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Sujan Chinoy, “The US National Security Strategy 2025: A Recalibration,” ORF Issue Brief No. 861, Observer Research Foundation, March 2026.
The United States (US) published its first formal National Security Strategy (NSS) report in 1987 under then President Ronald Reagan, following a mandate by Congress in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.[1] Although legally required to do so annually, most administrations have released only one NSS report in the course of a four-year term. Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush had two each in a row. Bill Clinton’s presidency proved prolific during the unipolar decade—and perhaps because of it—with eight reports. George W. Bush and Barrack Obama had two each over their respective eight years in office. Donald Trump’s first came in 2017, and now again in 2025 in the first year of his current term. Joe Biden had published a formal one in 2022, after an interim national security strategic guidance document in 2021.[2]
While later amendments to the law expressed a preference for annual submissions, there is no mechanism to enforce it. Strategies are also not operational requirements, and therefore do not necessarily have to change every year. Moreover, not publishing a formal NSS report does not imply that a country does not have such a strategy. They exist internally and often provide the policy orientation for action even if they are not released in the public domain.
Trump’s 2025 NSS has aroused keen interest and been the subject of myriad analyses. This is understandable, considering that the US remains the world’s single-biggest hyperpower,[3] with exceptional economic and military might. Yet, since the establishment of a United Nations (UN)-led order in 1945, Washington has seen a gradual erosion of its pre-eminence in the normative order. It has had to contend with a flatter, more globalised and multi-aligned world facilitated by the UN. President Trump’s frustrations largely stem from the clear dichotomy between the empirical reality of the power of the US and the checks placed on it by others, including rival power centres like China and Russia.
Today, eight decades since 1945, it is clear from NSS 2025 that the US is resetting the terms of its engagement with the rest of the world, and relocating its primacy through an ‘America First’ diplomacy. The document expresses frustration with the global order for not serving US priorities, advocating for the classical Westphalian system which has now been around for nearly four centuries.
The key features of the Westphalian system, including the idea of a nation state with sovereignty, territorial integrity, and agency over clearly demarcated borders, as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of others, became integral to the UN Charter at the end of the Second World War.[4] Other core characteristics, of equality of all nations, also emerged as part of the vade mecum for the post-War architecture.[5] Proponents believed that great powers could exercise strength, even military power, as legitimate dispensers of coercive force, to alter the balance of power. Sovereign states pursued their national interests through military strength, alliances, and balance of power, with little concern for moral or religious considerations.
Yet, the world has moved on, even as the global order has remained static. The post-Westphalian aspirations of the large majority sit uneasily with advocates of the power politics of a pure Westphalian era. President Trump’s disenchantment with the UN is largely due to some of its post-Westphalian characteristics, such as the idea of collective security, the emergence of human rights norms, including the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine, the growing agency of supranational NGOs, and international laws and treaties that allow others to benefit at what Trump perceives is the cost of US interests.
The NSS reeks of self-flagellation, in this case a damning critique of the follies of past US administrations, and portrays the current dispensation as the saviour that is making America “strong and respected again”.[6] There is clearly a preoccupation with regaining lost ground in terms of economic, military, technological, and cultural supremacy at a time when the normative order has allowed the US’s partners and adversaries, and even far lesser powers, to pursue a course that no longer links outcomes to national power. In effect, state survival is the supreme goal and military power matters most.
NSS 2025 highlights the “survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic,”[7] underscoring the need for the US to build and “field the world’s most powerful, lethal and technologically advanced military” to protect its interests. Robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrents and next-generation missile defences are regarded as a sine qua non. Economic nationalism is a recurrent theme.
The clarion call to cultivate American industrial strength could not have come a moment sooner, considering the systematic hollowing out of US manufacturing, with virtually all of it outsourced to China over the decades.[8] That in itself should not be of as much concern as the fact that the US is reported to be lagging behind China in certain key sectors such as ship-building, including of large naval platforms. China’s Navy has some 370 platforms compared to the 290–300 of the US Navy, and the gap is expected to only grow in the future.[9] Similarly, China is adding more submarines annually to its fleet than the US, even if they are largely diesel-powered.
According to the 2025 Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, China now leads in 66 out of 74 critical technology areas, a notable shift from the early 2000s when the US led in over 90 percent of such technologies.[10] The US, however, still leads in frontier research and early-stage innovations, despite China leading, or being at par, in applications on an industrial scale.
