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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, “Understanding Russia’s Asia-Pacific Strategy,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 533, Observer Research Foundation, April 2026.
Beyond the security discourse, the Asia-Pacific region did not occupy a central place in the strategic calculus of Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, or the Russian Federation until the 21st century.[1] However, the eastward shift in global geoeconomics, due to the accelerated economic growth of East and Southeast Asia since the 1990s, has made engagement with the Asia-Pacific region more palatable for Moscow. Since the turn of the century, Russia has prioritised relations with Asian countries to build economic and trade linkages, particularly to accelerate the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East by building trade hubs pointing eastwards.[2] At the ideational level, Russia’s eastward pivot aims to strengthen its position as an Asian state.[3]
The Russian territory spans continental Europe in the West and juts out into the Pacific Ocean in the East, giving Russia a ‘Eurasian’ identity. With a majority of its population and cities concentrated in its European parts, Russia’s rationale for strengthening ties with Asia stems from the need to develop Siberia and the Russian Far East, as well as build supply chain linkages with the markets of China, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia.[4]
To advance these priorities and enhance Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “turn to the East” at the 2012 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit in Vladivostok.[5] Additionally, Russia’s growing contestation with the West following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 further elevated the primacy of Asian states in its strategic calculus. During the same period, Russia’s relations with China grew across all domains. Moscow became more receptive to deepening engagement with Beijing, including in strategic areas it had previously blocked, such as the Russian Arctic.[6] The convergence of interests is further reflected in Russia’s articulation of a security architecture in Asia, which shares synergies with China's perception, albeit with a few differences.
Meanwhile, Russia’s perception of the region diverged from that of many Asian states—this is reflected particularly in Russia’s opposition to integrating the security dynamics of the Indian and Pacific Oceans into the single subsystem of the ‘Indo-Pacific’. In Russia’s understanding, the conception, along with groupings such as the QUAD and AUKUS,[a] are part of a US-led strategy to contain China’s rise.[7] Despite Russia’s objection with the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, varying perceptions of a security architecture have remained a mere irritant rather than a factor in the crumbling of bilateral ties, in the case of countries such as India.
In response, Russia has advocated retaining the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ and has called for a new security architecture,[8] based on comprehensive mechanisms anchored in the United Nations Security Council. Moscow positions the ASEAN as central[9] to this architecture, in coordination with organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and APEC.[10] Additionally, Moscow has incorporated the Asia-Pacific region as a key area within its Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) which aims to develop a system that incorporates a network of Eurasian economic projects and institutions.
However, the invasion of Ukraine has had an impact on Russia’s eastward shift. On the one hand, it has accelerated Russia’s pivot to Asia; at the same time, sanctions have curtailed access to key markets in the Asia Pacific Region.[11] Furthermore, other regional developments, such as the solidification of Russia-North Korea relations, marked by the conclusion of a friendship treaty,[12] have raised the balance of threat perceptions in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper aims to outline Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy, while briefly examining the Russian debates on the concept, and situate it in the context of India-Russia relations.
Given that Russia’s primary strategic focus has remained in the Euro-Atlantic domain, East Asia entered its broader strategic calculus relatively late. There is broad consensus that the question of grand strategy and the articulation of a security architecture in East Asia was visibly absent in Russia’s calculus until the previous decade.[13] Russian experts identify four factors shaping the evolution of Russia’s strategy in the East: the objective of integrating more effectively into the global economy; the adoption of a diplomatic approach that emphasises multilateral mechanisms for managing regional and international issues; a growing recognition of Russia’s interests in, and the strategic orientation of, its Asian regions; and the pragmatic pursuit of economic and strategic goals.[14] Of these, the priority continues to be the development of the Russian Far East through foreign investment in infrastructure development and making the supply chains to the East more resilient, while strengthening cooperation with like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Russia’s engagement with the East can be discussed in three phases. The first, from 1996 to 2001, placed greater emphasis on geopolitical considerations. In the early 1990s, the Asian region ranked sixth in Moscow’s foreign policy priorities. However, with the change of leadership in the Foreign Ministry under Yevgeny Primakov, the Asian vector gained momentum, rising to third by 1996, after the CIS and Eastern Europe.[15] Meanwhile, Russia’s strategy towards the West became more assertive, criticising American unipolarity and advocating a multipolar order, while strengthening cooperation with the West.[16]
The first attempts at designing the blueprints of an Asian security architecture were envisaged in Primakov’s strategic triangle, bringing together Russia, India, and China as a counterweight to Western hegemony in Asia.[17] During this decade, a notable foreign policy development was the improvement of Russia-China relations. The two countries concluded the Treaty of Friendship in 2001 after resolving their border issues.[18]
The second phase began at the turn of the century, when key policy priorities were articulated, including the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East and incentivising migration to the Far East, which had experienced population decline since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[19] In the 1990s, the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East remained minimal due to a lack of capital investment.[20] Thus, in Moscow’s calculation, opening up its Siberian and Far Eastern region to investments from East Asian countries would enhance economic activity in the region and build a new supply chains eastwards, strengthening Russia’s identity as an Asian power, for which engagement with the Asia Pacific region was crucial.
