Key Findings

1. India’s historical ties, people-to-people relations, connectivity, and economic relations with Bhutan continue to foster a positive image of India, enhance bilateral ties, and make young Bhutanese more receptive to Indian interests. Nearly all the respondents have visited India at some point in their lives. Indian languages, newspapers, websites, and radio channels remain popular in Bhutan.
2. There was a time when India enjoyed cultural hegemony in Bhutan. Today’s younger generation, however, has more access to the internet, OTT platforms, apps, and social media, providing them a window to other cultures, such as South Korea, Australia, Japan, the US, and China.
3. Young Bhutanese have a largely optimistic view about India in the domains of economy and foreign policy. India is deemed the top country when it comes to offering access to markets, assistance in technology, and exports. They are also of the view that India has helped their country realise its development goals. India is seen as a first responder and a trusted development partner today and in the near future.
4. The surveyed youth note that over-reliance on India is Bhutan’s biggest foreign policy challenge. This is closely followed by immigration, climate change, and economic slowdown. The majority are also supportive of Bhutan establishing diplomatic missions with Australia, Japan, Canada, the US, Singapore, the UK, South Korea, and France. Fewer respondents support establishing missions in Russia and China.
5. Bhutanese youth are neither hostile nor hopeful of the potential benefits that their country can derive from relations with China apart from trade. People-to-people relations are limited, and Bhutanese have little interest in studying or working in the country. Young Bhutanese do not regard China’s rise as a challenge, nor do they see Beijing benefiting their foreign policy. There is a degree of interest in Chinese culture and entertainment.
6. Australia has become increasingly popular for Bhutanese youth, with the country being their top choice for studies or residence. Australian news, culture, entertainment, and apps are becoming popular, and Canberra is seen as one of Bhutan’s well-trusted development partners.
7. Japan is a popular country for Bhutanese youth, especially in terms of foreign policy and economy. The country is seen as one of Bhutan’s top development and investment partners. Young Bhutanese see Japan as a country that offers market access and is one of the top exporters of durable goods. There is also some interest in learning the language and visiting the country. Cultural and religious similarities also foster optimism.
8. Young Bhutanese consider the US to be a popular destination to study and settle in, even as their people-to-people relations are limited. There is interest in American culture, though this does not translate to a positive opinion in matters of foreign policy and economic relations.
9. Perceptions of other countries are based on specific sectors of cooperation. In the case of Singapore, for example, investments and assistance in scientific and technological developments have generated positive opinions. With South Korea and Thailand, key are people-to-people relations and culture; and the UK and Canada are preferred for studies and residence. Bangladesh, too, has become important for potential economic ties.
10. India’s presence in the region and geographical realities have led to young Bhutanese viewing India positively. However, India’s clout is being challenged, as young Bhutanese are keen on diversifying their country’s foreign relations.

Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Shaping of Perceptions

As a small country landlocked between India and China, Bhutan has historically promoted diplomatic engagements, primarily on a need-to-have basis. In the 17^th century, following its unification, it established diplomatic ties with Nepal, Ladakh, and Sikkim.^[1],[1] However, following the Duar wars of 1865, where it ceded its Cooch Behar and Assam regions to the British, it isolated itself from the rest of the world.^[2] Its relations with Britain were limited and focused on trade, securing trade routes to Tibet, and receiving a subsidy of INR 50,000 in return for ceding its territories.^[2] The Treaty of Punakha, signed in 1910, enabled Britain to guide Bhutan’s foreign policy in return for not interfering in the latter’s domestic politics. Following Britain’s departure, Bhutan signed a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with India in 1949, continuing its safe-distance policy while permitting India to guide its foreign affairs.^[3] While Bhutan continued to prefer isolation, China’s invasion of Tibet in the 1950s and subsequent claims over Bhutan’s territories compelled it to gradually eschew this policy.

