The assassination of the head of Hamas’s political bureau raises critical questions about Hamas’s leadership, the Gaza conflict and potential escalation, and Iran’s internal security
Only a few hours after the coronation of Iran’s newly elected president Masoud Pezeshkian which was attended by many regional leaders, including representatives from India and several Arab states, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran. The news was announced by the country’s all-powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), highlighting the gravity of the situation.
Haniyeh has been at the centre of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza since the 7th October terror attacks last year. Hamas holding Israeli hostages in captivity launched a months-long entanglement between Israel and the Palestinian group which is proscribed as a terror organisation by the US and others. Regional players such as Qatar, Egypt, and the US have been central in trying to come up with an agreement for the hostages to be released. Within this construct, Haniyeh was the single most critical figure and bridge for Hamas. In a broader framework, Hamas has received significant support from Iran as part of the latter’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, which includes others such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis (also known as Ansrallah) in Yemen and other smaller actors sprinkled across the political chaos of Syria and Iraq.
Many questions arise as to the timing of Haniyeh’s killing, and the venue for the same. Iran is no stranger to being on the receiving end of actions aimed at eliminating or deterring individuals of interest on its soil. In November 2020, a top Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated on the outskirts of Tehran by an AI-assisted automated weapon system. Other such incidents, including the plunder of Iranian nuclear facilities from where Israel reportedly extracted files exposing the country’s nuclear intentions and designs in 2018, also show a consistent game of cat and mouse played between the two rivals.
Many questions arise as to the timing of Haniyeh’s killing, and the venue for the same. Iran is no stranger to being on the receiving end of actions aimed at eliminating or deterring individuals of interest on its soil.
Haniyeh had a target on his back long before 7 October, but more so afterwards. His centrality to hostage negotiations, which till yesterday continued to be brick-walled, gave him incredible opportunities to build Hamas’s case. The group had successfully re-marketed itself in significant spaces of public discourse from a terror actor to a ‘revolutionary’ one. Haniyeh lived in the relative safety of the gleaming towers in Doha, Qatar, far away from the destruction of Gaza. In June, 10 members of his family were killed in an Israeli airstrike. Earlier in April, a strike in northern Gaza killed three of his sons.
The question now arises is what happens with Hamas’s leadership, and more importantly, to the war in Gaza. Beyond this dynamic, the larger question of regional escalation is once again back on the table. It is unlikely that Iran will have a disproportionate response to Haniyeh’s killing. To begin with, leaderships of groups like Hamas surpass the requirement of a demigod-like figurehead. Despite a certain level of perceived popularity, leaders, are dispensable, and replaceable as long as political and ideological anchoring remains consistent across the hierarchy. Senior members of the Hamas Politburo, such as Khaled Mashal, would be well-placed to replace Haniyeh. It is also plausible that other Hamas leaders, even beyond Mashal, were looked upon as being more accommodative to both come up with a solution to the destruction being caused in Gaza and be more reasonable over the hostage negotiations. It is imperative to remember that, tactically in Gaza, it is Hamas’s military wing, the Al Qassam Brigades under Yahya Sinwar, which holds the decision-making power. It has been eluded in the past, largely in private, that internal tensions within Hamas on both the decision to conduct the 7 October attacks and the subsequent hold of Israeli hostages by the Brigades, have only made decision making more difficult and fractured.
It is unlikely that Iran will have a disproportionate response to Haniyeh’s killing. To begin with, leaderships of groups like Hamas surpass the requirement of a demigod-like figurehead.
Amidst all these different levels of crisis points, Hamas also faces uncertainty of its own political future. Much like Hezbollah has embedded itself within Lebanese polity, including attaining parliamentary capacity, Hamas after winning polls in 2006, parallelly cultivated a more political bend considering its roots are in favour of military solutions. Protecting these internal evolutions would also be important for the group’s future. A slide back into an exclusively militant movement may well ensure Hamas’s end, not just at the hands of Israel, but in all probability, albeit quietly, by its Arab neighbours as well.
On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would enjoy a spike in popularity, at least amidst his base, considering the dire situation he has been in politically (Israel has made no statements at the time of writing). Protests mobilised against his inability to strike a deal with Hamas on Israeli streets have been consistent. But for Netanyahu, or any other Israeli prime minister, to be an Israeli head of government and strike concessions with Hamas would be a legacy no one would want. And for Netanyahu, legacy is critical, if not everything.
Finally, the question of regional escalation is one not without warranted concern. However, it is unlikely that Iran, which did not mobilise beyond a point in response to Qasem Soleimani’s assassination in 2020, will look to set a broader fire across the region for Haniyeh. But there will be a response, as there was earlier this year, after a purported Israeli strike against its diplomatic mission in Syria. For Tehran, the bigger crisis for the moment may not just be the death of Haniyeh, but the fact that the Hamas leader was killed in Tehran, raising significant questions once again over its own internal security problems rather than just external designs.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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