The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept underscored the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region, calling for stronger regional cooperation and wider integration efforts in Asia through forums such as APEC and ASEAN.[21] This contributed to improved relations with Southeast and East Asian countries. Additionally, Russia played a constructive role in the Six-Party Talks aimed at denuclearisation in the Korean Peninsula.[22]
During this phase, economic cooperation between the Asia-Pacific countries and Russia expanded. Moscow’s push for enhanced technological and economic ties increased the region’s importance in its strategic thinking. In 2012, Russia announced its “turn to the East”, seeking to expand its political and economic footprint in the Asia-Pacific region while priming the Far East region for deeper engagement with the East.[23] Trade with Asia-Pacific countries, particularly China, Japan, and South Korea, grew. Demand for finished goods, consumer electronics, automobiles, and technology—particularly in eastern markets—was increasingly met by Asia-Pacific partners. The primacy of the region in Russia’s calculus was further reflected in the 2013 ‘Concept of Foreign Policy’ document,[24] wherein Russia expressed interest in creating an equitable security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.
The third phase, from 2014 to 2022 and continuing after the invasion of Ukraine, saw security considerations gain prominence alongside economic factors in Russia’s calculus. As Russia’s contestation with the West deepened following the annexation of Crimea in 2014,[25] its pivot to the East accelerated. One indicator was improved relations with US allies in Northeast Asia; despite sanctions imposed after Crimea, economic ties with Japan and South Korea continued to expand.[26]
At the same time, relations with Beijing gained prominence, as the interests of both countries in the Asia-Pacific began to converge. At a 2009 summit, then Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called for the creation of a security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.[27] The alignment would continue under Xi Jinping, who equated the Russia-China partnership as the “ballast stone in safeguarding global and regional peace and stability.”[28]
Moreover, security factors took an important position in Russia’s strategic discourse. The 2015 Maritime Doctrine outlined the structural deficiencies in the Pacific and called for securing Russia’s access to resources in the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Bering Sea.[29] Since the early 2010s, the Russian Navy has undergone aggressive reforms in bolstering its capabilities. The USSR boasted a formidable Pacific fleet in the 1990s, which by the mid-2000s had reduced by 40 percent in size. Rebuilding the Pacific Fleet—through renewed shipbuilding and expanded maritime activity—was prioritised in the 2015 Doctrine. Between 2010 and 2025, the Russian Navy inducted 13 new submarines into the Pacific fleet,[30] signalling intent to project power in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Moscow’s geopolitical imagination of the Asia-Pacific was beginning to be articulated within Russia’s Greater Eurasian cooperation framework.