China has emerged as a global leader in non-military areas too, including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence (AI), particularly in terms of the techno-industrial stack as distinct from foundational AI. It also has a larger number of satellite-monitoring constellations. These developments have critical implications for the continued dominance of the US in the Indo-Pacific.[11]
NSS 2025 treats Taiwan as a priority issue. One key reason is the linkage between Taiwan and the South China Sea, through which one-third of global shipping passes annually, and which has implications for the US economy.
This points to a determination to continue with Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) against Chinese attempts to constrain key sea lines of communication. Deterrence is the primary and preferred option, but the US military overmatch is expected to serve as a fallback to prevent China from forcibly reunifying Taiwan, in line with US obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The strategy’s stated aim of “denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain” and “hardening and strengthening US presence in the Western Pacific” sends a strong message to Beijing to desist from arbitrary actions.[12]
The NSS advocates maintaining the US’s “unrivalled soft power” and ensuring that such soft power serves America’s national interests.[13] This is a recognition of reality. In the past, US soft power dominated global imagination through films and lifestyle products such as denim jeans, Coca-Cola, and McDonalds, besides conflating democratic ideals with the “American Dream”.
Today, US soft power is no longer unrivalled in the face of Korean K-Pop, Japanese anime and manga, Chinese TikTok, and yoga and Bollywood from India. The US’s soft power has also been considerably overshadowed by China’s growing influence across think tanks, academia, and even Hollywood, where a self-imposed censorship on Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang enables access for US films to the vast Chinese market.[14] There was also a time when US automobiles symbolised prosperity and an aspirational lifestyle. Today, Tesla sales are reeling amidst intense competition from Chinese manufacturers—BYD, for instance, has officially overtaken Tesla as the world's largest manufacturer of battery electric vehicles (BEVs).[15] Meanwhile, European high-end luxury brands such as Mercedes Benz, BMW, and Audi have maintained their aspirational value worldwide.
It is clear from the NSS that America today is willing to pursue only its own core foreign policy interests, and is determined to redefine what it expects of the world. The strategy outlined in the document to achieve these objectives meanders through principles, priorities, and regions.
The Western hemisphere, for instance, is set to witness a re-assertion of the Monroe Doctrine through a “Trump Corollary”. Recent actions exemplify this. Whether ‘Operation Absolute Resolve’ in Venezuela or unilateral US claims to Greenland, Trump’s message is clear: US strategic interests, which are, in his view, increasingly threatened by China and Russia, must be protected. Further, access to Venezuelan oil reserves and Greenland’s critical minerals would allow the US to regain control of key global supply chains. Thus, in Venezuela, the presence and influence of countries like Cuba and Iran, both long-standing supporters of the Maduro regime, has been erased overnight. In the case of Greenland, Trump’s pronouncements are also a warning to NATO members, including large powers such as France and Germany, that the transatlantic partnership and European security are overwhelmingly dependent on the US. BRICS has also been in Trump’s crosshairs for some time now, especially on the idea of de-dollarisation.
While many analysts are of the view that, unlike the 2017 NSS of President Trump’s first term, the current strategy lets China off lightly, the reality is far different. Keeping the Western hemisphere “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” is an unambiguous indictment of China, as is the call to “reverse the ongoing damage that foreign actors inflict on the American economy” and “keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open.”[16] The clarion call to ensure US technology and standards in AI, biotech, and quantum computing is also a recognition of the threat posed to US leadership by the extraordinary advances made by China in recent years.[17]
US supremacy is reflected in the image built around Trump as well. Uncanny similarities exist between how the leader is being projected today in China, Russia, and the US. In China, President Xi Jinping has been increasingly cited as the core for achieving the country’s “two centenary goals” of building a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and a modern socialist country by 2049, particularly key to national rejuvenation and achieving the “China Dream”. This is a common refrain running through the amended 2018 Constitution as well as the Communist Party of China’s National Congress reports. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin is often referred to as a heroic figure of mythical proportions who is seeking to restore Russia’s great-power status.[18] The US’s NSS 2025, likewise, contains prominent and celebratory references to President Trump, bordering on the hagiographic, as the “President of Peace”, capable of solutions.[19] The Board of Peace for Gaza proposed by Trump reflects this role.
