A Grand Reception at the White House

Following a first meeting on 18 June 2025, United States (US) President Donald Trump hosted a second grand reception for Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir in the Oval Office on 25 September. It looked like a Cold War redux. The symbolism was impossible to miss: an American president feting Pakistan’s military strongman more effusively than the elected civilian Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif who had accompanied him. For those familiar with the fraught history of US-Pakistan relations, this image was a timely reminder of a recurring pattern of transactional ties between the two nations. It seemed that, as throughout much of the Cold War, the US had quietly set moral qualms aside, and was prepared to toast the man regarded as the most authoritarian of despots in uniforms.

The optics of the meeting were not lost on observers, particularly within Pakistan. Relations with the US had been minimal under Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, as observed when former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan was effectively ghosted by Washington,^[1] with Biden unwilling to take even a congratulatory phone call from Khan after his January 2021 swearing in. But now the Pakistani military establishment once again finds itself basking in US approbation. A section of the Pakistani media was delighted by the photo-op,^[2] hailing it as proof that the “global policeman” had not forgotten Islamabad’s loyalty during the face-off with Russia in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Sceptics remain uncertain about the nature and extent of Washington’s policy expectations from Rawalpindi. Nonetheless, the White House meeting has been described as “very significant”,^[3] with “Islamabad’s agility in sensing Washington’s shifting policy mood and recalibrating its own position”^[4] and “re-inserting Pakistan into conversations that had long moved on”,^[5]  drawing particular praise.

What has rekindled President Trump’s affection for the Pakistani military? Why did Trump invite Munir to the White House twice in just three months, and called the General his “favourite Field Marshal from Pakistan”?^[6] The answer lies in raw transactional calculus. As Pakistani scholar and diplomat, Husain Haqqani puts it, “A transactional relationship that deteriorated after (Osama) bin Laden’s discovery in Pakistan has returned to being transactional with slightly better atmospherics.”^[7]

Trump’s public affirmation of Pakistan’s full backing for his Gaza peace plan—at the time, freshly unveiled—underlines the geopolitical subtext behind the Washington-Islamabad embrace.^[8] Trump’s effusive remarks place Pakistan at the centre of a broader regional strategy, where Islamabad’s enthusiastic support for the Gaza plan is being projected as global Muslim consensus with American strategic goals. The praise for Sharif and Munir is a nod to Islamabad’s instrumental role in legitimising a largely vague plan that seeks phased Israeli withdrawal, Hamas disarmament, and regional stabilisation.

The Reality of Pakistan’s Tall Claims

In recent months, Islamabad has dangled a carrot before the US that dovetails with key elements of Trump’s emerging grand strategy. It has aggressively pitched its supposed oil and mineral wealth to Washington. So far, its tall claims of untapped oil reserves have met with scepticism,^[9] dismissed by experts as “theoretical estimates and political spin.”^[10] Even after decades of drilling attempts, some of them by the world’s biggest oil companies, no trace of marketable oil reserves have been found in Pakistan. Moin Raza Khan, a geoscientist and former managing director at Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), is reported to have remarked that Trump’s claim about Pakistan’s oil potential “has nothing to do with reality”, not being backed by “any data or evidence.”^[11] A 2015 survey by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), which had projected the lower Indus basin in Pakistan to be holding 9 billion barrels of “technically recoverable oil”,^[12] has increasingly come under scrutiny. According to Pakistani economist Javed Hassan, “Technically recoverable reserves are not always economically viable to extract, meaning they may not qualify as true reserves.”^[13]

A. Sabri, a former federal secretary at Pakistan’s ministry of petroleum, has also dismissed the narrative of massive oil reserves as a “political gimmick”, highlighting a growing disconnect between geopolitical rhetoric and geological evidence.^[14] Moreover, the bulk of Pakistan’s purported oil and gas reserves are in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, which are epicentres of long insurgencies and where foreign companies have frequently come under militant attacks.

Yet, notwithstanding the highly questionable resource claims and volatile physical security environment, Washington and Islamabad are going ahead with their energy cooperation. In July, Trump himself touted plans to help Pakistan tap its “massive oil reserves,”^[15] and in September, American firms signed a US$500-million deal to develop Pakistan’s critical minerals sector.^[16] These are no small enticements for cash-strapped Islamabad. The first consignment of rare-earth minerals has already been sent to US Strategic Metals (USSM), a private company in Missouri.^[17]

Perhaps the most flamboyant theatre yet for this transactionalism could be Gaza.

Trump’s Gaza Plan

On 23 September 2025, Trump convened a meeting with leaders from several Muslim-majority states—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Türkiye , and Pakistan—on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting to present his Gaza plan.^[18] Following a global outcry over the enormous scale of destruction and worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza^[a] and the declaration of formal recognition of Palestinian statehood by prominent Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and Portugal, the Trump administration was running short of options.^[19] Not wanting to lose further ground, Trump acted swiftly and succeeded in convincing Muslim countries to send their military forces to Gaza to facilitate Israel’s withdrawal and secure funding for rebuilding.^[20]

Eventually, Trump announced his 20-point peace proposal to end the war between Israel and Hamas. Titled “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”,^[21] it was made public just before Trump’s joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A key feature of the plan envisages the deployment of armies from Arab and Islamic countries, termed as an “International Stabilisation Force (ISF)”, in Gaza to facilitate an Israeli withdrawal by training vetted Palestinian police, securing borders, consulting Egypt and Jordan, and providing long-term internal security solution^[22] besides managing reconstruction.^[b] Predictably enough, eight Arab and Muslim-majority countries immediately welcomed it.^[23] As disclosed in the plan, Gaza will be temporarily administered by a technocratic committee composed of qualified Palestinians and international experts. It will manage public services, operating under the oversight of a newly established international transitional body known as the ‘Board of Peace’, which will be chaired by Trump himself and include other global leaders.^[24] After Hamas agreed to the US-brokered landmark deal which included the all-important prisoners-hostages swap, the ceasefire came into effect in Gaza on 9 October 2025.^[25] In a display of strategic diplomacy, Trump organised a high-level summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt on 13 October. Co-chaired by Trump with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, it brought together many international leaders including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif; an analyst wrote the US president had gathered “his fan club to Egypt.”^[26]

