Introduction: The Ancient Kingdom of Tibet

The Tibetan people trace their history to 2,000 BCE. Tibet’s period of prominence began under the Yarlung dynasty with King Nyatri Tsenpo in 127 BCE. His lineage of 42 kings ruled for nearly a thousand years, until 838 CE.^[1] The year Nyatri Tsenpo ascended the throne marks the first year of the Tibetan calendar.

Great powers do not emerge overnight, so Bod (the local name for Greater Tibet, pronounced Bo) was the result of centuries of consolidation by the Tsenpo kings. Before their rise, the region was fragmented among nomadic clans, each with its own chief, and their belief system and way of life involved spirits, demons, and deities collectively referred to as Bon.^[2] The most illustrious Tsenpo kings—Songsten Gampo, Trisong Detsen, and Ralpchen—are revered as the ‘Three Dharma Kings’ whose reign in the 7th and 8th centuries CE marked Tibet’s golden age.[3] One of the most outstanding achievements of King Songsten was the development of the Tibetan script and language, which was created by the scholar Thonmi Sambhota using Brahmi, Gupta, and other Indian scripts.^[4] This innovation was instrumental in unifying Tibetan society, facilitating governance, communication, and the preservation of its rich history.

By the mid-8th century CE, Tibet emerged as a military power, expanding into China and Central Asia as far as Samarkand in present-day Uzbekistan.^[5] Tibetan forces occupied large areas of Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan to the east; dominated Nepal; and exerted influence over Himalayan tribes in India and northern Burma. To deter Tibetan advances, the Chinese paid an annual tribute of 50,000 rolls of silk. In 763 CE, following the Tang emperor Daizong's refusal to pay, Tibetan forces seized the then-Chinese capital, Chang’an (present-day Xi’an). The Tang emperor fled, and the Tibetans installed a puppet ruler for a brief period. This issue was reiterated in 821 CE through a treaty between Tsenpo Ralpachen and Tang emperor Mu Tsung. To commemorate the treaty, three inscribed pillars—bearing Tibetan and Chinese text—were erected in Lhasa, Chang’an, and on the Sino-Tibetan border at Qingshui (in modern Gansu). The inscription reads, “The two countries, Tibet and China, guard the land and the frontier now in their possession. All to the east of that frontier is the land of Greater China, and all to the west is indeed the land of Greater Tibet. After that, both sides shall not struggle like enemies, lead armies into war, and not invade and seize each other’s territory.”’^[6]

In the 8th century CE, when the Tibetan Empire had expanded beyond its traditional boundaries, it encountered Buddhist societies across India, Nepal, China, and Southeast Asia. At the time, Buddhism was an international religion and the cultural lingua franca of the region. Though Buddhism had earlier been introduced to Tibet by Princess Bhrikuti Devi—King Songtsen Gampo’s Nepalese wife—in the mid-7th century, its influence remained limited to the royal family and the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa.^[7] In 762 CE, King Trisong Detsen declared Buddhism the state religion and invited Indian, Nepalese, and Chinese scholars to disseminate its teachings. This initiative led to the emergence of Tibetan Buddhism—a synthesis of regional traditions.

Though little recognised at the time, this moment shaped Tibet’s future and forged religious ties with Mongolia and China. Both the Mongols and later the Manchus—who ruled over Tibet, Mongolia, and China—were followers of Tibetan Buddhism. During this era, Tibet and China were roughly equal powers, with Tibet often holding the upper hand, particularly in military confrontations.

Evolution of the Cho-Yon (Patron-Priest) Concept

From the ninth century CE onwards, the Tibetan empire disintegrated into small princedoms. A key reason for this decline was the acceptance of Buddhism by the kings, while many nobles and lay people still followed the old Bon faith. This religious divide, which extended to the royal family, culminated in the assassination of the last emperor, Langdarma, in 842 CE, ending the Tsenpo lineage. His death sparked a civil war between rival heirs, fracturing the empire into smaller kingdoms. By 889 CE, Tibet had splintered into independent lordships ruled by local warlords. It was forced to withdraw from conquered territories, and by 905 CE, China had reclaimed most of the land previously lost to Tibet. Buddhism lost royal patronage, and many monks fled central Tibet to Western Zhangzhung and Eastern Kham and Amdo to preserve Buddhist literature and traditions. A dark period followed from 842 to 1247 CE. The empire’s collapse coincided with the disintegration of China’s Tang dynasty, which also broke into smaller kingdoms. For nearly three centuries, Tibet and China had little political or military contact beyond the border regions—until both were conquered by the Mongols in the 13th century.

During Tibet’s period of fragmentation, in 1024, Jangchup O, a local king of Western Tibet (Zhangzhung), invited the Indian scholar Atisha to impart Buddhist teachings. Under his influence, several Tibetan nobles converted to Buddhism, leading to the rapid growth of the religion and its political influence. This period also led to a stark division between Tantrik (Ngagpas) and Monastic forms of Buddhism, each fighting for dominance and the patronage of local nobles and warlords. It marked the beginning of the Cho-Yon (Patron-Priest) tradition, in which a religious head offered blessings and legitimacy to a noble or king in exchange for support of a particular religious sect.

Mongols: The First Foreign Rulers of Han China, Tibet, and Mongolia<

The Mongol Empire, founded by Genghis Khan in 1206, reached its peak in 1294 under his grandson, Kublai Khan, stretching from the Sea of Japan in the east to Eastern Europe in the west, making it the largest contiguous land empire in history.^[8] At the time, China was not a homogeneous entity and was ruled by multiple rulers. The Mongols spent 74 years and three generations, starting from Genghis Khan’s campaigns in Western China in 1205, his sons' conquest of other Chinese dynasties/regions, and finally his grandson Kublai Khan's completion of the Chinese conquest and founding of the Yuan Dynasty in 1279.

Unlike China, Tibet was not absorbed through military conquest but through a political and spiritual alliance. The first Mongol expedition into Tibet in 1240 was a reconnaissance mission with diplomatic intent. Given Tibet’s political fragmentation and its difficult terrain, the Mongols found it more practical to deal with centralised religious authority than with scattered warlords.

