Cambodia chairs ASEAN for the third time

Cambodia assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN for 2022. 2021 was tumultuous as ASEAN was challenged on many fronts. Besides the pandemic and its consequent economic downturn, ASEAN had to face the overthrow of democracy in Myanmar, continue to deal with an adamant China on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea (SCS), and face challenges to its centrality, with the growing impact of the Quad and AUKUS. Brunei, as the Chair in 2021, had a difficult task and now Cambodia inherited it. Cambodia holds the ASEAN chair for the third time since it joined ASEAN on 30 April 1999. It was the last amongst the 10 ASEAN countries to join ASEAN and has followed its regular turn in chairing the organisation every decade, in 2002 and 2012, respectively. There are only two countries—Cambodia and Brunei—whose leaders continued their tenure over the years in ASEAN, one being PM Hun Sen and the other one being the Sultan of Brunei. In the normal course, the chairmanship of ASEAN is not riddled with expectations or controversies. However, the five challenges listed above and the record of Cambodia as chair in 2012, bring a sense of anxiety to some ASEAN countries as to how things will run in the current year.

It was the last amongst the 10 ASEAN countries to join ASEAN and has followed its regular turn in chairing the organisation every decade, in 2002 and 2012, respectively.

Article 31 of the ASEAN Charter accords the Chair the right to preside over ASEAN and related summits, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils, and the relevant sectoral ministerial bodies. They also chair the East Asia Summit, which brings in its dialogue partners (DP) and is the most prestigious event in the calendar in Asia. The ASEAN Regional Forum, ADMM+ and ASEAN Maritime Forum see leadership of the Chairman. As the Chinese pressure on the SCS increased in the 21st century, they sought to assert the concept of the “Nine-dash line” and assume control over island territories belonging to the ASEAN countries. The incremental problem came to a head in 2012, during the Cambodian chairmanship. Most of the ASEAN countries wanted to criticise China for what it had done. Cambodia stood firm, confirming its status as the closest ally of China within ASEAN. Due to this, Cambodia as Chairman in 2012, could not have a joint communique of the foreign ministers for the first time in the ASEAN history. The Summit went through but it was left to the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to run a shuttle diplomacy to have a communique, which was finally agreed upon well after the Summit. ASEAN dislikes such aberrations which draw attention to its internal contradictions.

Cambodia as Chairman in 2012, could not have a joint communique of the foreign ministers for the first time in the ASEAN history.

The Cambodian chairmanship, thus, became a problem because of its alignment with China. Apprehensions amongst ASEAN countries arise on the issue of Myanmar, which is amongst ASEAN’s current challenges. When Myanmar had the coup in February 2021, ASEAN could have perhaps lived with it. The long drawn out killing of civilian protesters, however, drew attention. The principle of noninterference in internal affairs is there, but the onslaught on their citizens was something that several ASEAN countries felt perturbed by. Pressure from DPs, particularly the USA, the EU, and Australia emerged. Due to this, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore took the initiative and an ASEAN leaders meeting (ALM) convened in Jakarta in April 2021. Chaired by Brunei, it invited the Myanmar military leader and evolved a Five-Point Consensus (FPC) including Myanmar’s willingness to accept a special envoy of ASEAN who would meet all parties. The FPC brought ASEAN back to the centre stage. ASEAN’s allies felt relieved that it took a position pertaining to a member state’s problems. The UN Security Council have asked ASEAN to take the lead on Myanmar. However, Myanmar thwarted the role of the ASEAN envoy and resiled from the commitments made at the Jakarta meeting. Thus, ASEAN restricted Myanmar’s participation in the ASEAN summit in November 2021, to a nonpolitical participant, which Myanmar declined.

ASEAN restricted Myanmar’s participation in the ASEAN summit in November 2021, to a nonpolitical participant, which Myanmar declined.

