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Curiosity drew me to the Yasukuni shrine during a recent trip to Tokyo. When I lived in Beijing in the Nineties, I had been struck by the close attention paid by the Chinese authorities to every visit by a Japanese minister to this Shinto place of worship.
India’s multi-pronged strategy of using various instrumentalities of power — legal, diplomatic, economic and military — seems to have had some effect in shaping Pakistan’s behaviour.
The battle against naxals cannot be won purely by military means even though this may be the first requirement. It cannot definitely be won by introducing the Armed Forces in place of the para militaries. This would be the most retrograde of all steps and should not even be considered as an option.
U.S. defense cooperation with India is one thing Democratic and Republican administrations agree on.
This issue brief assesses the enduring political influence of the military in Pakistan. It delves into the historical, social, and geopolitical factors that have propelled the military's rise in the nation's governance structure. The brief also examines the military-bureaucratic nexus and its role in perpetuating military dominance, and the implications of a weak civil society and its constrained ability to counterbalance military power.
China has persistently employed a strategy of belligerent operations below the threshold of war against its territorial and maritime neighbours. These range from fistfights with neighbours’ armies and minor troop engagements on land, to ramming ships against theirs in its near seas, clashing with their coast guards, or engaging in aggressive military exercises and aviation patrols. These actions are not severe enough to provoke a war, but not s
The response to the country’s new defense budget suggests that Beijing continues to be tone deaf to regional anxieties.
A military base in Djibouti is a useful asset for China, as it denotes both geopolitical heft and economic stakeholdership in the Indian Ocean.
In the Chinese defence paper, though nothing is directly indicative of India, the implications are quite clear with the focus on open seas protection and unbending approach to territorial disputes. Urgency and imagination will be key in tackling Chinese ambitions in what is considered New Delhi's backyard.
With China aiming to develop a "world-class" military by 2050 that can fight and win wars across all theatres, Indian conventional and nuclear thinking will also have to evolve
Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan's tri-nation goodwill tour started with Pakistan on March 22, 2004 and ended with Thailand, with an in-between five-day visit to India from March 26 to 30.
This year’s defence budget marks an increase of 8.1 percent from last year. China has justified its defence budget by arguing that its defence spending is less than 1.5 percent of its GDP, but that argument is not going to go down well with its neighbours.
China’s growing military profile in Africa is following its economic footprint in the continent as exemplified by the Chinese “logistics support base” in Djibouti. It is moving towards an ever more expansive definition of its global interests, as its business in Africa pushes it to create new mechanisms for securing those interests, including its own growing military footprint abroad. This brief examines the changing nature of China’s inv
China’s annual parliamentary meetings offer a glimpse into its future direction. This year, amidst economic headwinds, a key takeaway is the continued surge in defence spending
Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics for quick and decisive victories in any theatre of battle. This brief exa
Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics that can lead the military to quick and decisive victories in any theatre of ba
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone many changes since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013. Efforts at modernising the PLA have been conducted in earnest for the past 10 years through the overhaul of the organisation and the introduction of latest technologies to make it battle-ready. This paper describes these capability-related and institutional changes in China’s military, wh
Since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has witnessed an accelerated modernisation drive. Following the 2015-16 organisational reforms, the CPC further standardised its services-level force structure and upgraded its military doctrine, combat capabilities, and weapons systems. This report analyses recent improvements in the structure, including the creation of t
On 3 September 2025, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held a grand parade in Beijing, showcasing ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear triad components, unmanned platforms with countermeasures, and conventional systems from across its services. The event marked the 80th anniversary of China’s ‘War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression’, which Beijing interprets as culminating in Japan’s surrender to the Allied Powers in September
Military modernisation was the fourth and last of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Four Modernisations’. Even before the third modernisation got underway—that of science and technology—China began using commercial technologies to advance its military capabilities. This strategy has gained salience since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 and made it the state’s key goal to transform the PLA into a “world-class military”. Military-Civil Fusi
China’s moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.
China's increasing assertiveness is not ad hoc and random; it fits in with their overall military strategy. And, finding this strategy to be quite effective, Chinese leadership are promote it, according to Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
Military capabilities remain the sine qua non of international politics. Therefore, critical defence reforms in India will have to be pushed with greater vigour. Without institutional, doctrinal and procedural changes, New Delhi will not be able to make the most of this moment in global geopolitics
What is a matter of grave concern has been the lopsided priorities of the government towards the military vis-a-vis the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) that have come to the fore.
The rapidly changing battlefield—framed by emerging transnational threats and the rising influence of public opinion—has transformed military diplomacy; today the focus is shifting from traditional combat to joint multinational operations and non-combat activities. Since the early 21st century, China has modernised its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and expanded military diplomacy to protect the country’s interests. Using civil-military f
Managing China is becoming a weightier challenge for the world, as the country’s economic, military and technological power grows. The challenge is more immense for India, given its border dispute with China and their geopolitical rivalry, overall. The relationship between the two Asian giants, also neighbours, went through a particularly troubled period in the last five years following the as-yet-unexplained Chinese incursions across the Line
Even though the Egyptian army has refrained from taking over governance in the interim period, analysts say the fear of repeating the same mistakes are legitimate. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether or not this political transition will have a long-lasting impact on Egypt's nascent democracy.
Pakistan is living through turbulent times and, General Musharraf, its self-styled President, is under tremendous pressure. The United States-led anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan has shaken Pakistan's polity like no other event in its troubled history.
In January 2000, when I spoke about the concept of limited conventional wars under the nuclear threshold at an international seminar in New Delhi, there was considerable uproar in the media and the strategic community, particularly in Pakistan.
Defence structures around the world are seeing a technological upheaving as new and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) are being added to military arsenals. However, military AI largely lacks precision and is often developed without any threat-modelling which takes gender into account, examples of which are already being seen in civilian applications of AI. Translated into a conflict environment, deploying such AI systems cou
I have no problem with military officers running a nation as long as they are out of uniform and have won the mandate to do so. But when a military officer ousts a legitimate civilian government, refuses to shed his uniform and abuses the basic democratic right of franchise, there is a reason for the civilized world to be alarmed and ashamed. Such men are a blot on the democratic, civilized world.
Peaceful relations with Pakistan is a prerequisite to India’s domestic stability and its quest for great power status.
The convergence of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) can serve as a strategic enabler for China to accelerate its geopolitical dominance and realise its ‘Middle Kingdom Dream’ by 2049. By embedding dual-use technologies into development projects, China effectively expands the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) logistical reach, strengthens cyber capabilities, and promotes state-controlled governance mod
The 2625 kg GSAT-7, developed at a cost of INR 185 crores, will be India's first dedicated satellite for maritime communications, providing UHF, S-band, C-band, and Ku band relay capacity over the Indian landmass and surrounding seas.
The late-first millennium BCE Arthaśāstra is popularly known for its vile recommendations—a perception that tends to overshadow its far more comprehensive and holistic message on state-building. While the treatise itself gives no geographical or chronological pointers, this paper takes a historicist approach to contextualise it in time and space to show that it was not a one-off product but the result of an entrenched tradition of enlightened
The Indian army’s higher leadership must reflect on its role as the sword arm of the republic, and have a clear vision of itself as the upholder of law.
Most of the joint exercises being conducted by security forces, like like the Malabar 2015, are of the simple basic variety and, hence, really provide no 'net value addition' to the Indian force that participates. Thus, approvals for such exercises should necessitate a case-by-case approach in the future.