The discovery of the Lingshui 36-1 gas field in the contested SCS is likely to escalate regional tensions, as China and other stakeholders vie for control over strategic maritime resources
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The race for extracting natural resources from the oceans have picked pace over the last few decades. The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a critical maritime space offering rich energy and gas fields prompting increasing interest from key stakeholders in the region. This has also resulted in tensions among resident and non-resident powers over claims on key strategic theatres in the region. China’s belligerent posturing, driven by its resolve to seek control over disputed pockets in the Indo-Pacific, has resulted in physical confrontation among various arms of coastguards of countries in the region, while some have also turned to international juridical institutions to push back against Beijing.
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the third-largest national oil company of China, has recently confirmed the discovery of gas in place at the Lingshui 36-1 gas field. This is widely regarded as a critical development since the Lingshui 36-1 gas field, estimated at more than 100 billion cubic meters, is the world’s first large, ultra-shallow gas field in ultra-deep waters. Notably, the Lingshui 36-1 gas field falls within the contested waters of the South China Sea (SCS) region. Arguably, the SCS region is one of the most disputed strategic theatres in the Indo-Pacific region. With China making assertive claims of control over the region, and other resident powers including the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan staking counterclaims in strategically located pockets of the region, the discovery of the Lingshui 36-1 gas field is likely to further intensify the territorial disputes in the SCS.
If countries increasingly direct their outlook towards oceanic spaces as geographies vital for strategic use, a rethink on the endurance of these partnerships becomes essential.
While territorial disputes in the SCS may pertain to the importance of the region as a vital geography for its key strategic location, increasingly the tensions of the region are likely to be moulded by not just its significance as a geostrategic region but also its strategic significance in advancing the national interests of various regional stakeholders. Thus, the discovery of the Linghsui 36-1 gas field is likely to accelerate an unfolding race over strategic use of the South China Sea, and the wider Indo-Pacific. This further poses complications for ensuing geopolitics in the region. By virtue of geography, resident powers have sought to leverage their location in expanding networks of strategic partnerships. In the Indo-Pacific context, the Southeast Asian countries are a critical case in point. Many Southeast Asian nations have had long-standing disputes with China, especially in the SCS. While these countries are far behind China in terms of their military capabilities and bandwidth, they continue to receive support from US, India, Japan, and other like-minded countries, aiding, at least notionally, their resilience to counter China. If countries increasingly direct their outlook towards oceanic spaces as geographies vital for strategic use, a rethink on the endurance of these partnerships becomes essential. This, however, does not discount the view that strategic partnerships and cooperation will remain pivotal in shaping the maritime security and governance architectures in the region.
In the SCS region, the prevalent territorial disputes have drawn significant strategic attention, particularly for their fatalistic ramifications for the overarching security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. The discovery of the Lingshui 36-1 gas field, and its significance as the world’s first large, ultra-shallow gas field in ultra-deep waters is likely to intensify the race for further expeditions to locate resources in the region. This is further complemented by the growing demand for energy resources, and impediments in supply on account of global tensions. For China, this discovery is crucial in partly overcoming its enduring threat perception of a potential blockade disrupting its sea lines of communication (SLOC) passing through the Indian Ocean, also characterised as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, to meet its energy demands. Therefore, inspired by the discovery of the Lingshui 36-1, China is poised to continue expeditions across its maritime periphery and beyond, to seek more avenues to meet its growing energy demands. This is likely to prompt greater tensions among resident countries in the region.
The discovery of the Lingshui 36-1 gas field, and its significance as the world’s first large, ultra-shallow gas field in ultra-deep waters is likely to intensify the race for further expeditions to locate resources in the region.
Increasingly, India appears to be articulating more vociferously its views on the unfolding geopolitics and territorial disputes in the SCS region. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar’s recent visit to Tokyo for the Quad foreign ministers’ meet amply demonstrated New Delhi’s willingness to proactively voice concerns against China’s continued belligerence in the South China Sea. More importantly, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that India will not remain immune to China’s efforts at expeditions for natural resources. Two key developments endorse this view. First, Chinese research vessels linked to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are increasingly traversing into the Indian Ocean, within India’s primary area of interest for research and survey. Given that important neighboring states such as Sri Lanka have allowed these ships to be docked at their ports in the past need to caution India of the possibility of Chinese expeditions within India’s maritime periphery. Second, China has undertaken efforts to build a regional multilateral forum since 2022—the China-Indian Ocean Forum, including key players in the Indian Ocean, keeping India out of the initiative. Beijing has placed significant emphasis on harnessing opportunities from aspects of the Blue Economy. Given that most of the Indian Ocean littoral states continue to be dependent on oceanic resources, Chinese efforts to extract resources from the Indian Ocean under the rubric of a grouping backed by Beijing cannot be discounted.
Indeed, the discovery of the Lingshui 36-1 gas field is an important development. This will certainly boost efforts to look for resources in the maritime domain, in the midst of crises in traditional sources of energy procurement. An immediate consequence would be the likely intensification of tensions in the already volatile SCS region. However, this also points towards a larger trend—increasingly oceanic spaces are likely to be seen through the prism of strategic use. Maritime spaces are vast and complex, making it imperative to not divorce the notion of control over oceans from the uses of the oceans. Thus, a rethink is important—the extent of engagement that various stakeholders pursue in the Indo-Pacific is likely to be driven by how they seek to use the oceans.
Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s research focuses on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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