Mao Zedong’s ‘Five Finger Strategy’ considers Tibet to be the palm and Arunachal Pradesh, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Ladakh to be the five fingers having Chinese influence. The main objective of this strategy is to secure China’s periphery. Considering this, China’s incursions into the Union Territory of Ladakh is no surprise. Officially, China has transgressed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as many as
2,264 times since 2015. The falling image of President Xi Jinping due to Covid-19 and Hong Kong protests has further forced him to take a more aggressive stance against India.
As we delve deeper into the Five Finger, we understand further the Chinese desperation. More than two fingers (Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, parts of Ladakh) are official Indian territory. Two fingers (Bhutan and Nepal) are traditional Indian allies and for Bhutan, India went through a
73 day standoff with China at Doklam, but Nepal has been shifting towards China. So out of all the fingers, China only has some territorial influence over parts of Ladakh and that occurred way back in 1962 along with the now recent Nepalese development.
In addition, Ladakh has become more important for China as it connects the two disturbed regions of Tibet and Xinjiang and is important for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The vigorous road development by Border Roads Organisation in Galwan region, development of Daulet Beg Oldie airstrip, having the infrastructure to land and depart even the heavy transport aircraft such as the
C-130J Hercules and declaration of Ladakh as a Union Territory, greatly irked China, pushing its posture to be more determined and aggressive.
Out of all the fingers, China only has some territorial influence over parts of Ladakh and that occurred way back in 1962 along with the now recent Nepalese development.
Another frontier, Arunachal Pradesh, (‘Southern Tibet’ to China), has always been claimed by Beijing. Being the seat of Tawang Monastery, the next Dalai Lama can be from Arunachal, making it very strategic. Thus, it becomes all the more important for India to aggressively guard the frontier states. But early Indian developments focused on winning the hearts and minds of the frontiers and not on Chinese threat due to the
Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai bubble, leading to the creation of Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS) in 1954.
The birth of IFAS comes from Nehru’s North East Frontier Agency
(NEFA Policy), where he outlined that for the tribes of this region, he wanted to avoid the two extremes of treating them as anthropological specimens and allowing them to be engulfed by masses of Indian humanity. The officers had to be specially selected and trained, tested on “how popular they are with the tribe.” The average ICS or Assamese officer (for NEFA) would not be suitable.
Nehru believed that “the primitive people living in the frontier regions need to be dealt with care and friendliness, requiring expert knowledge, lacking in an average administrator.”
However, the formation of the IFAS had nothing to do with countering China. If used properly, the IFAS could have formed the first line of defence countering the Chinese incursions through various means like using the tribes’ traditional ways of guerrilla tactics, on the same lines as used by
Vietnam to thwart Chinese advances in 1979. Most of all, they could have played a major role in shaking up New Delhi to the realities of the frontier. The IFAS in its heyday, not only made the frontier regions allies of India but also tackled the administrative problems on a realistic basis. In 1951,
Major Ranenglao Khathing (Bob), with his force, established Indian sovereignty over Tawang. He later became IFAS. Although, the leadership under Nehru wanted a Panchsheel type of approach, Major Bob went ahead, much to New Delhi’s surprise. IFAS officers, working on the frontier, due to their exceptional circumstances were given freedom “to act as deemed necessary.”
The formation of the IFAS had nothing to do with countering China. If used properly, the IFAS could have formed the first line of defence countering the Chinese incursions.
In addition, IFAS experts employed out of the box techniques to win the trust of the frontier population. Major S.M. Krishnatry of the Subansri Frontier Division led an expedition to establish administration in the last villages of Limeking, Ging and Na enclaves, after 42 Assam Rifles soldiers were massacred by the Tagin tribesmen (Achingmori massacre). In such a situation, the Major ordered not a single gun to be carried. He even came with his wife and made anthropological records. He distributed gifts like axes to the Tagin from Government of India, earning their trust. He has detailed the expedition in his book
Border Taigins of Arunachal Pradesh.
