To assert itself at a global scale, India must employ development cooperation objectives and utilise multilateral and plurilateral forums through a strategic plan.
This article is part of the Global Policy-ORF publication — A 2030 Vision for India’s Economic Diplomacy.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant global lockdown measures have had an unprecedented social and economic impact, disproportionately affecting poorer nations. Global GDP is estimated to contract by 4.3 percent in 2020, sending an additional 130 million people into extreme poverty<1>. This effect will be particularly devastating in the 46 least developed countries (LDC), with the already low standards of living falling further and high poverty rates steadily rising. Prior achievements on education, nutrition and health are being undone by the crisis, and there is an added stress on fragile healthcare systems.
With effects of this global crisis expected to continue until the next decade, human security and development will need to take centre stage in global affairs in the next few years. The massive economic fallout of the pandemic has made it imperative to expand foreign policy focus beyond traditional concerns of states around geopolitics into more complex global development challenges like public health and climate change. Currently, India’s immediate economic and security interests — such as maintaining regional stability, ensuring balance of power and meeting energy requirements — play a key role in the development cooperation with African countries and those in the neighbourhood. These interests need to be realigned to emphasise the linkages between traditional diplomacy and new economic diplomacy, with its focus on development and human security.
COVID-19 should be seen as a turning point, where India’s foreign policy agenda should prioritise its development partnerships. India will need to craft new strategies with a broader vision to engage in international development and global security as it bids for greater power status with agenda-setting abilities.
India’s economic diplomacy is shaped by solidarity with past associations and is largely anchored in its neighbourhood and Africa. But future economic diplomacy agencies will have to be located in a new geopolitical dimension that goes far beyond the impulse of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which set up cooperation channels between Asia and Africa in the colonial and post-colonial era<2>. The Indian Development and Economic Assistance (IDEA) programme, which began in 2003-04 as an initiative to provide grants and project assistance to developing countries in Africa, South Asia and other parts of the world, remains crucial in the post-pandemic world.
India’s commitment to international development cooperation in the financial year 2019-20 stood at US$ 1.32 billion, a significant increase over the three preceding years<3>. Although the allocation is less than 1 percent of India’s overall budget, it is still a significant contribution as compared to other high-income countries, such as Australia (US$ 2.8 billion, 0.22 percent of GDP), South Korea (US$ 2.5 billion, 0.15 percent of GDP) and Austria (US$ 1.2 billion, 0.27 percent of GDP), considering India’s US$ 2 billion in credit lines<4>. India pledged its highest foreign assistance budget so far in the financial year 2015-16, with commitments of US$ 1.52 billion that included US$ 290 million to large-scale projects like the Afghan–India Friendship Dam<5>.
The country’s overseas development assistance increased substantially in the 1990s and significant changes came in 2004 when India launched the second phase of line of credit (LOC) programme to extend concessional loans to partner countries in Asia and Africa through the Export Import Bank of India (EXIM). The LOCs are provided to developing countries on the recommendations of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), with over 300 LOCs worth US$ 30.66 billion extended to 64 countries until 2020. About half this amount, US$ 15.90 billion, has been extended to Asian countries, with the largest value going to India’s neighbours — Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Mauritius, Maldives, Myanmar and Seychelles<6>. The funds cover critical infrastructure sectors — transport connectivity through railways, roads and ports; power generation and distribution; agriculture and irrigation; manufacturing industries, healthcare, education and capacity building.
India’s capacity-building initiative, one of the key aspects of development cooperation, is channelled through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, which was constituted in 1964 and emerged as a prominent aspect of the development cooperation by 2015<7>. In one of the first signs of shifting priorities for development cooperation during the coronavirus crisis, ITEC conducted a multi-country training programme on COVID-19 in June 2020 titled ‘Good Governance Practices in a Pandemic’ through a webinar, with participation from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, Kenya, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Somalia, Thailand, Tunisia, Tonga, Sudan and Uzbekistan<8>.
Currently, India employs multiple instruments, such as grant-in-aid, line of credit, and capacity-building and technical assistance, to achieve its development cooperation objectives. The Development Partnership Administration (DPA), housed within the MEA, is responsible for the overall management, coordination and administration of India’s development partnerships<9>.