Meanwhile, as Russia attempted to find its footing in the region, Asia-Pacific countries were becoming increasingly cognisant of China’s aggressive posturing. Beijing’s development of Anti-Access Area Denial capabilities, expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, and increasing investments in hypersonic and long-range weapons systems altered the threat perceptions in the region. China’s rise was viewed by many regional states as revisionist rather than peaceful.[31] As Chinese activity intensified, altering the regional balance, the deepening Russia-China partnership was seen as an additional source of concern, prompting calls for greater US involvement.[32]
Against the backdrop of growing Chinese belligerence, a normative shift took place in the Asia-Pacific. Most notably, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising India, Japan, the United States, and Australia—was revitalised in 2017. At the same time, South Asia received renewed focus, with greater emphasis on the Indian Ocean and its linkage to the Pacific Ocean, redefining the Asia Pacific Region as the ‘Indo-Pacific’. Russia rejected the delineation and called it an American-sponsored vision.[33]
Further, Russia criticised the Quad and AUKUS, arguing that these arrangements run counter to its interest in building a collective security architecture in the Asia-Pacific and undermine ASEAN centrality.[34] Moscow views the Quad and AUKUS as a manifestation of the US’s interest to contain the peaceful rise of China.[35] Moscow has expressed concerns, equating these developments to the growing engagement of NATO in the East.[36]
At a fundamental level, Russia’s opposition to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is mainly due to the US’s role in its development. Russia has pointed out that the champions of the Indo-Pacific concept are attempting to reconfigure the prevailing structures in the Asia-Pacific region.[37] To be sure, however, there are various schools of thought within Russia in viewing the Indo-Pacific concept. One thought accepts the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and charts out its own vision for the region, aligning it closely with the Indian perception of the region.[38] The synergy with India’s position is due to the aligning positions in the creation of a multipolar world order.[39] Even with New Delhi’s concerns with Beijing in the Indo-Pacific, India’s outlook for the region is driven by principles of inclusivity, wherein New Delhi stands opposed to the use of force or joining multinational security coalitions in the region.[40] However, Russia’s official position remains unreceptive to alternative regional formulations and continues to prefer the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to delineate the region.
US efforts to align like-minded partners in the region and Russia’s priority of enhancing its relations with China as part of its turn to the East have led to the growth of Russia-China relations. In Russia’s calculus, the rapid political-economic linkages reflected in the increasing Chinese investments in Russian energy and infrastructure projects are aiding in the achievement of its regional development priorities. As bilateral trade increased, Chinese investments in the Russian economy grew, with firms participating in energy projects.
As bilateral trade increased (see Figure 1), Chinese investment in the Russian economy expanded.
Figure 1: Russia-China Bilateral Trade (2014-25, in US$ Billion)
Source: Author’s own, using data from Rosstat, UN Comtrade, and China’s customs database[41]
Chinese state-owned firms have invested in big-ticket energy projects in Russia such as Arctic LNG-2,[42] Yamal LNG,[43] the Power of Siberia gas pipelines,[44] and the Amur Gas Complex.[45] Chinese firms have also expressed interest in investing in Arctic ports.[46] Moscow has supported Beijing’s ambitions for enhanced Arctic cooperation, as outlined in China’s 2018 Polar Silk Road strategy,[47] which seeks to link the BRI with the Northern Sea Route.
In the Pacific, the two countries institutionalised transit cooperation under the Primorsky International Transport Corridor, connecting ports in Northeast China with the Russian Far East through existing transit routes.[48] These developments signalled a re-globalisation taking place in Eurasia, with the harmonisation of Russian and Chinese supply chains, the converging geoeconomic interests occurred in tandem with the other pillar of engagement increasing.
Military cooperation has also intensified. Beijing acquired major Russian defence platforms, including the S-400 missile defence system and the SU-35 fighter jets,[49] and both countries ramped up joint military exercises in the Pacific. Russian experts have indicated a growing convergence on the perspectives of a security architecture in East Asia, with Russia conditionally accepting Beijing’s positions in the Pacific.[50] Even though Russia did not support or accept the claims of the disputants in the South China Sea, calling for adherence to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the China-ASEAN declaration on the conduct of parties in the SCS, Moscow has not publicly questioned China’s legitimacy over its claims in the South China Sea. Against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, these developments were reflective of China’s growing importance in Russia’s calculus. Western experts argue that the partnership has continued to strengthen following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[51]
The growing convergence on a mutual understanding of a security architecture was further reflected in the identical assessment of the situation in the Korean peninsula in 2019. Both countries have expressed concerns about the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral in the region.[52] They have also opposed the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile systems and the militarisation of Japan, while Moscow does not overtly support China’s claim over the Senkaku Islands.[53] Over the years, Moscow’s positions have begun shift, echoing Chinese positions and pointing to alleged Japanese expansionism as the reason for increased securitisation from China.[54]
Instead of cooperating within the Indo-Pacific framework, Russia proposes its GEP[55] as an alternative vision for shaping a new international order. By institutionalising its eastward pivot through the harmonisation of Eurasian supply chains, with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) at its core, the strategy envisages strengthening cooperation with foreign partners through existing Eurasian mechanisms such as the SCO, BRI, and ASEAN, thereby promoting economic integration across Eurasia. The GEP underscores the primacy of the Asia-Pacific region in Russia’s calculus.[56]
Along with the growing importance of China, there is an understanding that regional and international political-economic linkages between Russia, Central Asia, and South Asia would be incomplete without the inclusion of the rapidly developing markets in Southeast and East Asia. Since the war in Ukraine, the GEP has gained considerable attention in official discourse; the GEP is pushed as the panacea for the country’s long-term goals, such as the eastward pivot and the Siberianisation of the country,[57] and advocating for the creation of a new multipolar order, with new power centres in the East. Since the previous decade, the GEP has not translated to remarkable results on the ground. This is because Russia’s foundations of its eastward pivot have been weak, majority of the Asian states have expressed concerns with the growing Russia-China alignment.[58] Given China’s central role in the GEP, countries in Asia, with their respective grievances on the growing Chinese belligerence in the Indo-Pacific have shown little interest in engaging within the GEP framework.
