Due to the deep political, economic, and infrastructural interdependence with Russia, the Central Asian countries could feel the consequences of the large-scale sanctions imposed by western countries due to the Ukrainian crisis. And this is irrespective of the fact that some of the countries of the region are partners in the Eurasian Economic Union (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are full members, and Uzbekistan has been an observer since December 2020). For almost every country in the region, Russia is a key trading partner and investor even without the EAEU; integration only adds institutionality and consistency to the existing deep interaction. All Central Asian countries have extensive bilateral relations with Russia, and an intensive political dialogue at leadership levels, departments, and regions. Due to the high level of binding of national currencies, following the sharp fall of the ruble at the end of February this year, almost all regional currencies entered the peak. However, soon after the ruble recovered, its previous levels against the world's leading currencies.

For almost every country in the region, Russia is a key trading partner and investor even without the EAEU; integration only adds institutionality and consistency to the existing deep interaction.

One of the most sensitive issues for the countries of the region related to the new geopolitical reality is the situation of numerous Central Asian diasporas in Russia. The slowdown of the Russian economy as a result of sanctions has a very significant impact on their incomes and, as a result, the remittances. Meanwhile, this money plays an important positive role in socio-economic stability. This remains especially true for Tajikistan, for which it amounts to nearly 30 percent of the country's GDP. These transfers are also very important for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Accordingly, any reduction in their size, and in the worst case, the mass return of migrants home due to job loss in Russia can cause serious social tension in the region. For Turkmenistan, to a lesser extent, anti-Russian sanctions, at least externally, affect it due to its rather isolationist foreign policy, a limited number of migrant workers, and a rather modest amount of trade turnover with Russia. Accordingly, Ashgabat has fewer opportunities to circumvent sanctions. Kyrgyzstan is one of the few countries that are ready to join Russia's assistance. Bishkek is informally considering the possibility of becoming a kind of financial and technological hub through which it will be possible to overcome restrictions on currency and financial transactions, as well as to supply goods and technologies prohibited for direct delivery. In part, the republic has already realised itself as a financial hub in late February–early March, when restrictions were imposed on Russian banks and companies to buy dollars and euros. Market participants noted a peak increase in the purchase of dollars for rubles in banks and exchangers of the Kyrgyz capital, which was due to the activity of Russian companies that took advantage of the opportunity to purchase currency. At the same time, due to the limited possibilities of the banking sector of the republic and the absence of a direct border with Russia, it is difficult for Kyrgyzstan to become a full-fledged anti-sanctions hub.

Bishkek is informally considering the possibility of becoming a kind of financial and technological hub through which it will be possible to overcome restrictions on currency and financial transactions, as well as to supply goods and technologies prohibited for direct delivery.

Officially, Tashkent takes a rather pragmatic position. Uzbekistan considers the sanctions imposed against Russia as an opportunity to increase its weight in regional trade and fill the vacant niches in the Russian market, for example, for its automotive industry. So, on the sidelines of the recently completed first Tashkent International Investment Forum, Uzbek high-ranking officials and big businessmen talked about plans to use new realities to strengthen the country's economy and its export potential. Another question is that, for now, the situation remains quite difficult for Uzbekistan in the absence of a full-fledged transport infrastructure alternative to the one that connects the republic with Russia. Unexpectedly, Kazakhstan, the closest to Russia, took the most anti-Russian position in the region. This became clear from the rather straightforward statement of the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Timur Suleimenov, that “Kazakhstan will not be a tool to circumvent the anti-Russian sanctions of the United States and the EU.” Such a stance of Nur-Sultan looks particularly challenging considering that it is Kazakhstan that has the greatest opportunities to help Russia in difficult conditions due to its long border, developed transport infrastructure, and high level of economic development.

On the sidelines of the recently completed first Tashkent International Investment Forum, Uzbek high-ranking officials and big businessmen talked about plans to use new realities to strengthen the country's economy and its export potential.

The main deterrent to Russia's willingness to help circumvent sanctions is not infrastructure restrictions, but the fear of western pressure. Therefore, the Central Asian five, through a neutral line and distancing themselves from the Ukrainian conflict, are trying to reduce the risks of falling under direct and secondary western sanctions. But even in such conditions, the countries of the region remain under serious pressure from the United States and its allies, who are closely monitoring any attempts to circumvent the sanctions restrictions. So, recently, one can observe the frequent visits of American high-ranking diplomats and officials to Central Asia, who officially discuss economic and humanitarian cooperation, but the red thread is the line on the inadmissibility for Washington of any support for Russia in the current conditions. Therefore, the five Central Asian countries face a dilemma: Either to increase cooperation with Russia, take advantage of new windows of opportunity, but be under pressure from the West, or reduce the level of economic and political interaction with Russia to their detriment, fearing western sanctions.

• International Affairs
• Russia and Eurasia
• West Asia
• anti-Russian
• Central Asian
• EAEU
• Economic
• GDP
• infrastructural
• Kazakhstan
• Political
• Russia
• Sanctions
• Ukrainian crisis
• Uzbekistan

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