Official development assistance (ODA), an indicator of international aid flow, by traditional donors was severely impacted during the COVID-19 crisis<10>. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has urged the international community to safeguard ODA to face challenges to basic health infrastructure and social protection programmes from COVID-19<11>. It is becoming increasingly clear that emerging powers like the BRICS nations will play a significant role in the future, with China and Russia already showing a readiness to lead on global issues and provide international development aid. The New Development Bank (NDB), a multilateral development bank established by BRICS, has promised to provide up to US$ 10 billion in assistance to combat COVID-19 crisis and has already provided loans to Brazil, China, India and South Africa for their economic recovery<12>.
Despite the slowdown induced by the pandemic, India’s GDP could reach US$ 5 trillion by 2026-27 with optimistic prospects for domestic growth and an increase in spending ability<13>. It remains to be seen whether the country will be able to continue to ramp up its ODA.
India needs a clear vision to lead a sustainable development agenda while positioning itself as a global power with interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. To achieve this, there is an urgent need to push for reforms in existing institutional structures on development cooperation. The new institutional architecture should be able to address better delivery, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and should engage with new actors, especially from civil society and the private sector<14>.
India must move beyond government-to-government negotiations and agreements to include more plural and diverse stakeholders — such as representatives from the private sector, academia, philanthropic institutions and civil society — most of whom will be operating in distant locations. Economic diplomacy necessitates a collective beyond the government that will place ‘brand India’ at the centre of all diplomatic relations.
In January 2020, the MEA began a restructuring process to renew its focus on development cooperation along with other verticals such as cultural diplomacy, economic and trade coordination, multilateral organisations and global summits<15>. A ‘New, Emerging and Strategic Technologies’ (NEST) division is also being set to facilitate collaboration with foreign countries on advanced technologies, as well as geographical divisions for better coordination<16>.
This paper makes a case for revisions to India’s existing institutional architecture for development cooperation through five key approaches: the Development Cooperation Act (2022), the establishment of an independent development partnership agency, private sector and civil society engagement, multilateralism, and plurilateralism.
India must redefine its ‘development cooperation’ as a set of activities with clearly defined objectives (such as environmental protection, strengthening of public health systems and eradication of poverty) and that can be financed through the Union Budget. India can seek to take up larger goals such as the strengthening of democracies across the world by promoting human rights and good governance in other countries under the umbrella of development cooperation. A vision such as this may be a slight departure from the current focus of providing only need-driven and demand-driven aid for friendly neighbouring countries, but it reflects the growing ambitions of the country to project itself on a global scale. This calls for a revision in India’s approach to be more in line with the changing world, while respecting the sovereignty of the recipient nation<17>.
There are indications that the future of development cooperation will be heavily impacted by the COVID-19 crisis and focused international cooperation is necessary to deal with the emerging global crisis<18>. This can be achieved through the exchange of material, services and knowledge. India’s upcoming Development Cooperation Act should reflect that a focused approach towards addressing global crisis is in its national interest.
Currently, India’s development cooperation objectives are broadly based on the South-South cooperation (SSC) framework — a technical cooperation tool among the developing countries in the Global South to collaborate on areas such as agricultural development, human rights, urbanisation, health and climate change. At the global stage, SSC is seen as an expression of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South, and as a complement to North-South Cooperation (NSC) not as a substitute to ODA<19>. While India views SSC as an alternative to the traditional NSC that can help a country become a major international player in the business of aid, many analysts suggest that SSC does not represent the country’s ambitions to the fullest. There is a need for India to make a strong independent commitment to global causes and initiate change through its development aid<20>.
A criticism of India’s aid programme is the absence of detailed information in the public domain and confusion on available details<21>. This lack of clarity is hindering India from becoming a major player in the international aid dynamics and from influencing the global aid architecture in a significant way. India’s Development Cooperation Act must address these issues and articulate a clear vision that guides the development partnerships and diplomacy.
