Between Indigenisation and Pragmatism: The Zorawar LBT Makes Progress

India’s indigenous Light Battle Tank (LBT) – the “Zorawar” – is showing visible progress with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announcing that the second prototype of the battle tank will roll out in September 2025. The developmental progress being witnessed today with the Zorawar tank is largely a product of lessons from past failures or, at best, mixed success in armour development, especially the Arjun battle tank. The Zorawar is built by the DRDO’s Combat Vehicle Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE) and Larsen & Toubro (L&T)’s Hazira plant in Gujarat. A quick recap of several trial and testing benchmarks that the Zorawar has completed reveals the extent to which it is undergoing rapid development.

The developmental progress being witnessed today with the Zorawar tank is largely a product of lessons from past failures or, at best, mixed success in armour development, especially the Arjun battle tank.

In July 2024, the first prototype of the LBT was unveiled at the Hazira plant. Subsequently, it underwent field trials in a desert environment where initial automotive tests were conducted. It performed exceptionally well, demonstrating high efficiency and meeting all its test objectives. Further, the performance of its firing capabilities successfully struck all its predetermined targets. Thereafter, this first prototype of the LBT underwent successful internal trials in December 2024. It is on the cusp of undergoing its first set of user trials by the Indian Army (IA) and is on course for integration or commissioning into the IA’s armoured corps by 2027. The second prototype of the Zorawar LBT is scheduled to undergo initial field trials by the end of September 2025. This is a positive outcome emerging from the LBT programme, with the second prototype being co-developed with Bharat Forge.

The Arjun Lesson for Zorawar 

All these developments suggest impressive developmental speed – contrasting sharply with India’s earlier efforts to develop the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT). Conceived initially in the 1970s, the Arjun MBT was launched only in 1988 as a serious venture for the IA’s armoured corps. One of the early mistakes made with the development of the Arjun MBT was the lack of sufficient involvement of the IA in its design, as well as poor alignment with technical requirements set by the IA for the DRDO, which is not the case with the Zorawar LBT. However, even in the case of the Zorawar, if not for the timely intervention of the senior leadership of the IA and serving armoured corps officers to involve the Army in the very early stages of conception, design, research and development to meet user requirements, the Zorawar LBT might very well have gone down the Arjun way.To be sure, technological feasibility, flexibility, and performance expectations will still need to be managed in the case of the Zorawar, and several challenges could still hinder the project. The Arjun, for its part, went through successive stages of evolution involving considerable technical changes accompanied by recrimination between the DRDO-led scientific and engineering establishment and the IA’s officer corps from the armoured and mechanised forces, which still blights India’s first indigenous battle tank.

Despite several improvements to the tank that the DRDO has managed to integrate at the behest of the IA, the Arjun’s place in the IA’s mechanised forces and armoured corps is highly contentious, at least among a segment of officers.

Despite several improvements to the tank that the DRDO has managed to integrate at the behest of the IA, the Arjun’s place in the IA’s mechanised forces and armoured corps is highly contentious, at least among a segment of officers. For the IA, both the firing capabilities of the Arjun’s main gun and its Battle Management System (BMS) remain inadequate. The DRDO, for its part, has drawn attention to its successes, especially the Arjun’s cross-country mobility, which matches the world’s best tanks in a similar weight class, and offers potent protection from anti-tank weapons. Yet the DRDO found the IA to be fickle about technical and performance benchmarks, accusing it of setting impossible technical targets for the Arjun. The IA placed its last order for 118 Arjun tanks in 2020 and is unlikely to order any more. So far, with the Zorawar, while these pitfalls have been avoided, many challenges persist.

One vital factor explaining the shift in the DRDO, the IA, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s strategy with respect to the Zorawar is the Arjun’s arduous and painful developmental trajectory – particularly the extreme emphasis on building almost the entirety of the platform indigenously. Indeed, as one analysis from over three decades ago aptly observed about the Arjun: “…indigenisation is the raison d’être of the MBT.” This caused long delays, plaguing the Arjun programme for years. As then Chief of Army Staff (CoAS), the late General Bipin Joshi, observed about the Arjun in 1993:  "What is indigenous about the tank is its design, which is tailored to meet our operational requirements. Only those items which are restricted need to be indigenised."