In 1244, Mongol Prince Godan (Koten) Khan invited Sakya Pandita, a Buddhist scholar and head of the apolitical Sakya Tradition, for negotiations. When they met in 1247 in Mongolia, Godan was so moved by his knowledge and wisdom that he converted to Buddhism and granted Sakya Pandita administrative authority over Tibet.^[9] This marked the beginning of the formal patron-priest relationship between Tibetan lamas and foreign rulers. While not a treaty in the modern sense, China now refers to this meeting as the ‘Treaty of Liangzhou’ to legitimise its claim over Tibet.^[10]

Unlike other conquered regions (e.g., China/Persia), Tibet had no resident Mongol viceroy. The Sakya lamas governed independently, without direct Mongol interference. In 1260—almost a decade before the full conquest of China—Kublai Khan adopted Buddhism as the state religion and appointed Drogon Chogyal Phagpa (nephew of Sakya Pandita) as Imperial Preceptor (Dishi)—the highest religious authority in the Mongol Empire, akin to the Raj Guru in ancient India. Phagpa conferred spiritual legitimacy on Kublai, declaring him a Chakravartin (universal ruler), and in return, Kublai offered Patronage to Tibetan Buddhism.

The adoption of Buddhism and a Chinese name ‘Yuan’,—meaning ‘new cosmic beginning^[11]— was a strategic move by the Mongols to claim the Mandate of Heaven and portray their rule as the rightful successor to the previous Chinese empires.

Two lasting effects of Mongol rule over Tibet were the political re-consolidation of fragmented clans after the fall of the Tsenpo dynasty in the 9th century, and the shift of power from nobles and clans to Buddhist schools or monastery-backed political leaders, strengthened through the Cho-Yon relationship with the Mongols. Contrary to Chinese propaganda, this period did not mark the beginning of Chinese rule over Tibet. The Mongol Khans viewed themselves as rulers of a vast Mongol empire, not as Chinese sovereigns. Any influence they exercised over Tibet was Mongolian, not Chinese.

Unlike their direct rule over China, Tibet was never an administrative province of Kublai’s Chinese empire. Instead, they indirectly ruled Tibet as a Mongol spiritual partner through the local influential Sakya hierarchy, along with a few Mongols, with no Chinese presence in the Tibetan administration. The Bureau of Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs (Xuanzheng Yuan),^[12] based in Dadu (modern-day Beijing), was headed by a Tibetan Imperial Preceptor and staffed not by Chinese but by Mongols and Tibetans. Its role was to oversee Tibetan affairs, not to impose Chinese control. Moreover, Mongol patronage of Tibetan Buddhism—and the elevation of Tibetan monks to the post of Imperial Preceptors—sparked resentment among the Chinese, who saw it as a threat to their cultural and artistic life.^[13] It is evident that the Yuan Dynasty's influence over Tibet was not an extension of Chinese rule, but a Mongol imperial arrangement.

In nearly 3,000 years of recorded history—from the Shang dynasty in the 16th century BCE to the fall of the Song dynasty in 1279 CE—none of the seven major ethnic Chinese dynasties ever invaded or ruled Tibet. It was the Chinese who historically feared raids and plundering by nomadic groups such as the Huns, Mongols, Turks, Manchus, and Tibetans, whom they labelled as “barbarians” from the northern steppe and western highlands. Lacking effective natural barriers, successive Chinese rulers constructed multiple defensive walls along the northern and northwestern periphery—collectively known today as the Great Wall of China.^[14] The Great Wall’s location is a strong geographical marker of the northern frontier as perceived by the Chinese for centuries.^[15]

Today's Chinese-occupied Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and East Turkestan (Xinjiang) are all beyond the Great Wall. While travelling in the West towards Tibet, the region of Amdo and Kham, consisting of multiple and almost parallel, densely forested river valleys and ravines of the Irrawaddy, Salween, Mekong, and Yangtze rivers, inhabited by numerous hostile tribes, created a natural barrier between China and Tibet.^[16]

All the ethnic Chinese empires remained confined within an almost circular geographical region, bounded by the south of the Great Wall and the Yinshan mountain ranges, and east of the Yunling mountain range.^[17] All areas beyond the above regions, now claimed/occupied by the PRC, were previously captured /ruled by dynasties originating from the ‘barbarians’ of the steppes, who also ruled China.^[18] The foreign ‘barbarians’ also extended China’s empire to the south. Gandhar (present-day Yunnan), with its capital at Dali, was an independent kingdom between China and Burma till its Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century, whose kings considered themselves the descendants of the Indian emperor, Ashoka. The Persian scholar Rashid al-Din wrote that the king of Gandhara styled himself maharaja. At their peak in the 10th century, Gandhar was controlling most of Myanmar and parts of modern-day Vietnam, with Dali being one of the major Buddhist centres for learning.^[19]

After the death of Kublai Khan in 1294, the lack of central authority, administrative overextension (from Korea to Poland), cultural and religious fragmentation (adoption of Islam, Buddhism, Persian, and old shamanic traditions by Genghis Khan’s descendants), and infighting amongst the rival scions led to the split of the empire into four khanates, namely the ‘Golden Horde’ in today’s Russia and adjoining territories, ‘Chagatai Khanate’ in Central Asia, the ‘Ilkhanate’ in West Asia and Persia, and the ‘Great Khanate (Yuan)’ in China and Tibet.

Ming: The First Ethnic Chinese Consolidators of Han China

Mongol rule in China was overthrown by a popular uprising, leading to the establishment of the Ming Dynasty in 1368. The Ming was the first true ethnic Chinese empire, which consolidated and ruled over the entire Han China, while Tibet continued to remain independent and remained religiously connected to the Mongols. The Ming organised China into 13 provinces—neither Tibet nor Inner Mongolia was included, nor did the Ming exercise political control over them.^[20] During their nearly 300-year rule (1368-1644), the Ming focused largely on defending against repeated Mongol and Manchu incursions. Although earlier dynasties had begun its construction, the majority of the Great Wall in its current form—including extensions along the Manchurian frontier—was built during the Ming period, especially in the 15th century.^[21]

Chinese contact with Tibet during this time remained religious. With Buddhism having declined in India, Tibet had emerged as the new international centre of Buddhism.

The four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism are the Sakya, Kagyu, Gelug, and Nyingma traditions.^[22] A more recent classification, ‘Yellow Hat’, refers specifically to the Gelug School, which is also dominant in Mongolia and China. In contrast, ‘Red Hat’ collectively refers to the other three schools. The most important and iconic of the 'Red Hat' Lamas were Padmasambhava and Milarepa.

Following the fall of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, the Sakya school (which had ruled Tibet under Mongol patronage) declined, while the Gelug school rose to dominance under Je Tsongkhapa (1357-1417), founder of the Gelug tradition and principal Yellow Hat lama. Tsongkhapa sought to unify the sects and restore monastic discipline. After his death, he was believed to have reincarnated (as a Tulku) into a young monk.

