483 results found
This paper trains the spotlight on India’s relations with Africa by studying the country’s relations with two east African countries – Tanzania and Kenya, and two south African countries – Mozambique and South Africa. The paper opens with a description of the trade, investment, and development cooperation links between India and these countries. An assessment follows of three key areas in these bilateral relationships: energy, food securi
India’s interest in cultivating the Colombo Security Conclave as a vital forum in the region is demonstrated by its need to look for avenues to enhance cooperation in the Indian Ocean
There is a consensus among intelligence officials, current and erstwhile, that the future challenges cannot be foreseen as they will emanate from the cyber world, space, the ocean, failed states and fundamentalism. The current intelligence system is woefully inadequate to meet these threats.
When India first began developing the ANI in the 1980s, the defence and foreign policy establishments were not entirely in agreement
New Delhi declared unequivocal support for “all peoples striving for decolonisation”, only to keep conspicuously quiet.
The navy has been undertaking anti-piracy operations in the region with significantly greater purpose than at any time since 2008
Someday, Gwadar port in Pakistan might well emerge as a full-fledged Chinese naval facility. For now, Karachi already serves as a major facility for the projection of Chinese naval power into the Indian Ocean.
After President Donald Trump’s 2017 visit to Asia, the Indo-Pacific region assumed greater significance in the United States’ foreign policy calculus, as articulated in the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’ released by the US Department of Defence. On 31 December 2018, Trump passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which authorises US$1.5 billion in spending for a range of US programmes in East Asia and Southeast Asia to “develop
As China and the US pursue development of unmanned underwater drones, the Indian navy is also adjusting its strategy to include autonomous vehicles in its armoury against China’s growing undersea footprint in the Indian Ocean
India and Japan have had a long relationship, which was never really a factor in their relationship with China.
China’s growing footprint in Sri Lanka has been of concern to India.
What explains New Delhi’s greater engagement with the country’s military government?
Observers in New Delhi profess mixed feelings — some joy for Australia, but more commiseration with France
India simply cannot afford to alienate the government in Male given China's growing reach. The President of Maldives was in China in October last year when Beijing announced a $500-million economic assistance for it. New Delhi views Maldives as central to the emerging strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean.
The two most-important objectives of foreign policy is ‘security’ — both external and internal — and ‘economy’.
India needs to consider the political and military consequences of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan and formulate a policy to support Taiwan's freedom
Security expert Ashley Tellis recommends upgrading India's aircraft carrier with US systems to counter the Chinese in the Indian Ocean. But does India face a credible enough Chinese threat and does it really need new systems?
Among other things, India requires its neighbours to 'out-source' its larger geo-strategic security concerns in the shared Indian Ocean Neighbourhood - and otherwise, too.
Even as India engages China in a dialogue, or becomes a way station in the sea silk route, New Delhi needs to take some lessons from China and anchor its maritime policies on a strong navy. As of now, we can more than hold our own in the Indian Ocean against all but the US Navy. But, tomorrow is another day.
China’s domestic debates throw light on issues behind the LAC crisis and also hold a lesson for India — to recognise and leverage its increasing strategic value to China
India should know that the OBOR scheme is not about CPEC and Pakistan; but in fact its primary goal is to integrate the rich European economy with that of China’s.
The Maldives preferres a multilateral regional approach to ensuring security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that is collaborative, rules-based and inclusive.
Given the centrality of the Indian Ocean to its national security, it is time for India to leverage existing and emerging multilateral platforms to engage deeply with partner countries and take on a greater leadership role in the Indian Ocean Region.
Though the importance of the Maritime Silk Route, proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, is laid on promoting greater economic integration and boosting connectivity through the Indian Ocean, the strategic significance of such a project cannot be underestimated.
With Narendra Modi pursuing a very active Indian Ocean region diplomacy, Maldives cannot be kept away from his outreach programme. Maldives is key to our strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and any instability or discord in its internal affairs would have a bearing on our security.
The strong strategic and political foundation as well as the trust between India and France provide for accelerated defense and security ties in the coming years.
The victory of a pro-China government in the Maldives offers Beijing an opportunity to restore its influence in the Indian Ocean region
France has emerged as one of India’s closest strategic partners and the relationship is likely to bloom further in the coming years.
By broadening the scope of bilateral cooperation from the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to encompass the entire Indo-Pacific region, the India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap, released in July 2023, underscores the importance of moving beyond the traditional self-centred approach to foster a more outward-looking dynamic with key regional partners. The cooperative trilateral mechanisms established by India and France in 2020 (India-France-Australia) and i
The Indo-Pacific region has become a crucial area of the India-United States (US) partnership. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the two countries have increased their alignment on the Indo-Pacific, with both sides giving greater priority to the region and acknowledging sharper shared concerns about China. The US and India are also increasing cooperation via the Quad and engaging in other platforms such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (I
This brief explores the factors informing the Donald Trump administration’s continuity on the US’s defence trade with India. The administration’s impetus to maintain US-India defence trade stems from factors like the ‘reverse revolving door’ policy that has increased the influence of US defence contractors, its ‘Buy American’ policy to boost US arms exports, and defence trade being construed as an incremental means to correct the bi
The November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai the commercial capital of an economically resurgent India?left a deep and indelible impact on the Indian security psyche. The attacks exposed the lackadaisical attitude of the Government, at both the Central and state level, towards coastal security and the sheer illpreparedness of the country to combat such terror threats from the seas.
Given the Maldives’ geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean, it is understandable that China has long-term strategic interests in it. The island nation sits atop of critical sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Gaining a larger footprint in the Indian Ocean is now part of China’s stated strategy.
The Bay of Bengal region is more than a channel for commerce — it has become an arena for power projection.
New Delhi finds a prominent place in the strategy’s focus on Washington’s network of allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.
India’s talk of an ‘Act East’ policy or an Indian Ocean presence sounds hollow when its ability to shape outcomes in its own neighbourhood is so limited
China is a new entrant into the Indian Ocean, and there is a lot of concern over its development of ports and infrastructure and links with various countries. India must not overstate China's significance.
Without timely replenishment, India could end up with a submarine fleet similar to that of Pakistan.
Noting that maritime disputes and strategic competition in the Indian Ocean are at the core of changing geo-politics in the IO, participants of the Indian Ocean Dialogue concluded that the members of the IORA should address the security concerns themselves rather than relying on international forces.
On India’s part, it has stood up to the China challenge on several fronts.
The expanding engagement with the Japanese navy, one of the strongest in the world, should give a boost to India's maritime diplomacy in Asia. If New Delhi's interests in the Pacific are growing, Tokyo's naval profile in the Indian Ocean has begun to expand.
The next government must recognise that the Bay of Bengal is no longer a backwater but a strategic hub connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans as well as China and the Bay of Bengal. Delhi must match its rhetoric on trans-border connectivity with much needed political will and administrative competence.
India’s plan for naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter China’s military power in the Indian Ocean
China’s growing interests, ambitions and military capabilities pose challenges for India. This paper examines China’s maritime interests and the dynamics of Indian responses at the maritime operational levels. The paper examines opportunities to counter China in the IOR, as well as options for the Indian Navy in the South China Sea. At operational levels, the Navy may need to think differently about ASW, carrier operations and power projectio