In part, General Joshi’s pragmatism is today driving and animating the development of the Zorawar LBT. The Zorawar’s basic design is partially native, with many of its parts sourced from Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in India, such as the LBT’s rubber components, gear systems, and cooling systems. It is enabled by locally developed Artificial Intelligence (AI) that allows it to traverse marshlands, deserts, jungles, mountain terrain, and water bodies. The Zorawar will be equipped with Unmanned Surveillance Vehicles (USVs) in its loitering munitions. Despite this indigenisation effort, the traumatic effect of the Arjun experience weighs heavily, compelling the IA and the MoD to import several components of the Zorawar.

One vital factor explaining the shift in the DRDO, the IA, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s strategy with respect to the Zorawar is the Arjun’s arduous and painful developmental trajectory – particularly the extreme emphasis on building almost the entirety of the platform indigenously.

First, the 105 mm Cockerill 3105 turret for the Zorawar, originally developed by John Cockerill, is now part of a co-development venture between the Belgium-based John Cockerill Defence and the Pune-based Electro Pneumatics and Hydraulics (EPH) under a 60:40 agreement. This arrangement will enable domestic production and boost defence exports. The Cockerill 3105 105 mm turret is under modification to service the IA’s requirements, integrating a 12.7mm remotely operated weapons station and twin anti-tank guided missiles.

Second, the American-built Cummins 760 Horsepower (HP) VTA904E-T760 engine and a RENK America HMPT transmission system power the Zorawar. The Zorawar is also scalable in that it can be subjected to upgrades and modifications, augmenting its firepower and mobility with a more powerful 1000 HP Cummins ACE engine. This will make it a little heavier than its current 25-tonne weight, yet effective in high-altitude terrain.

The test moving forward for the MoD and the DRDO is to secure an agreement that ensures Cummins establishes a co-development and co-production facility in India. Alternatives such as the German Motoren-und Turbinen-Union (MTU) — initially chosen for the Zorawar’s engine — exist, but the original deal fell through due to Berlin’s export control restrictions, which have since been relaxed. Even in the case of MTU, the challenge to secure Transfer of Technology (ToT) and co-production rights will remain. As this author has shown in earlier analysis, the indigenisation of armoured vehicle engine technology is as indispensable as the native development of aero-engines.

Apart from the IA’s shifting Qualitative Requirements (QRs), imports became a compulsion due to the MoD and DRDO’s overestimation of local developmental capacities, leading to needless delays and cost overruns.

However, in the absence of imports and co-development agreements, and if the Arjun’s developmental path had been followed, all the essential foreign components listed above would have taken years of design, development, and testing before their actual integration into the Zorawar tank. Indeed, the Arjun, including the latest Mk-1A variant, is not entirely or predominantly indigenous, despite the intent. The DRDO was unable to natively develop several key components, including its German-made engine, transmission and gun control systems. Other components, such as its fire control system and thermal imager, have been built locally, yet procured through licensed agreements with Israeli and French defence manufacturers. Apart from the IA’s shifting Qualitative Requirements (QRs), imports became a compulsion due to the MoD and DRDO’s overestimation of local developmental capacities, leading to needless delays and cost overruns. Following complete integration, the tank would still need extensive testing and trials, but the move toward a prototype for the Zorawar is a noteworthy difference from the Arjun. Further, private sector involvement in the development of two prototypes — albeit one that is more advanced than the other — is a key achievement of the Indian LBT programme. It stands in marked contrast to the Arjun, which never saw a parallel or near-parallel prototype tank being developed by the DRDO and the private sector. Although all the developmental and testing delays that bedevilled the Arjun have, so far, been avoided by the CVRDE and the IA, further testing is still required. The extent to which the Zorawar LBT can meet its operational performance demands remains to be seen.

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

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• Indian Defence
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• india's indigenous light tank
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• zorawar 2nd prototype
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