In 1578, the third Gelug Lama travelled to Mongolia and converted a local prince and his followers. The prince gave him the title of Dalai (a Mongolic word, meaning ‘ocean’ or great) Lama (Guru). The 5th Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso—also known as the Great Fifth—was a skilled political strategist who aimed to end sectarian conflict and unify Tibet.

With military support from Gushi Khan, a devout Gelug follower who led campaigns from 1637 to 1642, the Great Fifth subdued rival factions. In 1642, Gushi Khan offered him full temporal authority. The Dalai Lama established the Ganden Phodrang, a theocratic government led by himself and administered through the Kashag—a council of three lay ministers (Kalons)—thus uniting religious and political power.

Manchus: The Foreign Empire Linking Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang with Han China

In 1644, as Beijing fell to rebel leader Li Zicheng, the Ming emperor appealed to the Jurchens of Manchuria—then an independent kingdom—for assistance. The Jurchens invaded Beijing but seized the capital for themselves, overthrowing the Ming and establishing a new Manchu empire over China. The Manchus expanded the territory they captured from the Ming into regions such as Mongolia, Dzungaria, and Turkistan (modern-day Xinjiang) (see Map 1).^[23]

Map 1. Ming China and Subsequent Expansion by the Manchu Empire (Qing)

Source: https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Manchu_conquest_of_China?file=Manchu_conquest_of_China.png

To legitimise their foreign rule over China and Mongolia, the Manchus took three actions: they gave a Chinese name to their empire—Qing (meaning “Pure”), retained many Ming officials to reassure the local Han population, and sought religious support from Tibetan lamas to gain political legitimacy in Mongol territories, where Tibetan Buddhism was dominant.^[24]

Appreciating the power shift towards the rising Manchus from the declining Mongols, the Fifth Dalai Lama accepted an invitation to Beijing in 1653, where he met the Shunzhi Emperor and established a new Cho-Yon relationship. However, Chinese historians often portray this visit as a vassal paying homage to a sovereign, but contemporary Tibetan or even Chinese records do not support this interpretation.^[25]

In 1705, Dzungar Mongol king Lhabzhang Khan attempted to reassert old Mongol influence over Tibet and murdered the 6th Dalai Lama. At the Tibetan request, Qing emperor Kangxi dispatched troops, defeated the Dzungars in 1720, and reinstated the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, marking the first instance of Manchu troops entering Tibet. This created goodwill for the Manchus, and in return, the Tibetans accepted an Amban (a political observer) to be stationed in Lhasa.^[26]

The Gurkha invasion of Tibet in 1786 was a turning point in Manchu-Tibet relations. It compelled the 8th Dalai Lama to seek military assistance from the Manchu Emperor, Qianlong, once again. The Manchu army entered Tibet for the second time in 1791 and defeated the Gurkhas. However, this time, the Qing dynasty issued the “Twenty-Nine Articles” imperial ordinance in 1793 to strengthen Qing control over Tibet by institutionalising the Golden Urn system for selecting reincarnate lamas and increasing the power of the Amban by making him equal to that of the Dalai Lama.^[27] The ordinance was presented not merely as a legal, but as a moral and religious duty to safeguard the purity of Tibetan Buddhism.^[28]

Although the Tibetans did not resist the ordinance due to their reliance on Qing military support, most of the articles were implemented only selectively, with many provisions either delayed, diluted, or quietly ignored over time.^[29] After 1793, of the six Dalai Lamas that followed, only the 9th and 10th were nominally confirmed through the urn— only symbolically, as they had already been identified through traditional Tibetan methods. For the 11th through 14th, even this symbolic use was abandoned entirely.^[30]

By the mid-nineteenth century, the declining power of the Manchu rulers left them unable to provide temporal assistance to the Tibetans. Consequently, no Chinese troops participated in the Dogra War of 1841-42 or the second Gurkha War of 1855-56, both of which were fought solely by the Tibetan Army. The resulting ‘Treaty of Chushul’ and the Treaty of Thapathali were negotiated and signed by Tibetan officials alone, with no Chinese troops or signatories, underscoring Tibet’s de facto autonomy in foreign affairs during this period.^[31] The decline of Manchu power in China correspondingly diminished the authority of the Ambans in Lhasa, reducing them once more to the status of mere political observers.^[32]

Russo-British ‘Great Game’ & British Creation of Suzerainty Debate

By the mid-19th century, India came under British rule, and Britain became actively involved in the famous ‘great game’ with imperial Russia. The objective was to protect British interests in Asia by stopping Russian access to warm waters, and above all, to India. Britain supported Ottoman Turkey against the Russian invasion during the Crimean War (1854-56), resulting in the Russian withdrawal and the closure of its warm-water ambitions through the Mediterranean Sea. On the eastern front, Britain established close and profitable ties with the Manchus in China. At this point in history, the Manchus had become weak and were referred to as the ‘Sick Man of Asia’. Although they could have easily imploded, the British were unwilling to rule an internally unstable China directly. Instead, they preferred a proxy arrangement, supporting the stability of the Manchus. The dynasty survived the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), and many other internal uprisings largely due to assistance from British and other Western powers.^[33]

The British also actively encouraged the otherwise reluctant Manchus to claim East Turkestan, while persuading the Dogra ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to withdraw his border from the Shahidulla Fort^[34]—located beyond Aksai Chin on the Karakash River—to enable Chinese troops from Kashgar to take control of the region. This created a Chinese-controlled buffer zone between Russia and British India.^[35] These actions later paved the way for the subsequent Chinese claim over the Aksai Chin region. Had the British or Russians occupied Xinjiang and Tibet after the fall of the Manchus, these regions might have become independent nations, like many former colonies in the 20th century.