A leadership change in Bhutan in 1952 and then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to the country in 1958—the first by a head of government and world leader^[4]—convinced Bhutan to enhance its relations with India to further its socioeconomic growth and security and gradually open up to the rest of the world.^[5] The subsequent increase in bilateral relations and high-level visits fostered a positive perception of India amongst Bhutan’s public.^[6]

In 1961, India launched Project Dantak to build roads, schools, hospitals, and basic socioeconomic infrastructure in Bhutan. In the same year, India deployed the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) to train the Bhutanese army. India has also provided the largest amount of funding for Bhutan’s Five Year Plans (FYPs), funding 100 percent of Bhutan’s FYPs between 1961 and 1971, amounting to INR 11 and 20 crores, respectively. While the funding percentage for FYPs declined in subsequent plans, the total funds allocated have increased; for instance, for the 11^th and 12^th FYPs, India provided over INR 45 billion in funding, which has increased to INR 100 billion as of the 13^th FYP.^[7]

Since the 1980s, India has also assisted Bhutan in developing its hydropower sector, which accounts for 14 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 26 percent of the government’s revenue.^[8] India is also Bhutan’s largest import and export partner and the leading source of Bhutan’s foreign direct investments (FDI).^[9] Additionally, India is assisting with the Gelephu Mindfulness City (GMC) project, which is expected to reap economic benefits for the next generation of Bhutanese.^[3],[10]

This assistance has led to a positive perception of India among the older generations in Bhutan, especially from the early 1960s, when India launched Project Dantak. For most Bhutanese of the older generations, India is a land of holy places, markets, and trade. Indian culture is also an important part of their lives. Bhutanese students have studied in India on Indian government scholarships. Many of these Indian university graduates hold important positions in Bhutanese bureaucracy, administration, and politics.^[11]

Bhutan has also been a reliable partner to India, conducting crackdowns on insurgents from Northeast India taking shelter in their country and consistently displaying sensitivity to Indian security and strategic concerns when negotiating its border disputes with China.^[12]Owing to India’s assistance and the bilateral people-to-people relations, many in Bhutan, including civilians, understand India’s concerns.

Meanwhile, Bhutan’s relationship with China remains neutral at best. In tandem with Bhutan’s strategy to slowly open up to the world, its aversion to great-power politics and its policy of not having diplomatic relations with the P5 countries, Bhutan has hesitated to maintain diplomatic relations with China—despite the policy being the subject of internal debates.^{[4],[13],[14]} China and Bhutan also have no substantial economic and trade ties. Furthermore, Chinese border claims and intrusions have continued to fuel suspicion towards Beijing. Starting from 1984, Bhutan and China have held over 25 rounds of negotiations to demarcate borders and are close to resolving the dispute, barring the Doklam trijunction.

Bhutan has also taken steps to gradually open itself up to the world. Bhutan joined the United Nations (UN) in the 1970s and initiated bilateral relations with multiple countries.^[15]  In the 1980s and 1990s, it established diplomatic relations (not missions) with several Asian, Gulf, and European nations.^[5] During this time, it signed a transit agreement with Bangladesh and expanded commercial and economic ties with others.^[16] The UN agencies and multilateral institutions also played a crucial role in this economic diversification process.^[17]

By 2004, Bhutan had extended its relations to 22 countries, including Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, and the European Union (EU). During this time, Japan, Denmark, the EU, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, and New Zealand (as well as organisations affiliated to their governments) emerged as sizeable donors. Between 2008 and 2013, the first democratic government of Bhutan extended relations to an additional 31 countries, bringing the total to 53.^[18] Nonetheless, Bhutan hosts only three embassies—India, Bangladesh, and Kuwait^[19]—and has established just 11 diplomatic missions abroad.^[6]

