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A foiled ricin attack raises fundamental questions about where India situates biological threats within its wider counter-terrorism and nuclear-deterr

Pakistan’s pursuit of low-yield nuclear weapons lowers the nuclear threshold, destabilises South Asia, and undermines global norms on nuclear restra

India’s pursuit of BMD is no longer optional—it is a strategic imperative to counterbalance China’s growing nuclear shield and evolving war doct

The global consensus is shifting towards the perspective that, in extremely adverse situations, the use of NSNWs is justified. Should India reevaluate

स्टॉकहोम इंटरनॅशनल पीस रिसर्च इन्स्टिट्यूट (SIPRI) चा अलीकड�

The latest SIPRI report indicates the concerning trend of modernisation and growth of arsenals across the globe.

In light of the advances in Chinese defence capabilities, India must prioritise the development of the second phase of India’s BMD capability as wel

India’s No First Use policy was a result of the lessons that India’s key strategic thinkers learned in the long decades they spent thinking about

India’s challenge in asserting its stance on global nuclear disarmament requires a precise articulation of its goals and plans.

Even as India has had a long-running debate about many aspects of its nuclear doctrine, most importantly, its No First Use (NFU) policy, the country continues to maintain the NFU. This paper makes a critical assessment of recent arguments made by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang that India may be reconsidering its NFU policy because of counterforce “temptations”. The paper dissects the evidence they present—statements made by mostly retir