On 8 September, Asir Nazir Dar was found shot in the head outside of Srinagar’s Kashmir University Campus. He was an engineering dropout, described by his friends as a “polite and religious person”. Others, however, knew him by his alias Abu Anwar al-Kashmiri, and as the third Amir of the Islamic State for Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK). The identity of the assailant is disputed: authorities claim Dar’s death was on orders of Hizbul Mujahideen while Islamic State’s (IS) Jammu and Kashmir media outlet, Al-Tazkirah, claimed that he was killed by Indian agencies. What is known is that Dar’s death marks the third Amir of ISJK to be killed in six months, and the tenth member to be killed in 10 months.
Following Dar’s death, the media was flooded with reports describing the ‘IS shadow lengthening over Kashmir’, as well as senior officials identifying ISJK as ‘a serious threat’. This newly familiar narrative permeates the coverage each time something that links the IS to Kashmir occurs. Up until now, the supposed ISJK has demonstrated a series of unsuccessful operations and at small-scale compared to other militant groups operating in the region. However, the subsequent discourse identifies ISJK as a much more concerning presence than the events indicate. This signifies an emerging incoherence between the information reported and the way that such information is interpreted. Perhaps, this is unsurprising, given that the media often thrives off sensationalising minor occurrences. Yet, employing these tactics here is uniquely dangerous: legitimising ISJK is inherently politicised, and we should be careful of overestimating, and thus amplifying the issue.
Back in 2016, the IS had announced their intentions to expand into Kashmir. However, the movement lacked traction, and signs of the IS in the Valley only began appearing much later, after the liberation of Mosul in 2017. In November of that year, the group’s Telegram channel (an encrypted social media apparatus popular with IS), Al-Qaraar, claimed responsibility for the killing of a police officer. However, the claim was not verified, and intelligence agencies have doubted its accuracy. The broad consensus is that if there will be such a thing as ‘ISIS 2.0’, it will re-emerge as a terror outfit, rather than an immediate relived attempt to establish a caliphate (even if that does remain their primary goal). The re-capturing of Mosul by Iraqi forces marked a pivotal defeat for the IS, and the beginning of an uncertain future for them in West Asia. Reports of fighters and assets being smuggled out of Syria and Iraq and into Afghanistan have led analysts to question the group’s next move.
To understand what expansion means on IS terms; one need not look too far. The IS has become a global brand of jihadism off the back of their pervasive online media propaganda. It’s no surprise then that the most concrete evidence available of the ISJK can be found on the internet. In late 2017, Al-Qaraar launched a media campaign directed at Kashmiris using the hashtag ‘#wilayatkashmir’. More recently, online propaganda and graffiti across the Valley brand Kashmir ‘The University of Jihad’. Documents distributed by Al-Qaraar implore followers of the IS to target the Indian and Pakistani armies, declaring that Pakistan is not a true supporter of the Kashmiri struggle and Islam, but its own interests. This narrative echoes the attempt by Al-Qaeda to encourage Kashmiris to wage jihad against Pakistan in the late 2000s, which met minimal success.
Aside from their basic online presence, the physical imprint of the IS in the Valley is modest. Current intelligence indicates 4/5 militants are active in the region, all of whom are identified. Coverage of the group has been dominated by failures including arrests and killings of militants by intelligence agencies. The only verified evidence of an IS attack in the region was in February, in which a police officer guarding a moderate separatist leader in Srinagar was killed. However, even here, the details are underwhelming. A follower of the IS, Eisa Fazili, killed a police officer, then contacted the IS to inform them, and after which they claimed responsibility for the killing. It is likely that the IS were unaware of Fazili’s intentions prior to the murder. As ORF’s analyst Kabir Taneja rightly pointed out, there is a difference between killing on behalf of the IS and killing in the name of the IS, and this case is clearly the latter. On 11 September, the IS claimed responsibility for the killing of a PhD student in Srinagar, calling him an ‘Indian intelligence officer’. However, intelligence agency officials have doubted the accuracy of the claim. Just like the incident in February, there is little evidence to suggest that knowledge of the intent to commit an attack extended any further than Srinagar.
The world is no stranger to IS’s opportunistic attempts to claim responsibility for attacks they did not really commit. Such tactics are a valuable weapon in their media arson that we have seen deployed globally – and Kashmir is no exception. Following their failures in West Asia, creating a presence -- whether that presence is representative of the situation on the ground or not -- will prove essential to IS’s fight to stay relevant. Offering ISJK any kind of legitimacy therefore bears an intrinsic political element of which media and officials should be wary.
This is true for media outlets across the world. However, the complex political situation in Kashmir renders it especially crucial. Presently, what journalist and author David Devadas calls a ‘generation of rage’ exists in Kashmir: young, impressionable teenagers who are willing to take matters into their own hands to express their outrage. It is widely agreed that those aged 14-16 prolonged the 2016 unrest in the Valley, and not the older, more seasoned protestors. A strong IS footprint in the media, as well as an extensive online presence, may create a breeding ground for the radicalisation of young minds, who are far more inclined to be attracted to the newer, more glamourous jihadism offered by an outfit like ISJK.
That said, there are clear obstacles for the IS in Kashmir that should not be overlooked. Furthering a commitment to pan-Islamism amongst the nationalist and separatist dialogues that have presided for decades in the region seems like an ambitious task. Moreover, we have already seen the failure of Al-Qaeda to encourage an anti-Pakistan narrative in Kashmir. Reports on Twitter from pro-Pakistan activists have accused Indian agencies of fabricating the presence of the IS in Kashmir in an attempt to defame the freedom struggle. This includes a video that shows an undercover Indian police officer in the act of arresting a protestor, after many reported seeing him waving an IS flag for press cameras. The United Jihad Council (UJC) has echoed a similar claim, whilst the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) has declared the IS ‘un-Islamic’. Given the hostility of the environment and the major ideological differences, it may not come as a shock to find that an IS affiliate told officials that Kashmir has come up only twice, and that it was deliberately not chosen to establish a caliphate.
The reality is that ISJK is a small, unsuccessful outfit with limited potential for growth in the region. Yet, the narrative of their imminent threat has progressively found its way into the minds of media and officials alike. Like any militant group, intelligence agencies should take care to see their presence eradicated. Yet, we should be careful not to magnify the problem and play into the hands of IS media tactics, as doing so may escalate tension in the region.
(The writer is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
