Introduction

Amidst the fissures in the Transatlantic partnership, heightened United States (US)-China rivalry, and global trade frictions, commentaries of doom and gloom abound. This analysis offers a different perspective: while recognising the risks, it focuses on new opportunities that are emerging for the Global South. To deliberately mix two African proverbs, the Global South today is not the grass that gets trampled when elephants fight; rather, the lions have finally learnt to write and are shaping their own destinies. The age that glorified the hunter is ending.

It is worth acknowledging upfront that for some commentators, the ‘Global South’ is not a useful concept. While this brief recognises important differentiation and hierarchies within the Global South, as well as lively contestations around the term, it does not share the view that the term should be “retired”.^[1] For the purposes of this brief, the term ‘Global South’ is used to refer to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, which share histories of colonialism and deprivation. Their collective agenda today remains a reform (and often more than that: a reboot) of global governance institutions (such as the United Nations Security Council) and a more equitable distribution of global resources.

The growth markets in the Global South, the middle-income economies, and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) remain united in their concerns about development for their peoples. While indeed, the Global South is neither a monolith nor is it the singular club to which its members belong, the same holds true for most other global collective groupings, including the ‘West’ and the ‘European Union (EU)’ (and this, despite the fact that the EU is a legal entity).

Academic and policy debates readily accept France or Germany as individual actors in their own right, but also as members of the EU or working within a group of self-proclaimed liberal democracies. Yet we see few attempts to discredit the terms and categories to which Western players claim allegiance. In a similar vein, rather than indulge in semantic exercises to dismiss the ‘Global South’, it is only correct and useful to take developing countries seriously when they claim a belonging with this grouping. The Global South serves as one of several important identities and levels at which countries operate, and the term is used accordingly in this analysis.^[2]

The brief proceeds in four parts. As a first step, it identifies some of the existential problems that the world faces today, which affect both the developed and developing worlds. It further highlights an interesting North-South divide in how the series of economic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic crises are being perceived. These differences in perception are critical for the framing and implementation of potential solutions. Second, it provides an account of what was, and remains, wrong with the “system”—defined as both the structures and processes that shape and govern global interdependence. The analysis is based on the author’s reading of how countries that have long been regarded—and indeed, often see themselves—as being at the receiving end of global rules, the rule-takers rather than the rule-makers, the self-identified Global South. In the third section, the brief shows why key parts of the Global South now enjoy a negotiating advantage. Their improved bargaining position is vital for the countries themselves and also has promising implications for the planet. The tables have turned in interesting ways. The fourth and final section underlines the importance of avoiding complacency; this transformative moment could be lost, or even end up worsening the lot of developing countries. Timely and carefully considered action is needed, both on the part of the Global South as well as partner countries in the Global North. The brief concludes with recommendations for academia and practice.

Similar Challenges, Different Lenses

Shared Existential Problems 

The word “crisis” tends to be overused in political and economic discussions. Perhaps this is a hubris of every generation, which tends to exaggerate the problems that it is dealing with, or perhaps academic funding structures and social media create incentives for such exaggerations. But compare today with the optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, and the range and depth of problems that the world is dealing with is much greater.^[3] Contra Fukuyama’s “End of History”^[4] moment which saw an expansion of the international liberal order and a deepening of multilateralism (and the two further reinforcing each other), some very different developments are underway, within countries and transcending borders.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe lost its decades-long comfort and pride of being a zone of peace. Europe’s challenges have deepened under the Trump 2.0 administration. Although US officials have reiterated their country’s commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they have also been unequivocal in demanding that Europe will need to do more for its own security. Admittedly, American dissatisfaction about Europe’s “free-riding” is not new. But the new administration has been clearer than ever before in insisting that “Europe must lead from the front”, increase defence spending, and expand its defence industrial base. Beyond such exhortations, the US Defence Secretary has signalled the administration’s preference for a geographic division of labour on security affairs, with Europe focusing on its own region as the US prioritises “deterring war with China in the Pacific.”^[5]

Europe is not alone in having to deal with war in its region. Across different parts of the world, old-fashioned security threats are back with a vengeance. Further, these threats take on a new intensity as they spread across the world in different ways—for instance, via major disruptions to connectivity—be this through attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea or undersea cables in the Baltic or the Indo-Pacific.

