Author : Kanchan Lakshman

Expert Speak India Matters
Published on Feb 15, 2025

Successful SF operations against the Maoists at the beginning of 2025 will provide momentum to the enlarging security grid

Chhattisgarh's anti-Maoist operations: Key successes and implications

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Sustained and effective anti-Maoist operations by the Security Forces (SFs) leading to heavy Maoist casualties are continuing during the new year in Chhattisgarh. In a major achievement for the SFs, 14 cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-M), including top leader Ramachandra Reddy, were neutralised on 19 January in an encounter at Bhaludiggi, Chhattisgarh, along the Chhattisgarh-Odisha border. This was the second major setback for the Maoists in a week and the latest in a series of SF operations against them. Earlier, on 16 January, during another encounter in the Bijapur district, 18 Maoists, including Telangana State Committee leader Damodar, were neutralised.

In a major achievement for the SFs, 14 cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-M), including top leader Ramachandra Reddy, were neutralised on 19 January in an encounter at Bhaludiggi, Chhattisgarh, along the Chhattisgarh-Odisha border.

These two successful SF operations are indicative of a trend that began last year. Overall, 219 Maoists were neutralised in 115 SF-initiated engagements in Chhattisgarh in 2024 as against 26 deaths in 68 SF engagements during the entire 2023. With a staggering increase of approximately 750 percent, this is for the first time in the history of the Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) movement that more than 200 Maoists were neutralised in a single year.

Shrinking footprint

The expanse of SF operations has not only led to large Maoist casualties and a severe loss of morale among its cadres but also to a contraction in the Maoist geographical area of influence. The core military capacities of CPI-M are now limited to the Sukma-Bijapur axis and the Abujhmaad region in Chhattisgarh. There has been severe attrition in some of the armed Maoist formations in the South and West Bastar areas. In operational terms, four crucial armed Maoist formations are assessed to have weakened after the SF successes since last year. The Gadchiroli Divisional Committee in Maharashtra faced severe losses on 17 July 2024, when 12 Maoists were neutralised, resulting in a largely Maoist-free north Gadchiroli. Coy No. 5 in Kanker, Chhattisgarh, lost 29 Maoists in an encounter on 15 April 2024, significantly weakening the Partapur Area Committee. Additionally, Coy No. 6 and Coy No. 2 also experienced considerable losses in encounters in October and April 2024, respectively.

The core military capacities of CPI-M are now limited to the Sukma-Bijapur axis and the Abujhmaad region in Chhattisgarh.

The 19 January encounter on the Odisha-Chhattisgarh border indicates that the CPI (Maoist) is shifting its strategy to decentralise its armed groups and move them to safer areas. The Maoist leadership has assessed that their strongholds in Sukma-Bijapur and Abujhmaad are no longer secure. They are considering Central Odisha as a new safe location and have increased activities in Kandhamal, Kalahandi, Boudh, and Nayagarh districts. Moreover, they aim to revive the Sambalpur Deogarh-Sundergarh Divisional Committee to connect regions from Chhattisgarh to Jharkhand through Odisha. Future opportunities may arise from changes in the deployment of CAPFs in Odisha.

Maoists’ retaliatory tactics

For the CPI (Maoist), the situation is critical, leaving them no choice but to retaliate. After suffering significant losses recently, they are now attacking soft targets in Chhattisgarh. The Maoists have increased attacks on suspected police informers, particularly in South Bastar, killing about 80 civilians in 2024, up from 68 in 2023. Maoists prefer using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), spikes, and booby traps against SFs but are also trying to develop area weapons to target SFs in south Chhattisgarh. Recently, they have used crude Barrel Grenade Launchers targeting SF camps from 300-400 meters, which have not caused much damage, serving mainly as a nuisance. They are also aiming for retaliatory strikes against SFs, including attacks on their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). An IED blast by Maoists recently killed eight jawans in Kutru, Bijapur district, on 6 January. As SFs expand their presence, more attacks are anticipated, signalling also a possible advancement in their annual summer offensive called Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign.

Maoists prefer using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), spikes, and booby traps against SFs but are also trying to develop area weapons to target SFs in south Chhattisgarh.

Recent SF successes in Chhattisgarh will have a huge impact as they have already extended the FOB network to a significant part of the Sukma-Bijapur axis and towards the fringes of Abujhmaad, considered a veritable 'base area' of the outfit where most of its senior leadership are based. Next to South and West Bastar, it is in Abujhmaad or the “unknown hills” where the endgame of LWE is crystallising. Incursions into the ‘base area’ will not only deter Maoists’ free movement and provide momentum to the enlarging security grid but also dispel the perception that Abujhmaad is impenetrable. The rest of the core areas, including Abujhmaad, are expected to come under the SFs’ radar in the proximate future.

Future of insurgency

Overall, there has been a contraction of LWE, in terms of geographical areas of influence, violence and capacities, which is primarily due to successful intelligence-based SF operations recently. SFs have made significant advances in recent years, which include the ouster of CPI (Maoist) cadres from hitherto inaccessible strongholds in Bihar and Jharkhand. They have also made substantial gains in the Maoist strongholds of South Chhattisgarh and the bordering districts of Telangana, Gadchiroli (Maharashtra), Malkangiri and Koraput (Odisha). Their presence in the forested tri-junctions of Madhya Pradesh-Maharashtra-Chhattisgarh and Kerala-Karnataka-Tamil Nadu is limited and waning.

SFs have made significant advances in recent years, which include the ouster of CPI (Maoist) cadres from hitherto inaccessible strongholds in Bihar and Jharkhand.

Intelligence-based SF operations have successfully neutralised more than half of the erstwhile Central Committee Members and Politburo Members, which has led to the diminished organisational strength of the CPI (Maoist). This leadership vacuum is difficult to fill due to the lack of ideologically committed cadres. The ideological appeal of the ultra-left/Maoist movement has also petered out throughout the country and is now limited to a diminishing section of people. Similarly, the recruitment of foot soldiers, which is limited to the core tribal-inhabited districts, has also not been able to provide a replacement for the attrition of armed cadres by way of numerous neutralisations and surrenders in the past few years. Youths are no longer enamoured to join Maoist ranks (except for few pockets of south Chhattisgarh), which has led to attrition in armed strength. In core areas, it is assessed that they have relied on coercion to remain relevant and to maintain their support base.

Conclusion

Successful SF operations against the Maoists at the beginning of the new year will provide momentum to the enlarging security grid, which has achieved excellent operational achievements recently. The CPI (Maoist) is currently assessed to be at its weakest point ever since its formation in 2005. With more FOBs proposed to be established by SFs in Maoist strongholds and given the trajectory of SF operations since last year, severe attrition of Maoist cadres and the loss of morale among the cadre, it is assessed that the CPI (Maoist) will come under further pressure in the months ahead, including in its hitherto impenetrable nerve centre of Abujhmaad. The SFs will, however, need to be cautious of the outfit’s ability to retaliate, especially through IEDs, which continue to be a major cause for concern.


Kanchan Lakshman is a Delhi-based security analyst. His area of specialisation includes terrorism, radicalisation, Left Wing Extremism & internal security.

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