Despite growing convergences with China, Russia’s strategic interests continue to favour a polycentric order in the Asia-Pacific region,[59] without the hegemony of any single power, including China. According to Russian experts, Moscow’s preferred vision for the region is a concert of countries, such as the United States, China, India, North and South Korea (in the previous decade, Russia called for a unified Korea within the matrix), and a consolidated ASEAN.[60] In Moscow’s calculus, ASEAN is a strategic arbiter in the region and is essential for building a multipolar order. A stronger ASEAN can counterbalance the hegemonic ambitions of states in the region.
Another reason for the rejection of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is that it could undermine the centrality and leadership of ASEAN in the region,[61] and that the current great-power dynamics in the Asia Pacific Region can challenge and question the role of ASEAN, not to mention act as a polarising element amid the US-China rivalry in the region. Some of Russia’s concerns were underscored in ASEAN’s Outlook for the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), wherein ASEAN did not reject the terminology of ‘Indo-Pacific’, nor did it view the Indo-Pacific region and Asia Pacific region as contiguous; rather, it described them as closely integrated and interconnected.[62]
According to Russian experts, the Indo-Pacific concept and the Quad reflect a bloc-based mindset.[63] On the other hand, ASEAN’s cohesion and its emphasis on a rules-based international order grounded in international law render it more appealing. The AOIP further called for the strengthening of ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East-Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, and the ASEAN Maritime Forum.[64]
ASEAN’s centrality in Russia’s reckoning rests on its model of regional integration.[65] The heterogeneity of systems and regimes within ASEAN did not hinder the bloc's development. The primacy of the economic discourse within the bloc and its openness to international cooperation are among the reasons why ASEAN is regarded as an important player in the region. In 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed an Asian security architecture using ASEAN as the foundation, linking it to the GEP.[66]
Furthermore, Russia and Southeast Asian countries share strong trade linkages. Bilateral trade has averaged around US$20 billion over the last decade (see Table 1). The Moscow-backed Eurasian Economic Union concluded free trade agreements with two ASEAN countries and is in the process of negotiating with Indonesia.[67] Russia has robust military ties with Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Since the turn of the century, more than 25 percent of their arms procurements have come from Russia.[68] Southeast Asian countries perceive Russia positively. In other words, there is a convergence of interests in Russia-Southeast Asia relations.