European dependence on Russia for energy is just one of several global examples illustrating that the very mechanisms of interdependence that were supposed to bind countries into global prosperity and global peace have developed a fatal flaw—interdependence can be weaponised.^[6] This potential and real weaponisation of interdependence strikes at the core of the institutions of global governance, which were established at the end of the Second World War to address the problems of the previous century; today they find themselves ill-equipped to grasp or tackle the threats that confront the world.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides an illustration of the problems that afflict existing multilateral institutions. For some time now, all its three functions—negotiation, dispute settlement mechanism, and trade policy review mechanism—have been stymied.^[7] Unlike in previous times, it is clear that the US will not resume its role as a guarantor of the system. While American dissatisfaction with the WTO has come to transcend party lines, President Trump has been especially colourful in expressing his disregard for free trade and the organisation that is supposed to uphold its rules. Mere “talk” along such lines is usually enough to shake market confidence; the flurry of on-and-off tariffs targeting US friends and foes alike has injected even greater unpredictability in an already unstable world.

Add to this list the challenges to democracy—coming not just from authoritarian regimes but from within the heartlands of western democracy—and it is clear that the world is in a state of remarkable flux, and that too, at a time when our planet is burning.

The problems are real, wherever we sit. But how they are being viewed and approached differs across geographies and identities.

North-South Divide 

There is a polarisation in the ways in which different parts of the world are reacting to (sometimes) existential problems: the Global South and the Global North are far from being on the same page, be this over Russia and Ukraine, or over climate financing. Even more interesting than individual cases is an overall difference in approach. A tale of two conferences—both from this year—shows how stark the difference is.

The first conference took place in Munich in February. The annual Munich Security Conference (MSC) tends to be a polite affair. Familiar members of a global elite discuss reforming the system, return home to business as usual, and are invited again the following year for similar discussions—and thus the cycle continues. This Valentine’s weekend, however, there was anything but love present at the club of Munich. The speech by US Vice President JD Vance^[8] triggered outrage among European political leaders.^[9] Social media channels were alight with indignation. An unprecedented us vs them narrative emerged. The aftermath of that speech can be seen in political commentary even today, still laden with sentiments of anger and betrayal.

The second conference took place a month later—Raisina Dialogue.^[10] This too, is an annual event, but one that is hosted in Delhi, the capital of the country that is also host to the Voice of the Global South Summit. Raisina Dialogue has never allowed itself that gemütlich feeling—that cosy feeling—of being a small club of countries where everyone thinks alike. And perhaps almost as a corollary, this forum has not fallen into the opposite trap of us versus them and other betrayal narratives, when there is disagreement within the room. And disagreement there is aplenty, for this is the forum where there is no cancel culture. Rather than hand-wringing and finger-pointing—in striking contrast to Munich—in Delhi, there were serious, solution-oriented conversations. Importantly, these conversations were not always politically correct ones of motherhood and apple pie; there were also clear, red lines.

The difference in the mood of the two conferences is indicative of a bigger trend: while the Great Powers bicker amongst themselves, parts of the Global South have emerged as self-confident leaders in their own right. They have hard experiences of negotiating in tough neighbourhoods. Hurt feelings in Europe over the refusal of countries from the Global South to ostracise Russia bear little shrift with them: to quote India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar—Europe needs to get out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are everyone else’s problems, but everyone else’s problems are not Europe’s problems.^[11]

Overreactions to Vance’s speech also get little sympathy from countries that have put up with decades of lecturing from the West. They are undoubtedly affected by the instability in the transatlantic relationship, as well as US-China tensions; some of the small, open, trade-reliant economies of southeast Asia are considerably more concerned about tariffs than their larger counterparts. But by and large, in contrast to the underlying pessimism and bristling dissatisfaction in Europe and the US, respectively, there is a quiet resilience and guarded optimism in major parts of the so-called “rest of the world”. The difference in Stimmung (“mood”) can be correlated to the extent to which change is anticipated and welcomed by the Global South (and conversely, feared and resented by the incumbents in the global distribution of power and resources).

Much depends on how the transition from the global ancien régime to a new order will be managed (and if it will and can be managed at all). Leave the change solely in the hands of the G2s and G3s, and more fragmentation, disorder, and chaos are likely. Bring in (parts of) the Global South as agenda-setters and balancers, and the world just might witness the beginnings of a more secure, fairer, and kinder order.

