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This paper makes an assessment of the situation in eastern Ladakh following the Chinese occupation of several areas across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the summer of 2020. That occupation led to an incident in the Galwan river valley in mid-June, which resulted in deaths on both Indian and Chinese sides—the first such casualties since 1975. The paper outlines the course of events since then, and the negotiations that have been on
Sixty years ago, China provided India with actual map coordinates which delimited its claim line in eastern Ladakh. And the claim line shows the Chinese side is today trying to encroach westward, further into India.
Chinese maps do not show China’s territory extending to the point where the Galwan and Shyok rivers meet but the attempt to create new ‘facts on the ground’ suggests a new assertiveness.
If the Indian press statements are a signal to China, the message is clear: India is angry.
The 13th round of military commander’s talks between India and China will take place at Moldo today.
Since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has witnessed an accelerated modernisation drive. Following the 2015-16 organisational reforms, the CPC further standardised its services-level force structure and upgraded its military doctrine, combat capabilities, and weapons systems. This report analyses recent improvements in the structure, including the creation of t
China’s actions in Ladakh since 2020 are in violation of common understandings and have brought the focus of bilateral relationship back to the issue of the border. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of China’s behaviour along the India-China border by exploring a fresh perspective that explains the instability along the border as a function of China’s two-front conundrum. It makes a historical account of past events to arg
China’s ‘three warfares’ strategy (TWS)—understood as public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare—has received considerable attention, but most analyses focus on Beijing’s sovereign claim to Taiwan and its maritime claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. This occasional paper evaluates the manifestation of the TWS against India in Ladakh and China’s motivation for adopting the same approach in the Arctic and Antar
Not just India but others too are re-assessing the China threat and altering their stance accordingly
Various options are on the table, but given the bad experience in the pullback in June, there is need for caution.
While many will be content to lay the blame only on China, questions also need to be asked about the systemic shortcomings in strategic analysis and intelligence.
Beginning in 2017, the first Trump Administration steered United States (US)-China relations from engagement to competition. Thereafter, Biden largely built on this policy, while giving indications of moving towards a phase of “competitive co-existence”. Under Biden, the US sought to reassure China that it was adopting a strategy of “de-risking” and not “de-coupling,” and its goal was to adopt a technology export regime that would als
It has been a year since the Galwan clashes in Ladakh that led to the deaths of 20 Indians and 5 Chinese soldiers.
It is incumbent upon India to ensure that all possible assistance is being extended to the Bhutanese people.
Even if India wins, the situation may become more like Kargil.
Reports vary about the details of the latest talks, but there seems to be some optimism for an agreement.
In the past decade, India has successfully demonstrated the three pillars of effective deterrence—capability, credibility, and communication—in its strategic posture towards China. It has bolstered its defence diplomacy with key partners in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and across the broader Indo-Pacific region, through regular joint military exercises, military officers exchange programmes, frequent high-level diplomatic visits, and the co
Talk of a “Tibet card” in India’s hands is not new, but is New Delhi likely to play it?
India & China want things to stabilise, but we aren’t close to achieving status quo ante of April in eastern Ladakh.
Since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has witnessed an accelerated modernisation drive. Following the 2015-16 organisational reforms, the CPC further standardised its service-level force structure and upgraded its military doctrine, combat capabilities, and weapons systems. This report analyses recent improvements with the development and integration of new we
While the Chinese have kept us embroiled with their visa tactics in Arunachal, intrusions in Ladakh as part of an unsettled boundary issue, and nuclear plants to Pakistan, they have long endeavoured to seek access and presence south of the Himalayas. They appear to be succeeding in Nepal.
China’s bid to ‘internationalise’ the issue could push India to hurt its larger neighbour’s interests.
Was the new border clash ‘pre-planned’ & ‘carefully executed’? The use of Special Frontier Force is very telling.
Beijing needs to consider whether it wants to keep the pot boiling at the border
India must convince it that using LAC as pressure tool will yield diminishing returns
With tensions persisting on the Sino-Indian border, Delhi’s efforts to bolster its infrastructure in critical areas continues.
India’s border dispute with China, which goes back to the 1950s, primarily owes to the absence of an internationally accepted boundary between them, and of an agreement on where runs the Line of Actual Control. The border, as a result, is patrolled and managed by the military forces of both sides. After initial efforts to resolve the dispute failed, the two sides signed a set of agreements aimed at stabilising the LAC and normalising their rela
Given the state of bilateral relations between India and China, New Delhi is doubling down on its efforts regarding strategic border infrastructure.
Any appearance of weakness in Xi on the world stage could imperil his grip on power within China
The ongoing India-China face-off in Eastern Ladakh may appear to be a small-scale confrontation between conventional forces. But it is still one between nuclear-armed states, and the threat of escalation cannot be denied. In its wake, India has carried out a series of missile tests, while China too has fired a number of ballistic missiles near the Paracel and Spratly Islands, apparently to warn the US, but hardly something New Delhi can ignore. T
Beijing's 'illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive' strategy will test New Delhi
Rising nationalism and fortifications along the disputed China-India border make deadly clashes inevitable, and both sides should strive for border agreement
After the Ladakh intrusion, Delhi has sensibly stepped up the conversation on LAC management with Beijing. The recent violence on the LoC demands the same with Islamabad. When he meets Nawaz Sharif in New York next month, Manmohan Singh must seek Pakistan's renewed political support for the LoC ceasefire and an agreement to translate that commitment into a military reality.
Settle the border with India. With increasing US pressure, it is in China’s interest.
