Introduction

On 20 January 2025, the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan and the interim government, led by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), held a ceremony in Kabul to celebrate the 70^th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries. In his speech, the Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs of the IEA, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, praised the long-standing relationship and reiterated the commitment made by their founder-leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, to China—that Afghanistan’s territory will not be used against China or any other neighbouring country.^[1]

Regarding China as a key partner in their pursuit of peace and stability, he thanked Beijing for advocating their cause in multilateral platforms and called on it to tap the “unparalleled” investment opportunities offered by Afghanistan.^[2] The Chinese Ambassador, Zhao Xing, also committed to jointly promote regional peace and security.

Almost four years since the fall of Kabul, China has managed to maintain a consistent momentum of regular exchanges with the Taliban-led regime while not straying from the overall international consensus over the recognition of the Taliban. At the international level, Beijing has made a case for the reintegration of Afghanistan and urged the international community to not interfere in its internal affairs.^[3] It has called for the removal of sanctions imposed on the Taliban leaders, the release of the country’s foreign reserves, and keeping aid independent from any political preconditions.^[4]

Ever since the United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began retrenching their forces in Afghanistan, there have been speculations about the kind of role that Beijing could carve for itself in the country vis-à-vis potentially filling the vacuum left behind by the Western forces. For China, however, the exit of the West, while desirable, has revived security concerns about its Xinjiang province and the possible growth of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Chinese engagement, thus, both on the political and economic front, is a means to an end—i.e., to ensure that the ETIM does not get a safe haven in Afghanistan and the proliferation of different terror groups in the country does not further destabilise its western frontier.

This brief contextualises China’s engagement with the Taliban 2.0 vis-à-vis its long-term motivations and interests in Afghanistan. It will assess whether China has enough leverage with the Taliban to contain the security threat posed to its western border region. It will conclude that all other associated Chinese actions in the country—political and economic, as well as the “repackaging” of the Taliban’s image—emanate from this concern about security.

Drivers of China’s Afghan Policy

A decade ago, when the United States (US) and its allies first decided to take a step back from Afghanistan, some Chinese scholars contended that China did not necessarily see it as a cue to bolster its presence in Afghanistan. Its goals were limited.^[5] There was an acknowledgement that the US would still wish to maintain its influence in the country even after it leaves. For China, however, the maintenance of security and stability in the country, along with the threat of non-traditional security risks has always been a predicament, irrespective of who is in power.^[6]  Thus, when the US left, China was compelled to face the security threats without the cushion of a US security umbrella.

Afghanistan and China share a 92.45-km-long border along the Wakhan corridor. However, the border remains inaccessible, and the only access point from China is the Wakhjir pass,^[7] where no customs facilities exist. Work on a small stretch of the road in Badakhshan province finished only in January 2024, and in February 2025, reports suggested that the work had stopped.^[8] The road is located at the Wakhjir Pass, at the eastern end of the Wakhan Corridor, and is guarded by Chinese border guards.^[9] During the 70^th anniversary celebration, Stanekzai expressed hope that the Wakhan corridor could transform into an ‘economic and commercial gateway’ between the two countries. The Taliban view it as a symbolic manifestation of their success in completing infrastructure projects in the country in order to prod China into investing in the corridor. But for China, the Wakhan Corridor is seen as a “counterterrorism frontline”.^[10] An open border raises the risk of ETIM separatists getting access to the country, which is why it sees no practical economic value in the road.

China’s concerns about terrorism from Afghanistan go back to 1949, when, after the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Beijing’s focus extended to Tibet and Xinjiang, with efforts to bring them under the fold of the PRC. China consequently annexed Tibet in 1950 and started expanding its control over the Xinjiang region. In 1979, when a pro-Soviet government was established in Afghanistan after the Saur Revolution, China’s fears increased.^[11] With the Cold War going on, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was tense: there was a high military build-up at the border, and skirmishes occurred in 1969 and 1971. Fearing encirclement by the USSR  (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and the risk it could pose to the restive Xinjiang province, Beijing supported the mujahideen forces leading the anti-Soviet jihad. It supplied arms and ammunition, introduced Stinger missiles and contributed an estimated US$100 million. It also sold arms through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including rifles, grenades, and type-59 tanks, and maintained political links with the help of Pakistan. As the mujahideen emerged victorious and the Soviets withdrew, political Islam became a prominent force in the region.