This gradual extension has also helped Bhutan diversify its development assistance. For instance, in its latest FYP, the EU, Japan, and other multilateral agencies are expected to provide over INR 40 billion in funding.^[20] This diversification has benefits for Bhutan in various sectors, including education, health, and basic infrastructure, thus garnering goodwill for some of these donor countries in Bhutan (as will be discussed later in this report). Furthermore, Bhutan has used this diversification to overcome issues of unemployment, foreign reserves, and sources of revenue generation. From the mid-2010s onwards, the Bhutanese government has encouraged the youth to work in countries such as Thailand and Kuwait as well as other Gulf countries.^[21] This has furthered people-to-people relations and shaped Bhutanese perceptions of other countries. For instance, in 2017, the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the ‘Learn and Earn’ Programme with Japan which, by 2019, had seen the enrolment of 700 Bhutanese students.^[22]

Changing Perceptions: Why They Matter

Bhutan has seen political, economic, and social changes in the last couple of decades. Bhutanese historian Karma Phuntsho once wrote that Bhutan “has changed much more in the past 50 years than in the 500 years before that”. The younger generations have different perceptions of foreign policy and the world around them, as well as different aspirations, values, and expectations. They are keen for Bhutan to have an increased international footprint and are themselves more global than older generations. Even though they are keen on maintaining ties with India, they also want to look beyond their immediate neighbours.^[23]

The factors contributing to this shift in perceptions include the following:

• A space for politics and dissent: After nearly a century of being ruled by the Wangchuk dynasty, in 2007, Bhutan embraced a new system of democracy with constitutional monarchy.^[24] The transition was promoted by the monarchy even as the people were hesitant to accept the system.^[25] Today, the new generation is getting accustomed to democracy and democratic norms and are increasingly critical of the political class (though not the monarch), their parties, and existing policies, and have used their voting rights to express their sentiments. As a result, till date, Bhutan has not seen an incumbent government being re-elected to power. Young Bhutanese are more willing to criticise and have political opinions than the older generations.

The emergence of democracy has also increased the number of stakeholders in the country, such as the government, opposition, political parties, industries, lobbies, private sector, business communities, and youth—all of whom are promoting new narratives and shaping perceptions. This is being supplemented by the rapid increase in the means of communication, which include the television (introduced to Bhutan in 1999) and the internet. With more than 87 percent of the population using the internet^[26] and an estimated social media penetration rate of 91 percent,^[27] the communication and dissemination of information and counter-narratives has become easier.  Launching political attacks on social media and sharing unverified posts and opinions has also become common.^[28] Finally, unlike the older generations, young Bhutanese are exposed to other cultures and lifestyles through the internet, which has led to a shift in their values, aspirations, and priorities as well as the way in which they think of the world and their neighbours.

• Foreign policy and identity: Bhutan has balanced modernisation and tradition since the 1960s, when the country began to implement its development plans with assistance from India.^[29] Capitalising on elements of Vajrayana Buddhism, the country introduced the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH) in 1980, which places equal importance on the social, economic, spiritual, cultural, and environmental needs of the country and citizens.^[30] Bhutan has further used the GNH to shape its culture and identity, distinguishing itself from much bigger neighbours such as India and China. This balance between modernisation and preservation has allowed Bhutan to remain distinct from other neighbours—Tibet and Sikkim, which integrated with China and India, respectively—and has offered it a sense of security and sovereignty.^[31]

Bhutan has also presented an alternative way of life; 60 percent of its territory is mandated as forest cover, and it is one of the only two carbon-negative countries in the world.^[32] It has thus acted as a norm entrepreneur and role model for fighting global issues such as climate change.^[33] In 2011 and 2012, the UN adopted two resolutions introduced by Bhutan on holistic approaches to development and happiness towards a new economic paradigm.^[34] This served to reinforce confidence and nationalism among the Bhutanese and further shaped their perceptions about the world. The Gelephu Special Administrative Region project by the Bhutan government, which intends to portray that sustainability, heritage, and business go hand-in-hand, also reinforces this confidence and identity.