Furthermore, India must prepare these policies keeping in mind accountability to the public, as growing foreign aid contributions will increasingly come under scrutiny. For example, the enormous goodwill that India had generated by providing aid to other countries during the COVID-19 pandemic was challenged by domestic situations such as the plight of migrant workers. It will be increasingly difficult to justify overseas aid when there are domestic lapses in public health, minority protection and social development<22>.
India could draw lessons from the UK’s International Development Act of 2002 which detailed the country’s objective to contribute towards global poverty reduction<23>. The UK was one of the first countries to provide aid without being tied to any domestic policy considerations, making the 2002 Act an effective and successful framework<24>. The UK had also established the Department for International Development (DfID), to administer its development assistance budget. DfID is mandated to have close interdepartmental relations with key stakeholders and sharing of resources to achieve best results. Unfortunately, a June 2020 decision to merge the DfID with the Foreign Office has attracted wide criticism, but is seen as an inevitable consequence due to the slowdown of the UK’s economy<25>. For India, it is an opportunity and a clear indication that emerging powers with fast growing economies can provide an alternative structure to global development objectives. A vision that is independent of short-term geopolitical gains can ensure continuity in development aid regardless of policy fluctuations of different administrations, thereby building greater trust and credibility for the programme.
The mandate for cooperation must also incorporate changing requirements at the domestic and international levels, which can help in uncertain crisis situations. For instance, the German development agency GIZ, under the federal development ministry, was able to expand current projects to include measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic without any additional financial resources<26>.
To realise an institutional architecture for development cooperation, India needs an independent development partnership agency that develops long-term and short-term strategies, identifies priorities, builds knowledge and facilitates learning.
In its current form, the DPA is unlikely to be an authoritative agency that can realise the wider mandate of India’s development partnership. As a department under the MEA, there are several limitations to its functioning, including the lack of authority to undertake inter-ministerial coordination when required. To address this issue, changes must be made to transform the DPA into a more autonomous entity within the MEA, led by a Secretary-rank officer and empowered to address long-term and short-term strategies, including concerns around accountability. The need for an independent agency is recognised by several countries in the Global South. For instance, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, affiliated to the country’s foreign ministry, has a mandate to negotiate, coordinate, implement and monitor technical cooperation projects and programmes between Brazil and other countries<27>. Similarly, the Thailand International Cooperation Agency and Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development are independent entities empowered to implement development cooperation objectives of their countries<28>.
If empowered as an autonomous agency, the DPA can facilitate information sharing and create platforms for policy coordination across government departments, ensure coordinated efforts needed for development gains and mobilise resources quickly. The agency must have the mandate to articulate roles and responsibilities from various government ministries. The agency can also ensure continuity in India’s overseas development cooperation during changes in administration after elections.
As India’s development cooperation grows, the spending will come under public scrutiny; this requires an effective accountability and evaluation framework<29>. The lack of information disseminated in the public domain about India’s current development cooperation framework has been widely criticised by policy experts. The few strands of information that is available is widely dispersed and highly disaggregated, and has been further criticised in global platforms<30>. This opacity makes monitoring and evaluation difficult and creates a credibility crisis. The proposed independent agency must provide transparent access to information on budgets and programmes, and clearly articulate policy outcomes so it is not subject to the changing ideologies and priorities of different governments. Commitments to ensure the periodic review and revision of India’s international development cooperation policy based on broader strategic goals are also needed.
The proposed agency could be a resource centre that can help other developing countries in developing their cooperation framework. The resource centre can maintain careful documentation of the projects that are implemented through development cooperation. Over time, it can become a repository of knowledge that can inform future interventions. Knowledge sharing can also become a tool to engage with other Global South countries that seek India’s expertise in development cooperation. For instance, during the 2010 Haiti earthquake, knowledge sharing among donor countries helped in strategising an effective response<31>.
A successful knowledge hub will require proactive participation from civil society, national governments, private sector, academia and others. There will also need to be clear coordination with existing knowledge hubs, especially those by multilateral forums.