Neither Venezuela nor North Korea have been mentioned by name in the document, even with its references to cartels and nuclear deterrence. Iran is cited as the Middle East’s “chief destabilizing force” even though its salience as a potential threat, and that of the region in general, has diminished as compared to the time of NSS 2017, attributed to President Trump’s Operation Midnight Hammer of June 2025.[20]
Under Trump, the primacy of US sovereignty is now a central feature of external engagement. The NSS 2025 suggests the return to a purist Westphalian order, albeit with a nuanced recalibration. The strategy outlined in the NSS goes straight to the point, reiterating the “primacy of nations” and peeling away the layers of post-Westphalian attributes that have crept into the UN-led order, particularly the retrenchment of conditional sovereignty, universal human rights, binding treaties, and putting primacy on people above states.
In that sense, the current US approach is structurally similar to positions long held by certain non-Western states that are ideologically distinct, whether China or Russia. Even if motivations differ, the convergence appears obvious. As such, the US still rhetorically continues to use human rights critiques in an instrumental use of norms rather than from principled adherence, as a leverage against others, but the trend suggests that it is less inclined to favour humanitarian intervention unless it has a bearing on its economic and security interests, and has become circumspect about regime change as a moral obligation. US military intervention in Venezuela and claims to Greenland are cases in point. This explains the “flexible realism” outlined in the strategy, of “maintaining good relations with countries whose governing systems and societies differ from ours.”[21] Relations with Russia and China perhaps fall in this category.
Among the priorities outlined in the NSS is an emphatic declaration that “the era of mass migration is over.”[22] The document draws a distinction between the controlled legal migration of talent required by the US and unbridled “mass migration”, which is viewed as “invasion” and as harbouring attendant threats, including “terrorism, drugs, espionage and human trafficking.”[23] Going forward, migration and immigration will no longer be linked to human rights but to national priorities and national security.
The phenomenon of anti-migration sentiment is not unique to the US. Its policy now aligns with the restrictive practices of many non-Western nations, particularly the non-liberal ones. In Europe, too, right-wing and nationalist parties have made inroads into political leadership positions. However, while migration restrictions have intensified across several European states, opposition to migration has not yet coalesced into a single, system-wide strategic doctrine comparable in scope and articulation to that set out in the 2025 NSS.
NSS 2025 indicates a continuum of a major Trump demand from NSS 2017, that allies and partners must do more heavy-lifting by way of burden sharing and spending more on defence. The document demands “fairness”, whether in military alliances or trade relations, and explicitly calls out “free riders”, from transatlantic and trans-Pacific allies and partners to China.[24]
In line with this, NATO allies are to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence, in accordance with The Hague commitment, the success of which is attributed to President Trump. Further, the “ironclad” commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in NATO declarations notwithstanding, there is no gain saying that the US approach is now more transactional. Though Article 5 is triggered by NATO consensus, getting to that point requires the US to be on board, and the multilateral trigger cannot be pulled without the US.[25]
It is clear from the anxieties outlined in the EU’s ‘White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030’, presented in March 2025, complemented by the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 in October 2025, that there is an understanding that the triggering of such collective security is now largely a US sovereign decision, with the key determining factor being political willingness in Washington to go the whole nine yards.[26] Trump was unequivocal about this in his unprecedented, candid remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January this year, where he reminded Second World War allies that, but for direct US military involvement, “you’d all be speaking German and a little Japanese.”[27]
The section of the NSS pertaining to Europe, titled “Promoting European Greatness”, may be read in some European capitals as gratuitous and demeaning, particularly the charge of a “lack of self-confidence” in Europe. Others may view it as interference in Europe’s internal affairs, especially with regard to migration and the activities of transnational bodies that undermine “political liberty and sovereignty”.[28] However, the US’s core interest in negotiating an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine should give the EU some hope, so long as Ukraine’s fundamental interests are not sacrificed through deal-making that marginalises Ukraine or Europe.
Ironically, Germany is berated for “external dependencies”, enhanced by the war in Ukraine. The NSS points to German chemical companies “building some of the world’s largest processing plants in China, using Russian gas that they cannot obtain at home”—a damning indictment of European hypocrisy, especially in light of their criticism of India’s energy deals with Russia.
Finally, a frank statement of intent about “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance” is a discernible shift from earlier NSS documents, one that may be seen as reassuring by Moscow.[29] Any cleavage in the transatlantic alliance is bound to work to Russia’s, and China’s, advantage.
