The BRICS Summit 2024 makes it clear that members must align their positions if they seek tangible outcomes
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The BRICS Summit, held in the Russian city of Kazan on 22-24 October, marked a new phase in the development of BRICS, with five new members—
Throughout its existence, the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa has consistently generated divergent opinions regarding its significance. One view is that it is a significant initiative by non-Western powers united in their efforts to reform global financial institutions. Given the economic potential of its member states, two of which—India and China—are set to dominate the global economy in the near future, BRICS is seen as a forum to be reckoned with. From another perspective, however, the effectiveness of BRICS has so far been limited. Although the five nations have created an institutionalised platform with numerous working groups and exchange mechanisms, also establishing the New Development Bank, the net impact of their discussions has been rather modest. The lack of coherence in devising a common strategy and the low ratio between the number of meetings and their outcomes has led some observers to describe BRICS as little more than a “talk shop.”
The lack of coherence in devising a common strategy and the low ratio between the number of meetings and their outcomes has led some observers to describe BRICS as little more than a “talk shop.”
The issue of BRICS’ expansion has seemingly overtaken all other matters on the Kazan Summit agenda. The media, both from the West and from the BRICS countries, focused their attention on the issue of geographic representation at the forum and whether this demonstrates that Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, were not isolated.
If one sees through the hype surrounding the high-level attendance, there are three takeaways from the forum. One notable departure from previous summits is that Russia was successful in pushing through the issue of sanctions in its final declaration. It is well known that India has been reluctant to mention this in bilateral and multilateral documents with Russia over the past decade. China, too, although active in helping Moscow circumvent the restrictions, has restrained from bringing up this topic publicly at BRICS. The Beijing Declaration of 2022 made no reference to sanctions, and the Johannesburg Joint Statement of 2023 mentioned them only in passing, referring to their detrimental impact on agricultural trade. In stark contrast, the Kazan Declaration contains two passages condemning “unilateral coercive measures, including illegal sanctions, on the world economy, international trade and the achievement of the sustainable development goals” and “unilateral economic and secondary sanctions that are contrary to international law,” including a joint “call for their elimination.”
This might reflect a shift in the approach of previously cautious BRICS members, moving from a reserved critique of sanctions’ impact on several key projects (e.g., Chabahar port) to a more assertive public stance against sanctions. With Iran as a new member of the grouping, and Belarus and Cuba gaining partner country status, the axis of sanctioned countries is expanding and the issue will continue to loom large on the BRICS Plus agenda. However, most of the BRICS members are still highly globalised and involved in Western financial markets, so they are likely to comply with any restrictions imposed on the rest of the BRICS (primarily, Russia and Iran). The recent US’ decision to impose sanctions on nearly 400 entities and individuals from countries such as China, India, Malaysia, Türkiye, Thailand, Switzerland, UAE and others is a “serious message to both the governments and private sectors of these countries” conveying Washington’s commitment to countering the evasion of restrictions against Russia.
With Iran as a new member of the grouping, and Belarus and Cuba gaining partner country status, the axis of sanctioned countries is expanding and the issue will continue to loom large on the BRICS Plus agenda.
The second key insight is that BRICS nations are struggling to align their positions on geopolitical issues. The situation in West Asia was the main security-related topic in the joint statement, despite differing stances among the members on matters such as the Israel-Hamas conflict and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. For instance, the strong language against Israeli actions does not fully reflect the positions of all member states, including India. In contrast, the Russia-Ukraine war was referenced briefly, indicating that Moscow as the host had taken steps to narrow the gaps in opinion.
Russia is sending mixed signals about its intentions with the BRICS agenda. While echoing some of its partners’ sentiments that BRICS should not become an anti-Western club, Moscow is also using this platform to drive a wedge between the West and the Global South, and to lambast Western capitals for “blatant protectionism, manipulation of currency and stock markets, […] relentless foreign influence ostensibly promoting democracy, human rights, and the climate change agenda.” On paper, some of these points may resonate with its partners, including India, but in practice, as Russia finds itself in a full-blown confrontation with the United States and Europe, its rhetoric goes too far compared to other BRICS members (with the possible exception of Iran).
The situation in West Asia was the main security-related topic in the joint statement, despite differing stances among the members on matters such as the Israel-Hamas conflict and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
The third takeaway from the summit is that, while interbank cooperation is gaining momentum, Moscow’s key economic initiatives will take a long time to implement. The BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (BCBPI), a plan to launch a new multinational platform that would include a financial messaging component, and allow for the conduction of settlement via tokens backed by either national or digital currencies, has not yet received a positive response from other members. An important indicator of Russia’s partners’ reluctance to move forward with this new solution was their decision to send junior officials to the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Banks Governors meeting in Moscow. The difference in approach is obvious. While Russia perceives the creation of an alternative payment system as the need of the hour, other members are more cautious to move away from the US dollar and Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Like links in a chain, the development of the BRICS Grain Exchange and further, a larger trading platform for other commodities, appears to be a long-term prospect that will depend on the ability to agree on currency settlement and insurance issues.
The challenges facing BRICS are clear. Before its member states can act in unison, they must align their positions, a task that becomes more difficult with the addition of new countries. As BRICS has grown in size and ambition, and is on its way to embracing more partner countries with different agendas and identities, it remains a challenge for the grouping to transition from words to deeds. The Kazan Summit has hinted that the BRICS is being refashioned into a new ‘talk mall’ where representative exchanges on critical geo-economic and geopolitical issues do not necessarily translate into tangible decisions.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Research Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs National Research University Higher School of Economics Russia.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Research Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs ...
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