The development objectives of the proposed agency must reflect the progressive values of the emerging world with specific emphasis on diversity, gender empowerment and addressing social inequalities while preserving cultural identities. The agency must work towards Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) coordinating the government, private sector, academia and civil society.
The demand-driven approach of India’s development cooperation emphasises that the partner country does not have any obligations associated with the funding and is free to follow its laws and national interests while implementing cooperation projects<32>. With increasing geopolitical influence, India’s development cooperation is moving towards a need-driven approach where meeting the partner country’s development objectives goes hand-in-hand with India’s objective for strengthening the bilateral relationships through private sector investments.
The DPA is exploring innovative public–private partnership (PPP) models with Indian businesses to leverage their expertise in helping realise India’s development cooperation goals. In a recent review, the MEA has included about 27 new partner institutions of technical excellence, with seven new private sector institutes/universities selected to provide training<33>. The ITEC constitutes capacity-building partnerships with a footprint in 160 partner countries in Asia, Africa, East Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands, as well as small island countries.
Development cooperation projects across the world are adapting a PPP model in their implementation. In its 2030 Agenda, the OECD is prioritising engagement with civil society organisations to implement and monitor the SDGs. The OECD plans to build on the capacity of civil society members to bring forth the voices of those who are engaged in programmes related to poverty alleviation and other development objectives<34>.
India’s efforts towards collaborations with the private sector and civil society can be achieved by engaging with existing platforms such as the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC) — an initiative by the DPA, academia and civil society organisations, and launched in 2013 — that has been working to raise awareness on various dimensions of development cooperation policies through public engagement at the domestic level<35>.
Cooperation among countries can accelerate the response within individual nations and across regions during a global health crisis. It involves creating, adapting, transferring, and sharing knowledge and experiences to improve health, while making the most of existing resources and capacities. The World Health Organisation (WHO) made important strides in addressing shared health goals through cooperation. Within this landscape of cooperation, there has been a shift away from ODA towards effective development cooperation. The benefits include cooperation among countries to support and reinforce national efforts for health development and knowledge sharing. These exchanges have the potential to impact sub-regional and regional integration processes as well as global health debates. India must support these global health initiatives by the WHO and encourage knowledge sharing through SSC and triangular cooperation, BRICS and health cooperation in Small Island Development States<36>.
Traditional development cooperation providers are moving to align their efforts with ambitious climate action. OECD member states are building strategies to reorient aid to address the climate emergency in a way that can further help in their national and regional efforts. Efforts are also underway to include a pro-climate sustainable development cooperation in the OECD’s 2030 agenda that aligns with the Paris Agreement. The OECD has called for efforts to integrate the climate imperative into providers’ mandates and performance systems while establishing the right capacities and tools to deliver<37>.
The LDCs are among the most vulnerable to climate change. It might become extremely challenging for some of these countries to recover from climate stress as their economic growth is highly dependent on climate-sensitive sectors. For India, aligning with the Paris Agreement brings opportunities for development in the region. Fundamentally, alignment means ensuring that development pathways are low emissions, climate resilient and sustainable in the face of the multi-layered challenges that developing countries now face. India must recognise and take up the vast evidence that sound climate change policy is also sound development policy. India is currently in a unique position to mediate some of these crucial dialogues related to climate change at the various multilateral forums<38>.
India could utilise this opportunity and further assert itself by providing sustained long-term cooperation as a response to the crisis and reiterating its commitment to development cooperation. While India strives to assert itself globally using every opportunity for development cooperation, it could further its agenda by articulating its contributions towards the SDGs and efforts to mitigate climate change. By doing so, India needs to reassert and reaffirm its commitment to bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as the SSC. The ODA response to the COVID-19 pandemic remains insufficient, given the additional financing needed, and risk-informed development cooperation at multilateral forums will be vital in building back better systems after the pandemic<39>.