The anti-Soviet jihad also saw participation from the Uyghurs, who in the aftermath were seen to possess a renewed vigour about their own struggle.^[12] This, along with the rise of other transnational Islamic groups and the Taliban, raised Beijing’s concerns. When the first emirate was formed in 1996, it became suspicious of the links between the Taliban and ETIM and evacuated its embassy.^[13] Emboldened by the success of the jihad against the Soviet forces, China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang also started getting a pushback, with protests in Baren in 1990 and in Kuqa in 1991, bombings in Urumqi in 1992 and 1995, and riots in Hotan and Yining in 1995. In 1996, Beijing started targeting the Uyghurs for “alleged separatism”, cracking down on their religious practices.^[14] The crackdown led to many fleeing across the border to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Beijing also hardened its policy stance in the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and enforced its Strike Hard policy.^[15]

In 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security announced a list of four groups it regarded as terrorist organisations: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the East Turkestan Liberation Organisation, the East Turkestan Information Center, and the World Uighur Youth Congress.^[16] There were more attacks, with bombings in Kuka and Kashgar in August 2008, ethnic rioting in Urumqi in 2009, and the knife attack in Kunming in 2019. Beijing’s response hardened with policies like mass arrests, enforced disappearances, retrieval of DNA samples, iris scans, and the establishment of so-called “re-education camps” all becoming pervasive in the province. Some reports, which China has denied, also show that PLA vehicles were guarding the Afghan side of the Wakhan Corridor in October 2016, entering through Tajikistan. It also discussed forming a mountain brigade in Badakhshan and the establishment of a military base with US$90 million earmarked for the province in September 2017.^[17]

On 28 July 2021, a few weeks before the Taliban usurped power from the Republic-led government and established the second edition of their Islamic Emirate, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, held a meeting with Mullah Baradar. Beijing articulated its concerns about the ETIM, seeing it as a direct threat to China with the potential to destabilise the western Xinjiang region. Yi, however, also used the meeting to pre-emptively project the Taliban as an important military and political force in Afghanistan. It urged the group to prioritise national interests, pursue an inclusive political structure, and make a “clean break” from other terrorist organisations and actively combat them.^[18] The proactive nature of the meeting raised speculations about Beijing’s intentions to strengthen its foothold in Afghanistan. But it could be seen more as an attempt to ensure that its own domestic security situation is not adversely affected due to the regime change. This messaging on not allowing groups inimical to China’s interests to proliferate has been a consistent feature of China’s outreach towards Afghanistan.

The ETIM militants are located in the Badakhshan province in Afghanistan, which shares the border with Xinjiang. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Kabul, Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged the US to re-induct ETIM in its list of terror organisations in return for cooperation in stabilising Afghanistan. For Yi, the reinclusion of ETIM in the list was seen as paving the way for the removal of obstacles in US-Afghanistan cooperation.^[19] In 2020, Washington removed it from its terror list because the State Department could not find any credible evidence against the group in the past decade. The US designated it as a terrorist organisation in 2002, placing it in the US terrorist exclusion list but not the Foreign Terrorist Organisation list. At that time, the US and China were both cooperating, particularly in counterterrorism, in the aftermath of 9/11. The group apparently seeks an independent state of East Turkestan involving parts of the region of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and the Uyghur Autonomous Region.^[20] The group is also listed in the UN Sanctions Committee’s al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee.