Without Tibetan participation, the British signed the ‘Anglo-Chinese Convention’ of 1890 with China to define the Sikkim-Tibet border and the 1893 Trade Regulation regarding British trade rights in Tibet. The British soon realised the hollowness of Chinese suzerainty claims when the Tibetan government not only refused to implement the agreement but also repeatedly turned down British attempts to establish trade relations via the Manchu government for almost 14 years (1890-1904).^[36] In exasperation, the British invaded Tibet under Col. Younghusband in August 1904 to establish a direct link with the Dalai Lama. A treaty was signed between British India and Tibet, opening the trade route between Tibet and Sikkim. During this period, Tibet conducted its affairs independently, with no Chinese involvement.^[37] The Great Game formally ended with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in which both Russia and Britain defined the limits of their empires in Asia, designating Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet as buffer states.^[38]

In 1910, the Manchu invasion of Tibet marked a turning point in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations. For the first time, the Manchu army entered Lhasa against the will of the Tibetans. The Dalai Lama requested British intervention; however, before the British could respond, a nationalist uprising swept across China in 1911 against the Manchus.^[39]  When news of the revolution reached Lhasa, the Tibetans reorganised and drove the Chinese forces out of Tibet in 1912, declaring complete independence. President Yuan Shikai, the new ruler of China, made it clear that they hated the Manchus as barbaric foreigners and a feudal dynasty, calling the latter Manchu period a ‘century of humiliation’. Yet, modern China claims the Manchu conquest of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet as part of its national unification. This assertion of continuity ignores the imperial nature and foreign origin of the Manchu empire.^[40]

The 1913 Shimla Conference and Independent Tibet

Following the change in China's government system, the British convened a tripartite conference^[41] in 1913 at Shimla to address boundary issues between British India, Tibet, and China. Sir Henry McMahon, then Foreign Secretary to the British Government of India; Chen Yifan (also known as Ivan Chen), Controller of Foreign Affairs based in Shanghai, as the Chinese plenipotentiary; and Lonchen Shatra (the ‘prime minister’ of Tibet), representing the Dalai Lama, attended the conference.

Following nine months of negotiations from October 1913 to July 1914, the Chinese representative initialled the draft convention, which included a map outlining the Indo-Tibetan boundary. However, he did not sign or initial the maps detailing the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet, and contested claims over the Kham region. The eastern areas of Tibet, bordering China and partly comprising the Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham, were referred to as Inner Tibet. In contrast, the central and western regions of Tibet bordering India were referred to as Outer Tibet (Figure-2).^[42] It highlights that, at the time, the Chinese had no issue accepting the Indo-Tibetan boundary (marked as a red line on the Shimla Convention maps), as they had never historically been involved in it. ^[43]

China’s refusal to sign the convention was mainly due to differing perceptions of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet (marked as a blue line on the map), as well as different interpretations of their special relationship during the 267 years of Manchu rule and the change in equation following the fall of the Manchus in 1911.

Map 2: Simla Conference Map Showing Contending Claims of China-Tibet Boundary

Source: https://picryl.com/media/simla-convention-contending-claims-in-kham-3667d8

Red line: Frontier of Tibet proposed in the Simla Convention. Dark brown line: Frontier of Tibet proposed by China. Dark blue line: Boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet proposed in the Simla Convention. Light blue line: Frontier claimed by China in 1914. Pink line: Chinese proposal in 1915 for the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet. Dashed blue line: Chinese proposal in 1919 for the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet

The British warned China that if it did not sign the treaty, they would deal directly with Tibet, and China would lose its political space there. Tibet interpreted China’s refusal to sign the convention as an acceptance of its independence, on lines similar to those of Mongolia.^[44] Russia also did not object to the Shimla Convention. Hereinafter, the issue was relegated from Russian and British priorities due to the outbreak of the First World War.  The failure of the Shimla Convention highlighted that Tibet had to be ready for future Chinese hostilities. Thupten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, was an austere but visionary and pro-reform leader who initiated multiple steps towards modernising Tibet, such as reducing irrelevant religious rituals, tightening control over corrupt officials, joining the International Postal Union, establishing an English-language school in Gyantse, and establishing an army to counter the continued Chinese threat from the eastern front.

Due to British military training and weapons, the Tibetans soon gained the upper hand and were able to repel General Peng Jih Sheng’s forces from Chamdo, Markham, and Derge in eastern Tibet. They captured a large number of Chinese Prisoners, including General Peng himself,^[45] forcing a British-mediated agreement between the Tibetan and Chinese Generals, signed at Chengdu in 1918.^[46] The Sino-Tibetan boundary was accepted along the upper Yangtze, akin to the border during Manchu rule and the blue line marked earlier during the Shimla Convention.

Despite such successes, modernisation efforts were not liked by many monastics and aristocratic elites, being expensive, leading to new taxes being levied to support the military buildup. They equated modernisation as anti-Buddhism and argued that if Tibet had coexisted with China for centuries, there was no need for radical reforms. By the mid-1920s, the thirteenth Dalai Lama succumbed to pressure and withdrew many reforms, including demoting pro-modernisation officers and closing the English school, thereby losing an opportunity to create a modern polity capable of coordinating international support for its independent status and defending its territory.^[47]

However, the 13th Dalai Lama continued with a number of his other initiatives until his sudden death in 1933. In 1937, the current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso from the Amdo region, was identified as his reincarnation and was formally enthroned as the 14th Dalai Lama in Lhasa on 22 February 1940. It could be said that for almost four decades (1913-51), Tibet was de facto an independent kingdom until the PLA invasion in 1951.

Chinese Civil War and Establishment of the People's Republic of China

Tibet did not immediately pay a price for its departure from the above modernisation efforts, as during the interwar period, China also underwent internal upheaval. Within five years of the Nationalist uprising, President Yuan Shikai died suddenly in 1916, marking the beginning of China’s nearly 12-year-long warlord era, during which no central authority was in control. The periphery of the earlier Manchu empire—Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang—broke away, while Manchuria fell under the control of a warlord supported by Japan.

The Soviet Union was established by the Communist Revolution in 1917, which led to a resurgence of Russian interest in China. With Soviet support, the Communist Party of China (CCP) was founded in 1921. Initially, both the CCP and the nationalist Kuomintang Party (KMT) fought the warlords together; however, Western powers drew Chiang Kai-shek (KMT leader) away from the communists. After ruthlessly suppressing the warlords and the communists, Chiang declared the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1928. In 1937, the Japanese invasion of China led to an alliance between the Communists and the KMT to fight the Japanese together, but it did not last long. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour changed China’s fate, as the US, looking to decimate Japan, brought China into an otherwise Euro-centric World War II. China became an active ally and received a fair share of the spoils at the end of the war in the form of ‘Manchuria’ and ‘Taiwan’^[48].

After the Second World War, a civil war erupted between the communists and nationalists; however, active Soviet support turned the tide in favour of the Communists, resulting in the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. Meanwhile, the nationalists withdrew from mainland China to Taiwan, which they still hold today. The US declared support for the ROC (Taiwan) due to the PRC’s intervention in Korea against the US.

US Role in Support of Tibet

Taking full advantage of the US and other major international players being fully engaged in the Korean crisis, the PRC, within a year of its formation, invaded eastern Tibet in October 1950. The Tibetan government approached the UN against the Chinese invasion; however, except for El Salvador, no other country, including Britain and India, raised any official objection to Chinese aggression. At this time, China was holding only eastern Tibet and weighing the reactions of the big powers. An interesting contrast highlighting the double standards of the Western powers and Chinese duplicity is a comparison of the treatment of Tibet vis-à-vis Mongolia. When the Manchu (Qing) dynasty fell in 1912, Mongolian political status was similar to that of Tibet, with both reclaiming their independence.