The result of such actions was that Arunachal trusted India over China, even after 1962. In 1962, the Chinese entered Arunachal with pleasantries and while leaving, assured the people of Arunachal that they would return whenever required by the people, but Arunachal laid their complete faith with India. However, if resurrected today, the role of the IFAS needs to be redefined, that is not to be an exact copy of the 1950s IFAS. The IFAS of the current day and age needs to be tuned to the needs of modern India.
For starters, some of the states face the challenge of ever-changing bureaucracy. In 2019, chief ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram called for a
separate cadre. Currently, both the states fall under the Arunachal Pradesh-Goa-Mizoram-Union Territory (AGMUT) cadre. Sikkim, having a dedicated cadre has seen many strides in development, but in Arunachal, being AGMUT, some officers get trained only to be transferred to another state.
IFAS will add this much needed arsenal — one head of the jurisdiction, managing all activities — from tourism to trade being at the beck and call of the citizens.
However, frontier states like Sikkim having a dedicated cadre, also have the problem of too many cooks in the kitchen. There are a lot of departments overlapping each other, tending to develop inter-department rivalry. For example, initially there were less Covid-19 cases in Sikkim but when the numbers started to rise, cracks came out in the open.
A Border Roads Organisation Officer (BRO) was charged by Sikkim police for Covid-19 negligence. BRO calling the charge unfortunate, stopped all work. This rift between Sikkim Police and BRO could have been avoided, had there been one common head, having some control over both departments.
IFAS will add this much needed arsenal — one head of the jurisdiction, managing all activities — from tourism to trade being at the beck and call of the citizens. Next, the nature of the IFAS should be that of passion about anthropology and a desire to improve lives. Therefore, it is essential that the IFAS officers should be selected by the state and the application procedure should be open to all Indians, so that experts are not left out. Such field experts leading the administration had been one of the distinguishing features of the old IFAS. P.N. Kaul was Consul General in Lhasa, and even Major Krishnatry had served in Tibet.
Moving on, IFAS officers can be a bridge between the defence personnel and the local population. Indian defence can gain additional armour with a cooperative population on the frontline, just like
Kargil, where the local youth Tashi Namgyal discovered the intruders and alerted the Indian Army. But the problem is that the defence personnel keep on changing and their primary duty is not to interact with the locals. The IFAS, whose primary duty is to interact with the locals, will play a critical role in bridging the gap between locals and defence forces. Recruited by the state, it will have limited personnel, undergoing similar training. The local people will be used to the kind of response expected from IFAS and might frequently come across the same officer, building a higher degree of trust.
The IFAS needs to have a clear hierarchy and clearly defined roles.
One main reason for dissolving the IFAS in 1968 was absence for further growth and the job of the IFAS was being taken up by Border Roads Organisation and the usual district administration. In order to prevent that, the IFAS needs to have a clear hierarchy and clearly defined roles. The biggest hurdle for IFAS would be a career bureaucrat in the capital, who would not understand the nitty-gritty of the border. The top layer bureaucracy in such states should invariably come from the IFAS.
Finally, the name ‘Indian Frontier Administrative Service’ derives a lot from colonial history. If resurrected, it should define the new era of public servants and experts, not generalists. Name on the lines of Border Development Service or Department of Border Affairs, reporting directly to the CMO of the concerned state with representatives in the PMO will give the message of Indian seriousness with the border to aggressive neighbours while also striking a chord with the citizens.
The revamped IFAS with a new name is needed to pack a powerful punch in our strategic arsenal. Indian armed forces have everything to tackle a powerful neighbour, but an organised support of a strong espionage circle and locals from both sides of the border will propel Indian gains to new heights of strategic advantage. Such myriad tasks need to be managed at the helm by one leader, passionate about learning and preserving the unique cultural traits of frontier tribes. This new service is needed to not only thwart the Five Finger Strategy, but even make frontier regions staunch supporters of Indian administration.
The author is a research intern at ORF.
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