Parallel to the concern about Xinjiang, instability in Afghanistan also put China’s border with the CARs in a vulnerable position. The targeted attacks on Chinese personnel and projects in Pakistan also raised their radar, even as Beijing has tried to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the question of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The group has targeted public areas, security infrastructure, and Chinese workers involved in projects for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The increasing frequency of these attacks and Islamabad’s inability to act on them has drawn strong responses from Beijing. It has urged Pakistan to control the situation, offered counterterrorism cooperation and lobbied with the Taliban to stop its support to the TTP or other terror groups. It also assured Pakistan that it will increase counter-terror cooperation and jointly address the ETIM and TTP issue. The TTP has also earlier issued a warning to Beijing regarding its policy in Xinjiang. The prospect of Uyghurs aligning with the ISKP is also a concern for Beijing, as ISKP has been outspoken in its condemnation of Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang and has also threatened attacks against Chinese territory. There were reports about the ETIM switching over to the ISKP as they were worried about the Taliban handing them over to China in exchange for Beijing’s support.

Repositioning the Taliban’s Image

Beijing’s ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, met with Mullah Omar in December 2000 in Kandahar and Mullah Akhund in Islamabad. The agenda was to seek assurances that Afghanistan would not be used to threaten China’s security. In response, the Taliban prevented ETIM from establishing its own camps. When the announcement of the retrenchment of US forces was done back in 2014, Beijing increased its political involvement in the country. It placed the Taliban as an important stakeholder in the Afghan reconciliation process. In 2012, China’s then Minister of Security and member of the Politburo went on an official visit to Afghanistan. During this time, agreements to train, fund and equip the Afghan police were signed. Subsequently, Sun Yuxi was appointed the first special envoy for the country. These were pre-emptive steps to cushion the impact that the US drawdown could have on regional peace and stability.

In 2015, Wang Yi identified four types of support that Afghanistan required: the need for the Afghan people to work together to create an effective government and respect the then Afghan Unity government; support the reconciliation between the Republic and different political factions, including the Taliban; work towards reconstructing the economy; and support for Afghanistan's reintegration into regional cooperation.^[21] China participated in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), with Pakistan and the US, and the Moscow Dialogue Format in 2016 and 2017. After the first round of talks under the QCG, Kabul deported 12 Uyghurs.^[22] The talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban were revived in 2015 but broke down when news about Mullah Omar’s death became public in 2016. It also increased security cooperation with Tajikistan, bolstered the state capacity of the Afghan forces, and deepened intelligence cooperation.  Mullah Abdullah Ghani Baradar, the then chief of the Taliban’s political office in Doha and now the Acting Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs, also visited Beijing in 2019 to discuss China’s role in facilitating talks between the Taliban and the Republic government and for counter-terrorism cooperation.

China’s active pursuit of its interests in Afghanistan with the IEA is thus not just a linear response to the US withdrawal. The US has clarified in a few instances that it does not see Afghanistan as a site of the competition between the US and China. For Beijing, as indicated by the high level of interactions, a great-power angle is present to some extent. This angle thus supports the argument about China attempting to fill the vacuum.^[23] Thus, China’s incremental advances and the Taliban’s extremist policies are seen as a means of keeping the West away.^[24]

On 12 April 2023, the Chinese MoFA released a position paper on Afghanistan. Titled ‘China's Position on the Afghan Issue’, the 11-point paper outlined China’s perceptions of its engagement with the Islamic Emirate and how its principles contrast those of the US.^[25] The paper was aligned with Beijing's attempts to position itself as a mediator, willing to resolve issues with no vested interests of its own.^[a],[26] It also articulated its priorities vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Placing emphasis on the Three Respects, Three Nevers and the Three Forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism, Beijing emphasised the importance that it accords to Afghanistan’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, as well as the religious sentiments and national customs of the Afghan people.

The paper urged the West, particularly the US, to take responsibility for the crisis. It demanded the removal of sanctions and the release of Afghanistan’s foreign reserves. Beijing distinguished its own approach—a regional rather than a unilateral one—and committed to aid in the reconstruction of the country. It also called for the use of other international organisations which exclude the US in order to form a distinct policy. While Beijing did raise concerns about terrorism, cross-border trafficking, and the drug trade, it framed its own involvement in purely humanitarian and ‘good neighbourliness’ terms in the paper, i.e., China has been compelled to step up because the US abdicated on its responsibility.