The communist revolution in Mongolia led to it becoming part of the Soviet bloc. At this point in history, the independence of Tibet and Mongolia was de facto, not de jure, as Chiang Kai-shek was claiming both as part of China. Post-Second World War, unlike the United Kingdom and other Western powers’ ambiguous stance on Tibet, the USSR outrightly supported Mongolia's independence. Stalin convinced President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference to hold a plebiscite in Mongolia. With 100 percent of Mongolians voting for independence and the firm backing of the USSR, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to accept Mongolia's independence. Contrary to this, Chinese propaganda of suzerainty over Tibet was repeatedly accepted by the West, especially during the critical periods of the post-Second World War. Despite the strong Wilsonian commitment to self-determination of the US and the 1941 Atlantic Charter's acceptance of “the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live,” Western countries continued to yield to the Chinese narrative that Tibet was part of the Chinese nation.^[49]

With almost no international support for Tibet and Western attention focused on Korea, 20,000 Chinese troops marched into Lhasa on 9 September 1951.^[50] The Dalai Lama sent three groups of emissaries to the United States, Great Britain, and Nepal, hoping to persuade these countries to intervene on its behalf; however, none of these emissaries got any assurance. A fourth group was sent to China to negotiate a PLA withdrawal; however, taking advantage of the situation, on 23 May 1951, the PRC forced the Tibetan emissaries to sign the ‘Seventeen Points Agreement’ under duress.^[51] A peace-loving community was now forced to face the PLA’s onslaught on its own as the entire world abandoned it for political expediency. The biggest letdown was India, which, despite inheriting British obligations accepted during the Shimla agreement, refused to act because of Nehru’s romanticism with the idea of ‘Asia’s resurgence’ and courting Communist China at all costs. India, whose security was the most affected by the expansionist PRC, was among the first non-communist countries to recognise the communist government in China,^[52] the first to accept Chinese annexation of Tibet as an internal matter,^[53] and even attempted to mainstream the otherwise pariah Communist China among non-aligned countries by inviting Zhou Enlai to the Asian- African Conference at Bandung in 1955.^[54] While handing over these concessions on a platter, India did not demand any obligations from China, not even the most critical one: acceptance of the McMahon Line—an unparalleled self-inflicted surrender of interests by any nation in recorded history.

After losing hope of assistance from almost all sides, the Dalai Lama attempted to reconcile with the Chinese by ratifying the ‘Seventeen Point Agreement’ on 24 October 1951, hoping to extract as much concessions and autonomy for his people. The Agreement provided a written set of rules for the Sino-Tibetan relations, a promise of Tibetan autonomy, and non-interference in its distinctive way of life.^[55] However, for the PRC, the bait of Tibetan autonomy was a facade to defuse resistance, buy time, and save face amongst the international community about their illegal occupation of Tibet.

By 1954, the PRC started meddling in local Buddhist traditions and forced land reforms, causing immense resentment among the Tibetans. The situation continued to worsen, and increasing Chinese atrocities, mass killing of dissenters, and continued interference in local Buddhist culture in the Amdo and Kham regions of eastern Tibet forced a large number of ‘Khampas’ to revolt against the Chinese under ’Chushi Gangdruk’, the freedom-fighters alliance.^[56] Despite being poorly supplied with small arms and ammunition, mainly captured from the PLA and a small amount air-dropped under CIA operations, Tibetans fought valiantly.^[57]

For a peace-loving Tibetan society, where becoming a soldier and related violence was considered the lowest form of life, a few new regiments were hurriedly raised, who fought along with the local population, inflicting large Chinese casualties. Except for the soldiers’ bravery and the just cause of freedom, Tibetans were no match for the Chinese, who were superior in training and equipment and had a higher appetite for loss of men from a population 100 times larger in number.^[58] Despite limited outside support, Tibetan resistance continued for almost 10 years and culminated in a national mass uprising against the Chinese in Lhasa on 10 March 1959. The Chinese retaliated with ruthless force. On 11 March 1959, the Tibetan government legally withdrew from the Seventeen-Point Agreement, citing multiple violations, and reaffirmed its independence from China. On 17 March 1959, fearing death, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa to seek political asylum in India.^[59] Thousands of Tibetan refugees followed and crossed over to India. While Nehru was lobbying for a permanent security council seat for the PRC,^[60] Mao was preparing for a war to teach India a lesson for its perceived support of Tibet, leading to the 1962 Indo-China war.

US Role in Support of Tibet

The US only explored the possibility of a US-Tibet relationship after the communist takeover of China in 1949 and its open support for North Korea in the Korean War in 1950.^[61] In September 1951, the US offered financial support to the Dalai Lama, his family, and a retinue of approximately 100 individuals.^[62] The CIA subsequently helped the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother, Thubten Norbu, escape to the US.^[63] Until 1956, US assistance to Tibet was insignificant;^[64] however, a series of revolts in Kham and Amdo and the formation of the Tibetan voluntary resistance army led US to take a more active role, such as training Tibetans in paradrop and intelligence operations.^[65] After 1959, the CIA expanded its operations to include sending and airdropping military equipment to arm the resistance.^[66] These efforts, however, were inadequate for the growing number of fighters^[67] and often compromised their positions, enabling Chinese aerial bombardments that killed many.^[68] The failure of the airdrops, combined with India's refusal to support US plans, forced the CIA to establish a guerrilla base in Nepal’s Mustang region, with a capacity of 1,000 trainees.^[69] Apart from a few cross-border raids, the extreme terrain, logistical challenges, limited mobility, reliance on ex-monks as cadres, and shifting external support also limited this force to intelligence gathering rather than large-scale operations.

