East Asia is brewing with tension thanks to North Korea’s
belligerent missile testing and Chinese
military drills near Taiwan. While Seoul is strengthening its diplomatic and military capabilities to deal with this, it is Japan’s proposed plan to increase its defence expenditure that is grabbing eyeballs. Japan’s new defence plan includes Japan’s renewed claims on Dokdo islets, which has angered South Korea again. In this brief, we’ll analyse Japan’s revised security strategy and how it impacted the Korean Peninsula.
Japan’s security concerns
Japan’s postwar focus was to become an economic powerhouse, and its security was laid in
Article 9, as enshrined in the Japanese Constitution. Ever since Japan became an economic powerhouse, it largely remained connected to regional and global affairs through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), Official Development Assistance (ODA), and diplomacy based on culture, food, trade, etc. However, the recent
barrage of missile tests by North Korea, China’s constant
misadventures near its borders and
drills near Taiwan, and the rising criticisms for depending on the United States (US) for its security needs have made Japan amend its pacifist ways. The recent unveiling of its
National Security Strategy (NSS) on 16
th December, has signalled its long-pending demand of strengthening its security strategy. While stopping short of a constitutional amendment, the security documents indicate that Japan is veering away from the
pacifist constitution, which renounces war.
Japan’s new defence plan includes Japan’s renewed claims on Dokdo islets, which has angered South Korea again.
NSS and how it has changed?
The new NSS is a revised, robust national security strategy and complementary defence planning document. The NSS presents the guiding
principles of Japan's security and its national interests and objectives, demonstrates the security environment surrounding it, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and reflects Japan’s growing sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours. The strategy is Japan’s first in nearly 10 years and overall, it's second ever. The challenges faced by Japan 10 years ago were more to do with the
security challenges posed by China, while regarding China’s actions as an
“issue of concern to the international community.” However, the new NSS language is
blunt and describes China as its “greatest strategic challenge”. Additionally, it includes provisions that would enable the country to have
capabilities to directly carry out counterattacks on enemy missile-firing bases. This could potentially allow Japan to launch direct
strikes against missile bases in North Korea and China.
To mitigate the rising threats, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has asked his cabinet to secure enough funds to increase defence spending to 2 percent of GDP in the
next five years. Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada said that PM Kishida told him and Finance Minister Shunichi Suzuki to urgently increase its defence budget by fiscal 2027. Hamada further added that Kishida wants the administration to review government expenditures and
revenue streams, and decide how it can secure extra funding to increase its defence budget. Japan's
standard spending stands no more than 1 percent of its GDP on defence; the
proposed increase to 2 percent would be about US$287 billion over the next five years. In comparison, Japan’s defence budget for the fiscal year that ends in March 2023 is US
$39.66 billion. However, the revised measures by Japan are creating a furore in the neighbourhood, reviving the memories of Japan’s brutal imperial past.
The challenges faced by Japan 10 years ago were more to do with the security challenges posed by China, while regarding China’s actions as an “issue of concern to the international community.”
The Korean response
Unquestionably, this aggressive change was met with Chinese criticism which firmly opposed the Japanese description of China as its “greatest strategic challenge”. The revised NSS includes counterstrike capabilities and the territorial claim on Dokdo which has garnered criticism from the Korean Peninsula. Revised NSS
describes North Korea as “an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.” In response, North Korea’s foreign ministry condemned Japan’s move to authorise counterstrike capabilities and stated that it will take
‘actual action’ against Tokyo’s new security strategy. The document also
renewed claims on the Dokdo islets, called Takeshima by Tokyo, as Japan's “inherent territory” has created an
uproar in South Korea.
South Korean Foreign Ministry officials
criticised the revised NSS and argued for closer consultation on defence issues, and sought its approval in advance on issues that might have a significant
impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula and national interest. Gallup Institute’s
data shows that progressives and conservatives differ in viewing Japan’s NSS. Korea’s nationalist left found Japan’s revised NSS as a
sign of colonial militarism, a threat to Korean sovereignty, and a weakening of the current administration’s efforts to normalise ties. Whereas, conservatives have been calmer than progressives about this change. The
column in Donga Ilbo newspaper gave a lukewarm warning: “It is difficult to rule out the possibility of awakening the Japanese imperialism”. Meanwhile, other major conservative newspapers, such as the Chosun Ilbo, have refrained from criticising the NSS.
North Korea’s foreign ministry condemned Japan’s move to authorise counterstrike capabilities and stated that it will take ‘actual action’ against Tokyo’s new security strategy.
On the other hand, Progressive media houses, have been vocal about anti-Japanese sentiments. For example,
Kyunghyang Daily posits that Japan’s shift in its defence policy “should be an issue of concern because Kishida discarded the Peace Constitution and opened the way for Japan to become a military power.” In an interview with MBC, Choi Jong-gun, the former vice minister of foreign affairs in the Moon Jae-in administration,
said that Japan “denies Korea’s territorial and historical identity”. He also criticised the Yoon Suk-Yeol administration by saying that instead of looking into this alleged diplomatic insult, Yeol is busy cheering for ROK-US-Japan cooperation.
Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution declares any part of the Korean peninsula as a sovereign territory. Regarding this, a
column in the Hankyoreh newspaper mentions, “Japan made its ‘counterstrike capability’ doctrine official, which is, in effect, a preemptive strike capability on enemy bases. Hence, how can we accept the Japanese decision of able to strike the Korean peninsula as under their preemptive attack parameters?” Meanwhile, multiple South Korean civic groups
staged a protest in front of the Japanese Embassy against the planned amendments to the national security policies. However, the overall
response from the South Korean government reportedly welcomed counterstrike capability as it could contribute to regional peace and stability but outrightly rejected the Dokdo claims and called it a hindrance in growing relations.
Conclusion
The NSS
stipulates that striking enemy bases are permissible “as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others,” as these count as “self-defence.” Japan has every right to develop it as North Korea’s constant threat is not only limited to South Korea. However, the concern regarding Dokdo/Takeshima islets has only added fuel to the fire. In any case, the reaction to the shift in Japan’s defence policy shows that though the attitude toward Japan’s NSS remains increasingly divided, anti-Japanese sentiment remains strong. Moreover, Japan, China, and South Korea have failed to hold
a summit for three straight years, citing various issues with each other. However, for Japan, the new security strategy is a clear migration from the Yoshida Doctrine but not a
decoupling strategy. NSS advocates for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, investing in resilience and economic diversification from China. NSS ensures Japan remains strategically autonomous and co-operates with like-minded nations. Additionally, it is resisting Chinese hegemony while seeking opportunities to work with revisionist states in the future.
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