17 results found
For India to achieve greater self-reliance, it is essential to broaden the concept of 'air power' to include a country's ability to design, develop, a
The newly revised doctrine seeks to overcome the past inadequacy in the wider knowledge and leveraging of air power in India’s national security and
While every counter-terror theatre works on its own specific requirements and variables, Pakistan is a completely different ball game.
Any future limited conflict between India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will primarily be fought in a high-altitude environment along parts of the 4,000-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC). With the Indian Army likely to be constrained by the terrain and numerical parity to fight a largely positional battle with limited mobility and offensive options, air power offers several asymmetric opportunities to create operational advantages
Most leading air forces around the world were quick to learn from the experiences of the US Air Force between the Vietnam War in the 1960s and the Gulf War three decades later. This resulted in the widespread adoption by these forces of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) beginning in the mid-1990s. Only a few of these air arms, however, have matched the overall effectiveness of US air power, which combines aircraft survivability with weapon range,
Noting that the objective of the armed forces is not to win wars but to prevent wars, there was a consensus at an ORF discussion that India needs to overcome its deficiencies in order to create a credible deterrence.
This paper evaluates the importance of a space military strategy for India against China. It argues that in light of China’s advances in space weapons, New Delhi needs to seriously consider developing at least a limited menu of space weapons and integrate them into India’s defence posture. It draws on conceptual literature on nuclear deterrence, air power and sea power to show that space weapons, at least some variants, are usable military in
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has underlined the emerging realities of states’ air defence needs, including those for medium- and long-range air defence missile systems. The most important facet in the domain of air defence relates to terminal air defence—or the defence of a single object or a limited area like a ship, building or an airfield, now usually against air attacks and guided missiles. This report underscores the need for India to
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has underlined the emerging realities of states’ air defence needs, including those for medium- and long-range air defence missile systems. The most important facet in the domain of air defence relates to terminal air defence—or the defence of a single object or a limited area like a ship, building or an airfield, now usually against air attacks and guided missiles. This report underscores the need for India to
Neither the drone attacks - a significant technological innovation in air power - nor direct cross-border military raids address the ultimate source of terror, the Pakistan army. They merely target the manifestation of the problem.
The Indo-Pacific region is becoming the world's new strategic and economic ‘centre of gravity’. Indeed, the accelerated trajectory of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in recent years highlights the region’s growing importance. The Quad countries have committed to a rules-based order and a free and open Indo-Pacific, and are aiming to develop resilience across domains, such as in the maritime space, to counter and deter aggressive
They can keep trying to match each other’s capabilities but that will only increase chances of war.
India’s employment of offensive air power in sub-conventional operations has evolved rather slowly for several reasons, primary of which is the quest for restraint in the application of force against internal fissures. There is also a popular reluctance to recognise the capabilities of air power in pursuing counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-infiltration operations. This brief explores the evolution of a doctrinal clarity for the
The pace of Indian infrastructure building along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) bordering China has historically been slow due to financial and doctrinal constraints, but has accelerated in the past 20 years. Construction has become more efficient owing to bureaucratic changes and the infusion of greater financial resources. This paper attributes these changes to strategic compulsions brought about by Chinese actions—both diplomatic and on-th
