. The Mashal episode seemed to portend a decline in Mossad’s operational prowess, which was then perceived as the agency’s greatest strength. The reason for this downturn was, as Ronen Bergman puts it, the failure of Mossad to ‘adapt itself to changing times’. With the entry of Iran and advanced encryption technology into the scene, Mossad was facing a novel situation that was ‘more sophisticated than any Arab state’ it had previously operated in. Such new operational conditions demanded time, planning, preparation, and, more importantly, a resilience capacity to absorb blows and learn the right lessons.
The second criticism levelled against the R&AW concerns the use of criminals as partners. This is also not unique to India both from operational and ethical perspectives. Be it states such as Russia, China, and Iran, or democracies such as the US, intelligence agencies have long collaborated with organised criminal groups to fill in intelligence and operational gaps. The US intelligence, for instance, has used criminals for both vital intelligence collection as well as assassination operations. Beginning with the alliances that emerged between the US intelligence and the underworld during World War II, the Americans have partnered with organised criminals of various hues for operations in Cuba, Afghanistan, South East Asia, and Latin America. Therefore, irrespective of strong accountability measures and ethical considerations, intelligence agencies will continue to collaborate with criminals, especially if the latter brings resources and skills wanted to fulfil mission objectives. India is neither unique in this sense nor will any accountability measures substitute the need for partnering with unsavoury characters, especially within domains such as counterterrorism.
Many Indians on social media have been pointing out the US’ protection of Tahawwur Hussain Rana and David Headley as a counter to US pressure on India to extradite Yadav.
The third criticisms seem to focus on a still-developing story about Vikash Yadav. Speculations about his character and life story have become the focus of public chatter. Whatever the truth, the assumption is that an effort is being made to protect him from the Americans. If this is so, even such protection of officials is not without precedence in the intelligence world. Many Indians on social media have been pointing out the US’ protection of Tahawwur Hussain Rana and David Headley as a counter to US pressure on India to extradite Yadav. While the logic seems accurate, it is important to highlight that Yadav is an Indian intelligence official whereas Rana and Headley were not American intelligence officials. A more accurate comparison would be the MI6’s protection of two of its officers Richard Bartlett and David Watson after they were accused of being involved in a plot to assassinate Muammar Gaddafi in late 1995. With strict media censorship on the event, the MI6 has protected its two officers through relocation and grant of new identities. Therefore, from operational failures to partnering with criminals to defending exposed officials, India is not exclusive.
Information warfare to convert operational failures into strategic successes
History is replete with examples of tactical and operational defeats leading to strategic victories and vice versa. In war, this is especially crucial since the fortunes on the battlefield are but one of the factors that determine the outcome of the war. The best case in point relevant to this article is the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam. The Northern Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong launched a widespread surprise offensive against the US armed forces and their allies. Operationally, the offensive failed, and the attacking coalition suffered huge casualties before being routed from various cities. Yet, this operation became the most influential factor behind the US’ defeat and the Vietnamese victory. More importantly, the victory was shaped in the informational space. Soon after the offensive, media coverage of the incident created a “credibility gap” leading the American public to develop distrust in the US’ rhetoric about the war. The present situation between India and the West is comparable to the Vietnamese experience.
The Northern Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong launched a widespread surprise offensive against the US armed forces and their allies.
Like the Tet Offensive, the Indian operations in the US and Canada, irrespective of their lack of sophistication, have displayed a sense of audacity supported by the logic of national security. The failure and subsequent public revelations have provoked people to rise and take notice of the developments. However, where the Indian intelligentsia is failing is to utilise the opportunity created by the Indian intelligence offensives to highlight the “credibility gap” in the West’s principles of counterterrorism and sovereignty. Despite the US having proclaimed that counterterrorism is a principle that needs universal coalition, in practice its own counterterrorism policies fail to sustain this rhetoric. In the pre-9/11 era, numerous instances showed Western intelligence protecting terrorists. Britain was guilty of protecting Osama bin Laden even as many other al Qaeda cadres were hiding within its territory. A Libyan warrant for the arrest of bin Laden was buried by the British and American intelligence and the threat of Islamic terrorism was downplayed. Nevertheless, once the 9/11 attacks gave birth to the War on Terror (WoT), there was hope that the WoT rhetoric would hold credibility. Yet, within a decade of the WoT, it became evident that the US was selective in its targeting of terrorists, giving birth to the distinction between ‘your terrorist’ and ‘my terrorist’. Presently, following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Western countries are further emboldened to dilute the principle of counterterrorism and employ globally wanted terrorists as intelligence assets.
Like counterterrorism, the principle of sovereignty is also a rhetoric that has elicited selective application by the West. A good example of this is the October 1985 Israeli airstrikes against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia. Following the strikes, invoking the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, member states of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), including India, condemned Israel and passed Resolution 573. It was only the US that abstained from voting, thereby, indicating that interests mattered more than principles. Similarly, within the field of intelligence, especially considering that Canada has been invoking the principle of sovereignty against India, it is baffling to recall that Canada had supplied Israeli intelligence with Canadian passports in support of Mossad’s operations. It is unsurprising to find intelligence agencies using fake passports of another country for operational purposes. But for a nation like Canada that decries the violation of the principle of sovereignty to be volunteering original passports for misuse by another country presents a serious credibility gap.
Within the field of intelligence, especially considering that Canada has been invoking the principle of sovereignty against India, it is baffling to recall that Canada had supplied Israeli intelligence with Canadian passports in support of Mossad’s operations.
Therefore, from an information warfare perspective, the West’s credibility gap provides India with ample opportunity. There are sections within Western countries that question their own government’s policies of overruling principles and either tolerating or collaborating with terrorists. This was also evident in the Canadian opposition leader questioning the Trudeau government’s support for the Khalistanis. However, bereft of an information warfare strategy, neither has Indian intelligentsia managed to amplify these Western voices nor aggressively put forth its own version exposing the West’s credibility gap, with few notable exceptions. Instead, the focus has been on the R&AW’s operational prowess, which is either pointless, at best, or self-defeating, at worst. Whether the R&AW learns the lessons from its failure and improves, or it completely eschews the practice of targeted killings adhering to international law, will be decisions made by political and security leaders in New Delhi based on various factors. What the public and India’s intellectuals need to focus on is to conduct informational offensives where tactical and operational failures can be converted into strategic victories.
Dheeraj Paramesha Chaya is a lecturer in intelligence and security at the Department of Criminology, University of Hull, United Kingdom
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