Though the world has become accustomed to Trump’s boasts of his peacemaking achievements, what was most remarkable about his Sharm el-Sheikh speech was his claim that the Gaza deal was “not only the end of war…(but) the end of an age of terror and death.”^[27] Midway through his speech, Trump further surprised everyone by calling Shehbaz Sharif on stage. Sharif, keenly aware of the moment’s magnitude, indulged in a public flattery of Trump, also thanking him once again for ending the India-Pakistan conflict.^[28]

Pakistani Troops in Gaza

Around 200 US troops have been redeployed to Israel to assist in overseeing the Gaza ceasefire. The US military’s Central Command (Centcom) will set up a multinational taskforce in Israel, which is likely to include troops from Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).^[29] It has already set up a civil-military coordination centre, designed to coordinate ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian aid, logistics and communication. The US, however, will not enter Gaza; it is casting about for an ‘Islamic peacekeeping corps’ to police Gaza’s ruins—essentially outsourcing the convoluted and problematic work of occupation to other Muslim countries. What is new and unprecedented is that even though Washington might prefer that the peacekeeping mission receives the UN Security Council’s formal mandate, it will not like the mission to be conducted under full UN control. Since Trump is positioned to chair the top-level ‘Board of Peace’, Washington will want clean lines of command and would avoid involving the UNSC, as that would mean conceding ground to Moscow and Beijing who would insist on periodic reporting and control through the UNSC.^[30] For a White House used to unipolar levers, such a scenario is neither palatable nor strategically tenable. As deliberations on setting up the ISF intensify, this argument is being advanced that the US leadership of this police-and-military force is imperative to leverage the participation of Arab and Muslim states, while balancing “legitimacy and operational effectiveness”.^[31]

For Saudi or Emirati leaders who are chary of openly normalising relations with Israel amid widespread global outrage over Palestinian suffering, a contingent of Muslim troops under American direction or command provides a convenient fig leaf. Pakistan is poised to play an important role in this evolving scenario. Indeed, Pakistan’s inclusion has been carefully orchestrated, and explains Trump’s first public outreach to Munir in June at the White House. In the meeting, which was the first time a US president had hosted the chief of Pakistan’s army, Trump discussed Iran with Munir since Pakistan knew “Iran very well, better than most,” and claimed that Pakistan was not “bad with Israel.”^[32] In all likelihood, Gaza was brought up as well, as another key Trump agenda was to convince Munir to make Pakistan a part of the transition framework that would help maintain Western influence through regional clients.

The details of the proposed temporary international stabilisation force are yet to emerge, even as Indonesia has already offered troops.^[33] Other Muslim countries including Pakistan are watching developments closely and weighing the situation to maximise their leverage before announcing formal commitment. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif clarified to a private news channel in late October that the Pakistani military’s potential participation in the International Stabilization Force (ISF), based on a collective decision by the Islamic world, “would be a matter of pride” for the country, which is committed to “protecting and ensuring the well-being” of Palestinians.^[34] Asif’s clarification that the matter was “yet to be finalized” followed a news report citing US defence officials who claimed that Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Pakistan are leading contenders to join the ISF.^[35] However, on 31 October, Asif criticised a statement from federal spokesperson, Danyal Chaudhry, who had suggested that the Pakistani forces in the ISF would play a key role in maintaining security in Gaza, particularly in preventing “cross-border violations or terrorism” and the disarming of Hamas.^[36] This balancing act clearly indicates that even though Pakistan is increasingly tempted by the prospect of contributing troops in Gaza, it remains cautious and is deliberately avoiding any impression of haste.

Trump’s Gaza scheme is reminiscent of colonial-era mandates: Pakistan’s army on Arab land, wearing a Western badge of legitimacy. It would also enable Tel Aviv to avoid the bad publicity of a direct occupation while maintaining the underlying power dynamics favourable to its long-term goals. Under General Munir’s leadership, the Pakistani army has branded itself as the champion of the Ummah—“the only Islamic nuclear power”, claiming the mantle of Muslim protector. Under Munir’s tutelage, Pakistan’s hybrid regime has also floated vague ideas like an “Islamic NATO”.^[c],[37]

In September 2025, Pakistan inked a strategic mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia that ostensibly extends Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Riyadh.^[38] The pact, which stipulates that any attack on either country would be treated as an “act of aggression against both”, is significant for the regional security dynamics between South Asia and the Middle East. It was announced against the backdrop of Israel’s airstrike on Doha, ostensibly to eliminate Hamas members in the city. That Qatar, which is an important American ally and a mediator in its ceasefire attempts, was targeted by Israel, not only raised tensions in the Middle East but also highlighted the depth of US-Israel ties.^[39]

Though the formal text of the Saudi-Pakistan agreement does not contain any mention of nuclear cooperation, and Islamabad has also not confirmed that it would extend its nuclear deterrent to Riyadh,^[d] the pact has strengthened bilateral security ties by formalising what was previously a ‘transactional’ relationship.^[40] The durability of this agreement vis-à-vis Iran and Israel or whether it can evolve beyond symbolic gestures is anybody’s guess. However, as one analyst has put it, if Riyadh feels sufficiently reassured of not requiring its own nuclear weapons, “then the illicit start to Pakistan’s nuclear network could turn into a pathway for regional reassurance.”^[41] Particularly, Trump’s Gaza plan subtly reframes Islamabad’s role in the volatile region, adding a new layer that would affect how Pakistan’s security commitments are interpreted in Riyadh.

