China would have a seat in the high table when the South Asian neighbours discuss and decide upon the ‘K-issue’.
On the sideline - talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Bishkek SCO Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is reported to have ruled out reviving talks with Pakistan until the latter put a permanent end to cross-border terrorism against India. "Pakistan needs to create an atmosphere free of terror but at this stage we do not see it happening. We expect Islamabad to take concrete action to resume talks”, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale quoted PM Modi as telling President Xi.
During their meeting, Xi in turn reportedly told Modi that India and China "do not pose threats" to each other as he expressed Beijing's willingness to join New Delhi in pushing forward a closer development partnership. "China is ready to work with India to continuously advance closer development partnership between the two countries," Xi said.
In the weeks and months before the SCO summit and the Xi-Modi meeting, China had ‘lifted’ the technical hold on listing Pakistan-based Masood Azhar as a global terrorist by the UN. Beijing said it took the decision after it found no objection from the other four P-5 members, but then it was the case anyway almost from the day India began asking for the UN listing on Masood Azhar.
Coming as it is after the Elections-2019 campaign in India and Modi’s bigger win than in 2014, the Pulwama-Balakot, punctuated by the China vote on Masood Azhar are all seen as huge diplomatic victory for India on the global/regional scene and a personal political triumph for Modi nearer home - or, is it so?
At present, it may remain a moot question, but what if China is able to ensure that there is no more incident of cross-border terrorism? That it may not happen soon, or at all is borne out by the fact that at the time of the SCO talks in Tajikistan, Pakistan-based terrorists carried out an attack at Pulwama, the very scene of the pre-poll attack in which around 50 CRPF personnel were killed. But taking a medium and long-term view is required to see it all in a holistic fashion.
First and foremost, at the Summit sidelines, Modi and Xi are also reported to have talked about the long-pending border talks between the two nations. It is acknowledged by both sides and others too that resolving the border talks may not be key to normalisation of bilateral relations but resolving it alone would signal the final commencement of such normalisation.
Going by Beijing’s known position, it is here that a place for Pakistan in the India-China border talks becomes an unavoidable necessity at some point. It would be more so in the case of China having to be given even a back-row, end-seat in India-Pakistan bilateral talks which cannot overlook the Kashmir-centric border issue now or ever.
Islamabad’s handing over of Aksai Chin, which itself is very much a part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) has to be either the starting point or the end-point of any India-Pakistan talks on bilateral borders and Kashmir. They would have to either address the controversial transfer of territory or begin or end it by converting the de facto ground situation into a de jure position. In all permutations and combinations, this would mean China would have to have a seat in the high table when the South Asian neighbours discuss and decide upon the ‘K-issue’.
It is in this context, the deliberate Chinese inclusion of PoK areas into the much-touted CPEC as part of the prestigious BRI project need to be understood. It was obvious that apart from other reservations, if any India would not agree to such a construct if Beijing either expected New Delhi’s participation in the BRI. Yet, if China wanted it this way, it was possibly to try and highlight the trilateral angle to the India-Pakistan border issue and bring it to the notice of the international community too, even if in a subtle way.
Broadly-speaking, India and Pakistan have only two major issues, one in a way flowing from the other – Kashmir and terrorism. If India has proof that Pakistan has given up on terrorism for good, it will not delay border talks beyond a time. If China were to ensure as much, which the US was either unable /unwilling to ensure, especially post-9/11 and post-26/11 then Beijing’s place as a facilitator and negotiator at the same time cannot be side-stepped.
Sure enough, India and Indians may feel uncomfortable at such a possibility and may even be unwilling to accept any peace proposals coming either from Pakistan or China on the face of it. Even more so, the post-Cold War western allies of India, both inside the US-led Quad and outside will have problems coming to terms with such a wishful possibility.
On this, the long-standing parliamentary resolution that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including all parts of PoK continue to be a part of the Indian Union would be the guiding principle at bilateral talks. Even with a massive parliamentary majority, how PM Modi can ‘successfully market’ a possible trilateral agreement on the K-issue to the nation’s masses, polity and possibly the higher judiciary- not to leave out the security forces is too far-fetched a question just now – but cannot be over-looked, either.
Then there is the much talked-about and equally hyped and yet relevant ‘Shimla Accord’ of 1972, which put the stamp of ‘bilateralism’ in all negotiations between India and Pakistan. Ahead of the Bangladesh War (1971) which led to the Shimla Accord the India-Pakistan war of 1965 came to an end following Soviet intervention and the Tashkent Accord. Post-Shimla, every attempt by the US and the rest to play a ‘constructive role’, especially after the Pokhran-II / Chagai nuclear tests in 1998 and the ‘Kargil War’ just a year later did not go on record for their initiatives also because the text and spirit of the Shimla Accord stood in the way.
Truth be acknowledged, independent of their geo-strategic priorities and Islamabad’s perceived place in it the US and other European powers barring the erstwhile Soviet Union distanced only by Afghanistan, do not have any direct stake in India-Pakistan border dispute. Nor do they have any claims as China has.
There is then the question. Was China’s reluctant support on the Masood Azhar issue a reflection on Beijing’s own troubles with Islamic terrorists on its land, or even Pakistan’s inability to accept international norms and ground realities? Or, was it also a tactical way of trying to capture the Indian imagination viz the US and the rest of the West. So what if nearer home in India, PM Modi may have scored all the way to the next polls and more so into the hearts of future generations even more, as well?
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
N. Sathiya Moorthy is a policy analyst and commentator based in Chennai.
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