Countering China in the South China Sea

This article is part of the series—Jakarta Edit 2025

On 27 June 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Malaysian Prime Minister (PM) Anwar Ibrahim agreed to forge an economic agreement on the energy-rich Ambalat sea block. This latest development marks a significant leap towards creating the necessary conditions to potentially resolve the long-standing dispute, adding to the list of successfully resolved disputes between maritime Southeast Asian nations under international law. 

Hence, the ongoing deadlock and exacerbating conditions in the South China Sea (SCS) are not because of the unwillingness of Southeast Asian nations to negotiate based on good faith but because China has no intentions of restraining its expansionist ambitions, while also being intolerant towards a unified Southeast Asian agenda for the disputed maritime space. Therefore, it would be crucial for South China Sea claimant countries—especially Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—to reorient their approach beyond waiting for China to agree to a binding code of conduct. 

The ongoing deadlock and exacerbating conditions in the South China Sea (SCS) are not because of the unwillingness of Southeast Asian nations to negotiate based on good faith but because China has no intentions of restraining its expansionist ambitions, while also being intolerant towards a unified Southeast Asian agenda for the disputed maritime space.

China claims almost the entire SCS based on its illegitimate nine-dash-line map. In the past decade, China has effectively militarised the maritime space and has built offshore military bases within the lawful exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines. The China Coast Guard and maritime militia have also been pushing the envelope and harassing Vietnamese and Malaysians in their respective EEZs.

China’s dominance over the SCS is rooted in ensuring that Southeast Asian claimants remain divided and unwilling to speak for one another. In the SCS, the Spratly Islands encompass overlapping claims of China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. While several features in the SCS are points of contestation between China and individual Southeast Asian countries—such as the Paracel and the Scarborough Shoal—the Spratly Islands are perhaps the most complex of the features, considering the number of overlaps. However, unlike China’s illegitimate claims, Southeast Asian countries have a strong track record of abiding by international law in maritime disputes. Therefore, this becomes an opportunity for Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to forge an informal yet operational confidence-building mechanism in the Spratlys. 

Malaysia and Vietnam must also understand that they would need to pursue this endeavour without China’s involvement, particularly because China will not compromise on any process that would dilute its expansionist ambitions. The only way to apply more pressure on China is for the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam to forge an informal yet consistent and consolidated approach to managing their overlapping claims in the Spratly Islands. The initial goal of such a framework would not be to resolve these disputes immediately—as any concrete resolution would require China’s approval––but to create the right conditions for an integrated position of managing overlapping maritime borders and forge a consolidated position against China’s unilateralism.

All three countries should have a say whenever China acts provocatively in any part of the Spratly Islands, regardless of who occupies it or if claims overlap. This will make it harder for Beijing to divide the Spratly Islands into isolated spheres, which it can slowly dominate and occupy part by part without worrying about the cost of collective action or response. 

The only way to apply more pressure on China is for the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam to forge an informal yet consistent and consolidated approach to managing their overlapping claims in the Spratly Islands.

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has been actively trying to secure its lawful EEZ against China’s belligerent manoeuvres – targeting Philippine vessels and crew members with water cannons and ramming activities. Beijing’s actions are intended to warn other SCS maritime claimants not to emulate its behaviour, creating a false sense of security through silence. Fortunately, countries such as Vietnam are slowly waking up from this illusion, realising that dealing with Beijing alone may not yield optimal results without applying pressure on China. While Hanoi and Beijing retain their flexible diplomatic coordination, the past year has witnessed the beginning of a notable confidence-building process between Vietnam and the Philippines in the SCS with a series of two-way high-level visits of security officials and the inauguration of the first bilateral coast guard exercise in Manila in August 2024 and a second one in April 2025 in Da Nang. While this is an important development, more effort is needed to improve conditions for engagement between the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia in the Spratlys. 

First, negotiations between the three countries must begin to establish provisional zones for fisheries exploration and joint jurisdiction management in overlapping areas. Second, public awareness is equally important to build confidence and understanding at the state and societal levels, particularly among the Filipino, Vietnamese, and Malaysian fishing communities. Many SCS clashes occur between fisherfolk due to their limited knowledge of maritime boundaries and laws of neighbouring coastal states. Therefore, workshops for this purpose will provide greater depth in understanding the residents of these countries and may even catalyse deeper integration through better people-to-people ties. 

Third, all three Southeast Asian claimants must endeavour to establish informal but regular coast guard meetings and execute collective patrols on broader non-traditional issue areas across their overlapping maritime borders. While the Philippines and Vietnam have recently begun joint drills, Malaysia’s inclusion would add more depth and significance in demonstrating the commitment of the Southeast Asian nations towards upholding UNCLOS and Article 4 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS, which calls for the resolution of outstanding disputes through ‘friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned’, in accordance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

All three countries should have a say whenever China acts provocatively in any part of the Spratly Islands, regardless of who occupies it or if claims overlap. This will make it harder for Beijing to divide the Spratly Islands into isolated spheres, which it can slowly dominate and occupy part by part without worrying about the cost of collective action or response. 

However, the primary concern of these nations would be whether they may be sending the wrong signals to China and face greater risks. In this context, certain points must be highlighted.  First, this is a Southeast Asia-led and owned initiative that does not involve extra-regional players. Second, the fact that this mechanism will remain informal is to ensure that there is no strategic miscommunication and impede the informal and consultative norms surrounding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Way. Third, a more nuanced understanding is needed when deciphering the linkages between China’s security engagements and its economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. Saying that one would directly depend on the other is a misinformed narrative and impedes a consolidated Southeast Asian. For instance, the Philippines’ commercial activities with China continue to grow despite the former’s more active position in the SCS in the defence of its EEZ. This was also true during the former administration of President Benigno Aquino III, who took a hardline approach against China’s belligerence. 

Nevertheless, Beijing will likely paint this cooperation as an anti-China position orchestrated by the ‘troublemaker’ Philippines and try to convince Vietnam and Malaysia to abandon this endeavour. Each of these Southeast Asian countries will continue negotiating with Beijing on bilateral features, such as the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel; nevertheless, they must not let go of the opportunity to work collectively in the Spratly Islands. Doing so could deter China's unilateral activities in one part of the SCS and compel it to negotiate more equitably, setting a precedent for other features of the disputed sea. With some success, this could also encourage Brunei to strengthen its position in the disputed space. Therefore, Manila, Hanoi and Putrajaya must harness the political will for long-term regional stability and prosperity. 

Don McLain Gill is a Philippines-based geopolitical analyst, author, and lecturer at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University (DLSU).

• International Affairs
• Maritime Security
• China
• china and south china sea
• china claims on south china sea
• exclusive economic zone south china sea
• military build up south china sea
• nine dash line map
• South China Sea
• south china sea crisis
• south china sea dispute
• south china sea territorial dispute

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