Chinese backstabbing and the launch of the 1962 war forced India to become more receptive to the earlier US offer of active support for Tibetan guerrillas, in coordination with Indian Army operations.^[70] For the first time, Indian soil was used by the CIA to train Tibetan operatives in small teams, survival skills, and radio craft for cross-border covert operations. The CIA also conducted U-2 reconnaissance flights over Tibet and Xinjiang, one of which—over the Lop Nur military base—provided critical intelligence three weeks ahead of China’s first nuclear test on 16 October 1964.^[71]

US support for the Tibetan cause at the UN had little to cheer about, except for establishing an unofficial Tibetan embassy in New York, helping Tibetans raise their cause at the UN, and lobbying with other countries. In 1959, Malaysia, Ireland, and the UK sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution highlighting the denial of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Tibet.^[72] In 1961, another resolution called for the “cessation of practices depriving the Tibetans of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination.”^[73] In 1965, for the first time, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri supported another UN resolution on Tibet deploring the human rights violations.^[74]

From 1966 onwards, changing geopolitical dynamics led to the slow demise of the Tibetan cause. The death of three Tibetan-friendly politicians—President Kennedy in the US and Indian Prime Ministers Nehru and Shastri—slowed US-India cooperation. Meanwhile, Mao’s Cultural Revolution led to the massacre and imprisonment of thousands of Tibetans and the destruction of scriptures and priceless art. With Prime Minister Indira Gandhi courting the USSR and the election of President Nixon in 1969, who prioritised Sino-US rapprochement, Indo-US relations reached a low point.^[75] The US cut support for Mustang and disbanded the Tibetan force in 1969, finally abandoning the Tibetan cause in 1971, and accepted the One-China policy as part of a strategic shift to counterbalance Soviet influence.

Dalai Lama’s Peace Efforts and Contours of Tibetan and Chinese Strategy

Reduced global support for the Tibetan issue in the 1970s compelled the Dalai Lama to turn inward, focusing on preserving Tibetan identity by establishing social, religious, and educational institutions to promote Tibetan arts, culture, science, and traditions, while improving refugee settlements across India.^[76] After 1979, likely as part of efforts to modernise China’s economy and rebuild its global image to attract investment, Deng Xiaoping initiated limited economic and political reforms. The same year, he met Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother. He proposed that "except for independence, all other issues can be discussed," thereby opening direct contact between Dharamshala and Beijing.^[77] A Working Committee under the moderate CPC leader Hu Yaobang was also formed to initiate reforms. Between 1979 and 1985, the Dalai Lama sent four fact-finding delegations to Tibet to assess conditions first-hand and responded positively by adopting the moderate ‘Middle-Way Approach,’ seeking genuine autonomy rather than full independence.

By the mid-1980s, however, internal CPC divisions and the rise of hardliners slowed reforms in Tibet, prompting the Dalai Lama to redirect his efforts once again outward. He tried to democratically persuade reluctant foreign governments by mobilising popular support in these states, focusing on human rights, cultural, and environmental issues in Tibet, rather than independence. After largely remaining in India until 1985, he travelled extensively over the next 14 years to build political support.^[78] While addressing the US Congress in September 1987, the Dalai Lama presented a ‘five-point peace plan’ followed by the ‘Strasbourg Proposal’ to the European Parliament a year later^[79] to declare Tibet as a demilitarised “Zone of Peace,”. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for his continued efforts towards peace and commitment to nonviolence, elevating him from a regional spiritual leader to a global moral authority in the league of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.

This sudden support from Western governments enabled the Tibetan leadership to make significant inroads into parliaments worldwide. Influential politicians, such as Nancy Pelosi, ensured bipartisan backing for the Tibetan cause, leading the US Congress to pass 20 resolutions between 1987 and 1997. Meanwhile, the European Parliament passed 12 resolutions during the same period. President George H. W. Bush, in 1991, became the first U.S. president to meet with the Dalai Lama, while President Bill Clinton met with the Dalai Lama several times in informal drop-in meetings.^[80] All these meetings were deliberately kept low-key and informal as China’s importance as a trading partner grew post-Cold War. While economic reforms continued, the PRC abandoned its brief flirtation with political liberalisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mainly due to fears of national disintegration after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests, the 1987–89 Lhasa protests, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Deteriorating Sino-Tibetan relations, along with Chinese interference in the reincarnation of the 11th Panchen Lama in May 1995, compelled Dharamshala to adopt alternative strategies. The rise of many international grassroots organisations, such as ‘Students for a Free Tibet' and ‘International Campaign for Tibet', as well as the increasing number of newly converted Western Buddhists, including actor Richard Gere, and the Tibetan Freedom Concerts by the Beastie Boys band in multiple US cities, can be seen in this context.^[81] Migrant Tibetans, along with advocacy groups, made it almost impossible for any senior Chinese leader to visit any major Western capital without encountering intense street protests.^[82]

The US administration continued to view its relationship with China primarily through an economic prism—supporting China's entry into the WTO in 2001, while appeasing congressional Tibet supporters by enacting the Tibetan Policy Act (TPA) of 2002. Although not contrary to the One-China policy, the statute outlined several principles regarding human rights, religious freedom, political prisoners, and economic development projects in Tibet, including the designation of a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, the establishment of a US Consulate in Lhasa, and the resumption of talks with the Dalai Lama. In late 2002, Beijing relented again to talks, presumably under Western pressure, and to organise the hassle-free 2008 Olympic Games. Knowing fully well about Chinese duplicity, a lack of alternatives forced Dharamshala to agree to talk, even at the cost of alienating its constituencies by accepting Beijing’s demand to tone down international protests. Dharamshala frittered away its strongest bargaining position during the years preceding the Beijing Olympics, while China continued to employ the tactic of appearing conciliatory whenever cornered, making no actual concessions.

In March 2008, on the anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959, peaceful protests in Tibet turned violent due to Chinese heavy-handedness. According to independent human rights organisations, a total of 220 deaths, 5,600 arrests, 1,294 injuries, 290 sentences, and over 1,000 disappearances occurred in the Chinese crackdown.^[83] Unlike protests elsewhere in the world, which were easy to dismiss, protests within all three regions of greater Tibet could not be brushed aside by the PRC, and provided huge impetus to the Tibetan cause globally. The US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning China’s actions and expressing support for Tibet. Meanwhile, several Western leaders decided not to participate in the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, demonstrating the willingness of Western governments to take a stance. However, the Dalai Lama neither called for a boycott nor any sanctions against China, albeit fully supporting the Olympics.^[84] In January 2010, China unilaterally ended the ten rounds of dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. No communication has occurred between the two sides since then.