The Urgent Need for Change

For the incumbents—including major powers from the Global North and technocracies of international organisations—the current upheavals are understandably difficult to digest. From their perspective, there was little wrong with the old order, in which they had voice and vote, and whose institutions had helped maintain peace and stability (at least in the West). It is also fair to recognise that with the end of the Cold War, some of the benefits of the system came to extend to other players too. Were it not for globalisation, and specifically trade liberalisation under the auspices of the WTO, it is safe to say that China would not have achieved the remarkable strides in development that it did. There are other economic success stories too, including India’s. That said, the system also had serious limitations. Three are highlighted in the following paragraphs.

First, the liberal triumphalism of the 1990s—even in its most inclusive variants—came with an expectation that developing countries would simply be grateful for the gains that the system offered, and would thus buy into it, lock, stock and barrel. But this was not the bargain that most developing countries had envisaged: they sought greater inclusiveness in global decision-making forums, and more influence in determining the content of the rules.^[12] The failure of international organisations to reform (such as the UN Security Council’s inability to expand the original P5 membership and revise the veto) rankled many who had been waiting in the wings for decades. Even in the few exceptional instances when international organisations (e.g., the WTO) did update their decision-making processes and granted some developing countries seats at the high table, the Global South wanted more: not just token representation, but agenda-setting power.^[13] The faster these countries rose in economic and military prowess, the more out of sync global governance became with changing ground realities. Dysfunctional multilateralism and disgruntled memberships were the inevitable result.

Second, it is important to bear in mind that the Global South is not just a set of countries “out there” in the world regions, far away from Europe and North America. There is also a Global South within the Global North—individuals and groups who found themselves worse off for a variety of reasons (including inadequate redistribution mechanisms in their societies), and also those who were convinced that they were worse-off in a battle of narratives. The Brexit vote, President Trump’s election and re-election, the rise of the AfD in Germany are all, at least partly the results of failed liberal narratives and disintegrating societal bargains. Dissatisfaction and rebellion from different constituencies have thus been rumbling away within the old heartlands of power.

Third, if the Global South is conceptualised as being constituted by those who have lacked voice and been shortchanged by global and local bargains, it is impossible to ignore one further group of the completely marginalised and voiceless—our more-than-human^[14] friends and family, with whom we share this planet. Consider the fact that world wildlife populations have declined by over 70 percent in just the last 50 years, or the dramatic decline in biodiversity caused almost entirely by human activity.^[15] Think also of the individual animals who go through unimaginable suffering in the name of tradition or development—be this in the live markets of Asia, trophy hunting in Africa, factory farms of Europe and the US, and the export of live animals in terrifying sea and land crossings. The old model of globalisation and its governance have failed these innocent beings miserably.

Now that no one seems happy with the world as it is, there is a unique opportunity to build a better world—particularly with an eye to the state, non-state, human, and more-than-human members of the Global South.

Negotiating Advantage: The Global South

Amidst the global churn, there is no dearth of voices that point to the crippling and catastrophic effects of the current turmoil on the developing world, for instance via Trump’s tariffs.^[16] But the doom-mongering, at least in the name of the Global South, is exaggerated.

It is true that the Global South has historically shown a preference for “authoritative” international regimes and attached a premium on the certainty offered by international rules.^[17] It would be a mistake, however, to apply models from the 1980s to the Global South of today, many of which have moved up the development ladder and are also shedding their colonial legacies. The refrain of “No deal is better than this deal” from the WTO’s Cancun Ministerial Conference of 2003 was an example of an emerging bigger trend.^[18] Developing countries are no longer willing to accept the legitimacy of global institutions simply because they come packaged with slogans such as “rules-based system”, nor will they defend them to the hilt when such institutions come under attack (be this from Russia or China or indeed, the United States). Rather, countries from the Global South are economically, politically, and intellectually strong enough to ask: whose rules, and to what purpose?  Raisina Dialogue, celebrating its 10^th anniversary, exemplified this self-assured questioning. In contrast to rhetoric about global problems needing global solutions that has become a tired mantra in Europe, we heard the Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, recognise that multilateralism needs to be strong, but with a caveat: to be strong, multilateralism also needs to be fair.

