Aviation Engine Success Propelling China’s Air Combat Power

The rise of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) combat air power in the 21st century has been propelled by China’s hard-earned breakthroughs in jet engine development. After decades of failure—including the cancellation of the WS-6 and WS-8 programmes—Beijing has finally gained traction with the WS-10, a core engine that is now spawning a new generation of propulsion systems for both aviation and naval platforms. Led by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), this achievement reflects a multibillion-dollar push to master one of the most technically demanding pillars of military-industrial capability.

Origins of the Aviation Engine Programme

During World War II, China received I-5, I-16, and I-153 fighters, as well as SB, DB-3, and TB-3 bombers from the former Soviet Union. With Moscow’s support, China established aircraft factories across its cities after the war. This collaboration provided China access to a wide range of Soviet aircraft and jet engines, notably the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and especially the MiG-21, a supersonic, single-engine interceptor powered by the Tumansky R-11 turbojet, which Beijing saw as the foundation for mass-producing ‘people’s fighters’ to counter Western technological superiority. However, the 1960 Sino-Soviet split resulted in an abrupt culmination of this cooperation, as Soviet advisors were withdrawn, joint production was halted, and China was left with incomplete blueprints, disassembled MiG-21 kits, and only partially trained engineers. Despite this rupture, Beijing pressed ahead, producing thousands of MiG-17 and MiG-19 variants under the J-5 and J-6 programmes, and ultimately reverse-engineered the MiG-21 to create the J-7—a milestone in China’s drive for an independent aviation industry.

After decades of failure, including the cancellation of the WS-6 and WS-8 programs, Beijing has finally gained traction with the WS-10, a core engine that is now spawning a new generation of propulsion systems for both aviation and naval platforms.

However, the Tumansky R-11 turbojet engine proved to be the most challenging component for China to reverse-engineer, despite having complete technical documentation. It was only by 1975 that the J-7 could fly reliably with the Chinese WP-7 engine, whose early versions suffered from severe issues—including turbine disc expansion, blade failures, overheated bearings, and faulty afterburner nozzles—delaying a stable WP-7B until the 1980s.

The second breakthrough came with the 1971 Sino-American rapprochement, which led to the 1972 deal for Boeing 707s and 40 Pratt and Whitney engines worth US$20 million. Nonetheless, all Chinese attempts to copy the American engine failed. Furthermore, in 1975, China secured a £77 million license to produce the Rolls-Royce Spey Mk 202, with a plan to localise it within eight years. However, this ambition took over three decades to fructify. Only in 2010 did the Chinese-built WS-9 power the JH-7 and JH-7A fighter-bombers, marking hard-won but limited progress toward engine independence.

These repeated failures compelled Beijing to cancel two engine projects—WS-6 for fighters and WS-8 for airlift aircraft—after almost two decades of research and development (R&D). Even the J-10 programme—launched in 1988—stagnated for years as the domestic WS-10 engine failed to meet performance standards, severely hindering the PLA’s future capability augmentation and forcing Beijing to turn to Moscow yet again.

Russia provided D-30KP-2 engines for Y-20 strategic airlifters and AL-31FN engines for the J-10 and J-11 fighter programmes. Only after integrating the AL-31FN in the mid-1990s did the J-10 complete development and formally enter PLAAF service in 2003. As reflected in Table 1, this renewed dependence on Russian engines also revived China’s reverse-engineering playbook in the new millennium. Beijing studied the CFM-56 civilian engines and the AL-31FN Russian engine as foundations for developing its own WS-10 engine and also attempted to reverse-engineer other imported engines, including RD-33/93 and D-30KP-2.

Table 1: China’s Fighter Aircraft Engine Programmes

Source: Compiled by authors

Organisational Restructuring for Aviation Engines

A major flaw in China’s early engine development was the ‘one factory, one institute, one model’ system. Each aircraft project had a dedicated engine programme, so when an aircraft was cancelled, the engine research died with it. This inefficient structure led to mounting calls among scientists to separate engine and airframe development. In 2009, China established the China Aero Engine Corporation (CAEC) to spearhead development for both civilian and military aircraft engines. The effort gained momentum in 2016, when the State Council’s 13th Five-Year Plan ranked the ‘Two Engines’ project for jet and gas turbines as a national priority. On 28 August 2016, CAEC was reorganised into the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC), backed by the State Council, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), and the Beijing government, with a registered capital of 50 billion Yuan (US$7.5 billion). AECC consolidated most AVIC subsidiaries under a unified strategy to deliver reliable, indigenous engines for China’s aviation ambitions.