With the renunciation of politics and the delegation of his political authority to elected leaders in 2011, the democratisation of the Tibetan political system commenced, leading to the election of two successive non-monk, western-educated politicians as the heads of the Tibetan government-in-exile (Sikyong). While political transfer was easier, the Dalai Lama’s moral authority, global stature, charisma, and reverence among the common Tibetans would not be easily replaced. Modern information technologies have been a boon to establishing direct communication between Tibetans in Tibet and the exiles, despite Chinese firewalls^[85]. The new political dispensation at Dharmshala, unencumbered by the moral baggage of the earlier religious leadership, needs to explore the full spectrum of modern nonviolent tools, including tactics of dispersion (e.g., strikes, boycotts, economic and social non-cooperation), and impose a cost on Beijing’s delaying strategy. Contrary to democratic nations like India, having tenure-based policies with no comparable patience spread across decades or centuries, China can wait strategically and improvise tactically until the ‘Time is Ripe’ or favourable to them. Nothing else can explain the Chinese delaying tactics aimed at tiring out the Tibetans, as they are well aware that the Dalai Lama is already 90, and it would be challenging to match his stature and influence for any of his successors.

What After the Dalai Lama?

The Dalai Lama has been the single most influential figure around whom the entire Tibetan political freedom movement and quest for cultural preservation have been woven, and his demise will create a leadership vacuum. Recent confirmation by the Dalai Lama of his reincarnation, along with his charitable foundation, Gaden Phodrang, being designated as the sole authority to identify his successor, appears to be aimed at clarifying the succession process while exposing the Chinese plan to intervene in the affair. In 2007, the PRC officially made clear that it intends to select the next Dalai Lama itself.^[86]  The 2020 US Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TSPA) was primarily aimed at addressing the issue of the succession of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including the Dalai Lama, and reaffirmed that this decision should be made within the Tibetan Buddhist community, without any interference from the Chinese government. The TSPA also imposes sanctions on Chinese officials who engage in said interferences.^[87]  China may also seek to exploit the leadership vacuum during the long gestation period of almost 20 years between the death of the current Dalai Lama and the training and attaining maturity by the new incumbent, by exerting even more control over Tibetan religious institutions.

Being also a spiritual figure for millions of Buddhists around the world, his death may result in greater international solidarity and support for Tibet, particularly from Buddhist communities. China may try to fabricate a narrative that the Tibetan issue stands resolved with the demise of the Dalai Lama. Perhaps to preempt this, the Dalai Lama hinted in 2011 at the possibility of an emanation rather than reincarnation as his successor, a traditional Buddhist practice. The key difference is that for reincarnation to occur, the former self must leave the human body, while the emanation allows for concurrency in which the ‘old’ self and ‘new’ self can exist side by side. Perhaps the overlapping existence of a predecessor and successor will eliminate the uncertainty and anxiety that would otherwise occur with the passing of a Dalai Lama.^[88]

Unfortunately, the British obsession with containing Imperial Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries was carried forward by the US in the 20th century, resulting in the Cold War US rivalry with the USSR and later with Russia. The biggest beneficiary of this Western Russophobia has been China. Today, China is the only one of the three 19th-century imperial empires (Britain, Russia, and China) that remains alive and thriving. While all the former Western colonies in Asia and Africa gained independence in the 20th century, China continues to hold on to its imperial occupation of historically distinct ethnic nationalities, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria.

To assuage the ethnic tensions, the early Republic of China (1912-1949) propagated a symbolic principle of ‘Five Races Under One Union’, emphasising the unity of the five major ethnic groups in China—Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui (Muslim), and Tibetan people—while Communist China (1949 onwards) enlarged the list and talked about the equality of all 56 ethnic groups in China but it followed more unitary and assimilatory policies called “Community of the Chinese Nation”.^[89] The reality is that, barring the provincial and some low-level appointments, there have been very few members from the minority communities in any of the higher decision-making bodies of the CCP in the last 76 years of communist rule. All 24 members of the current Politburo are Han Chinese, and the Standing Committee of the Politburo has been entirely comprised of Han Chinese since the 1990s.

China continues to use force to suppress Tibetan nationalism and resistance. Demographic shifts, including Han migration and the removal of outer Tibet from the TAR, have altered Tibet's outlook. In November 2023, China officially renamed Tibet to Xizang. Massive indoctrination campaigns target Tibetans, brainwashing youth through boarding schools and replacing Tibetan with Mandarin Chinese as the language of tuition.^[90] Relocation of almost two million Tibetans in the last 20 years are the measures aimed at destroying the Tibetan culture and its unique identity.

The communist regime, which does not believe in any religion or the concept of rebirth, wants to have authority over the appointment of Tibetan Buddhist leaders and the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama,^[91] Sinicisation of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Yunnan appears to be complete, and a similar fate awaits Tibet and Xinjiang unless action is taken in the next one or two decades.^[92]

Likely Future Scenarios

Three potential scenarios may arise concerning Tibet. The first involves China granting Tibet complete independence. This highly extreme scenario could only materialise if significant internal reforms occur, such as a transition to a democratic multi-party system or a collapse of the Chinese communist regime, akin to that of the USSR. However, the prospects of such a regime's collapse remains unlikely due to the following:

Military Dynamics: China's military modernisation, its firm control of Tibet through a strong military presence, and its regional assertiveness—particularly in the South China Sea and Taiwan—present complex challenges that differ from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War dynamics.

Economic Interdependence: China's significant role in global supply chains means that aggressive economic sanctions could have widespread repercussions, potentially harming US interests and the global economy.

Diplomatic Clout: Unlike the isolated USSR, China has established robust diplomatic and economic relationships worldwide, including with Europe, forcing the US to navigate a more intricate geopolitical landscape.

Chinese Strategies to Avoid Mistakes of the USSR: ^[93] China realised the pitfalls of the Soviet Union's simultaneous pursuit of political openness (glasnost) and economic restructuring (perestroika), and adopted a model of economic reform without political liberalisation, allowing for market-oriented changes under the firm control of the Communist Party. Unlike the Soviet Union's diminishing ideological commitment, the PRC has ensured the dominance of the party's narrative in all aspects of public life. Unlike the Soviet Union's military and economic overextension in blind competition with the US, China has prioritised internal development and avoided unsustainable external commitments and rivalries.

The second scenario may be the United Nations recognising Tibet's historically independent status and supporting its right to self-determination. However, China's veto power in the UN Security Council and limited support from other countries, due to China's economic might, are likely to block any such resolution.  In the absence of UN support, the possibility of the US and the European Union, along with other friendly countries, recognising Tibet’s independence on the lines of Kosovo also remains slim, due to the close interdependence of global economies on China, Chinese military might, and the delicate balance of Sino-US relations.^[94]

Therefore, the third scenario, namely autonomy for Tibet within China, is the most plausible, at least in the near term. The Dalai Lama’s middle path approach seems to have been arrived at based on the above assessment. However, over the last two decades, Tibet’s struggle for genuine autonomy within the Chinese system has also been overshadowed, primarily by China's increasing geopolitical strength, driven by its expanding economy and continued global ambivalence regarding the Tibetan cause. Exploiting the situation, Beijing has hardened its stance and suspended the talks for the last 15 years, the longest gap since the negotiations began in 1979.

