A Refresh of the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review: What’s changed?

In March 2021, the British government released its ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’, a strategic document laying out a detailed blueprint for post-Brexit Britain’s engagement with the world. Yet only two years later, as the Ukraine crisis upended the global security order, Britain released an updated version of the document titled ‘Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World’. This update was ordered by the Liz Truss administration in 2022 to re-assess British priorities based on events that fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape since the release of IR2021. 

“Danger, disorder, and division” 

IR2023 warns of a likely further deterioration of the international security environment, amidst “a world defined by danger, disorder and division” created by “Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine combined with China’s aggressive stance in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait”. Russia continues to be labelled as Britain’s “most acute threat” and “most pressing” security challenge. However, a crucial difference from IR2021 is that the refreshed strategy links collective security to the outcome of the Ukraine conflict, with the Euro-Atlantic theatre continuing to remain Britain’s key geographic priority. This is evident in Britain’s military support to Ukraine, which at 2.3 billion euros, is the second highest after that provided by the United States (US).

A crucial difference from IR2021 is that the refreshed strategy links collective security to the outcome of the Ukraine conflict, with the Euro-Atlantic theatre continuing to remain Britain’s key geographic priority.

Significantly, the document links prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic to security in the Indo-Pacific and merges developments between these theatres. This is somewhat similar to the European Union (EU) Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific which links stability on the European continent to stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, the document mentions “a new network of Atlantic-Pacific partnerships” with shared interests. An emphasis on close cooperation with like-minded partners is a recurring theme throughout the strategy, where the US is referred to as Britain’s “most important” ally, Australia is the second-most referenced partner, and stronger relations with European allies are stressed. IR2021, with the Indo-Pacific tilt at its core, proclaimed Britain’s ambitions to become “the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific”. IR2023 reinforces this tilt as a ‘permanent pillar’ of British foreign policy, acknowledging that “conflict in the Indo-Pacific could have global consequences greater than the conflict in Ukraine”. Of note here is the fact that Britain, unlike some other European countries, has not released a formal Indo-Pacific strategy. However, as evidence of this Indo-Pacific tilt and projection of its regional presence here, the UK has committed to several initiatives such as becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner, deploying its Carrier Strike Group warship to the region, signing a defence pact with Japan alongside an Italy-Japan-Britain defence partnership called the “Global Combat Air Programme”, applying to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, and recently appointing a Minister for the Indo-Pacific followed by additional plans to appoint a ‘Tech Envoy’ to the region.

IR2023 reinforces this tilt as a ‘permanent pillar’ of British foreign policy, acknowledging that “conflict in the Indo-Pacific could have global consequences greater than the conflict in Ukraine”.

Most notably, the release of IR2023 coincides with PM Sunak’s trip to the US aimed at progressing AUKUS—the trilateral security partnership and defence agreement between Australia, the UK, and the US, which aims to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines with topnotch British technology and American support to develop joint capabilities to counter Chinese assertions in the Indo-Pacific. Sunak’s reference, at the recent trilateral press conference in San Diego, to AUKUS as “the most significant multilateral defence partnership in generations” demonstrates its centrality to the three nations’ joint vision to foster stability in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy also supports “stability in the Taiwan Strait” while opposing “any unilateral change in the status quo”. After AUKUS and several other factors soured ties, the recent thaw in Franco-British relations given France’s status as a central European player in the Indo-Pacific is another important development. As with the rest of the West, Britain’s worsening relations with China since 2021 have amounted to labelling China as an “epoch-defining challenge” in IR2023. Yet the reluctance to explicitly categorise China as a “threat” has disappointed the more hawkish elements in Sunak’s Conservative Party. The strategy adopts more measured language on China emphasising economic ties in the aftermath of Brexit, and engagement on common issues like climate change while pushing back against coercion. Once again, this approach is not too different from that of the EU which simultaneously labels China a “systemic rival, competitor and partner”. The document further stresses how Britain’s relations with China are not inevitably hostile or set on such a “predetermined course”. Even so, Britain’s intelligence agency MI5 acknowledges that “the activities of the CCP pose the most game-changing strategic challenge to the UK”. In particular, the strategy considers “China’s deepening partnership with Russia and Russia’s growing cooperation with Iran” of concern. It also emphasises that cooperation would “depend on the choices China makes” while highlighting the role of the G20 as an important forum for dialogue.

The strategy adopts more measured language on China emphasising economic ties in the aftermath of Brexit, and engagement on common issues like climate change while pushing back against coercion.

The document makes a number of references to India, including the importance of working with “middle powers”, while mentioning India’s closer cooperation with the G7, and reiterating Britain’s support for the G4 countries towards permanent UNSC membership. In tandem with IR2021, working towards the FTA as well as deepening bilateral ties through the 2030 Roadmap released in 2021 is mentioned.

A question of resources

Besides the AUKUS announcements, pledges to increase Britain’s defence budget to 2.25 percent of GDP above the current 2 percent NATO commitment also accompanied the strategy. However, the current increase is still considered insufficient by top British military officials given the heightened scale of threats. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting Britain as the only likely G7 economy to enter recession in 2023, balancing domestic economic concerns with an ambitious foreign policy that involves a sustained commitment to both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres will pose its challenges. Analysts worry that in the context of limited military resources along with diminishing stocks resulting from support to Ukraine, the country’s attempts to contribute as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific will dilute its critical role in the Euro-Atlantic, where it is most valued. Furthermore, Britain is not poised for general elections until 2025, but with polls suggesting a possible win for the Labour Party then, the Indo-Pacific may rank lower in Britain’s set of future foreign policy priorities given the party’s greater emphasis on supporting NATO.

With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting Britain as the only likely G7 economy to enter recession in 2023, balancing domestic economic concerns with an ambitious foreign policy that involves a sustained commitment to both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres will pose its challenges.

Continuity over change

Overall, IR23 continues with the broad direction and similar set of priorities laid out in IR2021, rather than any fundamental changes or reassessments. However, the document does provide an important touch-up to its original and is a clear reflection of Britain’s thinking and its resultant policy trends arising from the mammoth global shifts of the past two years. While reinforcing Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt as well as a commitment to the Euro-Atlantic, it also places greater stress on the issue of military and other resources. The Refresh also comes after some tangible projects and actions demonstrating what Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt actually entails. Britain’s support to Ukraine has demonstrated the country’s continued relevance in world affairs and its ability to shape the international order despite Brexit. In theory, IR2023 is indicative enough that while navigating a truly volatile landscape, Downing Street is, indeed, thinking "Global". Time will tell if it can deliver on its ambitions.

• International Affairs
• European Union
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• AUKUS
• defence
• Indo-Pacific
• NATO
• security
• South China Sea
• United Kingdom

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