Between 2010 and 2015, China poured RMB 150 billion (US$23.7 billion) into advanced jet engine development, and by the end of 2020, total investment in the ambitious “Two Engines” project had doubled to nearly RMB 300 billion (US$42 billion).

The 2016 reform of the engine sector aimed to end the rigid military-civilian divide and address chronic fragmentation caused by promoting vertical integration. A key government directive—Opinions on the Integrated Development of Economic and National Defence Construction—called for a deep fusion of military-civilian aviation engine development. AECC adopted a ‘small core, large collaboration’ model, producing only 30 percent of an engine’s highest-value components in-house while outsourcing the rest to over 350 suppliers, including 69 from 16 foreign countries. These suppliers were involved early in R&D, improving efficiency, specialisation, and integration. This open, cross-border approach helped dismantle upstream data and technical barriers, accelerating innovation and reducing costs. Additionally, between 2010 and 2015, China invested approximately RMB 150 billion (US$23.7 billion) in advanced jet engine development. By the end of 2020, total investment in the ambitious ‘Two Engines’ project had doubled to nearly RMB 300 billion (US$42 billion).

WS-10 Engine: First Modern Propulsion

The WS-10 engine occupies a pivotal yet troubled chapter in China’s jet propulsion history. First conceptualised in the 1970s and formally approved by 1987, it achieved design and production certification by 2005. Yet, even by 2017, it remained rather unreliable for frontline employment, limited to testing on twin-engine J-11s with Russian AL-31Fs as a fallback. The WS-10A experienced critical failures: overheating turbine blades, cracking, spraying, and mid-air stalling. Its first-generation directionally solidified turbine blades proved inadequate against high core temperatures and pressure loads. In its initial three years, the PLA logged nearly 20,000 faults. The engine’s wet thrust—originally capped at 129 kilonewtons (kN)—was later raised to 137 kN, with a 145 kN target under development.

A breakthrough arrived only with the WS-10B, which incorporated improved alloys and components for turbines, compressors, and bearings. In 2018, a J-10C powered by the WS-10B performed aerobatics at the Zhuhai Airshow, signalling improved reliability. Finally, after over three decades of development, China began equipping single-engine fighters with WS-10Bs from the 2019 fourth J-10C batch. However, its mean time between failures (MTBF) still lags behind Russia’s AL-31F and remains well below global benchmarks.

Two Engines Project: Offshoots

Over the years, China has increasingly relied on its mature WS-10 engine to power a wide range of frontline aircraft. This includes the early models of the stealthy J-20, the carrier-based J-15T, and various iterations of the J-11, J-16, and J-10, including export variants. Although far from flawless, the WS-10 became China’s workhorse engine, and its evolution helped shape the engine architecture and materials science, providing a foundation for more advanced propulsion systems such as the WS-15 and WS-19, which now anchor the country’s fifth and sixth-generation fighter ambitions. Since June 2023, with prototype 2052, the J-20 has reportedly begun flying with the WS-15, marking a quiet but significant milestone in China’s aspiration to end its dependence on foreign jet engines.

The WS-10A faced critical failures: overheating turbine blades, cracking, spraying, and mid-air stalling. Its first-generation directionally solidified turbine blades proved inadequate against high core temperatures and pressure loads. In its initial three years, the PLA logged nearly 20,000 faults. 

Conclusion

China’s jet engine development, once hampered by embargoes, failures, and isolation, has achieved a critical breakthrough. The WS-10, initially dismissed, now powers frontline fighters including the J-10, J-11, J-16, and J-20, and serves as the foundation for next-generation WS-15 and WS-19 engines. This progress was driven by sustained funding and successive policy shifts, culminating in the pivotal 2016 reform that merged numerous fragmented R&D units into a unified aerospace enterprise. The result is a more autonomous and strategically capable combat aviation force, one no longer reliant on foreign propulsion.

India, despite access to Western technology and ongoing collaboration with France on Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) engines, has yet to demonstrate comparable clarity or institutional resolve. The Chinese experience underscores a core lesson: sustained capability demands organisational focus, long-term investment, and mission-driven execution. If India is serious about engine independence, it must move beyond piecemeal efforts and adopt a unified, strategic approach, one that prioritises self-reliance with purpose.

Atul Kumar is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

Ananya Vellore is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• China
• china jet engine technology
• chinese jet engine development
• jet engine development in china
• people's liberation army air force
• ws 10 engine

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