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India may have a geopolitical interest in the South China Sea area, but it is driven by an economic need. India must make its presence felt and pursue its engagements in the area. This in turn will involve a continued effort to cooperate and collaborate with the Southeast Asian nations.
New Delhi must stand committed to its rhetoric on the Freedom of Navigation (FON) and to defend its interests should the need arise. This in turn would involve deepening naval cooperation with the key countries of the ASEAN and major powers sharing India's interest in defending the principle of FON.
While India is preparing to give up one of the blocks it has been drilling in, it has no intention of abandoning its search for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea.
New Delhi’s strategic recalibration recognises the South China Sea’s critical importance to regional security and the global maritime order
India’s back-to-back moves to boost relations with Japan and Russia, particularly in security matters, appear to indicate it wants a bigger naval role in the contested South China Sea to counter a rising China. The reality is far different
Competing maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea resulting in frequent provocations and standoffs are well-documented. China’s increasingly assertive stance over its claims has led to increased militarisation of the region, making it a potential flashpoint. To better understand the complex SCS question vis-a-vis the extent of, and jurisdiction over this maritime space, this brief explores the distinction between the principl
Tensions between India and Pakistan or North Korean provocations or South East Asia's maritime problems should not be perceived as local. The tensions in the South China Sea can single-handedly destabilise the region and the world, argues Prof. Rory Medcalf.
The age-old Chinese dictum of hiding one's capabilities and strategically biding time for an opportune moment seems to be fast eroding to make way for aggressive posturing by the Chinese especially in the South China Sea.
Even though the territorial disputes in the South China Sea is nothing new, the recent confrontations among China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have sparked global concerns. It is being feared that the region is becoming a new flashpoint with serious security consequences.
The verdict delivered in July by an international tribunal on the South China Sea case in The Hague is a stunning defeat for China. The Tribunal has upended the maritime claims of a number of nations in the South China Sea, but China is most affected, as its claims were also most extensive. As China had already rejected the verdict even before it was pronounced, the world sits at a juncture of two possible paths — China could become more assert
India has wider stakes in South China Sea as nearly 55% of India’s trade with the Indo-Pacific region passes through these waters.
There is more at stake than geopolitical gamesmanship in the South China Sea
Though the regional grouping continues to have difficulties on the issue, it nonetheless remains important to Hanoi’s calculations.
Japan knows India is the best possible regional counter-weight to a rising China. At the same time, it has to work with China to counter global uncertainties.
By ratcheting up tension, China is causing alarm in other countries that use the busy South China Sea as the shortest and most convenient link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Chinese could well end up the losers as the countries affected could band together to offset Chinese aggressiveness. Worse, it could well trigger off Japanese nationalism and rearmament.
India's defence export policy did help in accelerating and convincing Manila about the merits of purchasing the BrahMos
political warnings are part of a state’s predisposition for regime survival.
US commitment to Asia-Pacific security is evident in the ‘Aukus pact’ that will see it share nuclear technology with Australia
The tariff war is not the only issue hindering cooperation. Differences over Taiwan and the South China Sea, the basic lack of trust in the relationship is acting as a dampener across the board.
Be assertive close to home. But India should not shrink from distant waters, either.
New Delhi and Canberra are likely to conclude the much-awaited Mutual Logistics Sharing Pact — as well as other agreements covering science and technology and public administration.
China is showing Nepal that the Himalayas may not be a trade barrier for rail-based trade with Asia or Europe or even maritime trade through the South China Sea. The landlocked country is now actively considering the use of alternative routes from India’s sea ports to China’s, once its roads and rails log into the BRI. This brief examines three learnings from Nepal’s growing engagement with China through the Belt and Road International Trad
The emerging faultlines in the Indo-Pacific are clear: An illiberal China intent on shaping a unipolar Asia, pitted against a ‘concert of democracies’ who seek a multipolar and rules-based alternative.
With no guarantee that the security environment in the Indo-Pacific will settle down any time soon, the expectation is that military spending will continue to increase.
For Tokyo, the G-7 Summit was driven by the need to define and devise the means of navigating the complex geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific
Rediscovers relations after falling out with China
New defense and security cooperation efforts are springing up across the Indo-Pacific, between some Quad members and those outside the grouping.
Given the criticality of this partnership for ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region, India will be keenly watching the Biden-Xi meeting.
Post-Brexit Britain needs to move away from its China-centric policy and step up trade engagements in the region, which offers potential for win-win economic gains. London should also look to join its allies, including the US, India, Australia in the support of regional security to manage the risks posed by Beijing
The list of China's signs of displaying its assertiveness in the South China Sea is numerous - like the incident with the Japanese coast guard and the USNS Impeccable. The Pentagon accused the Chinese vessels of "harassment" during the US ship's routine operations in international waters.
Over the last five years, Brexit, the victory of Donald Trump in the US and the assumption of power by Xi Jinping in China, the seizure of Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis, the South China Sea disputes, and the emerging Iran crisis, have all helped upend the world order. Amidst these crises, the surge of Chinese acquisitions and investments in Europe did not draw much attention. The acrimony, however, between China and the US on trade and industri
Indonesia is increasing its military presence in the region and upgrading its forces in the Natuna Islands as it seeks to challenge China and maintain its control over an important sea domain containing abundant marine food and energy resources.
China’s ‘three warfares’ strategy (TWS)—understood as public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare—has received considerable attention, but most analyses focus on Beijing’s sovereign claim to Taiwan and its maritime claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. This occasional paper evaluates the manifestation of the TWS against India in Ladakh and China’s motivation for adopting the same approach in the Arctic and Antar
The Indian Ocean is important to China because Chinese trade and energy resources transit this route.
Recent grey-zone activity in maritime-Asia suggests an increase in hybrid warfare, even as the lines between military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and criminal means of aggression become increasingly blurred. By replacing overt military aggression with soft provocations – kept well below the threshold of open warfare – aggressors attempt to leverage asymmetry, ambiguity and incrementalism for strategic effects. These tactics are highly
New Delhi needs to note that China’s estrangement from the US is not as serious as the one with India.
