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This year’s defence budget marks an increase of 8.1 percent from last year. China has justified its defence budget by arguing that its defence spending is less than 1.5 percent of its GDP, but that argument is not going to go down well with its neighbours.

Tibet is where India and China meet. It is through Tibet that China manages its relations with India, using the boundary dispute to keep New Delhi off-balance. India is also where the most revered Tibetan, the 14th Dalai Lama lives in exile. Having failed to negotiate his return, there is now a two-pronged effort by China to deal with the consequences of the Dalai Lama’s passing and his possible reincarnation outside Tibet: to m

This paper examines major developments achieved by China in outer space in recent years, both from a technological as well as an arms-control perspective. The paper also looks at the implications for India in the domain and in the broader regional secu rity context.

The 13th round of military commander’s talks between India and China will take place at Moldo today.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is central to the country’s ambitious policy reorientation. The energy sector accounts for nearly 40 percent of all investments under the BRI, with significant geostrategic and geoeconomic implications. In recent years, China has adopted a “greening the BRI” strategy, emphasising green energy projects. This brief analyses China’s BRI investments in the energy sector to establish the potential trend

Over the last two decades, China has established a significant economic presence in most African countries. Its lucrative economic investment package, flexible political approach, and focused big-ticket development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provide an ostensibly massive opportunity to African countries. However, the unilateral nature of the initiative, the lack of transparency and accountability to African countries, and t

China’s caution in the Middle East endures. As US influence wanes and Gulf states diversify defence ties, Beijing may expand its role—but not replace Washington.

China’s growing military profile in Africa is following its economic footprint in the continent as exemplified by the Chinese “logistics support base” in Djibouti. It is moving towards an ever more expansive definition of its global interests, as its business in Africa pushes it to create new mechanisms for securing those interests, including its own growing military footprint abroad. This brief examines the changing nature of China’s inv

At a time when the world is distracted by the Wuhan virus pandemic, China has stepped up its plan to annex Hong Kong fully

In the past seven decades, China has been actively building civilian, military, and dual-use infrastructure in Xinjiang and Tibet—which it calls, respectively, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This infrastructure web runs close to India’s northern borders, over which clashes have led to two standoffs in the recent past: in mid-2017 (at Doklam) and in mid-2020 (in Galwan Valley). China’s inf

China’s long game in Africa is not just about economic influence or military strength. It is also about the subtle art of diplomacy and influence

Mohamed Muizzu is helping Beijing expand its presence in the Indian Ocean

China’s space policy planners are convinced that the country should aim for manned lunar landings by 2040. It has already established a sophisticated robotic lunar exploration programme and human landings are perceived as the logical next step. New navigation and communication architectures are being developed for this purpose, in addition to building life support systems and a suitable launch vehicle. However, China’s political leadership wo

Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics for quick and decisive victories in any theatre of battle. This brief exa

Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics that can lead the military to quick and decisive victories in any theatre of ba

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone many changes since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013. Efforts at modernising the PLA have been conducted in earnest for the past 10 years through the overhaul of the organisation and the introduction of latest technologies to make it battle-ready. This paper describes these capability-related and institutional changes in China’s military, wh

Since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has witnessed an accelerated modernisation drive. Following the 2015-16 organisational reforms, the CPC further standardised its services-level force structure and upgraded its military doctrine, combat capabilities, and weapons systems. This report analyses recent improvements in the structure, including the creation of t

On 3 September 2025, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held a grand parade in Beijing, showcasing ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear triad components, unmanned platforms with countermeasures, and conventional systems from across its services. The event marked the 80th anniversary of China’s ‘War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression’, which Beijing interprets as culminating in Japan’s surrender to the Allied Powers in September

Military modernisation was the fourth and last of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Four Modernisations’. Even before the third modernisation got underway—that of science and technology—China began using commercial technologies to advance its military capabilities. This strategy has gained salience since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 and made it the state’s key goal to transform the PLA into a “world-class military”. Military-Civil Fusi

Even as Nepal’s new leaders appear to pursue closer ties with Beijing, not all is lost for New Delhi.