In this narrative, a battalion of Pakistani ‘peacekeepers’ in Gaza would be framed as Islamic solidarity, even as it will also fill Rawalpindi’s coffers. Pakistan is thus getting ready to sell both recruits and rare-earths in one geopolitical marketplace. This suits Trump’s preference for symbolic victories, allowing Pakistan’s military to regain favour in Washington. If Riyadh is willing to bankroll another contingent, if the US authorises a long-overdue F-16 aircraft upgrade, and if Pakistan’s military rulers are assured they will not be questioned for suppressing democratic voices at home, then loyalty can be bought. Field Marshal Munir will expect that the troop deployment would offer Pakistan low-cost geopolitical leverage: re-entry into the US security fold, which would counter India’s growing influence in Washington and enhance regional relevance.

The Afghan Connection

The second arena where Pakistan could be useful for the Trump administration is Afghanistan. Trump has made no secret of his desire to retake the strategic Bagram Air Base outside Kabul (abandoned during the 2021 US withdrawal), warning publicly that “bad things are going to happen” if the Pentagon is not granted access to it.^[42] That is easier said than done, however. After two failed wars, Washington is reluctant to land boots again in the Hindu Kush. The solution for Trump lies in leaning on Pakistan because geography and history give Islamabad outsized influence over Afghan affairs. The situation is sure to get more complex as China and Russia will not easily digest America’s re-entry in this volatile regional landscape.

Iran has tried to position itself pragmatically in Afghanistan, managing diplomatic ties with the Taliban despite ideological differences. Relative calm along its Afghan frontiers has allowed Tehran to focus on other issues such as Israel, Gaza, and nuclear negotiations. As analyst Kabir Taneja points out, a renewed US military presence at Bagram would be seen by Iran as a direct threat.^[43] Trump’s strategy likely involves leveraging Pakistan as a logistical and political conduit, and this would complicate Iran’s calculus.

On 7 October, regional countries including India, Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran issued a joint statement during the ‘Moscow Format’ talks, denouncing any renewed US foothold in Afghanistan.^[44] Yet, Pakistan’s criticism of Trump’s intention to retake Bagram appears to be crafted for public consumption—the strategic undercurrents suggest a different reality. Trump sees Munir as a critical interlocutor—and apparently hopes that Pakistan could facilitate US access to Bagram. In return, Trump would be expected to adopt a more restrained and non-intrusive posture towards Pakistan’s domestic and regional affairs. For the Pakistani military, such an understanding could serve as an opportunity to recoup its strategic losses. Islamabad had helped the Taliban reclaim power in 2021, but now finds itself the target of intensifying domestic attacks from the Tehrik-i-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP)^[e] spilling out of safe havens in Afghanistan.^[45] The Pakistani army is aiming to push back on the TTP and reassert its dominance. Munir’s calculations likely hinge on using a US-Pakistan understanding to exert sustained pressure on the Afghan Taliban to curb the TTP’s freedom of movement.

Following recent deadly clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Trump’s offer to mediate between the two neighbours,^[46] there is speculation that Pakistan and the US could be “considering a regime change operation” in Afghanistan,^[47] despite the fact that such attempts would make a bad situation even worse. The promptness with which Islamabad welcomed Trump’s mediation^[48] does suggest that besides Pakistan’s security concerns, a broader regional strategic calculation is at play, likely connected to American interest in the Bagram airbase. Raising doubts that Pakistan’s current conflict with Afghanistan is about either the Durand Line or the Afghan-backed militancy, political scientist Kanti Bajpai has raised another pertinent question: “Is it also not possible that foreign powers are using Islamabad against the Afghan Taliban?”^[49]

Domestic Dangers

Trump would like Islamabad to work quietly with the Gulf nations to help stabilise the volatile region, tapping into Pakistan’s relationships with both Tehran and Riyadh. The US essentially views Pakistan’s army as an expendable proxy force for its Middle East and South Asia gambits. But there is a downside. It is important to highlight that Pakistan, far from being a monolith, is a country of diverse nationalities with varied political viewpoints. While the military is the superior partner to elected civilians in its hybrid regime, there are many people and groups who do not share their infatuation with the US. Many Pakistanis across the political and ideological spectrum have criticised their government’s endorsement of Trump’s peace plan. Key themes of their criticism include betrayal of Pakistan’s long-standing pro-Palestine stance, the absence of Palestinian voices in the peace plan, perceived submission to US-Israeli pressure, and defiance of consensus in Pakistani society regarding Palestinian statehood.

Calling the Gaza plan a “complete surrender by the Muslim world,” Abdul Basit, a retired Pakistani diplomat last posted as High Commissioner of Pakistan to India, criticised the absence of any reference in it to East Jerusalem being made the Palestinian capital, and cautioned the Pakistani government against joining the Abraham Accords^[f] without the establishment of a Palestinian state. Asad Umar, former finance minister in the Imran Khan-led  government, accused Prime Minister Sharif of “overturning a cornerstone” of Islamabad’s pro-Palestine policy without any national debate, and termed Trump’s Gaza plan as “treachery disguised as peace.”^[50] Fatima Bhutto, author and activist, termed Pakistan’s moral duty to Palestine as “sacred,” and described Pakistan’s endorsement as an “embarrassment and humiliation.”^[51] Citing Jinnah’s view that Israel was a “bastard state,” veteran politician Javed Hashmi condemned the government. Jamaat-e-Islami’s Hafiz Naeemur Rehman also called the plan a betrayal of Palestinians and questioned, “How can one individual speak in the voice of Donald Trump without the people’s consent?”^[52]