In the current scenario, the non-violent Tibetan David is not in a position to defeat the Goliath communist regime without the support of international actors, especially countries like the United States, India, or the EU. The passing of the Resolve Tibet Act June 2024 has, for the first time, brought three critical issues to international attention: (i) laying down a statutory definition of historical Tibet encompassing not only the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) but also Tibetan areas within the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan; (ii) tackling Chinese disinformation about Tibet’s history, culture, people, and institutions, including Chinese propaganda of Tibet being part of China since antiquity; and (iii) emphasising the right to self-determination under international law.

The US and the international community must use a combination of the following diplomatic, economic, and soft-power tools to encourage China to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama:

Diplomatic Pressure and Human Rights Advocacy: The US and other nations, directly or through multilateral organisations like the UN and EU, can use diplomatic channels or pass resolutions urging China to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama. The UN Human Rights Council and other Global human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, can continue global scrutiny of China’s human rights abuses in Tibet and push the PRC to respect the rights of Tibetans. Governments can collaborate with Tibetan NGOs and advocacy groups to raise awareness of Tibet’s plight.

Economic Leverage and Trade Relations: China is deeply integrated into the global economy, and its trade relationships with key countries, including the US, the EU, Japan, and India, are crucial to its economic growth. While economic sanctions or punitive measures are unlikely to force China to negotiate, these countries can use their economic leverage in a more nuanced way, such as tying Tibetan human rights issues to trade or offering conditional trade deals or investments, encouraging China to enter into dialogue as part of broader diplomatic negotiations.

Support for the Dalai Lama’s Message of Peace:  Supporting the Dalai Lama’s message of peace and nonviolence can make it more difficult for China to justify rejecting talks outright. High-profile meetings between international leaders and the Dalai Lama have historically drawn condemnation from China; however, these meetings also signal to Beijing that there is global support for Tibetan rights and self-determination. Continued engagement with the Dalai Lama, particularly in discussions on religious freedom, human rights, and cultural preservation, can help keep the issue on the global agenda.

International Support for Tibetan Cultural Rights: Many countries, including the US, the EU, and Japan, have passed resolutions and made statements advocating for cultural and religious autonomy of Tibet. By reinforcing the idea that Tibetans should have the freedom to practice their religion, speak their language, and preserve their cultural heritage, these countries can signal to China that respecting Tibetan culture and religious practices is important not only for Tibetans but also for global stability and the reputation of the Chinese state.

Role of India: Besides supporting Tibetan independence, India has acted as a responsible and honourable neighbour, with its most notable contribution being the preservation of Tibetan culture, heritage, religion & language. Since 1959, India has hosted the 14th Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala. Tibetan monasteries, schools, and cultural institutions have thrived in India, preserving Tibetan traditions. India has facilitated the establishment of Tibetan schools and educational institutions, helping to maintain their cultural identity. India has provided humanitarian assistance to lakhs of Tibetan refugees, including housing, healthcare, and employment opportunities. Tibetan refugees enjoy legal rights and protections in India, enabling them to live and work without fear of persecution. While these efforts have supported the exiled community, they have not improved conditions within Tibet itself. Given that India's security is directly affected by unrest in Tibet and an assertive China, India must go further. It could support the measures and recommended actions by the US and other international communities, while also leveraging its relationship and regional cooperation mechanism to encourage China to resume the talks and create a conducive environment in Tibet for the early return of the Dalai Lama and lakhs of refugees staying all across the world.

Conclusion

Historically, no ethnic Chinese empire ruled Tibet or explicitly claimed it as part of China, aside from the symbolic "Middle Kingdom" notion of tributary states—a framework that also included Korea, Japan, Burma, and other Southeast Asian nations. Both Tibet and China remained isolated from the world and confined within their landmasses until the arrival of one of the greatest ethnic Chinese dynasties, the Tangs, and the ‘three great Tsenpo Kings’ of Tibet, during a common period between the 7th and 8th centuries CE. Although China first unified under the Qin dynasty in the 3rd century BCE, there was little political contact with Tibet until a matrimonial alliance between the Tang and Tsenpos, when both states were of equal stature. Only two foreign dynasties—the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing—ruled both China and Tibet. China now bases its sovereignty claims on these periods, disregarding the imperial and foreign nature of those regimes.

Tibet historically functioned as a sovereign state, barring the last three centuries, during which a unique relationship developed between the Buddhist Manchu rulers of China and Tibet. During this period, Tibet was neither sovereign in an orthodox sense nor an integral part of China. This relationship can be best described as ‘Patron & Priest’, where Tibet had never lost its autonomy to govern its internal affairs, and most of the time, the Manchus did not interfere in Tibet's internal affairs, except when called upon. Culturally and linguistically, Tibet and China share little in common. The Tibetan language belongs to the Tibeto-Burman branch, with its own script and strong Sanskrit influences. Chinese, in contrast, is Sinitic, using ideograms without an alphabet.

Buddhism reached China from India via the Kushan Empire in the 1st century CE and arrived in Tibet in the 7th century. Tibetan Buddhism blends Mahayana, Tantric Buddhism, and indigenous Bon traditions, while Chinese Buddhism incorporates elements of Taoism and Confucianism. The idea of spiritual sovereignty, like Europe’s ‘Papal States’ (756–1870), offers a useful parallel to Tibet’s historical status.

The Chinese narrative of historical sovereignty over Tibet is endless. With the Chinese facade of ‘peaceful rise’ now being exposed and the world waking up to the Chinese nefarious designs and imperial mindset, the time has come to call out the Chinese propaganda on Tibet. Amid ongoing demographic aggression in the region, India and the US—world’s oldest and largest democracies—are key stakeholders in resolving the Tibetan issue. Despite past missteps, India has played a crucial role in preserving Tibetan culture and supporting the Tibetan refugee community. However, the moment has arrived to move beyond cultural symbolism and work towards building international consensus. This includes pressing China to negotiate with the Dalai Lama for genuine autonomy—if not full independence—and enabling the return of Tibetan refugees. India’s recent firm stance on the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation marks a positive step in this direction.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

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Endnotes

• International Affairs
• China
• 14th dalai lama
• annexation of tibet
• chinese occupation of tibet
• chinese rule over tibet
• dalai lama escape
• dalai lama reincarnation
• exile of dalai lama
• tibet independence
• tibet india relations

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