China’s nuclear expansion could lead to a spiraling arms race.

The oil deal could be a fundamental test for the future of Afghanistan-China cooperation

Despite continuing talks between India and China, military preparations clearly are continuing, too.

In recent years, the United States (US)—under both the Donald Trump 1.0 and Joe Biden administrations—has resorted to a technology-denial regime to deprive China of advanced know-how that could give it any military advantage. During Trump’s first presidential term, he levied tariffs that led to a trade war, prompting China to respond with retaliatory tariffs and currency depreciation. Anticipating Trump’s possible return, China began deve

The annual parliamentary sittings of China’s National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—usually held at the same time—are important political events, with speeches of leaders at the meetings reflecting the country’s policy trajectory. During the last sessions of both in March 2023, President Xi Jinping noted that western countries led by the United States (US) are seeking to “contain and en

The message — no business if you are on the wrong side of issues like Xinjiang

For China, it is the problems in what it considers to be its core interests which are becoming difficult to handle.

New Delhi will need to look to the US for help resisting Beijing’s maritime ambitions.

The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important.

Sharp power—a state's attempt to alter the behaviour of other countries through the manipulation of culture, education systems, and the media to further its interests—is a key tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Issues related to regime legitimacy and the CCP's development priorities have shaped China's sharp power approach. In the Xi Jinping era, there is some anxiety in the party ranks that external conditions are turning aga

शार्प पॉवर (sharp power) - एक देश की सांस्कृतिक, शैक्षणिक व्यवस्था और मीडिया बर्ताव में तिकड़म का उपयोग करते हुए परिवर्तन की कोशिश करते हुए दूसरे देश को प्रभावित करने का प्रयास - चीन

China finds that its trustworthiness among ordinary Aussies has plummeted from 52 per cent to just 23 per cent in two years.

New Delhi’s Indian Ocean woes aren’t confined to Sri Lanka. Across the Indian Ocean’s littorals, the Chinese navy has been preparing to establish a stronger security presence. On Pakistan’s Makran coast, the PLAN has deployed regularly, including at Gwadar, also constructed by CMPorts. Earlier this year, the PLA is said to have initiated talks with the Pakistan military for another outpost at Jiwani.

Beijing’s Southeast Asia outreach may complicate the U.S.’s efforts to build a coalition to isolate or deter China economically.

Vivek Mishra, “China’s Tech Challenge: Assessing Biden’s Response,” ORF Issue Brief No. 649, July 2023.

A significant technological feat for China, Beijing’s accomplishment is also a reminder of the revved-up space competition among the major space powers.

China’s actions in Ladakh since 2020 are in violation of common understandings and have brought the focus of bilateral relationship back to the issue of the border. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of China’s behaviour along the India-China border by exploring a fresh perspective that explains the instability along the border as a function of China’s two-front conundrum. It makes a historical account of past events to arg

The China-brokered Saudi Arabia-Iran deal puts the spotlight on New Delhi’s ties with Tehran

Despite the hypocrisy and power politics at the foundation of the GSI, it would be foolish to dismiss it or assume that it will not garner support from other countries.

China’s ‘three warfares’ strategy (TWS)—understood as public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare—has received considerable attention, but most analyses focus on Beijing’s sovereign claim to Taiwan and its maritime claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. This occasional paper evaluates the manifestation of the TWS against India in Ladakh and China’s motivation for adopting the same approach in the Arctic and Antar

India’s ties with Beijing have frayed even as relations with Moscow lose warmth because of their actions

With the enhancement of power in the Indo-Pacific region, China is attempting to create new constructs in the security arena which will be exclusively for Asians and it will bestow primacy to themselves.

Trump has been making certain goodwill gestures, from inviting Chinese President Xi Jinping to his inauguration ceremony to providing a high-level reception to China's special representative and Vice President Han Zheng through US Vice President JD Vance.

China taking primary ownership to try and mend Afghanistan-Pakistan ties can bog Beijing down in a region and conflict where it has limited experience

Tensions in Taiwan Strait are an allegory for the Sino-American joust to dominate tomorrow's tech world