Nevertheless, concerns emerge, especially on the question of strategic convergence. Russian experts further opine that Moscow’s approach to international relations, overall, emphasises balance of power politics and does not converge with the ‘ASEAN Way’.[69] ASEAN countries are also viewing the progression of Russia-China relations with a degree of caution.[70]
Table 1: Volume of Russia’s Trade with ASEAN (2015-2024)
Source: Author’s own, using data from Rosstat, and ASEAN portal[71],[72]
Russia’s war in Ukraine has had spillover effects in the Indo-Pacific. Western sanctions on Russia resulted in a temporary pivot of Russia’s supply chains eastward, and deepening economic engagement with India and China increased. The ripple effects of the war were felt in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in Northeast Asia. Russia’s relations with Japan and South Korea deteriorated, with these states joining the sanctions regime against Russia.[73] South Korea and Japan are important Asian markets for Russia; in 2021, Russia’s bilateral trade with South Korea stood at US$28 billion,[74] while it reached US$20 billion with Japan.[75]
As Russia’s relations with the West deteriorated after 2014, Japan and South Korea became important partners for Russia, particularly in trade and investment. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to improve relations with Russia by addressing the issues of disputed territories and the growing impetus to sign a peace treaty[b] resulted in a marginal improvement in relations.[76] Despite strained political ties, Japan retained stakes in key energy projects in the Far East and the Russian Arctic.[77] These include oil projects in Sakhalin and stakes in Russian LNG projects in the Arctic. Meanwhile, South Korea’s importance to Moscow stemmed from its status as an important shipbuilding state in the region. Seoul has an interest in investing in the Northern Sea Route by engaging in port logistics in the Russian Arctic.[78] Before the war, South Korea helped Russia in the construction of ice-class vessels and offered technology transfers.[79]
Since the war in Ukraine, the Russian Far East’s access to Japan and South Korea has been blocked, with the states joining the sanctions regime; economic cooperation has remained at its lowest. Furthermore, the improving Russia-North Korea relations, particularly in the wake of the conclusion of a friendship treaty with DPRK with a mutual security clause, amped the balance of threat perceptions in Northeast Asia.[80]
In the past decade, Russia’s Pacific Fleet has been quietly rebuilding, with particular emphasis laid on its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet. As a result of renewed impetus, the Pacific fleet has ranked second in terms of force projection in the Russian Navy.[81] Western experts estimate that the fleet consists of 260 vessels, 65 surface combatants, and two dozen conventional and nuclear submarines.[82]
The 2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine placed emphasis on power projection in the Pacific Ocean.[83] The doctrine focused on developing relations with China and stressed the implementation of long-term objectives in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, and the eastern Arctic within the Northern Sea Route. Furthermore, since the war, Borei-class nuclear submarines and their upgraded version have been deployed in the Pacific Fleet,[84] and the frequency of naval patrols in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan is increasing fears of a Cold War-like configuration in the Pacific.
Against the backdrop of isolation from the West, structural factors in the East Asian Order have paved the way for enhanced cooperation with Russia and North Korea. Since the invasion, Russia’s growing demand for large volumes of munitions has been met by the DPRK,[85] in turn benefiting the North Korean economy.[86] North Korea’s standing in the region has improved since the previous decade. In the last decade, Russia and China were constrained in their support to North Korea, limiting the latter’s options.
However, in the current decade, growing contestation with the West and converging positions on regional security have elevated North Korea’s importance in Russia’s estimation. Moscow vetoed the renewal of the UN panel of experts’ mandate to assist the council’s DPRK sanctions committee.[87] Second, in the summer of 2024, President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea after a hiatus of 24 years, and the two leaders concluded a comprehensive strategic treaty. The treaty outlined multiple areas of cooperation, and as mentioned earlier, the clause on mutual security guarantees was a watershed moment in the East Asian Security architecture. The deployment of North Korean troops to the Kursk region[88] starting from the winter of 2024 raised concerns in Asia of a potential Russian involvement in the Korean peninsula.
Additionally, since the conflict in Ukraine, a palpable shift in the nature of Russia-China relations could be observed. Unlike North Korea, China did not officially support Russia’s war in Ukraine; however, China did not join the sanctions regime and became the largest economic partner for Moscow. Before the war in 2021, bilateral trade stood at US$147 billion; by 2024, trade had reached US$245 billion (see Figure 1). Since the war, trade has been pivoting eastwards towards China, and Beijing has become one of the world’s largest importers of Russian oil.
