Drone surveillance is a crucial blind spot in security policies for CBRN facilities. Thus, drone detection systems are proving to be increasingly essential
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Despite its size, Ukraine’s response to Russian attacks and its use of drones have significantly contributed to the future of warfare. It is presumed that by using drones, Ukraine has damaged a third of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. This act of asymmetric warfare has opened the gates for conversations around the use of Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs, referred to as drones throughout this article). Asymmetric warfare allows smaller powers to respond to larger, traditionally more threatening powers on the same scale. The case of Ukraine's use of UAVs is not novel. Similar cases have been seen in Saudi Arabia, the Gaza Strip, and many other regions, often sparked by non-state actors. The use of drones as a tool is not only between nation-states but also is a grave threat to civilian peace if used as a tactic by malicious and non-state actors.
Ukraine’s response to Russian attacks and its use of drones have significantly contributed to the future of warfare. It is presumed that by using drones, Ukraine has damaged a third of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.
The introduction of drones has changed the landscape of conflict. They are easily accessible and can even easily be engineered. Most drone attacks in grey zones and civil areas come under two main categories. The first is attacks that utilise drones as a delivery system for explosives, as well as biological and chemical weapons. These are also used to attack institutions, factories, and larger regions. The second is drone espionage, which uses drones for surveillance. While drone swarms and other forms of drone threats like drone base trafficking and drone collisions, along with lethal autonomous weapons and their regulation, remain urgent and unaddressed problems, the use of drones for surveillance and interference is an issue that is closer on the horizon.
One area of interest is drone insertion into the airspace of critical infrastructure, specifically chemical factories, biological labs, and nuclear facilities that may host Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials. While all critical infrastructure sectors are essential for a country’s safety and security, an attack on a CBRN facility would have more catastrophic, widespread and long-lasting effects than an attack on other sectors, such as a transport system. A breach in a CBRN facility could result in not only the immediate loss of life and destruction of property but, more imperative to the larger population, the release of hazardous materials or radiation. Currently, detecting drones using traditional radar technology is difficult, if not rare, due to the speed with which they move and their small size. Often, such radar systems confuse drones and drone swarms for fleets of birds. Most CBRN facilities have yet to upgrade their surveillance technology and are thus at risk.
Since 2019, multiple new models have been developed to address the difficulties of tracking drones in critical airspaces. These models often use machine learning to detect and classify drones, focusing on different types of sensors, including radar, visual, acoustic, and radio-frequency sensors. Further, as Bilal Taha and Abdulhadi Shoufan mention in their paper, these models can differentiate between a drone and a bird, a threatening drone and a non-threat, and finally, identify a swarm of drones. In India, three forms of drone detection systems (DDS) have been developed by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) for land and air-based surveillance, with hard-kill and soft-kill options.
Since 2019, multiple new models have been developed to address the difficulties of tracking drones in critical airspaces. These models often use machine learning to detect and classify drones, focusing on different types of sensors, including radar, visual, acoustic, and radio-frequency sensors.
However, these systems are not without their challenges. The first challenge is the wide range of drones that must be addressed, which requires DDSs to integrate different sensors with different communication protocols into a unified system. This is a costly and energy-consuming process that requires onboarding different technologies.
Here, it is imperative to prioritise and fund the area of drone detection and deterrence and ensure funding for the application of novel technologies. The second challenge is detecting drones in swarms. If a drone in a swarm does not have a recognisable radio frequency signature, it is harder to deter. To address this, technology needs to advance to detect swarms by recognising minor air disturbances caused by drones. A drone signature database is needed to address this. Here, private sector cooperation with drone manufacturers and the registration of drones is imperative. This will also help identify non-registered drones as threats.
Finally, hardware sandboxing that can resist drone jamming, along with jamming prevention techniques, is necessary to include along with detection technologies.
CBRN facilities, especially biosafety labs and chemical facilities, often ignored in security requirements, must continually update their defence. Such systems are already incorporated globally. For example, after the 2019 disruptions at Gatwick Airport caused by drones, the United Kingdom (UK) invested heavily in anti-drone systems for its airports to prevent drone incursions in sensitive airspace. These systems are regularly updated to handle new drone designs.
The United States’ Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also proactively deployed counter-drone technologies, especially around critical infrastructure such as chemical plants, power stations, and military installations. The “Counter-UAS Program” was launched in 2018. The DHS also works with local law enforcement and private sector organisations to establish best practices for drone security, regularly updating policies to stay ahead of emerging drone technologies and tactics.
As mentioned earlier, India’s BEL has been developing counter-drone solutions for both military and civilian use, including counter-drone initiatives to be used by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The involvement of the private sector in this space has led to rapid development. However, these technologies still need to be installed and upgraded regularly.
Other countries as well have seen the need to emphasise drone detection and deterring technologies. Saudi Arabia, for example, in 2019, experienced a drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities. The Saudi government has also partnered with other geopolitical powers like the US and international defence contractors, regularly upgrading systems in response to evolving drone threats.
Across most policies that protect CBRN facilities, cybersecurity is often either present or popularly recommended as a gap to be addressed. However, surveillance through drones and the jamming of services by drones are ignored. Furthermore, drone attacks on such areas that are unprotected remain unaddressed beyond airports and some critical facilities.
As mentioned, traditional radar systems struggle to detect drones due to their size and speed, and many CBRN facilities lack advanced surveillance technologies. Therefore, it is imperative to include drone detection systems in the individual security guidelines of these facilities to protect them from attacks by malicious and non-state actors. Including such systems at a granular level will help address the need for regular updates and remove the bureaucracy that may slow the process down.
To address this, cooperation with drone manufacturers, updating technologies regularly and ensuring robust defences against jamming are essential. To do this, certain manufacturers can be certified and audited regularly to ensure that Drones, DDS and radio frequency signatures are registered and approved centrally while technology installation and upgrades are not hindered. In a rapidly evolving space that impacts critical technology, environmental safety, and national security, time is of the essence and timely technological updates are crucial.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Her fields of research include geospatial technology, data privacy, cybersecurity, and strategic ...
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