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For far too long, the Indo-German relationship has been one of unfulfilled promises. This may be about to change.
Image Source: Getty
Against the backdrop of the seventh instalment of the Intergovernmental Consultations between India and Germany, this article develops three points. As a first step, it identifies the key issues that led the Indo-German relationship to underperform in recent years, despite the many favourable factors that should have made the two countries natural allies. In the second section, it explains why these two strategic partners may be entering a new era of cooperation. The third section offers some caveats.
India and Germany have been strategic partners since 2000. India was among the first countries to recognise the Federal Republic of Germany; the two celebrated 70 years of diplomatic relations in 2021. And yet, for different reasons at different points in time, the partnership remained a lacklustre one. A commonly used German phrase, “Luft nach oben” comes to mind when describing the state of affairs between the two democracies: acceptable enough as a relationship, but one that leaves much room for improvement. Compared especially with the warmth in the Indo-French relationship, the contrast was striking.
India was among the first countries to recognise the Federal Republic of Germany; the two celebrated 70 years of diplomatic relations in 2021.
Amongst the several irritants, three stood in recent years.
First, for all the talk of working with India at an “eye-to-eye level”, Germany did not seem to walk the talk. Frequent sniping from Germany on questions of values and raising eyebrows on the state of Indian democracy—even only a few months ago on the matter of Mr Kejriwal’s arrest, for instance—did not help the relationship.
Second, India’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine disappointed Germany, and German disappointment on this issue, in turn, irritated the Indians.
Third, unlike the Indo-French relationship that includes a robust component of defence cooperation, Germany’s historic hesitation to engage on this issue was another deterrent to deepening cooperation between the two countries. This reluctance on the part of Germany was serious for India, given its difficult immediate neighbourhood and its broader region at large.
But things may be about to change.
Unlike the Indo-French relationship that includes a robust component of defence cooperation, Germany’s historic hesitation to engage on this issue was another deterrent to deepening cooperation between the two countries.
Last week, the German Federal Government published a paper entitled “Focus on India”. This document reflects the important changes that are underway in Germany and the new approach that it now seems to be taking towards India.
First, the document reveals a resounding appreciation for Indian democracy. Chapter 1 is in fact and entitled “India—a democratic partner of Germany for stability and security”. Its comment on the 2024 Indian elections is an unambiguous statement of support: “The 2024 parliamentary elections in India impressively demonstrated the vitality of the world’s largest democracy.” Further, instead of the usual lecturing on values to India, the document recognises that the two countries have values in common, which both seek to preserve.
Second, the document does not shy away from recognising differences between India and Germany on Russia. But it moves beyond the old exhortations to India to rethink its position. Instead, it adopts a position that some (including this author) have been advising on for years—that Germany becomes a reliable security partner for India—which will also help reduce India’s dependence on Russia for military supplies.
In the context of India’s relationship with Russia, but also factoring in the Indo-Pacific and India’s “direct neighbourhood”, the document is clear in addressing the third sticking point of defence cooperation: “The German Government will therefore expand its arms cooperation with India, continue to improve the reliability and predictability of arms export control procedures, and promote and support cooperation between German and Indian arms companies. The German Government will make relevant decisions based on the applicable national and European guidelines.” Expanding and deepening military cooperation with India is exactly what is needed
The document also does well in other areas where Germany already cooperates, including multilateralism, green energy, climate, development cooperation, trade, immigration, and research & academia. It recognises India’s achievements, including on the G20 and the solar alliance, and rightly acknowledges that Germany can learn from India—rather than just the other way around. The language on implementation is strong, with not just shoulds, but wills.
The document also does well in other areas where Germany already cooperates, including multilateralism, green energy, climate, development cooperation, trade, immigration, and research & academia.
The content and tone of the document suggest a change in Germany’s foreign policy towards India. This positive shift is perhaps partly a result of some self-reflection on the part of Germany’s foreign policy elites (prompted, in turn, by a growing recognition in Germany of the dangers of China’s rise and the failed hope of Wandel durch Handel, or Change Through Trade). But India deserves a good deal of the credit, too. India has proven itself to be an economic powerhouse with democratic credentials and a responsible global player (which, for instance, came to the aid of those who could not afford vaccines via its Vaccine Maitri initiative). Its diplomacy has been highly effective amidst several global crises. This is a power that should not have been sidelined before and is now even more indispensable to the West now. The document shows recognition of this. If Germany takes this document as the basis of its future dealings with India, then we can be cautiously optimistic about the significant strides forward this relationship can finally take.
While the document is suggestive of an important and positive shift towards India by Germany, questions of implementation and sustainability remain. Governments are not unitary actors; Germany’s federal system is complex; Chancellor Scholz’s government is made up of three parties that do not always agree with each other. And even if these complicating factors were not present, public engagement and buy-in will be crucial to develop the agenda laid out in the document. Thus far, Germany has maintained a much stronger interest in China than India, as is reflected in the funding for academic positions and research institutions, as well as the contrasting content and volume of coverage received by the two in German media. It remains to be seen if and how Germany will attract top-level expertise on and from India, and manage to create public awareness about the country that goes beyond crude stereotypes.
The more Germany comes to recognise and appreciate the different identities and ideas that India brings to the negotiating table, the deeper and more meaningful will this bilateral cooperation become.
Second, it is impossible to ignore the occasional slip back into the old paternalism even within the impressive Focus on India document. An example of this is with reference to the Global South, where three mentions of the term are preceded by “so-called”. This dismissal of the Global South as a term and an entity has become fashionable in the West in recent years. But for India and the 123 countries that participated in the third Voice of Global South summit in August 2024, there is nothing “so-called” about the Global South. Moreover, this is not an issue of “just” language but has concrete policy implications. The more Germany comes to recognise and appreciate the different identities and ideas that India brings to the negotiating table, the deeper and more meaningful will this bilateral cooperation become.
Amrita Narlikar is Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Amrita Narlikar’s research expertise lies in the areas of international negotiation, World Trade Organization, multilateralism, and India’s foreign policy & strategic thought. Amrita is Distinguished ...
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