The position paper was reflective of Beijing’s attempts to refashion how the Taliban is being viewed and how Afghanistan is being perceived, both domestically and internationally. Immediately after the fall of Kabul, it portrayed the Taliban as a grassroots organisation, comparable to Mao Zedong’s communist rebels in 1949.^[27] It considered their revival as the choice of the people, obfuscating information about the group’s links with terror and instead focusing on their student origins. People calling for the rights of the Afghan women were censored. China followed a dual-track narrative for domestic and international audiences. Internationally, their state media showed how women were scared and were voluntarily staying home with no clarity about how the Taliban would rule.^[28] This narrative shifted the blame to Western forces. Domestically, the media assured audiences that conditions were returning to normal.^[29] An Afghan vlogger was targeted for criticising the Taliban and stating that China perceives anyone who is against America to be their friend.^[30]

China also supported local network channels in Afghanistan and leveraged its own media channels to present a favourable image of the Taliban. The emphasis was on security and development, with negative developments being attributed to the US and Western forces, and positive developments to China’s involvement and the Taliban’s return.^[31]

No Intermediaries: China’s Direct Engagement with the Taliban

For Beijing, the tools of ensuring that its interests are protected and the security of its western frontier is maintained have now changed. In the 1990s, Pakistan was seen as a conduit to establish contact with the Taliban. In the second iteration, as Islamabad slowly loses its leverage over Kabul, Beijing has had to overhaul its policy. This has resulted in a more direct engagement with the IEA. On 30 January 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping formally accepted the credentials of the Taliban-appointed ambassador, Asadullah Bilal Karimi, in a ceremony at the Great Hall of the People. This followed the appointment of a new envoy for Afghanistan by Beijing in September 2023, Zhao Xing, who presented his credentials to the Acting Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate, Mohammad Hassan Akhund. While the Taliban projected this as China’s recognition of their emirate, Beijing deemed the exchange as “normal diplomatic protocol”.^[32] A few months earlier, China asked the Taliban to introduce reforms, improve security, and mend relations with its neighbours, hinting at Pakistan, in order to receive full diplomatic recognition. It urged the Taliban to respond to the demands made to them and work towards integrating itself in the international community.^[33] Even as it has made a case for ending their international isolation, it has marketed its support in a quid pro quo setup. The incentives are both diplomatic and economic, aimed at inducing the Taliban to take positions that align with China’s interests.^[34]

In the initial months following the fall of Kabul, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, saw China as Afghanistan’s most important partner.^[35] For the Taliban, transitioning from an insurgency to a government was a substantial task. The country faced a lack of foreign aid, frozen foreign exchange reserves, and widespread distress. In these circumstances, China’s public statements stating that it would invest in the country and help in its rebuilding were accepted with optimism. Working with Beijing allowed the Taliban to show their credibility and the indispensability of their rule. For the Taliban itself, the internal talks on the resumption of large-scale projects were important to create a narrative of self-recovery, self-sufficiency, and independent dealings with other countries. China also championed elements of the Taliban’s agenda in UN forums. Without formally recognising the regime, Chinese statements stressing Afghan independence and sovereignty, and accepting the ‘objective reality’ of their rule indicated tacit recognition of the regime’s legitimacy.

The Emirate’s foreign policy approach is also structured to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a space for ‘negative’ competition. Its basic approach is hinged on two facets—leveraging the concerns of other countries, mostly security-related, to their advantage, and using that leverage to establish economic ties, thus increasing the space for them to implement their regressive domestic policies.^[36] China also apparently enjoys support across the cross-section of the Taliban. Soon after the Taliban came into power in Kabul, Suhail Shaheen, then its spokesperson, stated that the IEA would not allow the training of other groups in the country, would not provide fundraising for groups with foreign agendas, and would act against the formation of recruitment centres. He also assured China that members of ETIM have left the country.^[37] The Taliban moved the militants from the borders of China and Tajikistan but have not extradited them.

