The emergence of “coalitions of the willing” and impact on practical security cooperation in Southeast Asia

This piece is part of the essay series, Strategic High Tide in the Indo-Pacific: Economics, Ecology, and Security.

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Southeast Asia found itself in a peculiar position back in September after Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US) announced the formation of a new trilateral grouping, AUKUS. The intramural divide within ASEAN was made abundantly clear when Indonesia and Malaysia voiced open concerns about the ramifications of AUKUS on regional peace and stability—especially how Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under this framework would contribute to the ongoing regional arms dynamics—whereas some other member states appear at least ambiguous, if not outright positive.

Southeast Asia has, for decades, been a net beneficiary of the peace and stability accorded by a robust extra-regional security presence in the region.

Perhaps, it is worthwhile to ask whether such “coalitions of the willing” as AUKUS would undermine security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Southeast Asia has, for decades, been a net beneficiary of the peace and stability accorded by a robust extra-regional security presence in the region. Since 1945, a consistent US military presence has helped buttress peace and stability. Especially throughout the Cold War, this allowed the Southeast Asian countries to focus inward on consolidating sociopolitical stability and emphasise on economic development.

Post-pandemic realities

Fast-forward to today, Southeast Asian countries remain largely focused on socioeconomic development. In terms of defence and security, the region generally relies on two prongs of policy actions. First being national self-help: There is no way Southeast Asian countries, individually and collectively, could hope to engage in any meaningful arms race with the major powers—not least China, of course. But there is no stopping the quest to acquire some of the world’s most state-of-the-art conventional armaments. And in the 1990s, due to extant residual sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes, some Southeast Asian countries would arm themselves with their neighbours in mind, at least partially. The second prong of action is to involve extra-regional powers, through the ASEAN-centric regional architecture, to give each of them a stake in preserving peace and stability. This is where extra-regional security presence is situated, and it becomes a form of free-riding for Southeast Asian countries. In the post-pandemic era, as Southeast Asian countries find themselves having to prioritise economic recovery, any attempt to rely more on national self-help to offset the need for extra-regional presence has become less feasible. Between guns and butter, the prevailing public sentiment is skewed heavily towards the latter. Domestic constituents expect the political elites in power to devote limited national resources towards public healthcare and social security.

In the post-pandemic era, as Southeast Asian countries find themselves having to prioritise economic recovery, any attempt to rely more on national self-help to offset the need for extra-regional presence has become less feasible.

This possibly explains the somewhat positive tone of remarks from Singapore and the Philippines after AUKUS was announced. Indonesia and Malaysia did not do more than just voicing out concerns. If anything, US President Joe Biden’s assurance that AUKUS would complement, not supplant, ASEAN was well-received by some of the ASEAN leaders. The ASEAN-Australia Summit joint statement did raise AUKUS, but also sounded a positive note about prospects for deepening cooperation. The ASEAN Summit Chair statement also did not mention AUKUS, which would otherwise be the case if the new framework is, indeed, deemed to be a serious security concern to member states. At least, it does also demonstrate an absence of consensus within ASEAN on this matter. The absence of consensus within ASEAN should not come as a surprise. It reflects the very nature of Southeast Asia, which is made up of countries with diverse and, at times diverging, national interests, and therefore, the 10-member bloc is far from being monolithic in its approaches to regional geopolitics. While all ASEAN member states would embrace the opportunities for regional economic integration, not least seen in their tight linkages with China, for instance, in the areas of trade, investments, and connectivity, it is not to say all of them perceive Beijing in the same light. Given the uncertainties surrounding China’s policy actions that do not always gel with its words, and the extant threat felt by some of the South China Sea ASEAN claimants, there will always be an appetite within the bloc for continued, and enhanced, extra-regional involvement.

Delving beyond the rhetoric

It is important to look beyond rhetoric. Indonesia’s rhetoric over AUKUS and the Australian nuclear submarine deal would be considered much more mellowed compared to its response back in the later Cold War years and the early 1990s, when Canberra announced the purchase of nuclear weapons-capable F-111 long-range strike bombers. After AUKUS was announced, Indonesia got on with its usual defence and security engagements with Australia, including the regular coordinated maritime patrol along their common maritime boundary. And, most recently, the two navies conducted Exercise New Horizon 2021. Malaysia recently struck a new agreement with Australia to cooperate on cybersecurity—a move which would otherwise not have taken place if Kuala Lumpur deems Canberra a threat to its national security.

One may question whether ASEAN or any Southeast Asian capital would have agency in stopping the formation of such groupings in the first place.

Therefore, it is not presumptuous to surmise that so long “coalitions of the willing” such as AUKUS do not directly threaten ASEAN’s centrality, Southeast Asian governments are willing to accept its existence. In fact, one may question whether ASEAN or any Southeast Asian capital would have agency in stopping the formation of such groupings in the first place. Much like how the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the US was first received by the region, it is only a matter of time before AUKUS becomes yet another geopolitical fixture in the Indo-Pacific, and there would be discussions about how these new groupings and their member states would cooperate with ASEAN in select areas of regional security matters. In a nutshell, the emergence of “coalitions of the willing” such as AUKUS may cast the spotlight on, and lay bare, the inherent limitations of ASEAN. But they are far from being unwelcomed—in fact, given the prevailing post-pandemic circumstances, it would be worthwhile having these new setups co-existing with the established regional institutions while managing the extant geopolitical rivalries. Extra-regional parties and their associated groupings may be viewed warily for their potential influence on geopolitical dynamics, but they would still be regarded as net providers of regional peace and security. ASEAN and its member states will continue to seek to draw practical security benefits from engaging these parties and groupings.

• International Affairs
• Great Power Dynamics
• China
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• ASEAN
• AUKUS
• Coalitions of the Willing
• Indo-Pacific
• Southeast Asia

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