Non-BRI investments increased in the Chinese economy, particularly in the strategic sectors such as the Arctic and the Far East. By January 2025, Russian investments in the Russian Far East reached ~US$13 billion,[89] the majority of which were made in infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and cross-border logistics. Since the war, China has had a more pronounced role in the Russian Arctic, along with increasing investments in port developments such as in Arkhangelsk port, Chinese shipping firms have begun using the North Sea Route for voyages from China to Europe.[90]
Cooperation is also evident in the military domain.[91] For instance, in October 2024, Russia and China conducted joint patrols across the Arctic, and both countries regularly engage in military drills.[92] Recent reports of Russian military training Chinese airborne forces and exporting amphibious assault vehicles, light amphibious anti-tank machine guns, and airborne armoured personnel carriers have been extrapolated by Western military experts as Moscow potentially training Chinese forces for an airborne/amphibious invasion of Taiwan.[93]
The convergence of interests among Russia, China, and North Korea has prompted Western observers to draw parallels with a revived Cold War-style strategic triangle.[94] This convergence of interests has altered the balance of power in the region. As the war in Ukraine progressed, the concept of an “Asian NATO” gained traction in light of the former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s statement on forming one.[95] In the run-up to this development, NATO, on multiple occasions since the war in Ukraine, deliberated on security in the Indo-Pacific. Shigeru’s proposal was a radical departure from Japan’s pacifist stance, with Japan also bolstering its defence capabilities. The recent expression of intent by the Sanae Takaichi government to aid Taiwan in a potential cross-Strait clash has elicited a negative reaction from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.[96] For Moscow, these developments, along with the unsolved territorial disputes between the two countries, create constraints in the resolution of irritants in the Russia-Japan relationship.
Responses from among the ASEAN states have varied.[97] Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and the Philippines have had a more balanced reaction, calling for upholding sovereignty following the UN Charter while not overtly condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Myanmar was the only country whose position was indicative of tacit support towards Russia; Singapore, meanwhile, was the sole country to impose economic sanctions on Russia. To be sure, however, Russia’s engagement with the region continued even under the Western sanctions.
Following his landmark visit to North Korea, Putin visited Vietnam.[98] The visit was rife with symbolism, signalling the positive ties that Russia shares with countries in Southeast Asia. Countries in the region employ hedging strategies in their respective foreign policies, giving them room to manoeuvre, given their existing linkages with Russia. Barring Singapore, these countries did not join the sanctions regime, and trade relations between Russia and ASEAN countries in fact improved. The military-technical partnership that Russia shares with several ASEAN countries remained largely unaffected.[99] However, the war has had impacts on ASEAN states, particularly in their imports of fertilisers and cereals from Ukraine.[100] The general sense from ASEAN remains that it is opposed to the war, as it has an impact on the global economy as a whole.
Three factors have influenced India’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific region. First, New Delhi is cognisant of the balance of power tilting eastward, where New Delhi’s interest in enhancing its engagement with East and Southeast Asian countries, articulated since the 1990s in strategic visions such as the Look East Policy and later the Act East Policy, is a further reflection of the region’s primacy in India’s calculus.[101] Second, the extension of the Asia-Pacific region bringing the Indian Ocean within a single strategic system has been in India’s interest given the renewed focus on the Indian Ocean, with the latter being vulnerable to the challenges of climate change and other non-traditional threats like piracy and maritime terrorism; the stability of this region remains a core national interest for New Delhi.[102] Thus, over time, New Delhi’s role has evolved from a ‘net security provider’ to ‘preferred security partner’.[103] Lastly, as India’s relations with the West improve and perceptions on matters related to Asian security converge, it was a natural evolution of Indian foreign policy, wherein building a Free and Open rules-based order was in their mutual interest.
Perceptions of the region vary despite broad agreement on the objective of building a free and open, rules-based order. National positions do not necessarily converge on a lot of factors. For context, India is the only Quad country not part of the American hub-and-spokes system. Beyond the fundamental convergence on the perception of building a free and open rules-based order, India and the other Quad countries do not align in various important domains. For instance, India’s ties with Russia have been a point of contention. The China factor in the security interests of each nation also varies. Additionally, India’s perception of the Indo-Pacific region encompasses West Asia and East Africa, while America’s understanding of the region terminates at the western coast of India.
Despite India’s position on the Indo-Pacific attracting criticism from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which on multiple occasions has called out the US and its allies for nudging India towards its hardened stance on China, the importance of India in Russia’s calculus has remained largely unaffected; there is an understanding in Moscow of New Delhi’s interests and, more importantly, the largely inclusive approach India takes in approaching the region.[104] As part of the inclusive vision in the region, in 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in Vladivostok, announced India’s interest in enhancing engagement with the Russian Far East under a new framework, the ‘Act Far East’ policy, and announced a credit line of US$1 billion.[105] The development has multiple effects for India’s interests in the Arctic-Pacific discourse. Along with the recent operationalisation of the Chennai-Vladivostok economic corridor, India has expressed interest in cooperating in the Northern Sea Route with Russia, thus maintaining a policy of putting forward its regional interests in the Indo-Pacific while strengthening cooperation with Russia from the Pacific.