The economic trajectories of some markets in the Global South have been indicative of a changing balance of power for some time now. Recent external developments (including Trump’s cuts to US aid and hiked-up tariffs^[19]), while creating some serious risks, also offer parts of the Global South new sources of bargaining leverage.

The current geoeconomic balancing underway creates the first negotiating advantage for the Global South. As the US, EU, and China now seek to realign their supply chains, the Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) of some countries from the Global South directly improves. It is perhaps not surprising that the EU’s commitment to securing a trade deal with India has increased significantly in the current circumstances; conversely, India’s hand is strengthened, given the urgency with which the EU now needs to find reliable partners and markets.  Other democracies in the Global South too, especially those with well-established institutional and infrastructure systems, will be similarly well placed to harness the opportunities coming from friend-shoring and re-shoring. Despite their current angst, small and open economies—such as the ASEAN members—too will come to enjoy some of these gains: they will likely find themselves being courted from different sides (including China, the US, and the EU, as well as trading partners from the Global South), as will resource-rich economies in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

Second, the advantage that the Global South may acquire goes beyond solely the economic or geoeconomic realms. With the transatlantic rift as well as problems between the US and China, the incumbents need not only alternative markets and suppliers of resources. Rather, they need to also win hearts and minds. For instance, if they are serious about boosting connectivity, interoperability is a precondition for viable, alternative corridors for exchange. This will require them to address issues of standards and norms, and create common ground. Cue: democracies and pluralistic polities from the Global South.

The third negotiating advantage that the otherwise difficult context creates for the Global South is ideational. The Global South does not comprise just “swing states” to be used to tip global and regional balances of power. Within this grouping are civilisational powers, and a living repository of much-needed alternative ideas to address different types of problems (e.g., on more equitable visions of order). While it is not unusual to read about the Chinese vision of regional and global order,^[20] India—as another civilisational power—offers a unique worldview.^[21] For instance, there are powerful traditions in India that argue that “human rights are not human only”^[22]; rather, they extend to all beings. India’s deep-seated values flourish to the present day, living in the verses that children are taught at school and the stories they hear from their grandparents. They are also reflected in rising India’s political narratives and practices.

India’s G20 Presidency planted the seeds of some of these ideas via its theme of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (“One Earth, One Family, One Future”). This is not a glib slogan but a far-reaching idea on inter-species justice.^[23] India’s leadership in establishing the Big Cat Alliance and Solar Alliance are concrete examples of putting these ideas into practice at an international level. For anyone serious about wanting to address climate change, sustainability, animal welfare, and planetary rights (perhaps doubly so amidst President Trump’s call to “drill baby, drill”), India’s non-anthropocentric traditions should be a go-to.

What Needs to Be Done Next

To summarise the argument made thus far: what is a crisis for the West is not only an opportunity for parts of the Global South, but also has exciting implications for globalisation and global governance. Several developing countries have reason to find themselves in a stronger bargaining position than before. But having a negotiation advantage does not guarantee success in negotiation, and this is no time for complacency.

There are several costs and risks. Despite the opportunities that it offers to rising powers, multipolarity compounds the difficulties of uncertainty and instability. Well-functioning, transparent, resilient domestic institutions will be important in bringing electorates on board,^[24] even as governments try to navigate as nimbly as possible through troubled international waters. Despite the fact that the BATNA of the Global South has improved amidst the exacerbated Great Power rivalry, China too, will exploit the growing transatlantic divide to its own benefit, with tempting overtures to different partners.

European proactive willingness to return to its former closeness to China^[25] could again alter the global power equation—this time, not only away from the Global South, but in favour of an authoritarian axis. Chinese goods shut out of the American market could further be dumped in the Global South and Europe, adversely affecting production. China’s harnessing loopholes in Trump’s trade policy (e.g., by relocating production in southeast Asia) would be a double-edged sword for smaller players. There is also a risk that China steps into the vacuum created by the US exit (in some cases de facto, in others de jure) from multilateral organisations. China would likely frame this in terms of a defence of the existing global order, and could also easily embrace rhetoric that aligns closely with a development-oriented agenda of the Global South. But those who have long argued for a fundamental restructuring of global governance (e.g. of the UN Security Council), and others who support values of democracy, pluralism, human rights, and animal rights—sub-sets of state and non-state actors from the Global South and the Global North—would find themselves severely shortchanged. To minimise these risks, both researchers and policy-makers can play a helpful role.