In the past, young Bhutanese believed that modernisation could bring more exposure, material benefits, and individual freedom. Yet, they remained sceptical about its social, ecological, and environmental implications.^[35] The Bhutanese youth of today continue to maintain an awareness of the environment and culture despite emigrating. They seem to be more confident about their country and its foreign policy.^[36]

• Economic issues: Bhutan continues to face structural challenges, from its landlocked geography, to its cold climate, to resource scarcity. However, development partnerships, investments in hydropower, and to some extent, tourism, have led to the country’s economic growth. Bhutan’s GDP rose from US$128 million in 1980 to US$400 million in 2000 and US$2.3 billion in 2020. Compared to the 1950s, the country has also seen a decline in illiteracy and poverty as well as a boost in per-capita income; in 2023, it graduated to the status of a lower middle-income country.^[37] From 2001 to 2019, Bhutan’s GDP grew by around 7 percent, much of which was derived from the country’s investments in and exports from hydropower; in 2021, the sector contributed to 16 percent of GDP and 40 percent of the country’s domestic revenues.^[38]

Nevertheless, the sector has been unable to generate employment opportunities and absorb the youth who have benefited from the state’s economic growth and welfare policies. As a result, youth unemployment has been a growing concern since at least 2005;^[39] today, youth unemployment is estimated to be at 29 percent.^[40] Nearly 40 percent of the workforce in the country is employed in agriculture, followed by 25 percent in the public sector.^[41] These sectors are either unappealing to the youth or unable to absorb them. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the country’s economic challenges, triggering mass migration. In 2022 alone, nearly 17,000 Bhutanese nationals emigrated out of the country.^[42] By 2024, the Bhutanese migrating elsewhere numbered 64,000, which is 9 percent of the total population.^[43] The number of people migrating—mostly to Australia, Canada, Europe, and the UK—is posing a massive challenge to a country that has a population of just 700,000. The migration crisis also indicates a changing Bhutan, where its youth—who make up nearly half of the country’s population—have career and educational goals beyond the country and are escaping an economy that is unable to generate enough jobs.

Even as Bhutanese take pride in their unique identity and the GNH, they have continued to look for employment and better opportunities. In this regard, they view economic diversification, including engagement with China, as a crucial process to fuel its own economic growth. A rising China, with which Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations, is being seen as a lost opportunity for economic growth and benefit. A section of young Bhutanese have also blamed India for Bhutan’s poor economic performance. India’s model of offering loans, grants, and credit lines for hydropower projects and using its labour, capital, and technology for hydropower projects has invited criticism.^[44]  Increasing debts and trade deficit, the slow implementation of projects, and environmental damage from some Indian projects have also gradually intensified this sentiment against India.  In this regard, there is a growing perception for the need to diversify the economy both domestically and externally.

These factors give rise to the question: What do Bhutan’s youth think of their country and its foreign policy?^[45] This report seeks to provide answers by addressing how young Bhutanese today view the world. The report highlights that a younger generation of Bhutanese are curious about other countries and cultures, are keen to diversify the economy and foreign policy, and are willing to migrate elsewhere. The results also indicate that India continues to have an advantage over other countries and enjoys a largely positive opinion among Bhutanese.

Endnotes

^[1] Historically, Bhutan consisted of several autonomous communities without any central power. In the 17^th century, the Tibetan monk Zhabdrung Rinpoche arrived in Bhutan and unified the country, which was suffering from political turmoil and internal fights. Ladakh and Sikkim were princely states at the time.

^[2] British expansion in the 18^th century posed a challenge to Bhutan’s sovereignty. This led to a series of confrontations called the Duar wars, at the end of which Bhutan and Britain signed a peace agreement, with the latter controlling both regions.

^[3] The GMC project is a special administrative region in Bhutan, bordering India. It is an urban development project that intends to promote sustainability, attract investments, and connect the country with South Asia, ASEAN countries, and China.

^[4] Bhutan has been hesitant to establish diplomatic relations with any of the P5 countries—the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France—fearing that it would be dragged into power politics. This scepticism has persisted since the Cold War era. However, its lack of relations with China has been debated in recent years.

^[5] These countries include Japan, Kuwait, Finland, Singapore, South Korea, Bahrain, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Thailand, fellow SAARC member states, and Scandinavian countries. See: https://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt/economic-and-political-relations-between-bhutan-and-neighbouring-countries/

^[6] This includes embassies in India, Bangladesh, Belgium, Thailand, Australia, and Kuwait; permanent mission to the UN in New York and Geneva; consulates in India’s Kolkata and Guwahati, and the US’s New York.

