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New Delhi’s strategic recalibration recognises the South China Sea’s critical importance to regional security and the global maritime order
With discussions underway for Canberra to join the Malabar naval exercises, New Delhi hopes to add a new backer in its fight against China
The pace of growth in the Australia-India strategic relationship is quite impressive, but New Delhi’s hesitance on hard security issues may hamper further developments.
‘Dogmas of Delhi’ mustn’t beat our ability to innovate and experiment at the level of big ideas
While the Modi government secured some notable gains during its time in office thus far, challenges lie ahead this year and beyond.
India’s back-to-back moves to boost relations with Japan and Russia, particularly in security matters, appear to indicate it wants a bigger naval role in the contested South China Sea to counter a rising China. The reality is far different
Realities in the Indo-Pacific region have changed, and it’s time for New Delhi to deepen its political ties with Taipei.
Faced with trade imbalances and geopolitical friction, India is pivoting from overt dependence on China to a “China-plus-one” strategy anchored in resilience and regional realignment
As New Delhi and Taipei draw closer together, the map of the Asia-Pacific could change for good.
The Canadian government, instead of robustly standing up to extremism, has found it easier to pander to some of the most violent and aggressive groups. This is partly because of how these extremist groups have increased their influence over state institutions
Indonesia’s upcoming general elections will see a rematch between incumbent President Joko Widodo (commonly called ‘Jokowi’) and his long-time rival, retired lieutenant general Prabowo Subianto. This paper examines the potential impact of the elections on Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially on the country’s maritime relations with India and other major powers. In the 2014 elections, the Visi-Misi (or election manifesto) of the incumb
India & China want things to stabilise, but we aren’t close to achieving status quo ante of April in eastern Ladakh.
Whether South Korea builds a nuclear bomb on its own or not, nuclear weapons are gaining greater importance in the national security thinking of many states in the Indo-Pacific.
Trump’s “toned down” stance on the South China Sea issue, his emphasis on “America first” policy and his soft attitude towards China have made many Japanese leaders suspect that the US is retreating from Asia.
India’s engagement with the Central European countries has historically been weak. It’s time for that to change.
भारत-ऑस्ट्रेलिया के बीच प्रगाढ़ द्विपक्षीय संबंध है. हाल के वर्षों में खासकर क्वॉड के गठन के बाद दोनों देशों के संबंधों में बड़ा बदलाव आया है. क्वॉड के गठन के बाद भारत और ऑस्
One concrete outcome of the bilateral talks between the visiting Japanese Prime Minister and the US President was that the US was able to get Japan closer to making a commitment to the Trans Pacific Cooperation Agreement which the US has been advocating since 2011.
While New Delhi’s desire to cultivate closer defense ties with Tokyo is clear, its overall strategic approach is much less so.
The expanding engagement with the Japanese navy, one of the strongest in the world, should give a boost to India's maritime diplomacy in Asia. If New Delhi's interests in the Pacific are growing, Tokyo's naval profile in the Indian Ocean has begun to expand.
Increasingly, many countries that have traditionally maintained a defensive and pacifist posture, like Japan, are having to reconsider their options.
While China's engagement strategy appears to operate on a quid pro quo basis, India's approach seems to be driven by its objectives
The visit of America’s Defence Secretary earlier in June has prepared the ground for the the Indian Prime Minister’s U.S. visit next week, which could see some big ticket announcements
New Delhi has geopolitical opportunities in China rethinks underway in Germany and other countries
India and Japan’s shared concerns about China are a key driver of their growing relationship.
For Brazil, there are multiple opportunities within BRICS, not limited to the economic sphere. In many ways, the grouping brings Brazil from the left corner of the world map to the center, where the geopolitical theatre is most active; in Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
France and India have shared a common belief in the importance of multilateralism and have a common respect for international rules and regulations. These shared beliefs can form the basis for a cooperation agenda.
How have nuclear weapons affected Indian foreign policy? Has India been able to leverage its status as a nuclear weapons state to further its foreign policy objectives? This issue brief examines these questions by first analysing how India’s foreign policy objectives have been affected by its possession of nuclear weapons. It then posits two strategies that India can pursue to leverage its status as a nuclear weapons state. The first strategy d
China’s maritime economic initiative, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) that is part of the larger One Belt One Road (OBOR), has been under considerable international focus recently. India, for its part, has remained non-committal despite China’s charmed offensive. However, with the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, both of which exclude the growing economies of I
Growing economic protectionism and recurrent geo-economic and geo-political tensions in recent years are testing the resilience of the global economic order. Erstwhile proponents of globalisation such as the United States and the European Union are themselves recoiling from the global value chains that are over-reliant on China. As the localisation of goods and services has become more critical, it calls to question the viability of a globalised
China’s failure to condemn the Ukraine war raised concerns on the future of the rules-based international order not only in the European Union (EU), but also in India and Taiwan. While their respective relationships with China and Russia are characterised by different complexities, the EU, India, and Taiwan are all vulnerable to authoritarian threats. All three recognise that China’s continued rise will have strategic implications for
Despite last year’s quadrilateral Malabar exercises and the recent announcement of new working groups, Quad cooperation on naval interoperability, critical technologies, and Covid-19 had been manifest previously.
As the Indo-Pacific region becomes an arena of strategic contestations, India and Australia’s interests are converging. Two large maritime states from two different continents, India and Australia were mutually indifferent for a long time. Today, however, their relationship is on the upbeat: not only is their bilateral trade on the rise, but they also have common concerns to balance an assertive China and uphold order in the region. By year-end
The next government must recognise that the Bay of Bengal is no longer a backwater but a strategic hub connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans as well as China and the Bay of Bengal. Delhi must match its rhetoric on trans-border connectivity with much needed political will and administrative competence.
Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise.
France has begun to pay serious attention to the Indo-Pacific region after a long time.
India’s plan for naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter China’s military power in the Indian Ocean
India has been understanding of the Maldivian government’s new policy, but it expects the island nation to respect Indian sensitivities and equally uphold its commitment to bilateral ties
New entrants in the Indo-Pacific offer both opportunities and challenges for outer space.