The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the serious drawbacks of multilateralism as well as the need for plurilateralism. The paralysis of the World Trade Organisation and the WHO’s credibility crisis amid the pandemic have exposed the deep-rooted issues plaguing multilateralism, and severely impacting the response to the pandemic. It was evident that multilateralism, in its current form, is incapable of dealing with its misuse by strategic rivals. To counter this, countries have always come together in smaller groups to formulate, influence or negotiate in or outside multilateral frameworks. India needs to realise its development cooperation objectives through engagements at plurilateral forums like the G20, BRICS and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
India should actively participate in the G20’s efforts in mobilising development finance and cooperation amid the COVID-19 crisis. G20 leaders have expressed a need to consider aid for displaced people, vulnerable groups and LDCs that are seriously affected by the pandemic<40>. Some African countries and small island nations will need greater support from ODA along with other emergency finance support systems. India should promote healthy development cooperation among G20 member countries and complement global development finance in meeting the disastrous consequences of COVID-19.
At the 15th G20 Leaders’ Summit in November 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi highlighted the importance of building an inclusive, sustainable and resilient future, and called for effective global governance in the post-pandemic world and reformed multilateralism<41>.
Engagement with regional bodies need to be more strategic through the clear articulation of India’s policies on development issues. India can utilise the NDB established by BRICS to raise direct new resources for development partnerships. As of November 2020, the NDB has approved 65 sustainable development and infrastructure projects worth US$ 21 billion across all BRICS economies<42>. These projects touch key development areas for the partnering countries, ning clean energy, transport infrastructure, water resource management, urban development, environmental efficiency and social infrastructure.
Through the SAARC, India engages with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka as an active development partner, with several ongoing projects in these countries. The engagement is based on a consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented approach, while focusing on delivering benefits such as greater connectivity, improved infrastructure and strong development cooperation in various sectors.
There is no doubt that India needs a new institutional architecture for development cooperation that is more aligned with its global ambitions. It must take into account emerging global development challenges in the post-COVID-19 world, such as public health and climate change. To assert itself at a global scale, India must employ development cooperation objectives and utilise multilateral and plurilateral forums through a strategic plan.
In its current form, the DPA does not reflect the growing mandate of India’s development partnership. The DPA must be strengthened into a standalone body that can have long-term and short-term strategies, including addressing concerns around accountability, autonomy and responsiveness. A comprehensive policy on India’s development cooperation can be addressed only by a strong and autonomous agency that can coordinate with various departments of the government.
India needs to move from providing need-driven and demand-driven aid to friendly neighbouring countries to a much more focused approach with clearly defined objectives, such as environmental protection, strengthening of public health systems and eradicating poverty. India’s Development Cooperation Act must articulate a policy roadmap for this vision that reflects the aspirations of the country in the post-COVID-19 world. Furthermore, there is a need to create strategic clarity and public accountability as the contributions to development cooperation overseas grow and projects come under increased scrutiny.
<1> United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Trade and Development: Transitioning to a New Normal, UNCTAD, pp. 8.
<2> A. Appadorai, The Bandung Conference, New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, October 1955.
<3> Rani D. Mullen, “Indian Development Cooperation Regains Momentum: 7 main take-aways from India’s 2019-20 Union Budget,” Centre for Policy Research, July 2019, pp. 2.
<4> Donor Tracker, “South Korea,” Donor Tracker.
Angela Clare, “Australia’s foreign aid budget 2020–21,” Parliament of Australia, October 2020.;
OECD iLibrary, “DAC Member Profile: Austria,” OECD.
<5> Mullen, “Indian Development Cooperation Regains Momentum”
<6> Ministry of External Affairs, “Lines of Credit for Development Projects,” Government of India.
<7> Prabodh Saxena, “Emergence of LOCs as modality in India’s development cooperation: Evolving policy context and new challenges,” RIS Discussion Paper, June 2016.
<8> Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of External Affairs
<9> Ministry of External Affairs, “Divisions,” Government of India.
<10> Aleksandra Morozkina, “Impact of COVID-19 on International Development Assistance System,” Observer Research Foundation, 21 September 2020.
<11> “Six decades of ODA: insights and outlook in the COVID-19 crisis,” in OECD Development Co-operation Profiles 2020 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2020).
<12> New Development Bank, “COVID-19 Response Programme,” NDB.
<13> “India’s US$5 trillion dream is attainable if economy grows at this rate,” Business Today, October 2020.