Even with the pushback from Moscow on India’s participation in the Quad, New Delhi has so far not taken any positions that could be deemed hawkish in nature. For instance, even in response to the blossoming North Korea-Russia relations with the deployment of troops to Kursk, the Quad statements in 2024 and 2025 expressed a mere condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear programme and missile programme and further reaffirmed cooperation for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. None of the statements explicitly mention Russia; experts argue that India’s position in the Quad could be attributed as the reason for the toned-down statements.[106]
Moscow’s “turn to the East”, launched in 2012, was among the first notable steps institutionally to strengthen Russia’s economic footprint in the Asia-Pacific region. The 13-year period has been transformative, with key developments in Europe, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 having ripple effects in the Pacific, and the balance of power in East Asia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the launch of the strategy, the primacy of the Asian vector in Russia has only increased against the backdrop of Russia’s strained relations with the West.
In recent years, sections of the Russian strategic community have adopted a more hardline realist perspective, arguing that rapprochement with the West remains impossible,[107] and that a durable pivot to Asia is essential for state resilience. Some advocate the “Siberianisation” of Russia, calling for a stronger emphasis on engagement with Asia within its Eurasian vision. These developments are observing palpable shifts ideationally in the Russian superstructure. Since the war, along with scaling up trade with countries in the IPR, a discernible shift has been observed in Russia’s turn to the east, a shift of energy supply chains taking place eastward.
However, on the ground, apart from the post-Ukraine war dynamics artificially redirecting the supply chains eastward, Russia’s equities in the Indo-Pacific region remain minimal. For instance, commencing from the domestic angle, despite increasing development activity across Siberia and the Russian Far East, the country continues to face a fundamental population crisis in the East; the population and the economic hubs remain concentrated on the European side of Russia, and a radical pivot will take decades.
Internationally, Russia’s markets in the East include non-Western states such as India and China as well as ASEAN states. Despite prospects for a potential revival of Russia’s partnerships with Japan and South Korea, the degree of volatility in Russia’s relations with these countries remains high and at times conditional on Russia’s standing with the US. Lastly, the recent developments in the US-Russia relationship are another variable in Russia’s eastward strategy; the arrival of President Donald Trump witnessed new shifts in the US-Russia relations. Along with taking a conciliatory position on Russia in the Ukraine conflict, and engaging with Russia, Trump aims to deaccelerate the Russia-China alignment.
At the same time, Trump’s focus on the Western Hemisphere[108] has given rise to a perception that the Indo-Pacific has taken a back seat in the US’s strategic calculus. The administration’s recent attempts at lowering tariffs on China, not imposing secondary tariffs on Beijing for buying Russian oil,[109] and referring to US-China engagement in “G2” terms—have been interpreted as signalling a recalibrated American approach to Beijing.[110]
In this context, even though Trump’s transactional foreign policy has raised questions on the political impetus from Washington on the Indo-Pacific, the institutional commitments continue to operate, indicative of a slight deviation from the norm. Against this backdrop, and with an uncertain future for the US-China G2 in the Pacific, with the likelihood of the US-China competition set to intensify in the Pacific, the question of Moscow’s positioning in the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly salient.
Will the Russia-China-North Korea alignment deepen further, fuelling fears of a renewed Cold War-style division in the East? Will Russia instead lean on a multipolar vision anchored in ASEAN centrality and closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific? Or might Moscow seek to improve its standing with Europe by negotiating a more favourable middle ground on regional security and expanding cooperation under the GEP framework? Ultimately, how the war in Ukraine concludes is a critical variable that will shape the contours of these complex dynamics.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is Junior Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.
The author thanks Abhishek Sharma and Sayantan Haldar for their valuable inputs on the Indo-Pacific.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] The Quadrilateral grouping consists of Australia, Japan, India and the United States. AUKUS consists of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[b] This has remained unaddressed since the end of the Second World War.
[1] Anatoly Torkunov et al., “Russia’s Pivot to the East: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects,” Polis: Political Studies, 30(5), 2020: 8-21.
[2] Sergei Karaganov, “Turning East?,” Russia in Global Affairs, February 18, 2014. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/turning-east/
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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