On 24 February 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out and has now progressed into its second year.
As the European Union (EU) imposes its
10th package of sanctions against Russia, and member states such as Germany revamp their security policies in a belated recognition of the importance of hard power, India’s continued ties with Russia and its substantially increased oil purchases have naturally been a source of disappointment for Europe. India’s neutrality has raised
questions regarding its commitment to a rules-based order that underpins the EU-India strategic partnership. In the initial days of the conflict, unprecedented European
diplomatic traffic made its way to New Delhi to persuade India to change its stance and rethink its war-related abstentions at the United Nations (UN).
India’s neutrality has raised questions regarding its commitment to a rules-based order that underpins the EU-India strategic partnership.
Yet differing positions on this crisis have not dampened India-Europe political engagement both at the Brussels level as well as bilaterally with EU member states; the upward momentum in ties remains steady.
A revitalised partnership
The pandemic era already witnessed an important strategic reset in EU-India ties, with relations coming a long way since the two sides primarily viewed each other through the prism of trade. Middle powers India and Europe were already seeking greater engagement with each other to fill the strategic vacuum left behind by the US-China rivalry. Thereafter, simultaneously shifting Indian and European threat perceptions of China further propelled this shift, with the historic
EU-India Leaders Meeting in an EU+27 format held virtually in 2021. The EU’s own emergence as a global strategic actor in the wake of the pandemic and the recent Ukraine conflict also contributed to its changing perception of India.
India and Europe now have institutionalised dialogues in many policy areas including climate change and maritime security; and the menu of items on the EU-India agenda has expanded to include defence, technology, and even triangular cooperation and Artificial Intelligence (AI). The first-ever
EU-India Security and Defence Consultations were held in June 2022.
The EU-India Trade & Technology Council was created to facilitate cooperation in these areas. Besides, Sweden’s current presidency of the Council of the EU has also prioritised the FTA with India.
Crucially, divergences on Russia have not undermined EU-India strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific where joint wariness about Chinese assertions is leading to enhanced cooperation. For the world’s largest single market and fifth-largest economy, the stability of trade routes and supply chains linking Asia to Europe is critical. In this context, the
EU-India Connectivity Partnership was launched in 2021 as part of the EU’s Global Gateway to rival China’s Belt & Road Initiative.
Against the backdrop of the Ukraine Crisis, the EU-India FTA negotiations, previously stalled since 2013, were reopened. Besides the natural economic benefits of the FTA, geopolitical imperatives including the stability of supply chains and diversification of trade partners played a role in relaunching the negotiations. In 2022, the
EU-India Trade & Technology Council was created to facilitate cooperation in these areas. Besides, Sweden’s current presidency of the Council of the EU has also
prioritised the FTA with India.
Deepening political engagement
India and Europe have also continued to politically engage with each other substantively. This is evident in consecutive European Chief Guests, European Commission President Von der Leyen and then Italian PM Meloni, inaugurating the Raisina Dialogue in 2022 and 2023. Both years saw a large European high-level contingent, including the EU’s Chief Diplomat Borrell and several European Foreign Ministers, attend the Dialogue. On the first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
German Chancellor Scholz chose to visit India, and PM Modi may be visiting France soon at French President Macron’s invitation.
India is also investing in heavy diplomatic outreach towards Europe, even moving beyond Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, to engage subregions including the Nordics and the Slavkov grouping. These engagements during a period of global disruptions and conflict on the European continent demonstrate India and Europe’s increased relevance in each other’s current worldview. The two are also cooperating in multilateral forums such as the G20 whose presidency India currently holds.
On the first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, German Chancellor Scholz chose to visit India, and PM Modi may be visiting France soon at French President Macron’s invitation.
Undoubtedly, the EU-India partnership has matured and galvanised through the pandemic and the Ukraine crisis. Gone are the days when episodes like the
2012 Italian Marines case derailed the entire partnership. Instead, present hiccups are being approached through better communication and a willingness to understand each other’s strategic perspectives. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar’s deft diplomacy and
thorough articulation of India’s position has contributed to this understanding. For Europe, the Ukraine Crisis has led to a resurgence of values-based partnerships with like-minded countries, where India as a democracy, neatly fits in.
Opportunities for Collaboration
In an altered global landscape, opportunities for EU-India collaboration are only increasing as both rethink their energy, trade and security architectures, and seek alternatives to move away from Russia and China.
Europe is weaning itself off Russian energy, and India is diversifying its defence imports away from Russia, which already
fell significantly following Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. A depleted Russian military and Western sanctions make Russia an unreliable defence partner for India’s future. European countries could fill some of this void through enhanced security cooperation with India. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Europe
accounts for 24 percent of the world’s total defence exports, and countries such as Germany are
liberalising their arms export policies. Along with France and Italy, these could support India’s defence capabilities and indigenous production through its “Make in India” programme as evident in Germany’s
pursuit to jointly build six conventional submarines in India.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Europe accounts for 24 percent of the world’s total defence exports, and countries such as Germany are liberalising their arms export policies.
Despite the declining value of India’s overall relationship with Russia, India will continue to maintain its ties with the country, primarily to prevent Moscow’s closer alignment with China and Pakistan, which would undermine Indian security. Moving forward, Russia will continue to remain a sticking point for Europe, and India’s well-performed balancing act could come under greater scrutiny by European partners. India may be compelled to make some tough choices as its space to navigate the international landscape further shrinks. Given the EU’s consensus-based mechanism of operation, countries such as Poland that are at the forefront of the conflict may reject advancing cooperation with India as it drags on.
Yet so far, the European pushback on India’s position has played out more in media commentary and public perception. Its bearing on actual government-to-government relations has been limited with both sides seeming determined to focus on the broader long-term picture given the potential at stake.
As debates on security, geoeconomics, China, Russia and the emerging world order continue to evolve within both Indian and European constituencies, New Delhi’s engagement with Brussels and member state capitals at this critical juncture is vital. As Borrell
said, “Seeing eye-to-eye on all instances must not be a prerequisite for any cooperation”. For India and Europe, the mutual need for greater security and economic cooperation may continue to supersede irritants.
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