For China, visibility is paramount. While China’s proactive engagement with the Taliban highlights the contradictions with its domestic policy against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, it has provided the Taliban with enough incentives to remain silent on the issue. Beijing has also secured the group’s acknowledgement of other core concerns, such as the ‘One China’ principle.^[38] As highlighted by Thomas Ruttig in his paper on China’s actions in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s farthest criticism of Beijing’s policy towards Uyghurs was back in 2012 when it acknowledged the oppression of Muslims around the world but refused to interfere in China’s internal affairs. China has been reluctant to provide military or security support.^[39]

Filling the Economic Gap: Scope and Scale of China’s Investments

In the days immediately after they established control over Kabul, the Taliban expressed confidence in rebuilding the country with the help of China. There were three aspects of China's economic involvement in Afghanistan: extraction of minerals, BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) and short-term handouts, and aid and assistance. Between 2001 and 2017, Beijing committed US$250 million for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In the aftermath of its growing political engagement with the country, it pledged an additional US$326.7 million between 2014-17.^[40] Beijing saw the responsibility of bringing in more investments in the country as a “burden” imposed by the US.^[41] From 2001 till 2017, China’s aid to Afghanistan was US$250 million. It was also cautious of investing more till it was sure how the post-2014 situation would look. The Chinese firms acknowledged US protection and showed their willingness to have the troops protect their investments for as long as possible.^[42]

Since 2021, there has been progress in small-scale cooperation between the two sides—the resumption of direct flights in May 2023, with the first flight run by Ariana Airlines from Kabul to Urumqi; the opening of land routes for shipping cargo in July 2023; the issuance of visas for Afghan businessmen; the removal of 98 percent tariffs; and a US$25-million agreement to facilitate the export of cotton.^[43] The two sides have also discussed cooperation on agricultural ventures, solar power panels, and generators. In the first six months of 2021 alone, Chinese investments in the country reached US$2.4 million. In March 2025, the chairman of the China International Development Cooperation Agency met acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Muttaqi and expressed China’s willingness to work with Afghanistan and expand development cooperation.^[44]

Between 2022 and 2023, trade between the two countries also almost doubled from US$595 million to US$1.33 billion, though China’s imports from Afghanistan have dropped in the last three years or so. Its exports doubled between 2021-2024.^[45] There was no major export of metals or oil products in 2024, with the only increase in the imports of zinc.^[46] There is a China-Afghanistan Business Association which facilitates Chinese companies’ investments in Afghanistan, and a business group called Chinatown which has a considerable number of companies under it. The Taliban have suggested the formation of a bilateral working group on this issue in March 2025. There were also reports about China investing in coal burning, and in 2023, there were talks about the possible use of Huawei cameras by Afghanistan.^[47]

Afghanistan’s importance to China on the economic front is also evident in Xi Jinping’s neighbourhood diplomacy, initiated after he assumed power in 2012. According to Zhao Huasheng, professor at Fudan University in China, the convening of the Central Work Conference on China’s Neighbourhood Diplomacy held by the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2013 signified the importance of the neighbourhood under Xi Jinping and the BRI. Under this initiative, cultivating positive relations with the neighbourhood became essential for maintaining a safe interior strategic environment and strengthening diplomatic influence.^[48] As China’s economic stakes in the region grew, it inevitably became involved in the politics surrounding its investments.^[49] A stable regional environment was seen as leading to an improved investment climate in China’s interior and western regions, ultimately making the investments more profitable.