At this stage, Cambodia took over the chairmanship. A relook at Myanmar was initiated. PM Hun Sen visited Myanmar (6-8 January 2022). A new Special Envoy of the ASEAN chair, Prak Sokhonn the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Ministerof Cambodia, was announced. He will be assisted by Cham Prasidh, Minister of Industry, a veteran of the Cambodian peace process. This is a decision by the ASEAN Chair, and how it lies with the decision of ALM of April 2021 remains unclear. ASEAN seems to dither on this, as some ASEAN interlocutors are apprehensive that by directly engaging the Myanmar Generals, Hun Sen as ASEAN Chair has gone beyond the brief of the ALM. The Cambodian view is that they are seeking a breakthrough and succeeded in engaging the Myanmar leadership to pursue elements of the FPC. Cambodia itself follows tenuous democracy, indicating that the democratic push to Myanmar will diminish. The Cambodian view is that they are better placed to get Myanmar to play by ASEAN rules than was possible last year. Cambodia’s first ASEAN Ministerial meeting for 19 January was postponed as several pleaded scheduling issues. The ASEAN countries who are backing the FPC are striking back since Cambodia, without consultations, invited Wunna Maung Lwin, the Junta Foreign Minister of Myanmar. The second major issue which Cambodia must deal with and which makes the other ASEAN countries apprehensive is the COC negotiation with China. In its priorities for the ASEAN chairmanship, Cambodia included this. It mentioned the 20th anniversary of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct (2002) for commemoration. This reminds ASEAN how long it has been kept adrift by China through a variety of negotiating styles.

The second major issue which Cambodia must deal with and which makes the other ASEAN countries apprehensive is the COC negotiation with China.

By 2021, there was hope that since the preamble was agreed, they could perhaps move forward. With Cambodia (the initial tripwire on the issue) as the ASEAN chair, the possibility of a COC with an ASEAN consensus in 2022 seems remote. An unresolved issue is the ASEAN preference for UNCLOS, which China, though a signatory, is reluctant to apply to the SCS. Moreover, the Chinese insistence on the SCS and its resources being primarily the responsibility of China and the ASEAN member countries is seen as a ruse to prevent other partners from stepping in. Some analysts believe that China has strung this out for too long, and annoyed several ASEAN countries by trampling over their sovereignty, islands, territorial waters, and fishing resources. Could this lead to a strategic shift by some ASEAN countries towards non-Chinese partners? The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP 2019) was a step in this direction since the Indo-Pacific as a concept is anathema to China. Yet ASEAN agreed on AOIP which ASEAN tends to use as a counterweight to the COC. Can Cambodia use its proximity to China to achieve an acceptable COC? Or will its demeanor cleave ASEAN so that member states take more independent strategic postures? The third area is to maintain ASEAN centrality. There is little that the Quad or AUKUS would do for Cambodian initiatives. Cambodia's pro-China stance makes it a lesser interlocutor. The decisions of the Quad summits are seeking a better engagement with ASEAN as a whole. How far can Cambodia take this through sectoral partnerships will determine whether they are a hindrance or facilitator. Depending on that, it can be ascertained whether they maintain ASEAN centrality, which requires a middle ground between China and the Quad. Cambodia will deal with AUKUS head on as now the UK is also a DP and will hold its first ASEAN+1 summit during the Cambodian chairmanship. Australia and USA are also scheduled to have such summits.

Cambodia will deal with AUKUS head on as now the UK is also a DP and will hold its first ASEAN+1 summit during the Cambodian chairmanship.

For India, a member of Quad with contradictions with China, Cambodia has been a long-term friend though the relationship has not blossomed in ways it should have, particularly on the economic side. The country coordinator for India for the next three years is Singapore, which gives a cushion between India and the ASEAN chair which rotates annually. However, 2022 is the 30th anniversary of the India-ASEAN dialogue partnership and is declared the Year of India-ASEAN friendship. Normally such commemorations see a summit besides other activities. While this would be coordinated with Singapore, the India-ASEAN summit would be co-chaired with Cambodia. There lies the importance for India and Cambodia to achieve more together. The ASEAN chairmanship is held by Hun Sen for the third time. It is an occasion for him to build his legacy. Surely, he would not like a failure of the kind in 2012, when Cambodia could not manage an ASEAN joint communique. As a senior leader of ASEAN, Hun Sen is in a position to leave a clear, distinctive mark on the progress of ASEAN. Perhaps his Myanmar initiative can be viewed in this light rather than as a cat’s paw for China? Similarly, he would perhaps act with greater dexterity to keep ASEAN away from Sino-Quad rivalry and give ASEAN the strategic autonomy that it craves. He could make a legacy out of quicker and effective implementation of ASEAN’s own decisions regarding community building, pandemic handling, and economic management. It is time for Cambodia to belie negative perceptions and for ASEAN to reinforce its centrality with responsibility. This year’s theme ‘Addressing Challenges Together’ is an elegant one to guide this period.

• International Affairs
• Great Power Dynamics
• China
• India
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• ASEAN
• AUKUS
• Cambodia
• Economic
• FPC
• Indo-Pacific
• QUAD
• South China Sea
• UNCLOS

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