Perturbed by the negative domestic reaction, and keen to appear aligned with the broader Islamic sentiment, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar sought to disclaim ownership of Trump’s 20-point Gaza plan,^[53] but the symbolism of Shehbaz Sharif’s presence at the 13 October peace summit in Egypt told an altogether different story. His effusive praise of Trump, calling him “a man of peace” and a leader “the world needed the most at this point,”^[54] underlined the transactional pragmatism that now defines Pakistan’s posture towards the US. Yet behind his applause, Sharif must have been aware that such optics are damaging to the way he is viewed by the Pakistani people and that his presence alongside Trump would be treated as evidence of supplication to Trump. It will therefore not be easy for the Pakistani government to manage the contradictions that accompany overt alignment with Trump’s framework in Gaza.

Having Pakistani boots in Gaza could also blow apart many of Pakistan’s own fragile domestic arrangements. It has a delicate balance of ethnic and regional forces: Punjabis dominate military officer ranks, Pashtuns in the northwest and Balochs in the southwest nurse old resentments, while Sindhis watch warily from Karachi. Deploying troops in Gaza’s combustible atmosphere under Western command could outrage many Pakistanis, who sympathise with Palestinians and view Israel as an enemy. The large-scale demonstrations, led by Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)^[g] in the first week of October, against perceived Western complicity in Israel’s actions during the Gaza conflict, underscore the volatility of domestic sentiment. When the TLP mobilised thousands for a “Labbaik Ya Aqsa Million March”^[h] from Lahore and Faisalabad to Islamabad on 13 October, aiming to march toward the US embassy to express solidarity with Palestinians, authorities in Pakistan responded with a heavy crackdown which included blocking of roads, suspending mobile and internet services and deploying security personnel to prevent the march.^[55] With rising anti-US sentiment, the Pakistani government risks alienating its domestic base if it is seen aligning too closely with Trump’s policies in Gaza.

Thus, renewed US backing could be a double-edged sword for Pakistan. While it may strengthen the security establishment at home, any further atrocities in Gaza or any cooperative gesture towards Israel could strengthen the opposition’s narrative against the regime. Within Pakistan’s borderlands, the blowback could be acute. The Pashtun population—long alienated by heavy-handed military campaigns in their provinces—would see foreign adventurism as yet another betrayal. In Balochistan, where nationalist insurgents clash with Pakistani forces, the idea of Baloch soldiers being used to fight in a faraway religious war would be politically inflammatory. And it is not hard to imagine Punjab’s politicians distancing themselves from the military establishment if the latter begins sacrificing Punjabi conscripts for a Gaza mission that has no popular support in Pakistan.

Operating in Gaza would represent a decisive departure for the Pakistani army, signalling a shift from ideological solidarity with the most important pan-Islamist cause to an expedient foreign policy that privileges alignment with the Trump-led security agenda in the Middle East, primarily to gain the upper hand in South Asian geopolitics. The Israel question is not simply a foreign policy issue for Pakistan; it is woven into its national identity and narratives of grievance where opposition to Israel has become institutionalised over decades.

Thus, the violent nature of the recent TLP protest raises the pertinent question of whether Pakistan’s military deployment in Gaza would provoke domestic repercussions among other radical factions. Since the political identity of radical Islamists in Pakistan has often drawn sustenance from global Islamist narratives, any perceived cooperation with Israel, where the Pakistani Army plays a role of peacekeeper, pushing back or eliminating Hamas in Gaza, would be seen as an implicit betrayal of Pakistan’s national commitments. The radical reaction to any Pakistani move providing legitimacy and recognition to the state of Israel would likely manifest either in politically-charged street mobilisation or in latent insurgent activity. It would therefore be interesting to see how the Pakistani army controls anti-state domestic narratives while justifying pragmatic engagement over sentimental reactions. Yet for now, none of that seems to figure in Rawalpindi’s calculations—the intoxicating grip of a Washington embrace is simply too great.

The renewed US-Pakistan flirtation would reverberate beyond South Asia. In the Middle East, Islamabad’s new visibility feeds a narrative of itself as a broker between Washington and the Muslim world. Pakistan’s long ties to Gulf Arab monarchies – now formalised in the Saudi defence pact – give it one foot in Washington’s camp.

By touting itself as the “only Islamic nuclear power” and siding with Arab calls for Palestinian statehood, Pakistan hopes to be the US’s chosen broker in regional conflicts. While Islamabad does not formally recognise the state of Israel, this may not prevent it from playing a behind-the-scenes role. Pakistan’s historic connections with the Arab world and its overzealousness to win Trump’s goodwill make Islamabad a plausible, albeit unofficial, channel for conveying messages. But, as noted before, Washington’s hopes of using Pakistan as an influential interlocutor may founder on Pakistan’s long history of condemning Israel. In practice, Pakistan’s role will likely be that of an informal go-between, not a full conduit for American policy, unless it makes a fundamental policy recalibration.