For China, the primary question that emerges in the context of its investments is its willingness to double down on its economic initiatives in the absence of credible security guarantees. Many analysts see China’s interests as first prioritising security and then stabilising the regional environment.^[50] They say that China is willing to wait till the investments become profitable and thus does not see economic engagement as a strategic priority.^[51] During the Republic era, a common perception about China’s actions was that it was leveraging the benefits offered by the US presence while not contributing anything to the security of the country. It was seen as ‘free riding’ on the security umbrella provided by the US, in the absence of which, its projects are now in limbo.^[52] Even as China’s economic commitments given to Afghanistan now are seen as part of its overall strategy towards the country, some analysts highlight how these initiatives were driven by business interests and subsequently co-opted by the Chinese state as part of their strategy, shaping it post-facto.^[53],[54]

In January 2023, the Acting Minister of Mines and Petroleum of the IEA, Shahabuddin Delawar, signed an oil and gas field agreement with the China National Petroleum Corp through the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company. China’s then ambassador Wang Yu and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs, were also present. The company received a 25-year concession to drill three blocks in a 5,000-km area. The US$7-million agreement included an initial investment of US$150 million in the first year, which would increase to US$540 million in three years, with the IEA receiving a 20-percent share in the royalties, which could increase to 75 percent.^[55]  The deal was presented as a symbol of China-Afghanistan cooperation and a manifestation of the good relations between the two countries.^[56] Chinese companies have since signed a total of four mining contracts.

Subsequently, China has also committed to invest in lithium extraction, with investments worth US$10 billion for exploration and other infrastructure projects. It is also expected to construct another Salang tunnel which, according to China, would create some 1,220,000 jobs. China also committed to resume work on the Aynak copper mine. The agreement for the project was first signed in 2008 with the Metallurgical Corporation of China and the Jiangxi Copper consortium, which were awarded a 30-year concession.^[57]  Initially, the company handling the mines indicated that operations would resume only if the situation in Afghanistan stabilised and the Taliban was recognised internationally.^[58] The 2008 deal had stalled because of the security situation, which blocked access to the road. The erstwhile Republic government under Ghani also threatened to revoke the deal because of China’s failure to meet project deadlines. In July 2024, Chinese officials held a groundbreaking ceremony to mark the beginning of construction on the access road, which is expected to be completed in 2025. In a meeting held on 30 November 2024, the company handling the mine announced plans to establish a joint China-Afghanistan market in the Logar province where the mine is located.^[59]  Certain disagreements, however, persist: the contract is seen as over-ambitious; China has doubts about building a power plant, railways and processing plant; and the Taliban insists on underground mining.^[60]

Since the beginning, the Taliban has expressed interest in joining BRI. When the Republic government was in power, China and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2016. In May 2023, at the China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, the three countries agreed to extend the BRI to Afghanistan. However, differences of opinion persisted. China and Pakistan framed the agreement as the extension of CPEC in Afghanistan. For the Islamic Emirate, while BRI is seen as the most strategically important strand of cooperation with China, the dependence on Pakistan and Afghanistan only being a secondary road in the project has been a contentious point. In the most recent meeting between the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China in May 2025, the three sides reiterated their commitment to expand CPEC to Afghanistan.

Conclusion

China now has more room to exercise its interests, even though the threats it faces remain largely unchanged. It has attempted to position itself as a mediator by spearheading mechanisms for cooperation and trying to secure long-term gains. It has also accepted the reality of the Taliban, with its interactions with other Afghan stakeholders notably reducing.^[61] However, this approach will be viable only as long as the Taliban sees credible current and future economic, humanitarian, and diplomatic benefits accruing from the relationship. It is also contingent upon the cohesion and continuity of the Taliban’s own China policy. Economically, the Taliban have also tried to diversify, with other countries showing interest in investing economically in Afghanistan, even as China remains the more visible power in the country.

As Pakistan and Afghanistan also try to rehash their ties to an extent and agree to have ambassadorial representation, the role played by China will become important and will influence how the dynamics are shaped in the region.

Endnotes

^[a] Like it did between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its attempts to broker peace in Ukraine.

^[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, https://mfa.gov.af/en/18203.

^[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, https://mfa.gov.af/en/18203.

^[3] “Chinese Envoy Evades Commenting on Girl’s Education Ban in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan International, June 27, 2024, https://www.afintl.com/en/202406272339.

^[4] Eva Dou, “China Calls for End to Sanctions on Afghanistan ‘As Soon as Possible’,” South China Morning Post, September 23, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3149816/china-calls-end-sanctions-afghanistan-soon-possible.