<14> Urvashi Aneja and Tanoubi Ngangom, “Learning from the old, preparing for the new: Designing an Institutional Architecture for India’s Development Partnerships,” Observer Research Foundation, 24 March 2017.
<15> Harsh V. Pant, “Indian Foreign Policy and Its Aspirations: Institutional Design Matters,” Observer Research Foundation, 16 December 2020.
<16> Suhasini Haider, “Foreign Secretary unveils major MEA revamp,” The Hindu, 31 January 2020; Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “MEA sets up emerging technologies division,” The Economic Times, 2 January 2020.
<17> Indian Development Corporation Research, IDCR Report: The State of Indian Development Cooperation, Centre for Policy Research, 2014.
<18> Stephen Klingbiel and Artemy Izmestiev, “International (development) cooperation in a post-COVID-19 world: a new way of interaction or super-accelerator?” Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 8 May 2020.
<19> Yuefen Li, “Assessment of South-South Cooperation and the Global Narrative,” South Centre, November 2018.
<20> Urvashi Aneja, “Shifting Currents: India’s Rise as a Development Partner,” United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, November 2015.
<21> Jandhyala Tilak, “South-South Cooperation: India’s Programme of Development Assistance – Nature, Size and Functioning,” International Perspectives on Education and Society Vol. 29 (2016), pp. 301-326.
<22> Supriya Roychoudhary, Partnership in Times of Pandemic: India’s COVID Diplomacy, India-UK Development Partnership Forum, July 2020.
<23> Owen Matthew Barder, "Reforming development assistance: lessons from the UK experience," Center for Global Development, Working Paper 70 (2005).
<24> Library of Congress, “Regulation of Foreign Aid: United Kingdom,” United States Legislative Information.
<25> Kate Proctor and Karen McVeigh, “Anger grows over decision to merge DfID and Foreign Office,” The Guardian, June 2020.
<26> Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, “Focus Coronavirus,” GIZ.
<27> OECD, “Brazil’s Development Cooperation,” OECD.
<28> OECD, “A solid partnership between Thailand and the OECD,” OECD; Doaa El-Bay, “Interview: Egyptian Aid in Africa,” Ahram Online, 21 February 2020.
<29> Malancha Chakrabarty, “India’s development cooperation – are we getting it right?” Observer Research Foundation, 22 November 2019.
<30> Kashyap Arora and Rani D. Mullen, “South-South Development Cooperation: Analysis of India and China’s model of development cooperation abroad,” Centre for Policy Research, December 2017.
<31> Armida Alisjahbana, “Why knowledge sharing matters for development cooperation,” DevEx, 3 March 2014.
<32> “An Indian approach to International Development Cooperation,” Jindal Journal of Public Policy, vol. 3, issue 1.
<33> Ministry of External Affairs, “Capacity Building through ITEC,” Government of India.
<34> “Development Assistance Committee Members and Civil Society,” in The Development Dimension (Paris: OECD Publishing, 30 April 2020).
<35> “Indian Development Cooperation: A theoretical and institutional framework,” FIDC Policy Brief no.7, March 2016.
<36> WHO, “Cooperation among countries,” WHO.
<37> “Aligning Development cooperation and climate action,” in OECD Development Dimension (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019).
<38> Amitabh Mattoo and Amrita Narlikar, “Resuscitating multilateralism with India’s help,” The Hindu, 7 May 2020.
<39> Navid Hanif, “Build back better with risk-informed development cooperation,” Development Initiatives, 5 May 2020.
<40> Priyadarshi Dash, “G20 response to COVID-19,” G20 Digest, vol. 1, no.5 (March-May 2020).
<41> Narendra Modi (speech, 15th G20 Leaders’ Summit, 22 November 2020), PM India.
<42> Aashna Mehra and Meeta Keswani Mehra, “BRICS New Development Bank: Last five years and looking ahead into the next five,” Financial Express, 16 November 2020.
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Vikrom Mathur is Senior Fellow at ORF. Vikrom curates research at ORF’s Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED). He also guides and mentors researchers at CNED. ...
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