‘Balakot Plus Plus’: Positioning Offensive Air Power at the Centre of Indian Deterrence

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As the dust settles, many lessons are beginning to emerge after India’s measured and definitive retaliation to the Pahalgam terror attack perpetrated by Pakistan. The short, swift, lethal, and unprecedented air operation executed within just 90 hours has brought back Indian air power to the centre stage of national security. With the waning of the media blitzkrieg of breaking news, heated debates, and strident opinions, it is time to reflect on some initial takeaways from a larger national security perspective. Some key emerging aspects are signposted as reference points and warrant further introspection and discussion.

With the waning of the media blitzkrieg of breaking news, heated debates, and strident opinions, it is time to reflect on some initial takeaways from a larger national security perspective.

A swift military response has its limitations, especially if the element of surprise is lost and the adversary anticipates a reaction. It also restricts the scope and scale of retaliation due to the limited planning and preparation window available. On the other hand, a measured response executed at a time and in a manner of one’s choosing allows all elements of comprehensive national power to come together, constituting a synergised, calibrated, and escalation-controlled strategy. The element of surprise in the response timing was replaced instead by a surprise in the scale and intensity of the punitive air strike. No longer a measured quid-pro-quo restrained by the nuclear overhang, the response marked a disproportionately harder strike— meant to inflict serious damage at each step up the escalatory ladder. India’s traditional defensive security outlook has been replaced by an offensive posture, no longer constrained by the threat of nuclear blackmail that Pakistan has historically employed.

In a “Balakot plus plus” response, India’s retaliatory strike hit nine targets, five in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK ), and four in Pakistan’s heartland of Punjab. The target choices were specifically and exclusively restricted to terror hubs and infrastructure. They were carried out in a coordinated and calibrated offensive operation with collateral-controlled precision— most importantly without entering Pakistani airspace. The air strike was launched by the Indian Air Force (IAF) at 1:15 AM on 7 May 2025. The twenty-three minutes marked a turning point in India’s counter-terrorism strategy, as an array of air-launched stand-off weapons concentrated the fury of India’s ire. The number of targets struck simultaneously and their geographical spread underscore the IAF’s complex planning, marshalling of resources, intricate coordination, and professional execution. What makes the operation unique in contemporary global air power employment is that it was executed against an adversary with a near-peer air force, which took immense pride in its purported invincibility. ‘Operation Sindoor’ was thus a revival of the salience of offensive air power in India’s military instrument and national security.

The twenty-three minutes marked a turning point in India’s counter-terrorism strategy, as an array of air-launched stand-off weapons concentrated the fury of India’s ire.

In the escalation that followed, the much-vaunted Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) strikes against Indian civilian targets and forward airfields using drones and missiles were deterred by the IAF’s Extended Integrated Air Defence System (EIADS). Truly indigenous in its networked architecture and construct, the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) forms the backbone of the EIADS. It comprises a wide array of ground and airborne sensors that provide three-dimensional visibility over the adversary’s airspace. The sensors are synergistically integrated with a variety of shooters, including long-range surface- to- air guided weapons such as the S-400 missile system, a mix of indigenous and imported medium and short-range missile systems, close-in terminal weapons, and the beyond- visual- range (BVR) armed air defence fighters. These deterred the PAF from any offensive action and allowed the neutralisation of aerial threats. A unique first was the plugging-in of the Indian Army’s air defence into the EIAD mainframe via another successful indigenous system, the Akashteer, enabling the engagement of unmanned aerial systems launched in large numbers by an airpower-constrained adversary. The fact remains that India’s air defence was not only successful in deterring the PAF and shooting down enemy missiles and drones with great effect, but also played an important role in creating the critical conditions of control over the enemy’s airspace. This, in turn, enabled the Sukhois and Rafales to execute offensive targeting of selected centres of gravity within the enemy's air power infrastructure and assets. From a broader air power perspective, air defence has evolved into an offensive concept, that is operationally the conjoined twin of offensive air power. Together, they are a warfighting criticality in India’s military strategy—as they are interdependent, inseparable, and most importantly, a national security imperative given the strategic outcomes they deliver.

The swift technological transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) into a strategic air power is increasingly being employed to counter the United States' (US) domination along China’s seaboards.

Much has emerged in the media about the efficacy of Chinese platforms and weapons deployed by Pakistan, which was expected given the long-standing strategic, military, and defence industry handshake between Beijing and Islamabad. The swift technological transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) into a strategic air power is increasingly being employed to counter the United States' (US) domination along China’s seaboards. An increasingly aggressive PLAAF, in synergy with the PLA Navy (PLAN) , is trying to push the US threat away from Taiwan and the South China Seas to beyond the Second Island Chain. Not having fought a war and employed its air power offensively in combat since the Korean War in the early fifties, China is trying hard to dispel doubts regarding the efficacy of its defence industry products, and attempting to weave a narrative of combat-proven superiority of its weapon systems through the PAF. While it is evident that there are weaknesses in their weapons and operational integration, both nations—under the guise of their predictable international narrative-building of a purported PAF victory—are closely examining the flaws and gaps present to address them swiftly. The synergy between the two nations and their air forces warrants close examination and continuous monitoring, as it will shape the nature of the military threat India may face in the future.

An increasingly aggressive PLAAF, in synergy with the PLA Navy (PLAN) , is trying to push the US threat away from Taiwan and the South China Seas to beyond the Second Island Chain.

Finally, combat losses are par for the course for professional militaries, a factor India’s armed forces have long taken in their stride while delivering military victories towards larger national goals and strategic outcomes. No amount of number-crunching comparison or false narrative-building can obscure two essential facts. The PAF, true to its historical legacy, swiftly withdrew from action. This highlighted its inability to defend, let alone attack, and has cast doubts over its offensive-defence military strategy. Second, India’s air power has incorporated a bold and welcome offensive outlook. It has firmly established itself as a credible military instrument of consequence, operating in a grey zone in times of tenuous peace and simultaneously capable of neutralising threats in conventional warfare. It is high time that the nation’s deterrence capability is bolstered apace with economic growth, and the long- pending air power gaps are filled with a sense of urgency and purpose.

Air Marshal (Dr) Diptendu Choudhury, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM, is a former Commandant of the National Defence College at New Delhi and an Air Power Strategist.

• International Affairs
• India
• Pakistan
• air strikes on Pakistan
• india pakistan conflict
• india pakistan war
• india's strike against terrorist
• Operation Sindoor
• pahalgam retaliation

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