^[5] Zhao Huasheng, “Afghanistan and China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 891–908, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/92/4/891/2688072.

^[6] Sun Zhuangzhi, “Afghanistan Reflects US’ Self‑Obsession,” China Daily, March 24, 2010, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-03/24/content_9632407.htm.

^[7] Ayjaz Wani, “China and Afghanistan’s Jousting Over the Wakhan Corridor,” Observer Research Foundation, April 20, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20250420192548.pdf.

^[8] Rick Noack and Carolyn Van Houten, “A Taliban Highway Could Lead to the Future. But It’s Stuck in the Past,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/01/wakhan-corridor-highway-afghanistan-china/.

^[9] Zhao Ziwen, “Why China is Wary of Opening up Afghanistan’s New Road to Xinjiang,” South China Morning Post, January 26, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3249931/why-china-wary-opening-afghanistans-new-road-xinjiang.

^[10] Ziwen, “Why China is Wary of Opening up Afghanistan’s New Road to Xinjiang”

^[11] Raghav Sharma, “Afghanistan: Discerning China’s Westward March,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 3 (2019): 339–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672408.

^[12] Sharma, “Afghanistan: Discerning China’s Westward March.”

^[13] Baisali Mohanty, “China in Afghanistan: Security, Regional Standing, and Status,” Observer Research Foundation, October 24, 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-in-afghanistan-security-regional-standing-and-status.

^[14] Ayjaz Wani, “The Ghost of ETIM: China’s Tool to Silence Uyghur Voices,” Observer Research Foundation, December 5, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-ghost-of-etim-china-s-tool-to-silence-uyghur-voices.

^[15] Sharma, “Afghanistan: Discerning China’s Westward March.”

^[16] Ayjaz Wani, “China’s Terror List and its Implications,” Observer Research Foundation, January 3, 2004, https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-terror-list-and-its-implications

^[17] Sharma, “Afghanistan: Discerning China’s Westward March”

^[18] Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Mumbai, http://mumbai.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202107/t20210729_8955548.htm.

^[19] “China Asks U.S. to Lower Frictions, Ban Xinjiang-based ETIM in Return for Cooperation to Stabilise Afghanistan,” The Hindu, August 17, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-asks-us-to-lower-frictions-ban-xinjiang-based-etim-in-return-for-cooperation-to-stabilise-afghanistan/article35957906.ece

 

^[20] “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, September 4, 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/183551/The%20East%20Turkestan%20Islamic%20Movement%20(ETIM)%20-%20Council%20on%20Foreign%20Relations.pdf

^[21] Stanly Johny and Ananth Krishnan, The Comrades and the Mullahs: China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics (Gurugram: HarperCollins India, 2022), pp. 113

^[22] Sharma, “Afghanistan: Discerning China’s Westward March”

^[23] Thomas Ruttig, Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2023, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/themed-reports/regional-relations-themed-reports/chinese-investments-in-afghanistan-strategic-ecnomic-move-or-incentive-for-the-emirate/

^[24] Shivam Shekhawat, Afghanistan Under the Taliban: Enduring Challenges, Evolving Responses, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20240304130446.pdf

^[25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/wsrc/202405/t20240530_11335301.html.

^[26]Harsh V. Pant and Shivam Shekhawat, “A Position Paper: China’s Image and What It Means,” The Hindu, July 27, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-position-paper-chinas-image-and-what-it-means/article66824191.ece.

^[27] Johny and Krishnan, The Comrades and the Mullahs: China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, pp. 112

^[28] Dalia Parete and Hazrat Bahar, “China’s Growing Presence in Afghan Media,” China Media Project, August 16, 2024, https://chinamediaproject.org/2024/08/16/chinas-growing-presence-in-afghan-media/.

^[29] “China’s Warm Welcome for Taliban Sparks Backlash at Home,” Bloomberg, August 20, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-20/china-s-warm-welcome-for-taliban-sparks-backlash-at-home.