^[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Bhutan,” https://www.mfa.gov.bt/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Foreign-Policy-Document.pdf

^[2] Nitasha Kaul, “Friendship and International Relations in the Himalayas: Bhutan, Britain, and the 1910 Treaty of Punakha,” Itinerario 46, no. 3 (2022), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/84B58A6909F14A5B6D609B825777A0D1/S0165115322000067a.pdf/friendship_and_international_relations_in_the_himalayas_bhutan_britain_and_the_1910_treaty_of_punakha.pdf

^[3] Ministry of External Affairs, “Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship, 8th August, 1949,” https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5242/treaty+or+perpetual+p#:~:text=The%20Government%20of%20India%20agrees%20that%20the%20Government%20of%20Bhutan,and%20welfare%20of%20Bhutan%2C%20and

^[4] ENFRAtv, “Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Visit to BHUTAN - ENFRA tv- Archives - Nehru Wangchuck Cultural Centre,” YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JELlYxKHmBI

^[5] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for India and China,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 356, June 2022, Observer Research Foundation    https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-changing-contours-of-bhutan-s-foreign-policy-and-the-implications-for-china-and-india

^[6]  ENFRAtv, “Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Visit to BHUTAN - ENFRA tv- Archives - Nehru Wangchuck Cultural Centre”

^[7] Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for India and China”

^[8] Chencho Dema, “What Bhutan’s Failure to Meet Hydropower Goal Shoes About the Geopolitics of Energy,” The Wire, March 14, 2023,  https://thewire.in/energy/bhutan-hydropower-electricity-energy-geopolitics#:~:text=With%20 hydropower%20 contributing%2014%25%20 of,at%20the%20Economist%20Intelligence%20Unit.

^[9] Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Bhutan Relations,” https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brief_on_India_Bhutan_Relations_March_2024.pdf

^[10] “Bhutan-India Ties and Gen-Z,” The Bhutanese, March 22, 2024 https://thebhutanese.bt/bhutan-india-ties-and-gen-z/

^[11] Karma Ura, “India-Bhutan: A Unique Bond,” Gateway House, June 13, 2014, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-bhutan-a-unique-bond/

^[12] Harsh V Pant and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The India-Bhutan Story: India Understands the Urgency and needs of its neighbour,” Financial Express, March 28, 2024, https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/the-india-bhutan-story-india-understands-the-urgency-and-needs-of-its-neighbour/3438659/

^[13] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Bhutan’s Embankment to the New World Order,” Observer Research Foundation, November 16, 2023,  https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/bhutan-s-embankment-to-the-new-world-order

^[14] Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for India and China”

^[15] Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, “Bhutan’s Foreign Policy: Cautious Self Assertion?” Asian Survey 33, no. 11 (1993): 1043–54, https://doi.org/10.2307/264499

^[16] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Delhi and Dhaka are Bolstering Bhutan’s Vision for Connectivity,” Observer Research Foundation, July 12, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/delhi-and-dhaka-are-bolstering-bhutan-s-vision-for-connectivity

^[17] MB Subba “Govt. to Expand Diplomatic Relations,” Keunsel, July 10, 2019, https://kuenselonline.com/govt-to-expand-diplomatic-relations/

^[18] Subba “Govt. to Expand Diplomatic Relations”

^[19] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, “Resident Embassies of Other Countries,” https://www.mfa.gov.bt/resident-embassies-of-other-countries/

^[20] Thukten Zangpo, “Draft 13th Plan Allocates Nu 80 Billion for Economy,” Keunsel, January 18, 2024,  https://kuenselonline.com/draft-13th-plan-allocates-nu-80-billion-for-economy/

^[21] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Assessing Bhutan’s Migration Trends and Policies,” Observer Research Foundation, March 31, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/assessing-bhutans-migration-trends-and-policies

