The Bhutanese PM’s recent interview is being lauded by the Chinese as an attempt by Bhutan to move closer to China at the expense of India
Bhutanese Prime Minister Dasho (Dr) Lotay Tshering’s recent interview with a Belgian paper, La Libre, regarding the Bhutan-China boundary talks courted controversy in India and beyond. To clear the air, the Bhutanese PM later stated in a Bhutanese newspaper that there was “no change in position by Bhutan”. This was soon followed by a three-day state visit to India by Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, from 3-5 April 2023.
Meanwhile, in China, the development brought cheers to the Chinese strategic community, as it was largely interpreted as “Bhutan publicly speaking out in China’s favour” and “slapping India in the face”. Some Chinese observers appreciated the fact that the Bhutanese PM’s statement was “seamlessly synchronised” with China's official stance on the China-Bhutan border issue, the only difference being the position on Doklam. In the Chinese assessment, the statements that matched perfectly (between China and Bhutan) include “Bhutan does not have major border problems with China”, “territories have not yet been demarcated…draw a line”, that “China has never intruded into Bhutan's territory” etc. Some Chinese observers even interpreted the Minister’s statement as Bhutan’s rejection of the Indian stance that “the trijunction is located not at Mount Gipmochi but near Batang La some 7-8 km North”, as well as an endorsement of China’s claim that the Pangda Village and related places all belong to China. Overall, the Chinese inference was that “neighbouring Bhutan has finally taken the initiative to move closer to China,” regardless of its special relationship with India.
Some Chinese observers appreciated the fact that the Bhutanese PM’s statement was “seamlessly synchronised” with China's official stance on the China-Bhutan border issue, the only difference being the position on Doklam.While analysing China’s expanding footprints in the Himalayan region, one thing becomes clear: China’s robust propaganda machinery and targeted disinformation campaign play a crucial role in its diplomatic success vis-à-vis nations like Nepal and Bhutan. Below is a list comparing China’s English-language propaganda with its Chinese-language domestic discourse on Bhutan.
India, it is argued, is reluctant to see China-Bhutan complete a border agreement because that will leave India as the only country with a territorial dispute with China.However, after a careful reading of the Chinese language literature on Bhutan, it becomes evident that the real reason why China-Bhutan border negotiations have made limited progress so far is due to China’s reluctance. Chinese observers believe that the China-India and China-Bhutan border disputes are “inextricably linked” and need to be resolved in a particular sequence. That is, to solve the border issue thoroughly and completely between China and Bhutan, China and India would need to settle their border issue completely as an essential pre-condition, and agree to some sort of a “package deal”. In fact, Qi Pengfei, Professor at Renmin University of China, believes that Bhutan is going to be the last amongst China’s 14 land neighbours to get its border with China delineated and surveyed. In other words, China wants to keep the pot boiling on the China-Bhutan front and use Bhutan’s territory as a bargaining chip, as and when required, to gain leverage in the China-India border dispute. Just like we saw in 2020, when amidst the Galwan row, China, out of nowhere, staked claim on the Sakteng sanctuary in Eastern Bhutan, which had never figured in border talks between China and Bhutan in the last so many years. Since then, it has been running a high-pitched campaign for its domestic audience that “the weakest country in the world (Bhutan) is illegally occupying Chinese territory of 3,300 - 3500 square kilometres—Molasading area.”
A case in point could be the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Although China has exercised military control over TAR for all these years, it continues to remain the least developed region in whole of China.From that perspective, Bhutan, like Nepal, is often seen by the Chinese side as an important platform for TAR’s economic and trade expansion to South Asia
Although Bhutan is small, Chinese strategists argue that it is comparatively well-connected internationally (compared to TAR) and deeply integrated into the South Asian economic/transit circuit.As a countermeasure, India needs to do more in debunking China’s double-dealings and disinformation campaigns in South Asia that are meant particularly to drive a wedge between India and its neighbours. Secondly, it must better communicate with its Himalayan neighbours that given the history and geography of the region, the security, peace and prosperity of the people of these countries remain closely linked to that of the people of India. Playing the “China v/s India game” is less of a bargaining chip and more of a lose-lose proposition for these nations. Because as explained in the text above, no “gift of development” from China is going to come their way through the TAR, only debt traps and exaggerated territorial claims. On the other hand, Bhutan’s close interaction with China only complicates its ties with India, causes serious mistrust, thereby limiting its role and stake in India’s fledging economy and harming the interest of its own people.
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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
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