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China sees its primary focus as on neutralising the US- Japan challenge on its eastern seaboard. To that end, maintaining an even keel in its relationship with India makes good sense.

An erratic US President Trump, with a poor grasp of policy, can give Beijing a free run not only in South-east Asia, but Central and West Asia as well

In the Chinese defence paper, though nothing is directly indicative of India, the implications are quite clear with the focus on open seas protection and unbending approach to territorial disputes. Urgency and imagination will be key in tackling Chinese ambitions in what is considered New Delhi's backyard.

With China aiming to develop a "world-class" military by 2050 that can fight and win wars across all theatres, Indian conventional and nuclear thinking will also have to evolve

Modi must now bridge the growing strategic gap with China through both internal and external balancing. This must run parallel to a significant expansion of economic cooperation with Beijing at the bilateral and regional levels. But can Modi play three-dimensional chess with China?

We are yet to get to the bottom of the mystery of the Chinese incursions. But the rhetoric that is coming out from New Delhi and Beijing now seems to suggest that the issue may quietly die down. As it is, it comes on the eve of External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid's visit to Beijing, and, more Chinese premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi.

The Shanghai spirit moved into the next phase of its development as the fourth summit of the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) began at Tashkent, Uzbekistan on May 17, 2004. From a security-centred organisation that came into being in June 2001,

Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan's tri-nation goodwill tour started with Pakistan on March 22, 2004 and ended with Thailand, with an in-between five-day visit to India from March 26 to 30.

China's existing stand of moving ahead with its aggressive stance on nuclear policy clearly stems from Indo-US nuclear deal, which according to China, seriously damages the integrity and effectiveness of non-proliferation thereby setting dangerous precedence for other countries.

The decision of key American allies like the UK, Germany, France, South Korea and Australia to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) marks another step forward in the shaping of a Chinese-led Asian economic and, possibly, security order.

In light of Africa's increasing dependency on and trouble with Chinese actors, African leaders are beginning to look beyond China in an attempt to diversify. India and the long-standing presence of Indian businesses in the continent can help Africa deal with the losses from China.

Though South China Sea has remained contested for several decades, the recent tensions surrounding these waters have heightened the potential for it to emerge as a major flashpoint. China's recent steps have made the involvement of external powers very likely.

China's Air Force (PLAAF) conducted the test flight of its new generation stealth fighter J-20 on January 11, 2011. Whether the J-20 matches the F-22 (latest US stealth fighter) or not, the Chinese flight-test has spot-lighted the spiralling arms race in Asia and beyond.

Two examples-the first from the aviation and the second from the renewable energy industries-demonstrate how China has used unfair rules and regulations to fuel its meteoric rise.

If New Delhi lets domestic political passions overwhelm the need for a carefully crafted strategy towards Pakistan, it will find the Afghan dynamic will soon make matters a lot more difficult for India.

Since 9/11, both China and the US have one concern in common - the threat of 'Islamic' terrorism. On December 15 2003, China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a list of four terrorist organisations and eleven terrorists that pose a threat to China's security.

The successful tests of Chinese nuclear device WU-14 has brought the emphasis back on deploying effective ballistic missile defences. The Chinese test is also definitely going to speed up the US' quest for enhancing both its offensive and defensive technological capabilities.

Bilateral relations between China and Bangladesh will strengthen further once the road and rail links are established between the two countries through Myanmar. The prospects for the road-rail links have brightened after Myanmar cleared the transit facility, the Chinese envoy for Bangladesh has said.

As the power of the US is declining, China, the US and India will have to work together for peace in the region, according to Prof. Huang Jing, Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

This brief makes an assessment of the data-sharing arrangement between China and India as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding for sharing hydrological information on the Brahmaputra river system, aimed at facilitating advance warning for floods in India during monsoon. Using hydro-meteorological data, this brief assesses the arrangement and identifies its limitations, primary of which is the wrong choice for the location of measuring stat

If the Indian press statements are a signal to China, the message is clear: India is angry.

Beijing’s statements on China-India relations should be reassuring, but China’s repeated aggressive moves do not give India much confidence that Beijing means what it says.

This paper examines China and India’s economic engagements at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. The evaluation is made in the context of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the mega-regional trade agreement in the east in which both nations are parties. The paper argues that irrespective of the nature of the two countries’ relationship, at its core is not cooperation, but mutual mistrust aggravated by Ch

China and India are competing to be seen as leaders on the Afghanistan issue, resulting in a deadlock.

Territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and between Japan and South Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan have,particularly in the second half of 2012, given rise to concerns about peace and security in North East Asia. Territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and between Japan and South Korea over the Takes

China's relation with Pakistan has become one of the most comprehensive one that Beijing has with any country. The strategic imperatives of developing Pakistan as a bulwark against India has been among Beijing's overriding objectives in influencing the balance of power in South Asia.