Although formal recognition is not a prerequisite for showcasing a state’s diplomatic relevance, it does shape the extent of any mediatory role it wishes to play.^[56] Not recognising Israel gives Pakistan the freedom to engage with it without the political complications of overt alignment. But it also imposes limits – formalising diplomatic ties would alleviate a long-standing strategic bottleneck to deepening alignment with the US. While outright advocacy of good relations with Israel in the Pakistani media remains limited, a few pro-establishment Pakistani voices have begun to advocate a “more purposeful approach” towards Israel instead of “strategic rigidity”,^[57] favouring Islamabad’s enhanced engagement with Tel Aviv to counter “India-Israel alliance and growing camaraderie” as Islamabad does not “benefit by creating an enemy out of Israel, which does not pose a direct threat to Pakistan.”^[58] The complex dynamics of Pakistan’s anti-India policy, coupled with Munir’s instinctual loathing of India, may prompt Islamabad, as predicted by analyst and journalist Shekhar Gupta, to “sign some equivalent of the Abraham Accords and recognise Israel much before it ever makes peace with India.”^[59]

Old Alliances, New Incentives

In the 1950s and 1960s, NATO and SEATO^[i] allowed Western powers to support friendly dictators (from Greece’s Georgios Papadopoulos^[j] to South Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem^[k]) as bulwarks against communism. In the Muslim world, the US has long balanced rhetoric and reality: praising democracy one day while showering Riyadh or Islamabad with weapons the next.

When the US was trying to contain Soviet influence in South Asia, it offered munificent military and economic assistance to Pakistan in exchange for joining both SEATO and CENTO.^[l] However, the two countries never shared the same global perspective. Gradually, Pakistan’s security establishment became the most consequential actor in its domestic politics, frequently riding roughshod over civilian authority under the guise of national security. This also entrenched a praetorian military ethos within Pakistan’s armed forces, eventually leading to the militarisation of the Pakistani state.

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the US took the fateful decision to back General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamising dictatorship to funnel arms to the Afghan Mujahideen, only to denounce Pakistani extremists two decades later. Trump seems to be dusting off that same Cold War playbook. The US strategy has always been narrowly goal-oriented rather than based on a broad alliance.

The current episode under Trump is a textbook case of that old pattern. Yet, there are new wrinkles. While on previous occasions, Rawalpindi exploited American vulnerabilities by offering incremental favours to remain relevant in Washington’s strategic calculations, Trump is too transactional to be swayed by incrementalism. He is likely to keep a close watch over concessions that Pakistan offers the US, ensuring they are substantial. Moreover, the previous US alliances often involved direct aid or weapons; now Washington is also dangling participation in emerging diplomatic initiatives (such as reviving the Abraham Accords) and access to climate-tech resources. Moreover, Trump’s political style has some charm for image-conscious despots such as Munir. Social media adds a veneer of instant publicity since Trump’s theatrics in the Oval Office amplify the spectacle of America’s transactional pals.

Implications for India

There is concern among Indian observers that Pakistan is gradually emerging from the geopolitical difficulties it was previously subjected to. These commentators are agitated, perhaps feeling that the hand of history has slapped New Delhi. India has spent years trying to script an era in which the country would replace Pakistan as America’s closest partner in South Asia. The narrative of the Quad,^[m] democratic solidarity, and Sino-Indian balancing, all seemed to point to a new strategic alignment with Washington. Thus, Trump’s sudden pivot back to Pakistan feels like a betrayal of that hope. Trump’s apocalyptic predictions about any India-Pakistan war quickly escalating into a nuclear exchange are irritating for India, but welcome for Pakistan. Trump’s repeated endorsements of the Pakistani claims of alleged Indian losses during the four-day war clearly indicate that Pakistani elite’s unbridled flattery of the American president is paying rich dividends.^[60]

However, what is happening now in US-Pakistan relationship is not so much unique as a relapse into old habits.^[61] Though India-US strategic ties are not going to disappear overnight, what India must recognise is what little worth Trump attaches to these ties. Washington’s emerging shift towards Islamabad is driven more by Trump’s obsession with deals and transactions than geopolitics. As highlighted by political scientist and author Ashutosh Varshney, “Had he been driven by geopolitics, he would not have embraced one of the most important allies of China.”^[62] If Pakistan is quietly rewarded with US support for its defence or energy projects, India will need to redouble its own engagement with Washington to avoid being undercut by policy pivots. Since American rehabilitation of Pakistan is going to embolden its ruling elite and legitimise its militarist policies, India will need to watch closely whether the US lets Islamabad off the hook on cross-border terrorism.^[63] Any hint that Pakistan can re-emerge as the US’s fixer in the Middle East or Afghanistan without consequence will be noted in New Delhi.

Nevertheless, in the medium to longer term, India would do well to take cognisance of a crucial dimension. The ‘America first’ circles show limited inclination to subordinate their country’s interests to those of any other nation, including traditional American allies.^[64] Besides his characteristic unpredictability, Trump’s advancing age adds uncertainty into future strategic dynamics with Pakistan. His potential Republican successors are not likely to show any substantive commitment to Pakistan’s military establishment led by Gen. Munir.

Conclusion

Since he has tied his personal reputation to the Gaza peace deal, Trump has poured diplomatic and military resources into ensuring its smooth implementation. Although the details regarding the deployment of the international force are yet to be hammered out, there is little doubt that the Trump administration is trying to construct a coalition of Muslim nations for Gaza’s post-war governance. However, the core objective does not appear to be a long-lasting and meaningful transformation; it could well merely be reflecting Trump’s penchant for optics over outcomes.

Since the emerging security architecture in Gaza requires an appearance of Muslim solidarity, Pakistan’s participation in the ISF assumes significance. Trump’s cosying up to Munir should therefore be read as a signal of Washington’s continued opportunism, not a sudden ideological shift. For Islamabad, involvement in the Gaza initiative is equally attractive as it offers a golden opportunity to reaffirm Pakistan’s Islamic credentials while strengthening its strategic relevance to Washington.

Just like previous iterations of their entanglement, neither the US nor Pakistan is willing to address the mutual suspicions that have long plagued their relationship, because both are currently fixated on short-term advantages. The US may cringe at democracy-promoters, but it will always find an ally in the pliant strongman when crisis calls. For India, the question is whether to chafe at this reality or adapt to it. India’s long-held postcolonial dream was to be a great-power partner with the US, asking Washington questions about values and policy.