Insofar as the crisis of the West presents a turning point in favour of the Global South—and reflexively could offer advantages to Western partners and friends—there is considerable merit in finally placing alternative viewpoints in focus (especially from like-minded, Southern democracies). Think tanks and universities could work towards theories of International Relations and International Political Economy whose starting point is not Western political thought. For instance, if we were to build a theory of International Relations from Indian political and strategic thought, we would be working with very different premises. Such a theory would be less anthropocentric to start with, and the idea of Human Rights would differ not only from “Asian” variants, but would also be more protective of the rights of the individual (human and more-than-human) than Western variants of liberalism.

A parallel move by practitioners would require them to move out of their technocratic silos and disciplinary comfort zones, and ensure that policy is informed by a diversity of disciplinary, global perspectives. For instance, were economists and trade lawyers alone to advise policymakers in the EU or India on realigning global supply chains, the resulting policies would prioritise security of supply and growth (along the lines that such matters are discussed in the WTO^[26]). In contrast, were diversification to take place with the advice of political scientists and historians, considerations of national security, development, and ethics would also come into play. Trade trajectories would change in a fundamental way, as would the shape and scope of globalisation. Engaging systematically with these diverse perspectives will not only be important for the institutions of global governance; it will be indispensable for the forging of new partnerships, alliances and friendships.

The tables are finally turning: what we make of this is up to us.

An early version of this paper was presented at a conference, Framing World Interdependence (31 March – 1 April, 2025), organised by the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the Institute for New Economic Thinking. A more advanced version was presented as the inaugural lecture for the DAKSHIN special lecture series at RIS, New Delhi, on 25 April 2025. The author thanks the organisers and participants for their valuable feedback at both events. The paper has further benefited from the constructive suggestions of Martin Daunton as well as the helpful comments of an anonymous reviewer. Usual caveats apply.

Endnotes

^[1] Stewart Patrick and Alexandra Huggins, “The Term ‘Global South’ Is Surging. It Should Be Retired,” Carnegie Endowment, August 15, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/08/the-term-global-south-is-surging-it-should-be-retired?lang=en; Alan Beattie, “The ‘Global South’ Is a Pernicious Term and Needs to be Retired,” Financial Times, September 14, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/7f2e0026-56be-4f3d-857c-2ae3a297daab.

^[2] For More: Nora Kürzdörfer and Amrita Narlikar, “Was Ist Schon Ein Name?,” Internationale Politik,  August 28, 2023, https://internationalepolitik.de/de/was-ist-schon-ein-name; Republished in English, “A Rose by Any Other Name: In Defence of the Global South,” Global Policy,  August, 29, 2023, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/29/08/2023/rose-any-other-name-defence-global-south.

^[3] Amrita Narlikar, “On Breakthroughs, Deadlocks, and Rose-Gardens Lost in Between: The Failed Promise of North South Cooperation,” in Rethinking the 1990s: Liberal World Order-Building in the Aftermath of the Cold War, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Peter Trubowitz (Oxford University Press, accepted for publication, forthcoming 2026).

^[4] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18.

^[5] Pete Hegseth, “Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defence Contact Group,” (speech, Brussels, February 12, 2025), US Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4064113/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact/.

^[6] For a differentiation between earlier forms of asymmetric interdependence versus weaponized interdependence, see Daniel Drezner, Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman eds., The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence (Brookings Institution, 2021).

^[7] Amrita Narlikar, Poverty Narratives and Power Paradoxes: International Trade Negotiations and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

^[8] The White House, “Vice President JD Vance Delivers Remarks at the Munich Security Conference,” YouTube video, 19:30 min, February 14, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCOsgfINdKg.

^[9] For an analysis of why the Vance speech prompted such a strong reaction- Amrita Narlikar, “Outrage at Munich,” Raisina Debates, February 18, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/outrage-at-munich. .

^[10] Read more about the history and culture of Raisina Dialogue in S. Jaishankar and Samir Saran, Raisina Chronicles: India’s Global Public Square (Rupa Publications, 2025).