In so far as India is concerned, some analysts have been quick to conclude that India’s importance has been diminished in NSS 2025. However, NSS 2025 does refer to India as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific and as a part of the Quad framework, while calling for improved commercial relations and security cooperation.[30] At the same time, the threat of further sanctions and fresh tariffs for India remain, due to its continued purchase of Russian oil and trading with Iran.
The limited number of references in NSS 2025 (four), as compared to earlier NSS editions (seven in NSS 2022 and eight in NSS 2017) reflects a more transactional, pragmatic tone rather than a de-facto decline in India’s global significance. India’s emergence on the global stage with greater agency is an ineluctable tide. Trump’s invitation to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to be a part of the Board of Peace for Gaza, as well as to join the Pax Silica initiative on securing critical supply chains, are cases in point.
President Trump is attempting to revert to a more purist form of the Westphalian order, albeit with US primacy. However, this approach is not guaranteed to succeed. First, Trump’s term, as things stand, ends in 2029. Second, with the US withdrawing from multilateral organisations, it leaves the field open for China to fill the void created by US retrenchment. Third, the stress of Trump’s policies on issues such as Greenland, including the imposition of tariffs on strategic partners that oppose unilateral irredentist claims, is beginning to cause European partners to rally together and push back.
In effect, there are limits to rolling back the UN-led normative order without causing fundamental fissures in US-led military and economic alliances and partnerships across the board. The dismantling of key post-Second World War structures could prove detrimental to the global order.
Ambassador Sujan Chinoy is Director General of MP-IDSA, New Delhi.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[1] National Security Strategy Archive, “National Security Strategy Archive,” https://nssarchive.us/.
[2] National Security Strategy Archive, “National Security Strategy Reports,” https://nssarchive.us/.
[3] Michael Mandelbaum, The Four Ages of American Foreign Policy: Weak Power, Great Power, Superpower and Hyperpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).
[4] Peter M.R. Stirk, “The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality,” Review of International Relations 38 (2012): 657-659, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/westphalian-model-and-sovereign-equality/1F68B4BF7CA2AE55F813C8EA4FC49D8B.
[5] Stirk, “The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality.”
[6] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., November 2025, 1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
[7] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 3
[8] Joint Economic Committee, “Decades of Manufacturing Decline and Outsourcing Left U.S. Supply Chains Vulnerable to Disruption,” United States Senate, https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/94bf8985-1e87-438b-9a3a-e3334489dd30/background-on-issues-in-us-manufacturing-and-supply-chains-final.pdf.
[9] Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33153.
[10] Jenny Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin and Linus Cohen, “ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: 2025 updates and 10 new technologies,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 1, 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aspis-critical-technology-tracker-2025-updates-and-10-new-technologies/.
[11] Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll and Nicholas Velasquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup.
[12] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 24
[13] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 4
[14] James Tager, “Made in Hollywood, Censored by Beijing,” PEN America, August 5, 2020, https://pen.org/report/made-in-hollywood-censored-by-beijing/.
[15] “China’s BYD overtakes Tesla as the world’s top EV seller – Is this the end of Tesla’s reign, or can their refreshed Model Y fight back? What’s behind the shift and what it means for the future of electric cars?,” The Economic Times, March 26, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/chinas-byd-overtakes-tesla-as-the-worlds-top-ev-seller-is-this-the-end-of-teslas-reign-or-can-their-refreshed-model-y-fight-back-whats-behind-the-shift-and-what-it-means-for-the-future-of-electric-cars/articleshow/119495465.cms.
[16] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 5
[17] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 5
[18] Helena Goscilo, ed., Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
[19] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 8
[20] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 28
[21] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 9
[22] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 11
[23] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 11
[24] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 10
[25] “Collective Defence and Article 5,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 12, 2025, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/collective-defence-and-article-5.
[26] European Commission, White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, Brussels: European Commission, March 2025, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en; European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, October 16, 2025, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-8364-60afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf .
[27] Adam Cancryn and Kevin Liptak, “Five takeaways from Trump’s antagonistic speech in Davos,” CNN, January 22, 2026, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/21/politics/donald-trump-davos-speech-takeaways.
[28] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 25
[29] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 27
[30] Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 21, 23, 24.
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Amb Sujan R. Chinoy is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi since 2019. A career ...
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