The hard lesson here, however, is that US presidents in a hurry prefer clients. In the calculus of American empire, clients are more useful than partners. Democracy in a partner is nice to tout, but pliable clients still deliver the artillery and troops. Pakistan’s generals and madrasa ethos are an easy-to-deploy commodity; India’s rising power, by contrast, requires patience and debate.

Vinay Kaura, PhD, is Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. He is also Non-Resident Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore. 

Endnotes

^[a]The UNGA has been dominated by discussions on Gaza throughout the year.

^[b]The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, run by the former UK prime minister, played a crucial role in formulating this demilitarisation and redevelopment plan for Gaza.

^[c]During an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha in September, Shehbaz Sharif, while condemning Israeli air strikes on Qatar and reaffirming Pakistan’s “full solidarity” with Qatar, called for the creation of an Arab-Islamic task force.

^[d]Pakistan’s Defence Minister has even clarified that a nuclear umbrella was “not on the radar.”

^[e]The Pakistani branch of the Taliban.

^[f]The Abraham Accords, brokered by the US, were a series of agreements signed in 2020 between Israel and various West Asian and North African nations – the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco – establishing diplomatic and economic relations.

^[g]A banned far-right Islamist political party in Pakistan.

^[h] ‘Labbaik Ya Aqsa’ expresses solidarity with the Al Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem.

^[i]South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an alliance between leading Western powers, such as the US, the UK and France, and select Asian ones, including Pakistan, to counter the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. It was started in November 1954 and disbanded in 1977.

^[j]Georgios Papadopoulos led a military coup in Greece to become prime minister, and later president, from December 1967 to November 1973 when he was overthrown.

^[k]Ngo Dinh Diem was president of Vietnam from October 1954 to November 1963 when he was assassinated.

^[l]Like SEATO in Southeast Asia, CENTO (initially called the Baghdad Pact) was set up to check communism in West Asia, and lasted from February 1955 to September 1979. Pakistan was a member of both SEATO and CENTO.

^[m] The Quad is a strategic alliance between the US, India, Japan and Australia, initially started in 2007 and terminated the following year, but restarted again in 2017.

^[1] “Pakistan Humiliated by Failed Efforts to Get Phone Call from Biden,” Deccan Herald, December 18, 2021, https://www.deccanherald.com/world/pakistan-humiliated-by-failed-efforts-to-get-phone-call-from-biden-1062245.html#google_vignette

^[2] “A Triumphant Outcome,” The Express Tribune, September 27, 2025, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2569141/a-triumphant-outcome

^[3] “‘Remarkable Turnaround but Caution Warranted’: Analysts Weigh in on PM Shehbaz’s Meeting with Trump,” Dawn, September 26, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1944756/remarkable-turnaround-but-caution-warranted-analysts-weigh-in-on-pm-shehbazs-meeting-with-trump

^[4] Muhammad Amir Rana, “Shaping of Pak-US Ties,” Dawn, September 28, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1945140/shaping-of-pak-us-ties

^[5] Dure Akram, “What a Week,” Daily Times, September 25, 2025, https://dailytimes.com.pk/1373650/what-a-week/

^[6] Nikita Sharma, “Trump Calls Pak Army Chief Asim Munir His ‘Favourite Field Marshal’ during Gaza Peace Summit,” Hindustan Times, October 14, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/trump-calls-pak-army-chief-asim-munir-his-favourite-field-marshal-during-gaza-peace-summit-101760376873029.html

^[7] Tushar Shetty, “US-Pakistan Relations: A Conversation with Ambassador Husain Haqqani,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/us-pakistan-relations-a-conversation-with-ambassador-husain-haqqani/

^[8] “Trump Says Pakistan PM, Field Marshal Back His Plan to End Gaza Conflict ‘100 Per Cent’,” New Indian Express, September 29, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/amp/story/world/2025/Sep/30/trump-says-pakistan-pm-field-marshal-back-his-plan-to-end-gaza-conflict-100-per-cent

^[9] “Experts Sceptical of Trump’s Claim of ‘Massive’ Oil Reserves in Pakistan,” Daily Times, August 28, 2025, https://dailytimes.com.pk/1360314/experts-sceptical-of-trumps-claim-of-massive-oil-reserves-in-pakistan/

^[10] Subhankar Paul, “‘Political Spin...’: Former Citigroup Strategist Slams Hype around Pakistan’s Oil Findings,” Business Today, August 2, 2025, https://www.businesstoday.in/amp/world/story/political-spin-former-citigroup-strategist-slams-hype-around-pakistans-oil-findings-487506-2025-08-02?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[11] Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Shah Meer Baloch, “Trump Brags of ‘Massive’ Oil Deal in Pakistan – But Drilling Has Not Found Any,” The Guardian, September 27, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/27/pakistan-us-oil-deal-analysis-trump

^[12] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: India and Pakistan (Washington, DC, U.S. Department of Energy), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/India_Pakistan_2013.pdf

^[13] Debdutta Chakraborty, “More Rhetoric than Reality? What Are ‘Massive’ Pakistani Oil Reserves Trump Has Promised to Develop,” The Print, July 31, 2025, https://theprint.in/world/more-rhetoric-than-reality-what-are-massive-pakistani-oil-reserves-trump-has-promised-to-develop/2709415/

^[14] Chakraborty, “More Rhetoric than Reality? What Are ‘Massive’ Pakistani Oil Reserves Trump Has Promised to Develop.”

