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কার্গিল যুদ্ধ চিন ও ভারতকে শিখিয়েছে যে এলএসি সুরক্ষিত ক
करगिल युद्ध ने चीन और भारत को यह बात सिखा दी है कि LAC को सुरक
कारगिल युद्धामध्ये पाकिस्तानवर भारताने राजनैतिक दबाव व
कारगिल संघर्ष आणि भारताची झपाट्याने होणारी आर्थिक प्रग�
कारगिलनंतर अस्तित्वात असलेल्या त्रुटी दूर करण्यासाठी र
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The Kargil War taught China and India that enhancing military capabilities and infrastructure is crucial for securing the LAC, with no room for compro
कारगिल युद्ध हे भारताचे पहिले युद्ध होते, ज्याची प्रत्ये
कारगिल संघर्षामुळे भारत आणि पाकिस्तान दोन्ही देशांच्या
करगिल युद्ध भारत का पहला ऐसा युद्ध था, जिसकी हर हलचल के बा�
करगिल संघर्ष और भारत की तेज़ आर्थिक वृद्धि की वजह से भारत-
करगिल युद्ध ने भारत और पाकिस्तान दोनों के लिए संघर्ष बढ़�
करगिल युद्ध के दौरान पाकिस्तान पर भारत का कूटनीतिक दबाव �
The aftermath of Kargil saw a series of reforms being brought to the national security system to plug existing loopholes
The Kargil War highlighted the need for clear nuclear doctrines and strong command systems to manage escalation risks for both India and Pakistan
The Kargil conflict and India’s rapid growth marked a turning point in India-US relations.
India's diplomatic pressure on Pakistan during the Kargil War illustrates the interconnection between diplomacy and war and how the former influences
The Kargil War, as India’s first televised conflict, revolutionised the media’s role and helped to shape public perception and to bolster national
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गलवान संकटादरम्यान, भारतीय हवाई दलाने कारगिल युद्धातून �
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गलवान संकट के दौरान भारतीय वायुसेना ने कारगिल युद्ध से स�
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During the Galwan crisis, the IAF applied Kargil lessons in air defence, offensive power, and support, coordinating closely with the Army. These lesso
भारत व पाकिस्तान दरम्यान पुन्हा संबंध प्रस्थापित होतील,
Speculation is rife on both sides of the Radcliffe Line about a possible re-engagement between India and Pakistan. However, it remains uncertain wheth
मोदी सरकार से इस मसले पर कई गंभीर चूक हुई है. एक ग़लती तो ये
Regardless of the stasis in India’s OND, the technological changes in India’s delivery capabilities are outpacing doctrinal change
Pakistan’s growing weakness could alter the nuclear dynamics in the subcontinent in the coming years
Any future terrorist attack could be met by a response to a contour shaped by the Balakot action.
It is important to humanise the ‘other’ and move away from the stereotypical ‘enemy’ perception that have dominated Indo-Pak relations.
From Kargil to 26/11 and to the recent attacks on military camps, we see a dynamic shift. Kashmir will be used as a cause and an excuse when it suits
The Kargil military conflict of 1999 between India and Pakistan came in the wake of the "bhai-bhai" ("we are brothers") euphoria generated by the bus ride of Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister, to Lahore and his high-profile meeting with Mr.Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's then Prime Minister. In the euphoria, we let ourselves be caught napping by the Pakistan Army in the heights of Kargil.
Many military veterans have returned the medals awarded to them for gallantry and fighting wars to the President, a sure sign of frustration and feeling of neglect.
Most leading air forces around the world were quick to learn from the experiences of the US Air Force between the Vietnam War in the 1960s and the Gulf War three decades later. This resulted in the widespread adoption by these forces of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) beginning in the mid-1990s. Only a few of these air arms, however, have matched the overall effectiveness of US air power, which combines aircraft survivability with weapon range,
Even if India wins, the situation may become more like Kargil.
Waziristan last month ostensibly to hunt down al Qaida and Talibanelements has been a visible failure which could dramatically alterthe already existing fault lines in the force divided betweenloyalty to Musharraf, nation and religion.South Waziristan is one of the seven areas -Khyber, Kurram,Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North and South Waziristan - which wereclubbed together as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)by the British who wanted
It is an unfortunate fact that India usually commits itself to reform after it is hit by a crisis. That is why the two periods of reform and restructuring followed the 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese and the Kargil war.
Now that BJP PM candidate Narendra Modi is approaching what could possibly be the pinnacle of his career, the last thing he wants is to box himself in by his own rhetoric. It is for this reason that in his Haryana speech, he also invoked Atal Bihari Vajpayee's policy, which used the Kargil crisis to get the world community to pin down Pakistan on avoiding the use of violence in relation to Kashmir.
His role is not just about tri-service cooperation, but also to ensure that acquisitions do not exceed capital allocations
India’s attempts at strengthening its intelligence infrastructure and capabilities have historically been reactive and incremental, rather than holistic and sustainable. This was seen, for instance, in the aftermath of the Kargil War, and following the terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. India has rarely undertaken proactive reforms and done little to implement corrective measures subsequent to these crises. This brief offers recommendat
Some years ago when Karan Thapar interviewed Pervez Musharraf, the general was self-assured and voluble. That was before 9/11 but after Kargil. Last fortnight, he was once again voluble, and when not talking about himself, he was talking about Kashmir. But his body language showed nervousness, impatience, an edginess and even tiredness. And Thapar drove a hard bargain.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must take a leaf from the Atal Behari Vajpayee book. Remember how he was stung at Kargil by Pervez Musharraf after his bus journey to Lahore. But he persisted. He was willing to go some distance even at Agra, the hardliners in his own party pulled him back.
The Kargil war of 1999 and Thursday morning's surgical strikes have now decisively proved that the LoC is not a focal point for India and Pakistan.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee emerges as a figure in the classical tradition of the 19th century European strategists like Metternich and Castlereagh—a realist committed to restraint and balance
In the 1971 war against Pakistan, had Indian forces managed to push beyond Turtok and capture Thang, the subsequent Pakistani adventure in Kargil in 1999 or the threat to Siachen would have been infructuous.
India’s employment of offensive air power in sub-conventional operations has evolved rather slowly for several reasons, primary of which is the quest for restraint in the application of force against internal fissures. There is also a popular reluctance to recognise the capabilities of air power in pursuing counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-infiltration operations. This brief explores the evolution of a doctrinal clarity for the