^[11] The Economic Times, “EAM S Jaishankar on Why Europe’s Perspective of World’s Problems is Flawed,” YouTube video, 7:12 min, June 3, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmsQaWZPvtQ.

^[12] Amrita Narlikar, ed., Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions, (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

^[13] On the discontent of the larger developing countries, see Amrita Narlikar, “Negotiating the Rise of New Powers,” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 561-576, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/89/3/561/2326649;  Specifically on why reform in the WTO did not prove adequate, see Amrita Narlikar, “How Not to Negotiate: The Case of Trade Multilateralism,” International Affairs 98, no. 5 (2022): 1553-1573, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1553/6686642.

^[14] The term “more-than-human” is more constructive than the negative “non-human” or the “othering” inherent in “other-than-human” when discussing transspecies rights and justice. See for instance, Matthew Leep, “Introduction to the Special Issue: Multispecies Security and Personhood,” Review of International Studies 49, no. 2 (2023): 181-200.

^[15] World Wildlife Fund and Zoological Society of London, Living Planet Report 2024, World Wildlife Fund, Gland, Switzerland, 2024, https://livingplanet.panda.org/en-IN/; “Biodiversity - Our Strongest Natural Defense against Climate Change,” United Nations Climate Action, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/biodiversity.

^[16] Cullen S. Hendrix, “Trump’s April 2 Tariff Spree Could Cripple Developing Economies,”  Peterson Institute for International Economics-Realtime Economics Blog,  April 4, 2025, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/trumps-april-2-tariff-spree-could-cripple-developing-economies; Olivia le Poidevin, “‘Impact of Tariffs on Developing Countries Could Be catastrophic,’ says UN Trade Agency,” Reuters, April 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/tariffs-have-catastrophic-impact-developing-countries-worse-than-foreign-aid-2025-04-11/.

^[17] Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: California University Press, 1985).

^[18] Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, “Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2004): 447-460.

^[19] For more on some of the possible and positive, unintended results of Trump’s trade policy, see Amrita Narlikar, “Three Beautiful Consequences of Trump’s Tariff Game,” Indian Express, April 23, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/three-beautiful-consequences-of-trumps-tariff-game-9959958/.

^[20] E.g., Ban Wang, Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture and World Politics (Duke University Press, 2017)

^[21] S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (Harper Collins, 2022); Aruna Narlikar, Amitabh Mattoo, and Amrita Narlikar, Strategic Choices, Ethical Dilemmas: Stories from the Mahabharat (Penguin Random House, 2023); Amrita Narlikar and Aruna Narlikar, Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons from the Mahabharata (Oxford University Press, 2014); Harsh Pant and Samir Patil, eds., The Making of a Global Bharat (New Delhi, Observer Research Foundation, 2024), https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20240220113216.pdf.

^[22] Raimundo Panikkar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept,” Diogenes 30, no.120 (1982): 75-102.

^[23] Amrita Narlikar, “India and the World: Civilizational Narratives in Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith et al. (Oxford University Press, 4^th edition, 2024).

^[24] It is worth reiterating that the Global South is not a monolith. Only some parts of the Global South will be capable of harnessing the opportunities presented by this brave new world. States with fragile economies and dysfunctional institutions of governance will lack the necessary agility to adapt (e.g. to new supply chains), and will risk further internal chaos amidst potential capture by terrorist organizations, authoritarian surveillance, control of scarce resources by unaccountable private actors, and more. Such disruption may also turn out to be difficult to contain, and may deliberately or accidentally inject new sources of extreme instability in their neighbourhoods and globally.

^[25] Jorge Liboreiro, “‘The West As We Knew It No Longer Exists,’ Von Der Leyen Says Amid Trump Tensions,” Euro News, April 16, 2025, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/04/16/the-west-as-we-knew-it-no-longer-exists-von-der-leyen-says-amid-trump-tensions .

^[26] N Kürzdörfer, “The End of the Golden Weather? Addressing the Geoeconomic Shift in Global Trade Governance” (PhD. diss., Hertie School, 2024), https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/5658/file/Dissertation_Kuerzdoerfer.pdf.

• International Affairs
• China
• USA and Canada
• global north countries
• global north countries
• global south countries
• global south summit
• munich security conference
• Russia Ukraine War
• trump 2.0
• trump 2.0 policies
• us china relations
• us china trade war

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