^[15] “US to Cooperate with Pakistan in Areas of Critical Minerals, Hydrocarbons, Says State Secy Rubio,” The Tribune, August 14, 2025, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/us-to-cooperate-with-pakistan-in-areas-of-critical-minerals -hydrocarbons-says-state-secy-rubio/

^[16] “US Firm Agrees $500 Million Investment Deal with Pakistan for Critical Minerals,” Economic Times, September 9, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/us-firm-agrees-500-million-investment-deal-with-pakistan-for-critical-minerals/articleshow/123776292.cms?from=mdr

^[17] Chidanand Rajghatta, “La Ore Pakistan Claims to Have Exported Rare Earth Minerals to US,” Times of India, October 6, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/la-ore-pakistan-claims-to-have-exported-rare-earth-elements-to-us/articleshow/124345590.cms

^[18] Jennifer Hansler and Tim Lister, “Trump Upbeat about Ending Gaza War as 21-point Peace Plan Takes Shape,” CNN, September 28, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/27/middleeast/gaza-trump-peace-plan-detail-israel

^[19] Patrick Wintour, “UK, Canada and Australia Announce Formal Recognition of Palestine, with Wave of Israel’s Allies to Follow,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/21/uk-canada-and-australia-announce-formal-recognition-of-palestine-with-wave-of-israel-allies-to-follow

^[20] Lorraine Mallinder, “Erdogan Says Trump Meeting with Arab, Muslim Leaders on Gaza Was ‘fruitful’,” Aljazeera, September 24, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/24/erdogan-says-trump-meeting-with-arab-muslim-leaders-on-gaza-was-fruitful

^[21] Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47), “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” Tweet, September 29, 2025, https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494

^[22] Response 47, “President Donald J Trump.”

^[23] Jacob Magid and Nava Freiberg, “Arab, Muslim Nations Pledge to Realize Trump’s Gaza Plan; Hamas Examining It ‘Responsibly’,” Times of Israel, September 30, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/arab-muslim-nations-pledge-to-realize-trumps-gaza-plan-hamas-examining-it-responsibly/

^[24] Mariel Ferragamo, “A Guide to Trump’s Twenty-Point Gaza Peace Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 13, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/guide-trumps-twenty-point-gaza-peace-deal

^[25] “Israeli Military Says Its Forces Have Withdrawn to Agreed Deployment Lines for First Stage of Gaza Ceasefire,” The Hindu, October 10, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/israel-hamas-gaza-palestine-ceasefire-updates-on-october-10-2025/article70147583.ece

^[26] David Hastings Dunn, “Egypt Peace Summit Showed That Donald Trump’s Gaza Deal Is More Showbiz Extravaganza than the ‘Dawn of a New Middle East’,” The Conversation, October 14, 2025, https://theconversation.com/egypt-peace-summit-showed-that-donald-trumps-gaza-deal-is-more-showbiz-extravaganza-than-the-dawn-of-a-new-middle-east-267472

^[27] Bill Hutchinson, “Trump Declares End of Israel-Hamas War, but Experts See the Hard Work As Just Beginning,” ABC News, October 14, 2025, https://abcnews.go.com/US/trump-declares-end-israel-hamas-war-experts-hard/story?id=126482789

^[28] Satyam Singh, “Shehbaz Sharif Glorifies Trump, Credits Him for Halting India-Pakistan War,” India Today, October 14, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/india-pak-nuke-powers-who-knows-what-could-have-happened-shehbaz-sharif-backs-trumps-truce-mediation-claim-2802626-2025-10-13

^[29] Tom Bateman and Elaine Okyere, “US to Send 200 Troops to Israel to Monitor Gaza Ceasefire,” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpvl97r4e8jo

^[30] Marc Weller, “Can the Trump Peace Plan for Gaza Succeed?,” Chatham House, October 2, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/can-trump-peace-plan-gaza-succeed

^[31] Jonathan Panikoff, “How to Solve Gaza’s Hamas Problem?,” Foreign Affairs, October 30, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/palestinian-territories/how-solve-gazas-hamas-problem

^[32] Anwar Iqbal, “Army Chief Joins Trump for ‘Historic’ White House Lunch,” Dawn, June 19, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1918044/army-chief-joins-trump-for-historic-white-house-lunch?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[33] “Indonesia Leader Offers 20,000 Troops for Post-war Gaza,” Arab News, September 24, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2616462/world

^[34] Hasaan Ali Khan, “Pakistan Says Decision on Joining Gaza Peace Force ‘Still under Process’,” Arab News, October 29, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2620659/pakistan

^[35] Felicia Schwartz and Paul Mcleary, “Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan in Talks to Provide Troops for Gaza Stabilization Force,” Politico, October 15, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/15/gaza-stabilization-force-talks-00609565

^[36] “Govt Aide’s Stance on Hamas Invites Minister’s Ire,” Dawn, November 1, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1952481; “Asif Slams Govt Spokesperson’s ‘Irresponsible’ Remarks on Gaza Peace Force,” Pakistan Today, November 1, 2025, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2025/11/01/asif-slams-govt-spokespersons-irresponsible-remarks-on-gaza-peace-force/

^[37] A. Ahmed, “Pakistan Calls for Arab-Islamic Task Force to Counter Israel,” Gulf News, September 16, 2025, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-calls-for-arab-islamic-task-force-to-counter-israeli-1.500270974

^[38] “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister State Visit to Saudi Arabia,” Saudi Press Agency, September 16, 2025, https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2399706

^[39] Peter Beaumont and Andrew Roth, “Israel Launches Airstrikes against Top Hamas Members in Qatar for Gaza Ceasefire Talks,” The Guardian, September 9, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/09/israel-targets-top-hamas-members-in-qatar-for-gaza-ceasefire-talks

^[40] “Pakistan Says Defence Pact with Saudi Arabia ‘Formalised’ Relationship That Was ‘Transactional’,” September 27, 2025, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-says-defence-pact-with-saudi-arabia-formalised-relationship-that-was-transactional/article70101805.ece#google_vignette