^[30] “Q&A: Afghan Weibo Blogger Targeted by China’s Taliban Trolls,” Bloomberg, August 27, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-27/q-a-afghan-weibo-blogger-targeted-by-china-s-taliban-trolls.

^[31] Parete and Bahar, “China’s Growing Presence in Afghan Media”

^[32] Akmal Dawi, “China’s President Accepts Credentials From Afghan Representative,” Voice of America, January 30, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-president-receives-afghan-ambassador-taliban-seek-recognition-from-russia-iran-/7463837.html.

^[33] Mallika Soni, “China’s Reform Message to Afghanistan’s Taliban: ‘Implement Moderate Policies’,” Hindustan Times, December 5, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/xi-jinping-news-chinas-reform-message-to-afghanistans-taliban-implement-moderate-policies-101701765364646.html.

^[34]  “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[35] “Taliban Says China Will Be 'Main Partner' to Rebuild Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, September 3, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-afghanistan-china-economy-/31440990.html.

^[36] Shivam Shekhawat, “Understanding Taliban’s Diplomacy and Its Implications for the Region,” Observer Research Foundation, September 13, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/understanding-taliban-s-diplomacy-and-its-implications-for-the-region

^[37] Johny and Krishnan, The Comrades and the Mullahs: China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, pp. 121

^[38] Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, http://af.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202301/t20230124_11014377.htm

^[39] “Afghanistan Under the Taliban: Enduring Challenges, Evolving Responses”

^[40] Jiayi Zhou, Fei Su, and Jingdong Yuan, “Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2022/8 (November 2022), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/202211/sipriinsights_2208_china_and_afghanistan_2.pdf

^[41] Sun Zhuangzhi, “Afghanistan Reflects US’ Self-obsession,” China Daily, March 24, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-03/24/content_9632407.htm

^[42] Erica Downs, “China Buys into Afghanistan,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 32, no. 2 (2012): 65–84, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2012.0022.

^[43] Zhou, Su, and Yuan, “Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan”

^[44] “CIDCA Chairman Meets with Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan,” China International Development Cooperation Agency, March 23, 2025,

http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2025-05/23/c_1096142.htm

^[45] Yun Sun, “China’s Unenthusiastic Economic Engagement with Taliban-Led Afghanistan,” Stimson Center, January 15, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/chinas-unenthusiastic-economic-engagement-with-taliban-led-afghanistan/.

^[46] “China’s Unenthusiastic Economic Engagement with Taliban-Led Afghanistan”

^[47] “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[48] Huasheng, “Afghanistan and China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy”

^[49] Johny and Krishnan, The Comrades and the Mullahs: China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, pp. 121

^[50] Feng Zhang, “China’s New Engagement with Afghanistan after the Withdrawal,” LSE Public Policy Review, no. 3 (2022),  https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.52

^[51] “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[52] Zhou, Su, and Yuan, “Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan”

^[53] Zhou, Su, and Yuan, “Treading Lightly: China’s Footprint in a Taliban-led Afghanistan”

^[54] “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[55] Islamuddin Sajid, “Afghanistan, China Sign Oil Extraction Deal,” Anadolu Agency, January 6, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghanistan-china-sign-oil-extraction-deal/2780972.

^[56] “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[57] “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[58] Johny and Krishnan, The Comrades and the Mullahs: China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics, pp. 121

^[59] Sarah Godek, “Update on China-Afghanistan Relations,” Stimson Center, June 27, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/update-on-china-afghanistan-relations/

^[60] “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic Economic Move or Incentive for the Emirate?”

^[61] Sarah Godek, “China’s Cautious Quest to Draw Afghanistan Back into the Fold,” 9DASHLINE, August 23, 2024, https://www.9dashline.com/article/chinas-cautious-quest-to-draw-afghanistan-back-into-the-fold.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Afghanistan
• china afghan policy
• china afghanistan relations
• china afghanistan trade
• chinese interest in Afghanistan
• chinese investment in Afghanistan
• taliban 2.0
• wakhan corridor

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.