^[22] Ryusei Takahashi, “Student’s Death Reveals Dark Side of Bhutan-Japan Exchange Program,” The Japan Times, December 29, 2019,  https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/12/29/national/students-death-reveals-dark-side-bhutan-japan-exchange-program/

^[23] Karma Phuntsho, “The Promise of Broken Youth: A Positive Perspective,” The Druk Journal, http://drukjournal.bt/the-promise-of-broken-youth-a-positiveperspective

^[24] Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for India and China”

^[25] Tim Sullivan, “Bhutanese Reluctantly Stepping into the World of Democracy,” The New York Times, March 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/world/asia/21iht-bhutan.1.11312503.html

^[26] The World Bank, “Individuals Using Internet (% of population) - Bhutan,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=BT

^[27] Bhutan Media Foundation and the Asia Foundation, Social Media Landscape in Bhutan, Thimphu, Bhutan Media Foundation, https://www.bmf.bt/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Social-Media-Landscape-in-Bhutan.pdf

^[28]  Siok Sian Pek-Dorji, “Youth and Politics in an Evolving Democracy,” Druk Journal, Spring Edition (2018),  

http://drukjournal.bt/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Youth-and-Politics-in-an-Evolviing-Democracy.pdf

^[29] Akiko Ueda, Culture and Modernisation: From the Perspectives of Young People in Bhutan (Thimphu: The Centre for Bhutan Studies, 2003).

^[30] Chhewang Rinzin, Walter Vermeulen, and Pieter Glasbergen, “Public Perceptions of Bhutan’s Approach to Sustainable Development in Practice,” Sustainable Development 15 (2007): 52-68, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227513098_Public_perceptions_of_Bhutan's_approach_to_sustainable_development_in_practice

^[31]  Ueda, Culture and Modernisation: From the Perspectives of Young People in Bhutan

^[32] Nitasha Kaul, “Small State, Big Example: Covid Pandemic Management in Bhutan,” Critical Studies on Security 9, no .1 (2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904359

^[33]  Nitasha Kaul, “Beyond India and China: Bhutan as a Small State in International Relations,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 22, no. 2 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcab010

^[34] Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, “Gross National Happiness,” https://ophi.org.uk/gross-national-happiness

^[35] Ueda, Culture and Modernisation: From the Perspectives of Young People in Bhutan

^[36] The Bhutanese, “A Call to Build our Future,” Facebook post, November 11, 2024,  https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=874247828187486&id=100068068309534&_rdr#

^[37] Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for India and China”

^[38] Thukten Zangpo, “Economic Diversification Crucial for Bhutan: World Bank Report,” Keunsel, September 13, 2024, https://kuenselonline.com/economic-diversification-crucial-for-bhutan-world-bank-report/

^[39] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Why the Exodus from Bhutan of Young People and Qualified Workers is a Worry for India,” The Scroll, March 18, 2024  https://scroll.in/article/1064266/why-the-exodus-from-bhutan-of-young-people-and-qualified-workers-is-a-worry-for-india#:~:text=Since%202022%2C%20the%20tiny%20Himalayan,a%20population%20of%207.7%20lakh.

^[40] Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Bhutan Elections: What is at Stake for India?,” Observer Research Foundation, January 22, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/bhutan-elections-what-is-at-stake-for-india

^[41] Zangpo, “Economic Diversification Crucial for Bhutan: World Bank Report”

^[42]  Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Why the Exodus from Bhutan of Young People and Qualified Workers is a Worry for India”

^[43] “The State of Our Nation,” Keunsel, July 6, 2024, https://kuenselonline.com/the-state-of-our-nation/

^[44] Gowdara Shivamurthy, “The Changing Contours of Bhutan’s Foreign Policy and the Implications for India and China”

^[45]  “Bhutan-India Ties and Gen-Z”

• Neighbourhood
• India
• Bhutan
• cultural influence
• development partner
• diplomatic diversification
• economic ties
• foreign policy
• India-Bhutan relations
• regional influence
• youth perspective

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