^[41] Samir Puri and Marion Messmer, “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s Mutual Defence Pact Sets a Precedent for Extended Deterrence,” Chatham House, September 23, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/09/saudi-arabia-and-pakistans-mutual-defence-pact-sets-precedent-extended-deterrence

^[42]“Trump Issues Vague Threat to Afghanistan over Bagram Air Base,” Arab News, September 21, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2616120/world

^[43] Kabir Taneja, “Trump’s Bagram Push: Recasting Afghanistan in Global Strategy,” Observer Research Foundation, September 30, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/trump-s-bagram-push-recasting-afghanistan-in-global-strategy

^[44] Anirban Bhaumik, “India Joins Russia, China, Pakistan, Others in Opposing US Bid to Regain Control of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan,” Deccan Herald, October 7, 2025, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/india-joins-russia-china-pakistan-others-in-opposing-us-bid-to-regain-control-of-bagram-air-base-in-afghanistan-3756252

^[45] Ilam Khan and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Borderland Struggles: The Consequences of the Afghan Taliban’s Takeover on Pakistan,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies 114, no. 1(2025): 34–51.

^[46] Asif Shahzad and Mushtaq Ali, “Afghan, Pakistan Peace Talks Enter Third Day As Trump again Offers Help,” Reuters, October 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-pakistan-peace-talks-enter-third-day-trump-again-offers-help-2025-10-27/

^[47] Hasan Ali, “Will Trump’s Threats Destabilize Relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan?,” The Nation, October 27, 2025, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/trump-bagram-afghanistan/#

^[48] Abhishek De, “Wary of Taliban Ceasefire, Pak Runs to Trump, Makes Bizarre India Claim,” India Today, October 17, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/afghanistan-pakistan-war-ceasefire-pakistan-donald-trump-mediation-india-proxy-war-taliban-2804005-2025-10-16

^[49] Kanti Bajpai, “Why Pakistan Can’t Be Written off,” Indian Express, October 23, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/why-pakistan-cant-be-written-off-10321459/

^[50] “‘Two-state Surrender’: PM’s Endorsement of Trump’s Gaza Plan Draws Strong Reactions from Political Sphere,” Dawn, September 30, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1945637

^[51] “‘Two-state Surrender’: PM’s Endorsement of Trump’s Gaza Plan Draws Strong Reactions from Political Sphere.”

^[52] “‘Two-state Surrender’: PM’s Endorsement of Trump’s Gaza Plan Draws Strong Reactions from Political Sphere.”

^[53] Aditi, “‘Not Our Draft’: Pakistan Foreign Minister Rejects Donald Trump's 20-point Peace Plan for Gaza Backed by PM Shehbaz Sharif,” Free Press Journal, October 3, 2025, https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/not-our-draft-pakistan-foreign-minister-rejects-donald-trumps-20-point-peace-plan-for-gaza-backed-by-pm-shehbaz-sharif

^[54] Shivam Pratap Singh, “After Netanyahu, Pak’s Shehbaz Sharif Backs Trump for Nobel Peace: ‘A Man World Needed…’,” Hindustan Times, October 13, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/after-netanyahu-paks-shehbaz-sharif-backs-trump-for-nobel-peace-a-man-world-needed-101760375686153.html

^[55] Majid Alam, “Pak on edge As 5 Killed: What Is Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, the Group behind Massive Protest,” Hindustan Times, October 13, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pak-on-edge-as-5-killed-what-is-tehreek-e-labbaik-pakistan-the-group-behind-massive-protest-explained-101760358115555.html; “Five Killed As Pakistan Police Clear anti-Israel Protest Site,” France 24,  October 13, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251013-five-killed-as-pakistan-police-clear-anti-israel-protest-site

^[56] Regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have engaged with Israel informally for years prior to normalization.

^[57] Junaid Qaiser, “From Rhetoric to Responsibility: Pakistan’s Emerging Role in Middle East Peace,” Daily Times, October 30, 2025, https://dailytimespk.com/from-rhetoric-to-responsibility-pakistans-emerging-role-in-middle-east-peace/

^[58] Allia Bukhari, “Pakistan, Abraham Accords and the Radical Islamist Right,” Times of Israel, October 15, 2025, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/pakistan-abraham-accords-and-the-radical-islamist-right/

^[59] Shekhar Gupta, “Something’s Hidden in the Oval Office Photo of Trump, Munir, Sharif. India Must Look Closely,” The Print, September 27, 2025, https://theprint.in/national-interest/pakistan-army-munir-sharif-america-trump/2752201/

^[60] Anwar Iqbal, “Trump Amplifies Pakistan’s Narrative against India,” Dawn, October 30, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1952079/trump-amplifies-pakistans-narrative-against-india; “‘Great Fighter, Favourite Field Marshal’: Here Are All the Comments Trump Has Made about COAS Munir,” Dawn, October 29, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1951979

^[61] Murali Krishnan, “India Watches as Trump Moves Closer to Pakistan,” DW, September 29, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/india-watches-as-trump-moves-closer-to-pakistan/a-74177283

^[62] Ashutosh Varshney, “Pakistan Is Getting New Friends. Conflicts with India Will Only Grow,” The Print, September 30, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistan-new-friends-conflicts-india/2754066/

^[63] Sharat Sabharwal, “Keep a Close Eye on Pakistan – Better Ties with Key Partners Could Embolden It,” Indian Express, September 30, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/keep-a-close-eye-on-pakistan-better-ties-with-key-partners-could-embolden-it-10279224/?ref=opinion_hp

^[64] Marc Lynch, “The Fantasy of a New Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, October 31, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/fantasy-new-middle-east

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