The issue of ‘nuclear liability’ generates enough controversy that there has been very little common understanding on defining the Tproblem, let alone identifying options for a politically feasible solution. For an objective analysis, therefore, it is necessary to place the issue in a wider perspective. This paper is divided into five sections:

(i) The first section explains the rationale of why India needs international cooperation for nuclear power and, consequently, the need for nuclear liability legislation;

(ii) Section Two identifies those elements of India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) passed in 2010 and the Rules issued in the following year that have generated concerns;

(iii) Section Three examines the reasons behind these concerns in the context of the evolution of the international nuclear liability regime;

(iv) The fourth section looks at the different suggestions that have been put forward by different stakeholders and the reasons why none of them have made much headway;

(v) Section Five concludes with a recommendation for a coherent and comprehensive approach which should help resolve the liability conundrum, as well as contribute to the process of restoring India’s position in the world of international nuclear trade and commerce.