Recent high-level meetings between Indian and Chinese officials suggest a possible shift in relations, with discussions on disengagement and easing tensions
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Is India on the verge of resetting its relations with China? There has been a flurry of meetings between Indian and Chinese officials in the months following the start of Prime Minister Modi’s third term in June. The 2024 Economic Survey’s call for relooking at restrictions on economic relations with China has added to speculation of a shift in India’s approach to China.
In October, PM Modi will attend the annual BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. He will be informally interacting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, but whether a bilateral meeting is on the cards remains to be seen.
On 12 September, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China and the Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, on the sidelines of the BRICS’ meeting of high-level security officials in St. Petersburg. External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr. S. Jaishankar had met Wang Yi in two back-to-back meetings in July and August this year. Also in July and August, within the span of a month, two meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) have been conducted.
There is a distinct softening in the tone of Indian officials. Doval, who, in a meeting in July 2023, had told Wang Yi that the military standoff in Ladakh had “eroded strategic trust” between the two countries, was content this time to talk of the “urgency” in the task of resolving the disengagement issue in Ladakh.
India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China and the Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, on the sidelines of the BRICS’ meeting of high-level security officials in St. Petersburg.
There appeared to be a similar shift in the approach of EAM Jaishankar. On 12 September, while speaking in Geneva at the Global Center of Security Policy, Jaishankar said, “We have made some progress. I would say, roughly, you can say about 75 percent of the disengagement problems are sorted out,” while adding that there were still things that needed to be done, especially since both sides had brought up forces close to the border.
Yet, despite recent rounds of talks between India and China, there is no indication that we are any closer to a resolution of the complex border issue in eastern Ladakh. India has been negotiating with China for the past four years to persuade Beijing to lift the series of blockades that the PLA has established, preventing Indian forces from patrolling their claimed part of the Line of Actual Control in six strategic points. These are the Depsang Bulge, the Galwan area, two areas in the Kugrang river valley, the north bank of the Pangong Tso lake, and the Charding-Ninglung Nala area in Demchok. Simultaneously, they had deployed 50-60,000 troops along the Line of Control without the prior notification that should be given as per the 1996 Sino-Indian Agreement in the military field along the Line of Actual Control. To date, there has been no explanation for the Chinese actions. Taken by surprise initially, India, too, moved its forces in eastern Ladakh to counter the Chinese.
According to the Chinese spokeswoman, in the meeting on Thursday, Wang and Doval discussed the “progress made in recent consultations on border issues”. She noted that “in recent years, frontline armies of the two countries have realised disengagement in four areas of the western sector of the China-India border including the Galwan Valley.” She went on to add that the China-India border situation is generally stable and under control.
India has been negotiating with China for the past four years to persuade Beijing to lift the series of blockades that the PLA has established, preventing Indian forces from patrolling their claimed part of the Line of Actual Control in six strategic points.
The tone of the Indian press release was somewhat different. It noted that the meeting had given the two sides an opportunity to “review the efforts towards finding an early resolution of the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control, which will create the conditions to stabilise and rebuild bilateral relations.” It went on to add that the two sides agreed to “work with urgency and redouble their efforts to realise complete disengagement in the remaining areas.”
Doval told Wang that restoring peace and tranquillity in the border areas was “essential for normalcy in bilateral relations.” He added that both sides needed to abide by the existing bilateral agreements and processes.
A close reading of the two statements makes it clear that while the Chinese seem to suggest that things were near normal in the border areas, the Indian stand indicates that more work was needed.
Jaishankar’s comment and the Wang-Doval meeting come two weeks after the 31st meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) in Beijing on 29 August. This meeting itself came within a month of the 30th meeting held on 31 July, suggesting that there has been a quickening of the pace of the consultations between the two sides on the issue of eastern Ladakh. The WMCC is the highest level of meetings between the two sides’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. However, the last meeting—and 21st round—of the military meeting involving the corps commanders of the two sides was held in February and there has been no meeting since.
The Indian press release after the 31st WMCC meeting noted that “the two sides had a frank, constructive and forward-looking exchange of views” on the issues in eastern Ladakh “to narrow down the differences” to finally resolve the outstanding issues.
Jaishankar and Wang have been interacting with each other since the very beginning of the crisis. It was following their 10th of September 2020 meeting in Moscow on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) ministerial meeting that a five-point joint statement was issued calling for the disengagement of forces to ease the tensions. This laid the foundation for the subsequent dialogue between the two sides, which was expected to be soon concluded. And yet, the process continues till this day. According to the September 2020 joint statement, the two sides had expected to resume their dialogue through the Special Representatives mechanism. Yet, there has been no formal meeting of the special representatives since 2019.
While the Chinese seem to suggest that things were near normal in the border areas, the Indian stand indicates that more work was needed.
However, Wang and Doval have interacted with each other and have played a role in defusing the crisis. For example, it was after a two-hour conversation on 5 July 2020 that the two sides agreed to move back 1.5 km each from the site of the 15 June clash in Galwan that had resulted in the loss of 20 Indian and four Chinese lives. Expectations that a similar disengagement could be effected at the other blockade points were belied and required negotiations thereafter.
In early 2022, when Wang Yi had made a low-key visit to India, he met Doval on 25 March where the two discussed the possibility of complete disengagement of the Indian and Chinese troops along the LAC. This was the first visit by a high-level Chinese official since the 2020 incidents and the Galwan clash.
Having withdrawn in Galwan, at the end of July 2020, the Chinese claimed that most of the process of disengagement was done and the situation was fast normalising. Seeing that talks were going nowhere, India took some pre-emptive action by occupying the Kailash heights on the southern banks of the Pangong Tso overlooking Spanggur Tso. The Chinese were taken aback and returned to the negotiating table, but it still took some months before the first disengagement in the north and south banks of Pangong Tso took place in February 2021 leaving a “no-patrolling zone” of 10 kms. India also vacated the heights on the Kailash range as part of this process.
It took another five months to get the second disengagement, with a 3.5 km buffer zone, at Patrolling Point (PP) 17 near Gogra. But there was no movement on the issue of disengagement of the neighbouring PP 15, 16 and 17A on the Kugrang river valley. It was only in July 2022 that an agreement for disengagement was forged, with a 5 km wide no-patrol zone, in the Kugrang river valley.
India took some pre-emptive action by occupying the Kailash heights on the southern banks of the Pangong Tso overlooking Spanggur Tso.
It has been two years since and there has been no forward movement for the lifting of the Chinese blockades in the Depsang Bulge and the Charding Nala area in Demchok. By the EAM’s reckoning, 75 percent of the disengagement may have indeed occurred, but the Chinese do not seem inclined to move forward now. The Depsang area is perhaps the most consequential and the largest area (900 sq kms or so) denied to Indian patrols, which used to go up to PP10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13 till February 2020.
In the 18th round of India-China Corps Commander Level Meeting in April 2023, China had demanded a 15-20 km “no patrolling zone” in the Depsang area, which would have largely fallen inside the Indian-claimed lines, as a precondition for disengagement. India said it would agree to a 3-4 km zone. Indian officials said that this would put most of the Depsang Bulge outside Indian patrolling limits.
India needs to ensure that it does not concede anything, even notionally, on the eastern Ladakh border to reset its ties with China. Such a move would only encourage Beijing to continue its strategy of military dominance along the LAC.
Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...
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