Xi's visit to the United Kingdom was not about trade and investment only. It has an important strategic component, viz, shaping China as a truly global power. Recall that the end station of both the land and maritime components of the Belt Road Initiative is Europe. As China shifts its economy towards high-end manufacturing and services, it is targeting the European market, where its two largest partners are Germany and UK.

In China, the regime's vision and capacity to transform the society and state has made a lot of difference, said Mr Harish Khare, Senior Associate Editor and Chief of the Delhi Bureau of The Hindu. Contemporary Chinese elite, cohesive as they are, have played a vital role in shaping-up the country.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is now revealing, more assertively than before, its high expectations with regard to the opening up of Sino-Indian border trade specifically through revival of Yadong (Shigatse, Tibet) Trade Post, which was set up on May 10,

Tibet is where India and China meet. It is through Tibet that China manages its relations with India, using the boundary dispute to keep New Delhi off-balance. India is also where the most revered Tibetan, the 14th Dalai Lama lives in exile. Having failed to negotiate his return, there is now a two-pronged effort by China to deal with the consequences of the Dalai Lama’s passing and his possible reincarnation outside Tibet: to m

Over the last two decades, China has established a significant economic presence in most African countries. Its lucrative economic investment package, flexible political approach, and focused big-ticket development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provide an ostensibly massive opportunity to African countries. However, the unilateral nature of the initiative, the lack of transparency and accountability to African countries, and t

This brief evaluates the state and development of China’s cruise missile capabilities, specifically that of its air-launched and ground-launched missile forces. It finds that China has developed a formidable inventory of cruise missiles, which poses a threat to India’s own military infrastructure.  The brief lays out the imperative for India: to build up its long-range cruise missile forces. It argues that India’s current capabilities woul

For India, China's growing presence around its periphery will continue to pose challenges.

China’s growing military profile in Africa is following its economic footprint in the continent as exemplified by the Chinese “logistics support base” in Djibouti. It is moving towards an ever more expansive definition of its global interests, as its business in Africa pushes it to create new mechanisms for securing those interests, including its own growing military footprint abroad. This brief examines the changing nature of China’s inv

China is extending its hand to Nepal, India’s Himalayan neighbour, which for its part is understandably attracted to the prospects that are emerging on its Northern front. How does China’s expanding footprint in Nepal affect India? This brief examines the possibilities for India’s success in competing with China in Nepal, and posits two overarching factors: New Delhi’s overall capacity to challenge China, and India’s political will to a

Mohamed Muizzu is helping Beijing expand its presence in the Indian Ocean

China’s space policy planners are convinced that the country should aim for manned lunar landings by 2040. It has already established a sophisticated robotic lunar exploration programme and human landings are perceived as the logical next step. New navigation and communication architectures are being developed for this purpose, in addition to building life support systems and a suitable launch vehicle. However, China’s political leadership wo

Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics for quick and decisive victories in any theatre of battle. This brief exa

Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics that can lead the military to quick and decisive victories in any theatre of ba

China’s evolving security dynamics with the United States have compelled it to rethink its nuclear strategy to achieve effective deterrence. It is aiming to modernise its nuclear arsenal and increase its nuclear ambiguity through conventional-nuclear entanglement. Ambiguity will increase the risks of mischaracterisation and can have a destabilising impact on the Indo-Pacific region. This paper highlights two areas where India ought to be most c

China’s nuclear weapons arsenal has grown and modernised over the recent years, and current estimates say the country has 350 operational warheads ready for delivery, over 248 land-based ballistic missiles, and 72 sea-based ballistic missiles. China also has 20 nuclear gravity bombs and additional warheads intended to be armed on land- and sea-based missiles. This brief outlines a history of China’s nuclear weapons programme, scrutini

For China, it is the problems in what it considers to be its core interests which are becoming difficult to handle.

New Delhi will need to look to the US for help resisting Beijing’s maritime ambitions.

Sharp power—a state's attempt to alter the behaviour of other countries through the manipulation of culture, education systems, and the media to further its interests—is a key tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Issues related to regime legitimacy and the CCP's development priorities have shaped China's sharp power approach. In the Xi Jinping era, there is some anxiety in the party ranks that external conditions are turning aga

New Delhi’s Indian Ocean woes aren’t confined to Sri Lanka. Across the Indian Ocean’s littorals, the Chinese navy has been preparing to establish a stronger security presence. On Pakistan’s Makran coast, the PLAN has deployed regularly, including at Gwadar, also constructed by CMPorts. Earlier this year, the PLA is said to have initiated talks with the Pakistan military for another outpost at Jiwani.

This brief aims to examine one of China’s possible responses to the various extremist and terrorist activities that plague the internal security of Pakistan, given the necessity of securing its USD 62 billion investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Given that Pakistan is failing to control this problem, China will have to take measures of its own to secure CPEC. The response of China could possibly be inspired by its strateg